This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000945 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2013 
TAGS: MOPS MCAP PTER PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL ARMY CLAIMS HEARTS-AND-MINDS CAMPAIGN 
SUCCEEDING IN INSURGENTS' HEARTLAND 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 0860 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 0469 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 0480 
     ¶D. KATHMANDU 0657 
     ¶E. KATHMANDU 0670 
 
Classified By: CDA ROBERT K. BOGGS.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Over the past month, the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has 
been conducting a series of one-week civil affairs programs 
in 25 Maoist-affected districts in the east and mid-west of 
the country.  While most of the programs so far feature 
mobile medical clinics, in some areas the RNA has carried out 
limited infrastructure development as well.  Local civilian 
government authorities are participating in the programs, 
according to the RNA.  The RNA has also begun conducting its 
own "cultural" programs, focusing on themes of peace and 
development, to counter the Maoists' extensive rural 
propaganda network.  The purpose of the campaign, says the 
RNA's Director of Military Intelligence, is to reassert a 
government presence in areas where civil authority has been 
eroded by the Maoist presence.  The RNA reports that the 
programs have so far been well received by the local 
population--and even, in some areas, by local Maoist 
cadres--and hopes to expand them to cover all 75 districts. 
The apparent success may have been one factor underlying the 
Maoist negotiators' May 9 demand that the RNA not venture 
farther than 5 km from their bases.  End summary. 
 
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CEASEFIRE BRINGS RENEWED HEARTS-AND-MINDS PUSH 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Since the January 29 announcement of a ceasefire 
between the Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents, 
the Maoists have mounted a vigorous campaign to recapture 
some of the initial public good will and support they 
squandered by breaking off negotiations and increasing 
violence in late 2001.  Reports from the field--including 
from emboffs who have traveled recently to outlying districts 
(Refs B-E)--indicate that the Maoists are attempting to 
rebuild their diminished popular support by holding 
round-table meetings with local mainstream party officials, 
staging "cultural" programs that feature revolutionary 
song-and-dance spectacles, helping local farmers with the 
harvest and even undertaking some minor development work, 
such as repairing roads and footpaths.  While the Maoists are 
actively and openly campaigning for hearts and minds in areas 
where they have an established presence, they reportedly are 
denying the same freedom of movement to representatives of 
mainstream political parties and to GON officials.  According 
to an official at the Ministry of Local Development, in 
several districts the Maoists continue to interdict any and 
all local government activities from taking place outside of 
the district headquarters (septel). 
 
¶3.  (C) According to Brig. Gen. Dilip Rayamajhi, Director of 
Military Intelligence (DMI), the leadership in the Royal 
Nepal Army (RNA) saw the ceasefire as an opportunity for a 
civil affairs campaign to regain public confidence in the 
GON's ability to provide services in Maoist-affected areas. 
Despite the ceasefire, he noted, GON officials are 
constrained by the lack of security and fiscal resources from 
restoring disrupted services.  In the initial phases of the 
program, the RNA can fill this gap by (a) providing scarce 
manpower and even scarcer materials and (b) by providing a 
security shield.  Rayamajhi said the RNA developed the plan 
internally and then disseminated it to local commanders, 
ordering them to coordinate its operation with local civilian 
government authorities.  (Note:  He said that a copy of the 
plan has been forwarded to the National Planning Commission, 
with no response to date.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The campaign, which began in April, has so far been 
conducted in communities in 25 districts (15 in the east and 
10 in the Maoist heartland in the mid-west).  Company-sized 
units are deployed into target communities for one week at a 
time.  According to Rayamajhi, the local commander chooses 
the community in consultation with local government 
authorities, who accompany the RNA unit on its one-week 
expedition to the field. So far, the programs have generally 
focused on providing medical care, but other services, such 
as infrastructure development or distribution of educational 
materials, have also been performed.  Col. Victor Rana of the 
Department of Military Operations provided the following 
break-down of services given under the program so far: 
--Medical assistance to 25,103 patients; 
--Medical evacuation of 7 patients; 
--One family planning camp established; 
--Distribution of educational/recreational materials to 28 
schools; 
--Distribution of food to 25 schools; 
--Repair of 6 educational facilities; 
--Distribution of construction materials to 6 communities; 
--Seeds distributed to 1,586 families; 
--Veterinary care provided to 5,583 animals; 
--Citizenship services provided in 20 districts (through the 
Chief District Officer); 
--15 "Cultural" programs conducted; 
--Two water pipes repaired; 
--One bridge built; 
--One small dam built. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
RESOURCES, WORK SHARED WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (C) The RNA has no special budget to conduct these 
programs, Rayamajhi said, but is using existing resources, 
supplies and manpower, supplemented by donations from the 
local business community, NGOs, and/or occasional materials 
or funding from the local government.  Rayamajhi depicted the 
effort as a joint endeavor between the military and the 
civilian authorities, stressing that district health posts 
contribute medicines and doctors to the mobile medical 
clinics, and that Local Development Officers and Chief 
District Officers have assisted in other programs.  The 
civilian police and Armed Police Force also participate.  The 
RNA hires members of the local community to provide the labor 
for their infrastructure development programs.  In some 
districts, such as Baitadi and Darchula, Maoist cadres have 
also turned out to assist in the RNA-sponsored development 
work, while in other locations insurgents have turned up as 
patients at the medical clinics.  Rayamajhi said the RNA 
accepts all comers to these projects--even Maoists.  Rana 
said the Maoists have not prevented the RNA from conducting 
programs in any area.  (Note:  According to local news 
reports, however, in some locations, like the eastern 
district of Panchthaar, the Maoists have prevented local 
residents from participating.  End note.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  As a companion piece to its civil affairs 
operation, the RNA has also begun launching its own 
"cultural" programs to counter the Maoists' propaganda 
campaign.  Featuring song and dance, the material is 
apolitical, Rayamajhi said, focusing primarily on the themes 
of "peace and development."  He reported an enthusiastic 
local response to the programs. 
 
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BENEFITS/DISADVANTAGES 
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¶7.  (C) Rana said the RNA hopes eventually to expand its 
civil affairs programs to all 75 districts.  He cited 
positive media coverage and high local attendance 
rates--despite Maoist threats--as key measures of the 
successs of the campaign.  The program has enhanced good 
relations between the security forces and their civilian 
counterparts at the local level, improved the Army's image, 
and promoted popular confidence in the GON's ability to 
provide service and security, while increasing the RNA's 
ability to gather intelligence in certain areas.  The major 
drawback, in Rayamajhi's view, is the GON's inability to 
continue the programs.  At the conclusion of each one-week 
program, the local development officials typically retire to 
the relative safety of the district headquarters, unable and 
unwilling to venture into Maoist-dominated territory without 
the security provided by the RNA, leaving the communities to 
lapse back into neglect and isolation. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C) The ceasefire offers an opportunity, at least 
temporarily, for the GON to resume basic services in areas 
long neglected as a result of the insurgency.  In some areas, 
however, the Maoists continue to deny GON officials entry and 
to threaten and intimidate them (septel), making it virtually 
impossible to re-establish a civilian goverment presence. 
The effectiveness of the program in countering the Maoists' 
appeal may be indicated by local guerrillas warning 
(unsuccessfully) the roving medical teams away from some 
villages and by the persistent efforts of Maoist negotiators 
to gain GON agreement to restrict the movement of army 
personnel in the countryside (Ref A).  While some RNA 
officers in the past have expressed disdain for the GON's 
inability to provide services in outlying areas, Rayamajhi 
and Rana seemed genuinely sympathetic to the financial, 
security and staffing constraints their civilian counterparts 
face in the field.  In the short term, we see little 
likelihood that either civilian staffing or budgets will be 
beefed up as long as security--and the outcome of the peace 
talks--remain uncertain.  The RNA's civil affairs campaign 
offers no permanent solution, but as long as it continues to 
incorporate elements of the civilian government, it seems a 
good interim first step. 
BOGGS