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Viewing cable 03HARARE939, POOR 2003 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03HARARE939 2003-05-15 10:15 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KHANDAGLE, BORNS, HALMRAST-SANCHEZ 
AFR FOR COPSON, FORT, BAKER, MACNAIRN 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR, DELISI 
PRETORIA FOR DIJKERMAN, HELM, DISKIN 
NAIROBI FOR DEPREZ, RILEY, HALE 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS 
MASERU FOR BELLEGARDE 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
ROME FOR FODAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR EFIN PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  POOR 2003 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
PROSPECTS MEAN CONTINUED FOOD INSECURITY IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  A USAID BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY CONFLICT AND 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (DCHA) PRELIMINARY RAPID 
ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR THE CURRENT HARVEST 
CONCLUDED THAT PARTS OF ZIMBABWE ONCE AGAIN FACE 
FAILED HARVESTS AND LIMITED MARKET ACCESS TO FOOD 
DUE TO A COMBINATION OF POOR RAINFALL, COMMERCIAL 
FARM CLOSURES, LACK OF INPUTS, AND COUNTER 
PRODUCTIVE FOOD MARKETING POLICIES.  ADDITIONALLY, 
THE GMB IS EXPECTED TO HAVE LESS CAPACITY (FOREX) 
TO IMPORT FOOD OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. 
 
2.  WHILE IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT NATIONAL AGGREGATE 
PRODUCTION WILL BE MARKEDLY HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR, 
IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE FOOD SECURITY SITUATION 
WILL IMPROVE FOR MANY HOUSEHOLDS, PARTICULARLY IN 
THE SOUTH WHERE MUCH OF THE CEREAL CROP HAS BEEN A 
COMPLETE WRITE-OFF.  MISGUIDED GOZ MARKET POLICIES 
CONTINUE TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ACCESS MAIZE AND 
WHEAT IN MARKETS, AFFECTING NEARLY EVERYONE IN THE 
COUNTRY.  GENERAL ECONOMIC DECLINE, POLITICAL 
TUMULT AND HIV/AIDS ALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DIFFICULT 
FOOD SECURITY SITUATION. DIFFERING CROP FORECASTS 
HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF 
ZIMBABWE, THE FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM NETWORK 
AND THE COMMERCIAL RARMERS UNION, RANGING FROM 
800,000 MT TO 1.5 MILLION MT. ALTHOUGH MORE 
DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT RESULTS ARE STILL SEVERAL 
WEEKS AWAY [SEE MISSION COMMENT, PARA 16.], 
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO POST AT THIS POINT 
SUGGESTS THAT MANY COMMUNAL FARMERS WILL REMAIN 
DEPENDENT ON FOOD AID FOR MUCH OF 2003.  IT IS NOT 
POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE A BINDING ESTIMATE OF NEED 
UNTIL FINAL HARVEST FIGURES BECOME AVAILABLE. 
 
3.  IN MOST AREAS, FOOD AID NEEDS WILL BE REDUCED 
AS A RESULT OF THE MAY/JUNE HARVEST.  DURING THIS 
TIME, FOCUS SHOULD BE ON IMPROVED TARGETING OF FOOD 
AID, INCLUDING FOOD-FOR-WORK, TO REACH THE MOST 
VULUNERABLE MORE EFFECTIVELY.  NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE 
PRIORITIES INCLUDE SEEDS AND OTHER INPUTS FOR 
COMMUNAL FARMERS, AND SUPPORT FOR U.N. HUMANITARIAN 
COORDINATION AND MONITORING.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
OVERVIEW OF ASSESSMENT MISSION 
------------------------------ 
 
4. AS PART OF A LARGER USAID REGIONAL ASSESSMENT TO 
DETERMINE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE NEEDS FOR 2003/04, 
TWO TEAMS COMPOSED OF OFFICERS FROM THE OFFICES OF 
FOOD FOR PEACE (FFP) AND U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE (OFDA) AND A FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
(FEWSNET) ADVISOR UNDERTOOK A QUALITATIVE FOOD 
SECURITY ASSESSMENT THROUGHOUT ZIMBABWE MARCH 17 TO 
28.  TEAMS INTERVIEWED MORE THAN 60 FARMER 
HOUSEHOLDS IN EIGHT PROVINCES AS WELL AS UN, NGO 
AND GOZ REPRESENTATIVES.  HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEWS 
FOCUSED ON COMMUNAL AREAS, WITH ONLY A HANDFUL OF 
INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN RESETTLED FARMING AREAS. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PROSPECTS FOR THIS YEAR'S HARVEST 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.  THE MAJORITY OF FARMERS INTERVIEWED ESTIMATED 
THAT THIS YEAR'S HARVEST WOULD BE SOMEWHAT BETTER 
THAN LAST YEAR'S, WITH PRODUCTION COVERING ZERO TO 
SIX MONTHS' NEEDS.  OBSERVATIONS OF STANDING CROPS 
IN THE FIELD CONFIRMED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF 
HOUSEHOLDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE MATABELELAND 
PROVINCES AND THE SOUTHERN PARTS OF MIDLANDS AND 
MASVINGO PROVINCES, WOULD REALIZE LITTLE OR NO 
PRODUCTION THIS YEAR. 
 
6.  IN THE GENERALLY MORE PRODUCTIVE PROVINCES OF 
MASHONALAND (EAST, CENTRAL AND WEST) AND 
MANICALAND, LATE RAINS IMPROVED PRODUCTION 
PROSPECTS.  TOTAL AREAS PLANTED, HOWEVER, HAVE 
DECLINED FROM PRIOR HISTORICAL AVERAGES, AND NGOS 
POINTED OUT NUMEROUS PREVIOUSLY PRODUCTIVE FIELDS 
LYING IDLE. WHILE THIS SURVEY DID NOT INCLUDE FARMS 
CONFISCATED UNDER THE FAST-TRACK LAND 
REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAM, SOURCES INTERVIEWED 
INDICATED THAT PRODUCTION LEVELS ON THESE FARMS, 
WHICH PREVIOUSLY ACCOUNTED FOR BETWEEN 25 TO 45 
PERCENT OF TOTAL MAIZE PRODUCTION -- MUCH FOR ON- 
FARM CONSUMPTION AND STOCK FEED-- WOULD BE POOR. 
 
7.  OVERALL, AGGREGATE NATIONAL MAIZE PRODUCTION IS 
EXPECTED TO BE HIGHER THAN LAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH WELL 
BELOW NATIONAL CONSUMPTION NEEDS.  EARLY 
INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE HARVEST WILL BE IN THE 
NEIGHBORHOOD OF ONE MILLION MT OR MORE.  IF 
CORRECT, THIS ESTIMATE WOULD BE ROUGHLY 60 PERCENT 
OF NATIONAL CONSUMPTION REQUIREMENTS, AND ABOUT 
HALF THE LEVEL OF 2000 (ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE 
ROUGHLY DOUBLE THE 2002 LEVEL). 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8.  WHILE MOST HOUSEHOLDS HAVE WEATHERED THE CRISIS 
UP TO NOW, AS ZIMBABWE ENTERS ITS THIRD CONSECUTIVE 
YEAR OF POOR HARVESTS, FOOD SHORTAGES AND ECONOMIC 
DECLINE, TEAMS ENCOUNTERED CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT 
COPING MECHANISMS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY DEPLETED. 
MANY HOUSEHOLDS, PRIOR TO RECEIVING FOOD AID, WERE 
RESORTING TO ADVERSE COPING MECHANISMS SUCH AS 
SELLING PRODUCTIVE ASSETS, CONSUMING UNHEALTHY 
FOODS, WITHDRAWING CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL AND 
PROSTITUTION. 
 
9.  MANY OF THE HOUSEHOLDS VISITED WERE 
CHARACTERIZED BY UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBERS OF ORPHANS, 
ABSENCE OF WORKING AGE MEN AND DISPROPORTIONATE 
NUMBERS OF WIDOWS, ELDERLY AND CHILD HEADS OF 
HOUSEHOLDS.  IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL 
DISINTEGRATION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY, FURTHER 
DEPLETION OF RURAL HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AND EROSION OF 
BASIC RURAL LIVELIHOODS COULD LEAD TO INCREASED 
MORTALITY AND REDUCED CAPACITY TO RECOVER IF AND 
WHEN CONDITIONS BECOME MORE FAVORABLE. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
PROJECTED EMERGENCY FOOD NEEDS IN 2003/04 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  UNDER THE 2002/03 EMERGENCY OPERATION (EMOP), 
WFP ESTIMATED THAT THE TOTAL POPULATION IN NEED OF 
FOOD AID WOULD PEAK AT 7.2 MILLION BY MARCH 2003 
AND THEN DROP OFF IN APRIL 2003 AS THE NEW HARVEST 
CAME IN.  WFP ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION LEVELS WERE 
CONSISTENTLY FAR LESS THAN PLANNED LEVELS DUE TO 
PIPELINE AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS.  NEVERTHELESS, 
WFP DISTRIBUTED 53,000 MT IN MARCH 2003 TO 4.6 
MILLION BENEFICIARIES (DISTRIBUTIONS THROUGH OTHER 
PIPELINES BROUGHT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES 
TO 5.7 MILLION).  DISTRIBUTION LEVELS ARE EXPECTED 
TO FALL BY ABOUT 60 PERCENT IN MAY AND JUNE 2003. 
WFP HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL USE THIS HARVEST 
PERIOD TO DEVELOP MORE REFINED TARGETING CRITERIA 
TO ENSURE THAT AID IS PROVIDED TO THOSE MOST IN 
NEED.  THIS SITUATION WILL REQUIRE RENEWED EMPHASIS 
ON MONITORING WFP AND OTHER NGO PROGRAM OPERATIONS 
TO ENSURE THAT MORE SPECIFIC TARGETING CRITERIA ARE 
PROPERLY ADHERED TO. 
 
11.  GIVEN THE COMBINATION OF POOR PRODUCTION, 
DISFUNCTIONAL FOOD MARKETS AND THE BROADER EFFECTS 
OF THE HIV/AIDS AND ECONOMIC CRISES, THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEANS REQUIRING FOOD AID BETWEEN 
JULY 2003 AND MARCH 2004 WILL BE SIGNIFICANT, 
ALTHOUGH AT THIS TIME THE NUMBER IS UNQUANTIFIABLE. 
SEVERE SHORTAGES OF FOOD IN LOCAL MARKETS REMAIN A 
MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE CRISIS.  AT THE CORE OF THE 
FOOD AVAILABILITY PROBLEM ARE GOZ POLICIES, 
INCLUDING THE GMB MONOPOLY ON MAIZE IMPORTS AND 
SALES AND UNREALISTICALLY LOW FIXED PRICES FOR 
STRATEGIC FOOD COMMODITIES SUCH AS MAIZE AND WHEAT. 
 
12.  WHILE GMB'S PERFORMANCE OVER THE PAST YEAR WAS 
AT BEST ERRATIC, IT NONETHELESS DID DELIVER A 
SUBSTANTIAL TONNAGE OF FOOD (APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE 
THE AMOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID) INTO THE 
MARKETS (BOTH THROUGH OFFICIAL SALES AND BLACK 
MARKET DIVERSIONS).  BUT GIVEN THE DIRE FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE POSITION IN WHICH THE GOZ NOW FINDS 
ITSELF, THE GMB IS EXPECTED TO HAVE LESS CAPACITY 
TO IMPORT FOOD OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS.  WHILE 
MAIZE PRODUCTION MAY IMPROVE THIS YEAR IN MORE 
PRODUCTIVE AREAS, HOUSEHOLDS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE 
WILLING TO SELL TO GMB AT CONTROLLED PRICES UNLESS 
COERCED.  THESE FACTORS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE 
MARKET MAIZE AND WHEAT SUPPLIES, MAKING IT 
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN BOTH URBAN 
AND RURAL AREAS TO ACCESS FOOD. 
 
13. AMONG THE MOST VULNERABLE, THE PLIGHT OF UP TO 
1.5 MILLION EX-COMMERCIAL FARM WORKERS AND THEIR 
FAMILY MEMBERS REMAINS A PRIORITY HUMANITARIAN 
CONCERN.  LACK OF ACCESS TO EX-COMMERCIAL FARMS 
REMAINS AN OBSTACLE TO CONDUCTING A CREDIBLE 
ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS. 
 
--------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
14.  FOR ZIMBABWE TO EMERGE FROM THE CURRENT FOOD 
SECURITY CRISIS, EMERGENCY FOOD AID IN 2003-04 
WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SERIOUS POLICY 
REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN FOR SALE IN 
LOCAL MARKETS AND ENSURE ACCESS TO INPUTS NEEDED TO 
INCREASE PLANTED AREAS.  THE FOLLOWING ARE DCHA 
TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
A.  PROVIDE TARGETED FOOD AID FOR THE PERIOD JULY 
2003 THROUGH MARCH 2004 FOR RURAL AREAS WHERE 
ASSETS HAVE BEEN DEPLETED AND CURRENT YEAR 
PRODUCTION PROSPECTS ARE POOR. 
 
B.  BEGIN A TRANSITION FROM GENERAL FOOD 
DISTRIBUTIONS TO MORE TARGETED DISTRIBUTION 
MECHANISMS INCLUDING FOOD-FOR-WORK. 
 
C.  EXPLORE WAYS TO PROVIDE FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR 
VULUNERABLE URBAN/PERI-URBAN HOUSEHOLDS THROUGH 
MARKET CHANNELS. 
 
D.  CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON THE PROVISION OF SEEDS FOR 
COMMUNAL FARMERS, AND SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN 
COORDINATION AND MONITORING OF DONOR FOOD 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 
E.  MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE GOZ TO PROVIDE ACCESS 
TO RESETTLED FARM AREAS SO THAT THE UNMET NEEDS OF 
EX-COMMERCIAL FARM WORKERS CAN BE MET BEFORE THEIR 
SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER. 
 
F.  MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE GOZ TO ENACT POLICY 
REFORMS THAT ALLOW FOOD MARKETS TO OPERATE 
EFFECTIVELY AND INCREASE MARKET AVAILABILITY OF 
FOOD. 
 
G.  DEVELOP A MEDIUM-TERM FOOD SECURITY RECOVERY 
STRATEGY FOR ZIMBABWE THAT PROMOTES CROP 
DIVERSIFICATION (MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF DROUGHT- 
TOLERANT CROPS/VARIETIES) AND IMPROVED WATER 
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES. 
--------------- 
MISSION COMMENT 
--------------- 
 
15.  IT MUST BE NOTED THAT ESTIMATES OF PROJECTED CROP 
HARVESTS AND SHORTFALLS ARE CURRENTLY A PRIME OBJECT OF 
SPECULATION IN HARARE.  FEWSNET HAS RELEASED ESTIMATES THAT 
PROJECT A MAIZE HARVEST OF APPROXIMATELY 1.3 MILLION MT.  IN 
SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEWS WITH USAID/HARARE STAFF, HOWEVER, 
FEWSNET SAID THAT THE FIGURE IS PROBABLY CLOSER TO 1.1 
MILLION MT, AS THEIR PREVIOUS (MARCH) ESTIMATES HAD NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF 
FAILED LATE-YEAR PLANTINGS.  (IN ADDITION, THE GOZ CLAIMS TO 
HAVE CONTRACTED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 225,000MT NOT YET 
DELIVERED.)  ON THE OTHER HAND, CURRENT NON-OFFICIAL 
GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES RANGE AS HIGH AS 1.5 MILLION MT; 
HOWEVER, THE CREDIBILITY OF THESE LATTER ESTIMATES SUFFERS 
SERIOUSLY DUE TO GOVERNMENT'S KNOWN DESIRE TO CLAIM SUCCESS 
IN ITS DISASTROUS LAND REDISTRIBUTION PROGRAM.  A MORE 
ACCURATE DETERMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION YIELDS AND 
ASSISTANCE NEEDS WILL BE POSSIBLE ONCE ON-GOING ASSESSMENTS 
ARE COMPLETED.  THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND CREDIBLE OF THESE IS 
THE JOINT WFP/FAO CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION 
(CFSAM) NOW UNDERWAY (WITH FEWSNET ASSISTANCE), WITH RESULTS 
EXPECTED BY LATE-MAY.  IN ADDITION, MULTIPLE U.N. AGENCIES, 
GOZ, NGOS, FEWSNET AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS ARE CURRENTLY 
COMPLETING THE LATEST UPDATE OF THE NATIONAL VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT (VAC), WITH RESULTS EXPECTED ALSO BY LATE-MAY. 
FINALLY, THE RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL NUTRITION AND EPI (CHILD 
IMMUNIZATION) SURVEY, COMPLETED BY UNICEF AND THE GOZ, ARE 
ALSO EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED SHORTLY.  HENCE, THE MISSION 
EXPECTS TO HAVE MORE CREDIBLE INFORMATION ON THE 
CURRENT/PROJECTED COUNTRY FOOD SECURITY SITUATION WITHIN THE 
NEXT FEW WEEKS.  WE WILL ADVISE WHEN RECEIVED.  SULLIVAN