This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  04-09-13 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS CE NO JA LTTE
SUBJECT:  Report re Jaffna security zones recommends 
mutual GSL-LTTE drawdowns and increased monitoring 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo-SA/INS 04/08/03 class e-mail 
-      (B) Colombo 593, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons:  1.5 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Minister Moragoda (pls protect) has 
provided us a copy of a long-awaited re the security 
zones in Jaffna.  The report, which was written by a 
retired Indian general, recommends that the GSL and 
Tigers agree to mutual drawdowns of their military 
positions.  In doing this, both sides would engage in 
confidence-building measures facilitated by increased 
monitoring.  While the report is fair-minded, the Tigers 
-- who seem to want to keep this issue alive for 
political reasons -- will probably balk at its 
recommendations.  (Note:  Also see DATT's Septel review 
of the report.)  END SUMMARY. 
 
============== 
Nambiar Report 
============== 
 
¶2.  (C) On April 7, Milinda Moragoda (Amcit -- pls 
protect), the Minister of Economic Reform and a key 
player on peace process issues, provided the Ambassador 
a (close-hold) copy of a long-awaited independent report 
on the "high security zones" in Jaffna District. 
Retired Indian General Satish Nambiar wrote the short, 
complex report, which was sent to Department in Ref A. 
Nambiar, who had been asked by the GSL to draw up the 
report, had visited Sri Lanka earlier this year for 
consultations and research on the controversial security 
zones issue.  (Note:  Our understanding is that the 
Indian government, while publicly taking a hands-off 
posture regarding the report, paid Nambiar's salary and 
expenses.)  According to Moragoda, the GSL continues to 
review the report.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) have not yet seen it, but are scheduled to 
receive a copy soon.  Nambiar is due to visit Sri Lanka 
in late April to discuss the report with the government 
and the LTTE. 
 
============================= 
Recommending Mutual Drawdowns 
============================= 
 
¶3.  (C) The report acknowledges the importance of 
assisting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 
returning to their home areas in Jaffna, including to 
sites within the security zones.  To facilitate this, 
the report's central conclusion is that the government 
and the LTTE should engage in carefully calibrated and 
mutual military drawdowns of their Jaffna-related 
military positions. (Note:  The military's security 
zones constitute approximately 18 percent of the land 
size of Jaffna.  The LTTE only has military posts in a 
sliver of Jaffna, but it has many cadre in Jaffna and a 
strong military presence just south in the Wanni area.) 
In making this recommendation, the report, in effect, 
rejects the LTTE's long-standing view that the 
government should unilaterally slash the size of its 
security zones, so that the IDPs can return home 
immediately.  (Note:  Per Ref B, about 270,000 IDPs have 
already returned to their homes in the north/east.  Over 
500,000 IDPs remain in the south.)  In light of the 
LTTE's strong stand on this issue, the report admits 
that agreement to the notion of mutual drawdowns will 
have to be achieved by the two sides within the context 
of the ongoing GSL-LTTE peace talks. 
 
¶4.  (C) If the LTTE agrees to (unspecified) drawdowns of 
its own forces and at least some of the confidence- 
building measures set out below, the report recommends 
that the Sri Lankan military move forward and consider 
drawdowns of its own positions in the following two 
stages: 
-- (A) The military would dismantle its "forward 
positions" in areas near "Muhamalai, Nagarkovil, and the 
promontories south of Chavakachcheri, along the beach 
road south of Jaffna and along the coastal areas." 
(Note:  The three areas named above are all in eastern 
Jaffna and close to the GSL-LTTE Northern Forward 
Defense Line, "FDL," on the Jaffna Isthmus.) 
 
-- (B) The security zones surrounding Palaly airbase, 
Kankesanturai ("KKS") harbor, and Point Pedro harbor 
would be "considered for reduction in size..." 
(Note:  The area around Palaly airbase and KKS harbor 
forms the largest of the security zones in Jaffna.  It 
is where the government's Security Force Headquarters in 
Jaffna is located.) 
==================== 
Increased Monitoring 
==================== 
 
¶5.  (C) In moving toward military drawdowns, the report 
recommends that both sides engage in confidence-building 
measures facilitated by increased international 
monitoring.  The report is not dispositive on what 
organization would do such monitoring.  It recommends, 
however, that the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM) assume the responsibility, as it is 
already in place monitoring the February 2002 ceasefire 
agreement.  In order to do this, Nambiar states that the 
SLMM should expand the size of its staff and be provided 
more resources.  If the SLMM was to assume more 
responsibility, consideration should be given to it 
reporting to a "joint commission" that could include 
"representatives from the major countries that agree to 
provide the additional observers/monitors, and from some 
of the major aid donors." 
 
¶6.  (C) The report outlines the following two major 
areas for the increased monitoring effort to focus on: 
 
-- (1) Long-range weaponry:  The report recommends that 
the two sides agree to place their long-range weaponry 
in "designated areas under international monitoring." 
If the LTTE objects to this, the group would be asked to 
allow the monitors to inspect the equipment where it is 
in place. 
 
-- (2) Challenge Inspections:  At the request of one of 
the sides, the monitors would inspect a site or sites 
controlled by the other side in order to ensure that all 
was in conformity with the ceasefire agreement. 
 
¶7.  (C) (((Note:  In recommending that monitors focus on 
these two areas, the report clearly is taking into 
account two great fears of the Sri Lankan military in 
Jaffna:  First, that the LTTE, in a sudden strike, would 
use its long-range guns positioned in the Wanni to 
devastate Palaly airbase.  Second, that without 
inspections, the military could miss a surge in LTTE 
troop concentrations potentially signaling the launch of 
a surprise attack.))) 
 
================== 
Re Key Road Artery 
================== 
 
¶8.  (C) In addition to the items reviewed above, the 
monitors would also be responsible for facilitating a 
confidence-building measure involving the use of the 
"A-9" road.  (Note:  This important road connecting 
Jaffna with the south reopened a year ago.  Due to the 
war, it had been closed for over a decade.)  Nambiar 
advocates that the Sri Lankan military be allowed to use 
the road, something that it is currently unable to do 
because a key stretch is within LTTE-controlled 
territory.  If the Tigers were amenable, the monitors 
would ensure that the military's vehicles would not be 
subject to stops and searches on this stretch of the 
road.  (Note:  The opening of the A-9 to such convoys is 
important to the military, which is now reliant 
exclusively on air and sea transport for resupply and 
troop deployments involving Jaffna.) 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶9.  (C) In our estimation, the report is professional 
and fair-minded.  Nambiar clearly understands how 
volatile this issue is and the need to proceed via 
deliberate steps.  Our guess is that the Sri Lankan 
military will like most of the report, as it takes into 
account many of its security concerns.  (Note:  The 
military may not be too thrilled with the idea of 
"challenge inspections" of its positions, however.) 
 
¶10.  (C) Despite Nambiar's best efforts to be fair to the 
LTTE, however, it is quite possible that the group will 
balk at what he recommends.  The Tigers seem to want to 
keep the security zone issue alive for political 
reasons, as it has proven a useful tool in whipping up 
support in Jaffna.  It is also tough to see the Tigers, 
at this time, agreeing to the monitoring of their long- 
range weapons or allowing "challenge inspections" of 
sites in the Wanni.  Of course, the Tigers could 
surprise everyone, but the group has shown no indication 
that it wants to compromise on this particular issue. 
(Note:  Earlier this year, for example, the LTTE pulled 
out of a joint committee set up to review security- 
related issues, after vociferously rejecting a 
preliminary report prepared by the GSL military re the 
security zone issue.)  The best that can probably be 
expected is that the group does not reject the report 
outright, but agrees to review it.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS