This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
IO/EDA FOR WINNICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2013 
TAGS: AORC FAOAORC FAO
SUBJECT: FAO TERM LIMITS: OPTIONS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: LUCY TAMLYN, ALTERNATE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE 
 
¶1.  (C)  THERE IS SHARP DIVISION IN THE OECD GROUP OVER 
TRANSITION MEASURES ON THE APPLICABILITY OF TERM LIMITS FOR 
THE CURRENT FAO DIRECTOR GENERAL (DG). THE EU IS READY TO 
ALLOW THE DG AN OPPORTUNITY TO RUN FOR A FOUR YEAR TERM 
(NON-RENEWABLE) IN 2005 AS PART OF A PACKAGE WHICH WOULD 
INCLUDE A CHANGE TO THE FAO BASIC TEXTS TO INTRODUCE TERM 
LIMITS.  AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND DO NOT SUPPORT 
ALLOWING THE INCUMBENT TO RUN AGAIN BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT A 
SPECIFIC PROHIBITION MAY CAUSE THE G-77 TO BACK OFF SUPPORT 
FOR TERM LIMITS ALTOGETHER.  THE FRIENDS OF THE CHAIR MUST 
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PAGE 02        ROME  01032  01 OF 02  130620Z 
COME TO AGREEMENT SOMETIME IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS OR RISK 
DEFERRING THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING AN AMENDMENT TO THE 
FAO BASIC TEXT FOR FOUR MORE YEARS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) THE OECD GROUP MET ON MARCH 12 TO DISCUSS THE 
APPROACHING MARCH 17 MEETING ON FAO DIRECTOR GENERAL TERM 
LIMITS.  THE GREEK AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THE EU POSITION:  THE 
EU SUPPORTS A FOUR YEAR TERM RENEWABLE FOR AN ADDITIONAL FOUR 
YEARS.  AS A FALL-BACK THEY WOULD SUPPORT A SIX YEAR TERM 
RENEWABLE FOR FOUR YEARS.  IN BOTH CASES THEY WOULD ALLOW THE 
INCUMBENT TO RUN AGAIN AS A CANDIDATE FOR ANOTHER FOUR YEAR 
TERM (NON-RENEWABLE). THE EU INTENDS TO MEET WITH REGIONAL 
GROUPS TO "EXCHANGE VIEWS" BEFORE THE MARCH 17 MEETING. 
 
¶3.  (C) THE DELEGATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA REPORTED THAT 
ALTHOUGH THE ASIAN GROUP LACKED A COMMON POSITION OVERALL, 
MANY KEY COUNTRIES SUPPORTED A TERM OF FOUR YEARS RENEWABLE 
ONCE (THAILAND, PHILIPPINES, INDIA).  NONETHELESS, THESE 
COUNTRIES WERE UNLIKELY TO BREAK RANKS IF THE LARGER G-77 
SOUGHT A LONGER TERM.  WHILE ASIAN GROUP MEMBERS DID NOT HAVE 
A POSITION ON TRANSITIONAL MEASURES, KOREA NOTED THAT HE HAD 
NEVER HEARD FROM ANY OF THOSE MEMBERS THAT THE INCUMBENT MUST 
BE ALLOWED TO RUN AGAIN.  THE DELEGATE OF AUSTRALIA REPORTED 
THAT HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH TWO KEY G-77 COUNTRIES, PAKISTAN 
AND BRAZIL INDICATED THAT FOUR PLUS FOUR WAS "DEFINITELY 
FEASIBLE." 
 
¶4. (C)  THE DELEGATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ASKED THE EU IF 
THEY WERE NOT WORRIED THAT THEIR POSITION ON TRANSITION 
MEASURES "SENT A SIGNAL" CONCERNING THE 2005 ELECTIONS AND 
POSSIBLE OECD SUPPORT FOR THE INCUMBENT WHICH WOULD AFFECT 
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PAGE 03        ROME  01032  01 OF 02  130620Z 
THE FIELD OF CANDIDATES AND THEIR POTENTIAL SUPPORT.  HE 
ASKED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE BETTER TO HAVE AGREEMENT THAT THE DG 
IS AN INCUMBENT LIKE ANY OTHER, RATHER THAN SINGLING HIM OUT 
FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. IN RESPONSE, THE EU EXPRESSED ITS 
CONCERN THAT THIS APPROACH MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE DG TO RUN FOR 
A FOURTH TERM. 
 
¶5.  (C) U.S. DEL AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT SEND ANY SIGNAL 
WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SUPPORT FOR A THIRD TERM AND 
NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE EU BE MORE DIRECT WITH 
G-77 INTERLOCUTORS CONCERNING THE EU DIRECTIVE BARRING EU 
MEMBERS FROM VOTING FOR ANY INCUMBENT WHO HAS SERVED 12 
YEARS.  THE EU RESPONDED THAT THE EU DIRECTIVE WAS "NOT 
GERMANE" AND THEY WOULD NOT RAISE IT. 
 
¶6. (C)  U.S. DEL ALSO NOTED THAT THAT POLITICAL PRESSURE 
NEEDED TO BE MUSTERED IN ORDER TO GET THE MESSAGE TO THE DG 
THAT HE SHOULD NOT RUN AGAIN FOR A THIRD TERM.  SHE NOTED IN 
THIS REGARD THE GENERALLY HELD VIEW THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN 
FOUR MORE YEARS, AND WAS UNLIKELY TO RUN FOR A FOURTH TERM. 
U.S. DEL WARNED THE EU THAT ITS CONSULTATIONS WITH REGIONAL 
GROUPS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN THEM BRINGING A "FAIT ACCOMPLI" 
TO THE TABLE ON MARCH 17 AS THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO 
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FRIENDS OF THE CHAIR GROUP. 
 
¶7.  (C) THE DELEGATE OF CANADA OPINED THAT SILENCE ON THE 
QUESTION OF TRANSITION MEASURES MIGHT BE PREFERABLE. IF THERE 
WERE NO TRANSITIONAL MEASURES, THE GENERAL INTERPRETATION 
WOULD BE THAT THE DG WAS FREE TO RUN LIKE ANY OTHER 
CANDIDATE; THE OECD WOULD HAVE SENT NO SIGNAL ON WHETHER IT 
WOULD CONDONE HIM SEEKING A THIRD TERM OR NOT.  IN THE 
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PAGE 04        ROME  01032  01 OF 02  130620Z 
INTERIM BETWEEN THE DECISION IN 2003 AND THE ELECTIONS IN 
2005, OECD MEMBERS COULD LOBBY AGAINST A DIOUF CANDIDACY. 
THE DELEGATE OF AUSTRALIA WARNED THAT THE ABSENCE OF CLEARLY 
LAID OUT TRANSITIONAL MEASURES (PRO OR CON) RAN THE RISK OF 
CREATING CONFUSION AND FORCING THE ORGANIZATION TO CONTINUE 
THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE QUESTION, THEREBY TYING UP 
SCARCE RESOURCES.  NEW ZEALAND ARGUED THAT TERM LIMITS WAS A 
"PACKAGE" AND THAT THE OECD WOULD HAVE TO GIVE SOMETHING UP. 
THE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GIVE UP THE MINIMUM  -- WHICH IN THIS 
CASE APPEARED TO BE THE EU OPTION OF ALLOWING THE INCUMBENT A 
FOUR YEAR TERM ONLY. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT: WE DO NOT EXPECT MORE THAN TWO MORE MEETINGS 
(INCLUDING THE MARCH 17 MEETING) ON THIS ISSUE.  THE FRIENDS 
OF THE CHAIR MUST COME TO AGREEMENT ON A PROPOSAL TO FORWARD 
TO THE JUNE COUNCIL OR RISK DEFERRING THE POSSIBILITY OF 
ACHIEVING AN AMENDMENT TO THE FAO BASIC TEXTS FOR ANOTHER 
FOUR YEARS.  ONE OPTION WOULD BE TO JOIN THE EU IN SUPPORTING 
AN AMENDMENT TO THE BASIC TEXT TO ALLOW FOR FOUR TERMS 
RENEWABLE ONCE WITH EXPLICIT MEASURES STATING THAT THE DG MAY 
 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0331 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01032  02 OF 02  130620Z 
ACTION IO-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  EB-00    EUR-00   TEDE-00 
      INR-00   NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-02   SS-00    SAS-00     /002W 
                  ------------------438CB0  130620Z /38 
O 130514Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8706 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
IO/EDA FOR WINNICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2013 
TAGS: AORC FAOAORC FAO
SUBJECT: FAO TERM LIMITS: OPTIONS 
 
RUN AGAIN FOR A FOUR YEAR TERM.  ANOTHER OPTION WOULD BE AN 
AMENDMENT TO THE BASIC TEXTS TO ALLOW FOR FOUR YEARS 
RENEWABLE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DG HAS THE SAME 
RIGHTS AS ANY OTHER NEW CANDIDATE (EITHER EXPLICITLY OR BY 
THE ABSENCE OF ANY "TRANSITION MEASURES").  THE FIRST OPTION 
HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF ATTAINABILITY AND SIMPLICITY: THE 
DRAWBACK IS THAT IT PRACTICALLY INVITES THE DG TO SPEND 
ANOTHER FOUR YEARS IN THE JOB; THE SECOND OPTION RUNS THE 
RISK (WHICH WE JUDGE SMALL) OF HIM SPENDING ANOTHER EIGHT 
YEARS IN THE JOB.  IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF NOT SENDING ANY 
SIGNALS ON MEMBER SUPPORT WHICH MIGHT DETER POSSIBLE 
CANDIDATES FROM SEEKING THE POSITION. END COMMENT. 
 
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 2003ROME01032 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL