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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU552, NEPAL: KING'S CONFIDANT ON INDIAN, EUROPEAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KATHMANDU552 2003-03-27 10:54 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA - LILIENFELD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  KING'S CONFIDANT ON INDIAN, EUROPEAN 
SUPPORT FOR PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
1.  (S)  On March 26 royal confidant Prabhakar Rana briefed 
the Ambassador and DCM on his recent secret discussions with 
foreign government representatives in India and Europe. 
Indian National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra reportedly 
emphasized to Rana that while the GOI supports Government of 
Nepal (GON) efforts to engage Maoists in dialogue, it 
unequivocally opposes third-party mediation or facilitation 
in that endeavor.  Rana reported that in a positive meeting 
Mishra denied any recent "cooling" in bilateral relations 
between the two governments and acknowledged with gratitude 
that the GON had informally "handed over" 45 suspected 
Kashmiri militants to the GOI.  Mishra reportedly assured 
Rana that USG security assistance to Nepal is "no longer a 
problem" for the GOI.  The GOI would support a royal proposal 
to form an all-party interim government, Mishra said, but 
strongly urged that the post of prime minister not be given 
to the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist 
(UML).  In meetings with British Defense Secretary Geoffrey 
Hoon, UK Special Envoy for Nepal Jeffrey James, and other 
senior FCO officials in London; EU Commissioner Chris Patten 
in Brussels; and members of the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg, Rana said his interlocutors expressed support for 
GON efforts to engage the Maoists in dialogue.  Hoon 
reportedly emphasized that if negotiations fail to bring 
about a peaceful resolution, his government will continue to 
offer development and military assistance to the GON.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------- 
DIPLOMATIC BLITZKRIEG 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) On March 26 Prabhakar Rana, King Gyanendra's 
confidant, business partner, and secret emissary, briefed the 
Ambassador and DCM on discussions held during Rana's March 
9-16 trip to India and Europe.  Rana said he undertook the 
trip at King Gyanendra's behest as "a diplomatic survey" of 
Indian, British, and EU support for ongoing Government of 
Nepal (GON) efforts to engage Maoist insurgents in dialogue. 
Rana reported receiving a sympathetic hearing from foreign 
government representatives at all stops in his visit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
NO "COOLNESS" IN GOI/GON BILATERAL RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Rana said he first met with Indian National Security 
Advisor Brajesh Mishra in New Delhi.  (The meeting was held 
in part to prepare the ground for King Gyanendra's private 
trip to India beginning on March 18.)  Rana opened the 
meeting by asking Mishra directly the reason for a recent 
"perceived coolness" in bilateral relations between the GON 
and the Government of India (GOI).  Mishra reportedly 
dismissed any suggestion that relations had cooled at senior 
levels.  The GON makes an effort to keep its large southern 
neighbor alerted to impending developments, he acknowledged, 
although he noted GOI disappointment that events do not 
always unravel as GON representatives predict them to Indian 
interlocutors.  He cited the King's surprise October 11 
appointment of Lokendra Bahadur Chand as interim Prime 
Minister--after the GOI had been informally told someone else 
would be the nominee--as a prominent example.  Rana rejoined 
that unforeseeable events sometimes occur but emphasized the 
GON's continued willingness and intention to keep the GOI as 
well informed and forewarned as possible. 
 
------------------------------- 
GOI WILL SUPPORT DIALOGUE-- 
BUT NO THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (S)  Mishra reportedly said the GOI welcomes GON efforts 
to bring Maoist insurgents to the negotiating table and to 
find a peaceful resolution to the conflict.  He stressed, 
however, that the GOI absolutely would not tolerate any 
involvement of third parties, either as facilitators or 
mediators, in the peace process.  He indicated that the GOI 
was aware of the Maoists attempting to reach out to certain 
European donors to establish a channel for dialogue (septel). 
 Rana reassured Mishra that the GON and GOI see eye to eye on 
this issue and that the GON has no plans to involve third 
parties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GOI: USG SECURITY ASSISTANCE "NO LONGER A PROBLEM" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
5.  (C)  Rana said he asked Mishra if the GOI had concerns or 
reservations regarding US and UK security assistance to 
Nepal.  Rana said he emphasized that improved security in 
Nepal is one area in which USG and GOI objectives coincide, 
and noted that the British, Indian, and U.S. missions in 
Nepal are working closely together to achieve that aim with 
"unprecedented transparency."  Mishra reportedly acknowledged 
some initial GOI concerns that the weapons and training 
provided to the Royal Nepal Army might be inappropriately 
"sophisticated."  The GOI now "knows everything" about USG 
security assistance to Nepal, which is thus "no longer a 
problem," Mishra said.  The GOI is "a little concerned," 
however, about possible Chinese reactions to USG assistance. 
Rana told Mishra that the GON had received no indications of 
Chinese discomfort with the assistance.  (Note:  Nor have we. 
 End note.)  According to Rana, Mishra added that Chinese 
influence in Nepal is "no longer a threat to (Indian) 
security and hasn't been for years." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
GOI ACKNOWLEDGES GON HELP ON MILITANTS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Rana said he raised repeated GOI charges that the GON 
fails to apprehend anti-Indian extremists the GOI believes 
operate on Nepali soil.  Rana said he reminded Mishra that 
the King had pledged assistance in a visit to India the 
previous year.  Since then, the GON has quietly turned 45 
Kashmiri militants over to the GOI in recent months, a point 
he said Mishra conceded and gratefully acknowledged.  Nepal 
has asserted greater control over the madrassas operating 
within its borders than has India, Rana also claimed, which, 
he indicated, Mishra did not challenge.  GOI accusations that 
Nepal is soft on extremists are thus unmerited, Rana 
concluded. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
GOI WILL SUPPORT ALL-PARTY GOVERNMENT-- 
BUT NOT ONE HEADED BY UML 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Noting that the King's previous attempts to bring 
the political parties into the interim government had failed, 
Rana told Mishra that the only real option left is for the 
King to appoint a new interim government with political party 
representation.  Rana emphasized that the GON would 
appreciate GOI support in influencing Nepal's political 
parties to participate in such a government.  Mishra 
reportedly committed to supporting such an endeavor, but 
noted that the GOI would need sufficient time--as much as 
three or four months--to bring the parties around.  According 
to Rana, Mishra urged against nominating Communist Party of 
Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML), currently the largest 
party, to head such a government.  Since the Maoists consider 
the UML ideological enemies, Mishra reasoned, it is more 
prudent to leave both the Maoists and the UML--or at least 
UML leader Madhav Nepal--out of the government to fight each 
other.  Rana said he replied that the Palace would like to 
move more quickly than Mishra's prospective timeframe, adding 
that if proposed dialogue with the Maoists goes as well as 
hoped the new interim government must be in place in order to 
oversee elections. 
 
------------------------------- 
UK DEFSEC PLEDGES FULL SUPPORT; 
EU WELL BRIEFED AND SYMPATHETIC 
------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Rana's next meetings were with UK Secretary of 
Defense Geoffrey Hoon, UK Special Envoy for Nepal Jeffrey 
James, and other senior FCO officials in London.  According 
to Rana, Hoon told him that the British Government respects 
and supports the King's courageous decision to enter into a 
ceasefire and pursue dialogue with the Maoists.  While the UK 
fully believes in the importance of pursuing a peaceful 
resolution, should negotiation efforts prove unsuccessful, 
Hoon pledged full support for development and military 
assistance.  Rana said he also discussed GON peace efforts 
with EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten in 
Brussels.  Rana described Patten as well briefed on Nepali 
affairs and sympathetic to GON aims.  Finally, Rana said he 
briefed members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg, where, he noted, Italian 
member and famed mountaineer Reinhold Messner of the European 
Free Alliance is chairman of the SAARC Sub-committee and an 
especially enthusiastic advocate for Nepal. 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
9.  (S)  Rana's lengthy, detailed readout of his meeting with 
the Indian National Security Advisor underscores the pivotal 
role this giant neighbor continues to exercise in domestic 
Nepali politics.  It is instructive--but not surprising--that 
the Palace should enlist Indian influence in persuading 
recalcitrant political parties to join a new interim 
government.  Indian opposition to a UML-led government, even 
without the Maoists' antipathy toward their erstwhile 
comrades, might well be enough to scuttle the largest party's 
long-cherished hopes of gaining the PM's chair.  Even clearer 
is the GOI's categorical opposition to any possible 
third-party mediation efforts.   We predict this resounding 
"no" from New Delhi will torpedo bids by some European 
missions here to play peacemaker in prospective talks. 
MALINOWSKI