This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000279 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR POL - J. MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MASS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: JANUARY 25 MEETING WITH OBASANJO 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for Reasons 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During a one-hour January 25 meeting with 
Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo spoke optimistically, 
though briefly, about his electoral chances.  In the lead- 
up to the election, the President predicted his opponents 
would try to exploit Iraq and the perception of the USG as 
anti-Moslem to mount protests assailing his Administration 
and its pro-Western leaning. On Cote d'Ivoire, Obasanjo 
declared Nigeria would not send peacekeeping troops but 
might give logistical support to the ECOFORCE deployment. 
Nigeria would also remain engaged diplomatically.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
THE DIFFICULT PART IS OVER! 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) The President described the PDP convention as his 
most troublesome hurdle on the road to reelection.  Having 
cleared that obstacle, he predicted winning approximately 
"60%" of the vote in the April general election.  Obasanjo 
gauged that religion could become a divisive element in the 
campaign, given ANPP's flagbearer Muhammadu Buhari's 
purported statements on Shari'a and on the imperative of 
Moslems voting for a co-religionist.  However, the 
confident Obasanjo planned to counter the centrifugal 
tactics of his foes by getting on the campaign trail to 
inform the electorate that, during his term at the helm, he 
had benefited Nigeria's Moslem's more than Buhari did as 
Head of State. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Regarding electoral violence, Obasanjo felt 
violence would not mar the election although some incidents 
would be inevitable.  However, he warned that the emotive 
confluence of electoral politics, religion, Iraq and the 
Middle East made for a potentially combustible mixture in 
Nigeria. Electoral foes would try to stoke religious 
sentiment and indirectly generate opposition to him by 
protesting against USG policy on Iraq and the Middle East. 
(Note: The previous day, President Obasanjo telephoned the 
Ambassador that Nigerian security forces had blocked 
numerous "rascally boys" from entering Abuja for the 
purpose of protesting USG policy on Iraq. Although the 
alleged hirelings had been turned back (Obasanjo would not 
reveal where they were coming from), Obasanjo remained 
concerned that trouble was still afoot. At the President's 
express insistence, we cancelled State Department Public 
Affairs Officer Nabeel Khoury's speaking engagement on 
USG's Middle East policy scheduled that day in nearby 
Kaduna. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment: We are unable to verify the presence of 
the alleged protesters but the account is plausible. Some 
Embassy Officers had heard rumors of a protest scheduled 
for either Abuja or Kaduna.  Obasanjo certainly does not 
want the security headache that goes along with such 
protests.  Demonstrations in Abuja can be like wildfire -- 
once started, they can get out of hand quickly.  Given 
Obasanjo's strong identification with America in the 
Nigerian mind, the President recognizes that an anti- 
American protest is tantamount to an anti-Obasanjo outing; 
in any event, it could quickly take that turn.  While 
confident in winning the election, protests in the capital 
would not present an attractive visual and would dampen 
Obasanjo's campaign.  End Comment.) 
 
 
------------------------------ 
HOW IRAQ IS PLAYING IN NIGERIA 
------------------------------ 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Because of this volatility, Obasanjo cautioned that 
we tread lightly in using public fora to explain our Middle 
East and Iraq policies. He also thought that any overt 
attempts by Nigeria's friends in the West to defuse 
religion as a potential campaign issue would be counter- 
productive.  If we decided, nevertheless, to go forward 
with such programs, Obasanjo asked that our plans be vetted 
with him. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Jeter informed the President about the 
January 25-27, private conference on USG engagement with 
Islam that we were co-sponsoring with the Emir of Kano and 
that was closed to the public and press. Obasanjo responded 
positively to the idea but asked that we inform him of any 
similar future events.  When Ambassador Jeter mentioned the 
receipt of a letter from Zamfara State Governor Ahmed Sani 
requesting the Embassy to co-sponsor a conference on 
Shari'a, Obasanjo shook his head negatively. He asserted 
that Sani was not a suitable co-sponsor.  (Note: Although 
in different political parties, Obasanjo has a congenial 
personal relationship with Sani, referring to the firebrand 
as his "campaign manager" in Zamfara.  The President 
probably believes Sani, known as the champion of Shari'a in 
the North, would not be able to resist inflammatory 
statements in an attempt to milk all the political capital 
that he could from such a conference. End note.) 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Before accepting proposals for public conferences 
on religion or Shari'a, the Embassy should first seek the 
advice of the Sultan of Sokoto, the spiritual leader of 
Nigeria's Muslims.  Obasanjo said he sought out the Sultan 
when Zamfara's Deputy Governor issued his infamous Fatwa 
against Isioma Daniels, the journalist who wrote the 
controversial Miss World editorial that sparked rioting in 
Kaduna last year.  "I asked the Sultan was this the proper 
way to issue a Fatwa?" Obasanjo recalled.  The Sultan's 
response was negative.  As a result of their conversation, 
the Sultan rescinded the improper Fatwa and the controversy 
began to die, Obasanjo remarked.  If we decided to go 
forward on a conference on Shari'a, Obasanjo said that we 
too should seek the Sultan's advice. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Cote d'Ivoire and Regional Peacekeeping 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Obasanjo's comments indicated his endorsement of 
the Ivorien peace plan was not whole-hearted.  He described 
the plan as effectively "disrobing" President Gbagbo. 
However, in the final analysis, Nigeria "could not be 
holier than the Pope."  If this is what the Ivoriens 
agreed, Nigeria will support it, he declared. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) However, deployment of Nigerian peacekeepers would 
not be part of that support, the President said. Nigeria 
might send engineers, medical units, signal corps or other 
logistical help, however, front-line troops, not even after 
the elections, would not be included.  Prior to embarking 
on another expensive peacekeeping deployment, Nigeria 
needed to put "some things in order" regarding its ECOMOG 
deployments in Sierra Leon and Liberia, he opined. 
Foremost, Nigeria had not rendered an accurate public 
accounting of the losses it suffered in those missions. 
"No one knows how many died in Sierra Leone and Liberia" he 
lamented. The closest approximation to an accounting is 
former ECOMOG Force Commander S.V. Malu's estimate of 800 
Nigerian soldiers dead. Ambassador noted that several years 
ago, he had heard very confidentially from Malu's ECOMOG 
Chief of Staff that Nigeria had lost more than 1,000 troops 
in Liberia.  Obasanjo noted that that figure also matched 
his conclusions.  Obasanjo went on to clarify that Nigeria 
was not turning its back on peacekeeping, but that it must 
"come to closure" on these two missions prior to joining 
any future PKO's in the region. 
 
 
¶10. (C) If Nigeria could not participate in the Ivorien 
peacekeeping mission, Ambassador Jeter urged Obasanjo to 
become more engaged diplomatically in the Ivorien peace 
process. Nigeria has been "missing in action" on the 
diplomatic front, he stressed. Obasanjo pledged Nigeria 
would become more engaged politically, making clear that 
Nigeria had not repudiated its heretofore active 
involvement in sub-regional peacekeeping.  Moreover, he 
said that Nigeria would engage again in peacekeeping but 
must do so in a way that is more transparent to the average 
Nigerian. 
 
 
¶11. (C) Obasanjo discounted reports of official Liberian 
involvement in the Ivorien morass. He believed ex-factional 
fighters from Liberia were gravitating to Cote d'Ivoire 
because it represented what they knew, a way to make money 
by the use of a gun. Poverty was the ultimate culprit, he 
argued. Poor men with guns were like locusts swarming to 
the latest harvest. No country was immune to this somber 
reality; any country in West Africa could be destabilized 
for USD 100,000. Obasanjo hoped to address this issue 
within the larger context of regional development during 
the July Sullivan Summit in Abuja. Already, six Heads of 
State had accepted his invitation. He hoped POTUS would 
also accept. (Note: A copy of the invitation to POTUS has 
been forwarded Septel. End Note.) 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) While very confident about his reelection 
prospects, President Obasanjo was very concerned about the 
possible protests regarding Iraq and the Middle East. He 
also has become more reticent about Cote d'Ivoire. Before, 
the Nigerians were giving some indications that they would 
consider an active peacekeeping role after the April 
elections. Obasanjo seemed to nix that idea. His rationale 
that Nigeria must publicly account for its Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean deployments is valid and essential for a 
democracy. However, the timing is a bit odd. Perhaps it is 
an indirection to let us know that stiff opposition would 
mount should he propose a major Nigerian peacekeeping 
operation right after the election. Additionally, his 
reluctance may be due to France's role in forging a 
controversial peace agreement that Obasanjo personally 
probably does not like. 
JETER