This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS IN NO MOOD FOR COMPROMISE 
 
REFS: A) 01 Kathmandu 2504, B) 01 Kathmandu 2437, C) 01 
 
Kathmandu 2423, D) 01 Kathmandu 2394, E) 01 Kathmandu 
2324, F) 01 Kathmandu 2302 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  In both their words and deeds, Nepal's 
Maoist insurgents have shown themselves to be unwilling 
to negotiate, compromise or abandon their armed struggle. 
They have admitted that they would use negotiations or a 
cease-fire as an opportunity to regroup for their next 
offensive.  The Maoists have been steadfastly vehement in 
their condemnation of the Palace, and increasingly 
critical of the U.S.  Events in December quickly proved 
that a Maoist pledge to cease attacks against certain 
targets was a hollow feint designed to gain tactical 
advantage.  Some of these efforts are likely intended to 
defuse mounting international pressure and criticism, 
including possible inclusion on at least one U.S. 
terrorism list.  In the absence of substantial, sustained 
military pressure by Government forces, and whether or 
not they temporarily suspend attacks, the Maoists will 
continue their campaign of terror and duplicity in 
pursuit of their strategic aims.  End Summary. 
 
No Mood for Compromise 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The record of public statements by leaders of 
Nepal's Maoist movement indicates that the insurgents 
have no interest in compromise or negotiation.  Recent 
pronouncements echo previous remarks, when the Maoists 
made it clear they would be disinclined, under any 
circumstances, to give up their armed struggle.  Most 
famously, Maoist ideologue Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who goes 
by the name "Prachanda," told an interviewer in May, 
2001, that the movement's "guiding principles on the 
question of negotiations are the experiences of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty under Lenin's leadership and the 
Chongqing negotiations under Mao's leadership."  In both 
cases, the communists used the pretext of engaging in 
talks to regroup and prepare for an offensive. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the same vein, Dahal told the Far Eastern 
Economic Review in October 2002, that the Maoists would 
not lay down their arms to come to the negotiating table, 
and that possibility for resolving the crisis through 
negotiations would "depend on the level of victory 
achieved on the battlefield." 
 
Monarchy Has to Go, Maoists Insist 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) A November 2002, article in India's "Economic and 
Political Weekly" by Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai 
takes an equally hard-line position.  Bhattarai's article 
divides the Nepali political landscape into three 
factions: the Palace, the parliamentary parties, and the 
Maoists.  He describes the King's actions in removing the 
Prime Minister as "retrogressive" and a "putsch," and 
claims the monarch is disinclined to share power. 
Bhattarai makes it clear that the Maoists are against the 
Palace-stating unequivocally that the Maoists will not 
rest until the monarchy is gone.  There is room, however, 
for a rapprochement with the political parties, who, 
Bhattarai suggests, may yet have a role in the 
revolution.  [Comment:  As Post reported previously, the 
Maoists may be using the peace process as a means to 
drive a wedge between the political parties and the 
Palace (Ref A).  End Comment.] 
 
Increasingly, U.S. Focus of Maoist Criticism 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the same article, Bhattarai singled out the 
U.S. for criticism on several counts, stating that the 
U.S. was behind the June 2001 assassination of Nepal's 
King Birendra, was directly in 
volved in the Palace "coup" 
of October 2002, and is "in league with India against 
China."  Bhattarai also mentions Ambassador Malinowski by 
name, and alleges that he has been "lobbying to 
rationalize the royal coup." 
 
Threats, Couched in Jargon 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Though couched in thick ideological jargon, 
Bhattarai's tone is unmistakably threatening, as when he 
says, "in the coming days revolution and counter- 
revolution can be logically foreseen to clash with 
greater intensity and ferocity."  And, more frankly, "it 
is but natural to centralize one's forces for the 
decisive battle."  Using the rhetoric of anachronistic 
Marxism, he speaks of the "historical necessity" of his 
movement, and of the "materialist dialectics" that 
determine the conflict between revolution and counter- 
revolution.  Orthodox Marxism describes three stages of 
protracted war:  strategic defensive, strategic stalemate 
and strategic offensive.  Bhattarai has already claimed 
that "a situation of strategic stalemate has developed" 
(Ref D).  [Note:  Nepal's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also 
recently told us that the conflict has reached a "50-50 
stalemate" (Ref B).  End Note.] 
 
Preparing to Up the Anted 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) In early December, there were signs that the 
Maoists were feigning a strategic cease-fire.  In a 
December press release (Ref F), Prachanda pledged to 
cease attacks on non-military infrastructure the cadres 
of other political parties.  Events quickly proved this 
promise hollow, as the number and ferocity of attacks on 
such targets continued unabated (Ref E).  Evidence exists 
that the Maoists are preparing to raise the ante even 
more.  A vernacular Nepali-language weekly reported in 
late November that a group of South Asian extremists, 
including Nepali Maoists, in early October formed a 
committee for "World Peoples' Retaliation Agitation" in 
South Asia (Ref C).  [Note:  Post has been unable to 
confirm the veracity of this report, although Indian 
intelligence officers pooh-poohed the notion that such an 
alliance would pose a threat.  End Note.] 
 
Comment:  Intransigence, Belligerence and Revolution 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (S) Judging both from the Maoists' rhetoric and their 
behavior, their position will not soften in coming 
months, and they will seize every opportunity, including 
negotiations or cease-fires, to gain advantage.  Some of 
the Maoist rhetoric about dialogue seems calculated to 
influence foreign audiences, including the U.S., in order 
to discourage putting the Maoists on any terrorist list. 
We are convinced, furthermore, that the Maoists will not 
approach peace negotiations in good faith unless and 
until they come under substantial, sustained pressure 
from security forces.  Faced with an increasing spiral of 
violence, Nepal's government has had difficulty rooting 
out the Maoists, and the insurgents' recent statements 
show them at their most intransigent and belligerent. 
Framed by the jargon of mid-twentieth-century Marxism, 
their claim to stand on principle stems both from their 
attempt to occupy the moral high ground and from textbook 
guerrilla tactics.  As the Maoists have learned from 
insurgencies elsewhere, to the extent that they can 
instill chaos, confusion and disorder, they will gain the 
upper hand.  We expect the Maoists to continue to pursue 
their strategic aims with single-minded determination, 
employing terror and duplicity as their tactics. 
 
MALINOWSKI