This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA AND IO 
NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA 
DEPT PASS USAID FOR OFDA 
EUCOM FOR J3 AND J5 
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2012 
TAGS: PREF AORC IZ MOPS PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TURKISH REFUGEE/IDP CONTINGENCY 
PLANNING; RESPONSES ON HUMANITARIAN MAPPING STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. 2002 STATE 264634 
     ¶B. 2002 ANKARA 7687 
 
 
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert Deutsch for 
reasons 1.5 B and D. 
 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  During the January 3 military-military 
talks, the Turkish General Staff provided a map identifying 
planned locations for Turkish-run IDP camps to EUCOM and 
CENTCOM representatives.  MFA Head of Department for 
International Political Organizations Feza Ozturk largely 
confirmed previously-disclosed information on GOT contingency 
planning for a refugee/IDP crisis, including provision for up 
to 276,000 persons and siting of some camps in northern Iraq. 
 He noted that Turkey was short of tents in relation to its 
plans.  Ozturk and other interlocutors were very cautious 
about NGO involvement in humanitarian assistance, but the GOT 
is still considering whether and how to involve them in its 
planning.  Prime Ministry Deputy Undersecretary Mustafa Cetin 
told DCM that the GOT had done considerable planning, but did 
not go into detail.  He did express willingness to work with 
foreign humanitarian NGOs, and urged Embassy to discuss this 
further with MFA.  Turkish Red Crescent's Director General 
told us that the organization did not have sufficient 
supplies to cover all needs in the contingency plan and said 
he would provide details later.  He also expressed concern 
about conducting relief operations in an environment in which 
CBW could be used.  Econoff also raised ref A request with 
Steven Corliss, UNHCR's Deputy Turkey Representative, who 
said he would pass this on to UNSECOORD.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Emboffs discussed refugee/internally displaced person 
(IDP) contingency planning connected with possible military 
operations in Iraq as well as ref A's request for 
humanitarian mapping information in separate meetings with 
Feza Ozturk, MFA Department Head for International Political 
Organizations; Mustafa Cetin, Deputy Undersecretary in the 
Prime Ministry; Fatih Evren, General Director of the Turkish 
Red Crescent; and Steven Corliss, Deputy Turkey 
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
 
 
Mapping Information Shared at Mil-Mil Talks 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶3. (S) During the January 3 military-military talks in 
Ankara, the Turkish General Staff provided a map to EUCOM and 
CENTCOM representatives identifying the locations of planned 
IDP camps in northern Iraq. 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (S) Contingency Planning:  Econoff and Polmiloff met with 
Feza Ozturk, MFA Department Head for International Political 
Organizations, on January 7 to discuss Turkey's contingency 
planning for a refugee/IDP crisis and to relay ref A request 
on humanitarian mapping.  Ozturk largely confirmed and 
fleshed out details of planning previously given by UNHCR and 
also leaked to the local press (ref B).  The GOT has the 
capacity to deal with 276,000 refugees/IDPs, but Ozturk 
stressed that this was not necessarily the number expected at 
Turkey's frontiers in the event of military operations.  He 
said the number would depend on a number of unknown 
variables, including whether there would be a northern front. 
 The plan calls for up to 18 camps (12 in northern Iraq and 6 
on Turkish territory).  The camps and supplies are modular 
and can be launched and augmented in increments of 3,000 
persons.  The Turkish military would be responsible only for 
external camp security, with six Turkish regional governors 
from southeast Turkey and the Turkish Red Crescent 
responsible for internal administration.  Turkey would set up 
camps inside Iraq first and only open the six camps in Turkey 
if needed.  All camps in Iraq would be within an hour's drive 
of the Turkish border.  Ozturk said the facilities could be 
erected within several days or at most one week.  Ozturk said 
that the Red Crescent had pre-positioned some of its 30,000 
to 35,000 stock of tents and other supplies in Silopi, but 
that these stocks were insufficient relative to the plan.  He 
said that, in the event that the full 276,000 refugees/IDPs 
required help, Turkey would have to ask for tents to shelter 
up to 120,000 persons.  Crisis centers would be established 
at the Prime Ministry and MFA.  A regional crisis center 
would be established in Diyarbakir, with several Turkish 
diplomats posted there.  Gaziantep would serve as the 
logistical hub. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ozturk stated that Turkey's contingency plans had been 
shared in part with UNHCR, but not with foreign 
governments/donors and he requested that we protect this 
information.  He noted that UNHCR had made a quiet appeal to 
donors for supplemental funding, but that Turkey did not plan 
to make a similar appeal at this point.  Of course, if the 
Red Crescent exhausted its resources, Turkey would approach 
donors to replenish its stocks.  We asked if the GOT had 
shared its plans with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 
which controls the territory in northern Iraq where Turkey 
intends to set up the camps.  Ozturk responded that the GOT 
had not. 
 
 
¶6. (C) On the Geneva Convention:  Ozturk pointed out that 
although Turkey is a party to the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, it has made a geographical reservation accepting 
the treaty's obligations only with respect to refugees from 
the European continent and does not accept refugees from its 
eastern neighbors for resettlement in Turkey.  He 
acknowledged that Turkey would in the future have to amend 
this policy as a condition of EU membership. 
¶7. (C) Role of NGOs:  Polmiloff noted that NGOs were an 
integral part of USG humanitarian relief planning, both for 
Iraq and elsewhere, and asked Ozturk what the GOT's views 
were on a role for NGOs in this possible crisis.  Ozturk said 
the GOT was very cautious about certain (unspecified) NGOs, 
contending that some had pursued a political as well as 
humanitarian agenda following the Gulf War and had supported 
the PKK.  He noted the GOT's standing decision to ban border 
crossings into northern Iraq of NGO personnel in 1996 (though 
some exceptions were granted later).  Note:  During the 
January 3 military-military talks, TGS said that it was GOT 
policy not to allow NGOs to enter Iraq via Turkey during the 
combat phases of an operation.  End Note.  He cited the 
absence of an official border authority on the Iraqi side as 
another reason for the prohibition, saying Turkey would 
remain responsible for the activities of NGO representatives 
after they crossed into Iraq.  Ozturk said that humanitarian 
relief was within the mandate of the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Iraq, and that the GOT wanted 
to work closely with UN agencies as well.  He said the GOT's 
principal concern was to assure centralized and coordinated 
humanitarian relief, with the Turkish Red Crescent as the 
focal point.  However, Ozturk said that the GOT was 
considering whether and how to bring NGOs into its 
contingency planning and said an interagency meeting on this 
subject was to be held later on January 7.  There was, he 
said, little prospect for resolving the problem of NGO access 
to northern Iraq through Turkey even if a decision was made 
to let NGOs participate in Turkish relief efforts. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Predictions:  While acknowledging that there were as 
yet too many unknowns to predict humanitarian need connected 
with an operation in Iraq, Ozturk opined that a mass movement 
towards Turkish borders was not likely unless the threat 
facing the population were extreme (e.g chemical/biological 
warfare, proximate armed conflict).  He said that IDPs were 
likely to move just far enough within Iraq to avoid immediate 
danger and would probably aim to stay within the country 
rather than seek shelter in Turkish camps guarded by Turkish 
soldiers. 
 
 
Prime Ministry 
-------------- 
 
 
¶9. (S) On January 3, DCM and Econoff met with Mustafa Cetin, 
the newly-appointed Deputy Undersecretary in the Prime 
Ministry, to discuss GOT refugee/internally displaced persons 
contingency planning.  Adil Ozdemir, General Directorate of 
Turkish Emergency Management, and Ilgin Atalay, head of the 
Prime Ministry's Foreign Relations Department, also attended. 
 DCM emphasized that the USG still hopes that military 
operations can be avoided through peaceful disarmament of 
Iraq, but that it is prudent to plan for the possibility of a 
refugee/IDP problem on Turkey's frontier.  He also suggested 
that any possible crisis will be much easier to handle to the 
extent that our two governments can cooperate fully and 
coordinate activities.  DCM asked for the GOT's thinking in 
handling this problem, particularly with respect to 
assistance that may become available from private 
humanitarian organizations.  He also noted that the USG had 
begun to collect mapping information on humanitarian 
facilities and personnel in Iraq, and asked Cetin if the GOT 
had any information to share on this. 
 
 
¶10. (S) Noting the strain on Turkey of the influx of 
refugees/IDPs in 1988 and 1991, Cetin said that the GOT had 
done considerable contingency planning and hoped to be better 
prepared if a similar crisis arose in the near future. 
However, he suggested that Embassy contact MFA's Multilateral 
Political Affairs General Directorate and Kizilay for a more 
detailed information, including on humanitarian mapping. 
Cetin expressed interest in cooperating with NGOs in 
providing assistance, and told us he would discuss this 
further with MFA.  He suggested that Kizilay should be the 
point of contact for those organizations.  Cetin thanked DCM 
for the United States' interest in raising these issues and 
its willingness to cooperate in this area. 
 
 
Turkish Red Crescent 
-------------------- 
 
 
¶11. (C) Econoff and Medical Attache met with Fatih Evren, 
General Director of the Turkish Red Crescent, on January 6 on 
these issues.  Evren stated that there were gaps in the Red 
Crescent's supplies relative to expected need in the event of 
a crisis, and that he would consult with the Red Crescent's 
President on a list of needed items to be shared with the 
USG.  On the role of NGOs in providing relief, Evren noted 
negative experiences with certain NGOs after the Gulf War and 
stated that the Red Crescent preferred to work only with 
UNHCR and other UN agencies.  However, he added that this 
decision was up to the GOT and suggested that we raise this 
with MFA.  On the humanitarian mapping request, Evren 
responded that Red Crescent had no presence in northern Iraq 
and referred us to MFA on this also.  Evren expressed concern 
that the Red Crescent was unprepared to provide assistance or 
treat refugees/IDPs in the context of use of 
chemical/biological weapons.  Medical Attache offered to 
provide medical information on planning and treating patients 
connected with CBW attacks. 
 
 
UNHCR 
----- 
 
 
¶12. (S) Econoff met with Steven Corliss, Deputy Turkey 
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on 
December 30 to request that UNHCR provide data on the 
locations of its operations in Iraq through UNSECOORD 
(reftel).  Corliss noted that, although UNHCR Turkey did not 
have any personnel or sites in Iraq, this could change if 
UNHCR staff in Iraq were evacuated in connection with 
military operations.  He told us that he would report the 
demarche to UNSECOORD and would also relay our request to the 
Turkish Red Crescent. 
 
 
¶13. (C) On contingency planning, Corliss told us that UNHCR 
planned to open a regional center in Diyarbakir in the event 
of a refugee/internally displaced person crisis, and that it 
already had staff in Van and Silopi.  On the issue of 
preparedness for providing assistance to refugees/IDPs who 
may have been exposed to chemical/biological weapons, Corliss 
confirmed that UN agencies would evacuate if CBW were used. 
He added that he assumed the Turkish and U.S. militaries had 
plans for this contingency, but told us that Red Crescent had 
not. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶14. (S) Embassy believes we have reached the stage where it 
would be useful to begin sharing further information with the 
Turks on USG contingency planning, particularly the roles we 
contemplate for NGOs in our response to a crisis and our 
ability to address any gaps in Turkish relief supplies. 
IDP/refugee issues are and will continue to be an integral 
part of the mil-mil talks, but we need soon to begin 
integrating our proposals and supply chain with the Turkish 
civilian and UN response plans.  That would include beginning 
to identify for the GOT and establishing a linkage with any 
USAID/DART or NGO elements that are part of our proposal. 
Please advise. 
DEUTSCH