This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000124 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS KPKO NI IV
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CHAMBAS SAYS DISCORD AND LETHARGY HINDERS 
 ECOWAS EFFORTS ON COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
 
REF: A. DAKAR 98 
     ¶B. DAKAR 151 
     ¶C. LOME 26 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER FOR REASONS 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a January 8 conversation with 
Ambassador Jeter, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas 
acknowledged ECOWAS diplomatic efforts in Cote d'Ivoire had 
lost steam due to ECOWAS Chairman Wade's erratic 
statesmanship, the lethargy of President Gbagbo and lack of 
focus of Togolese leader Eyadema in his role as mediator 
between the GOCI and the MPCI.  Chambas believed France 
originally hoped its call for a Paris Summit would roust 
ECOWAS from inaction. When ECOWAS leaders failed to 
respond, the French decided to proceed with the Summit. 
Chambas noted President Obasanjo had signaled thumbs down 
on deploying Nigerian peacekeepers on Iviorien soil; 
Chambas hoped Obasanjo would play a more active diplomatic 
role now that he had secured his party's renomination. 
Chambas did not believe member-states would commit 
additional soldiers to allow ECOWAS to increase the size of 
the proposed peacekeeping force.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During a January 8 dinner conversation at the 
Ambassador's residence, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohammed 
Ibn Chambas shared his views on the Ivoirien peace process. 
According to Chambas, dissonance among ECOWAS Heads of 
State was severely impeding the organization's efforts to 
forge a diplomatic solution and to get a peacekeeping force 
on the ground. Chambas particularly criticized ECOWAS 
Chairman Wade. Chambas said the Chairman's penchant for 
off-the-cuff statements confused and irritated Wade's 
colleagues. Because Wade was the ECOWAS Chairman, his 
statements were perceived to be official policy when in 
fact they were no more than his private musings. Wade's 
most recent transgression was to call for a UN peacekeeping 
force. Chambas said that Wade's call for the "blue helmets" 
not only came as a surprise but it also complicated ongoing 
efforts to coordinate the deployment of an ECOWAS force. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Chambas contended Wade's unilateralism had 
undermined the Contact Group and Eyadema's efforts as 
mediator.  At the December 15 summit in Kara, President 
Obasanjo took Wade to task for being a lone ranger and not 
using his position as ECOWAS Chairman to lead and 
coordinate with his colleagues. Obasanjo criticized Wade 
for being less than supportive of Eyadema's efforts, noting 
that Wade's public statements questioning the utility of 
the Lome mediation had humiliated Eyadema needlessly and 
that poor relationship between the two leaders most active 
in the peace process was impeding progress. Obasanjo also 
asserted that Wade had stepped out of line when, at the 
beginning of the crisis, he sent his Foreign Minister to 
Abidjan with an alternative peace plan almost immediately 
after the Contact Group had left.  Obasanjo chided Wade for 
following this dismal precedent for a relationship with the 
Contact Group.  When the Heads of State reached Abidjan, 
Obasanjo continued his blunt diplomacy. At their airport 
meeting, he told Gbagbo, "you have a problem and your 
problem is us!" 
 
 
¶4. (C) Chambas had hoped that Obasanjo's intervention at 
Kara signaled the Nigerian's more active engagement; he 
also hoped it would push Wade and Eyadema to mend their 
rift.  Unfortunately neither has happened.  Enmeshed in the 
business of his hard-fought presidential re-nomination, 
Obasanjo forgot Cote d'Ivoire. Because Obasanjo was not 
there to scold them and with no other ECOWAS leader to fill 
that void, Wade and Eyadema regressed to their relationship 
of cold indifference with occasional antagonism. Now that 
Obasanjo has secured his party renomination, Chambas hoped 
Obasanjo might devote more time to Cote d'Ivoire.  If so, 
he expected the Nigerian leader to continue his efforts to 
bring peace among the ECOWAS leaders, seeing the end of 
their competition as a precursor to ECOWAS playing a 
sufficiently constructive role in the peace process. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Chambas felt Wade's insistence on having a "global" 
peace agreement between the GOCI and the three rebel groups 
before deploying a peacekeeping force was handicapping his 
efforts.  He believed the fighting had to stop before real 
negotiations on a political solution could begin.  While 
Senegal has deployed a 21-man headquarters unit and the 
French are transporting Senegal's 170-man combat team to 
CDI, it remains to be seen whether Wade will allow 
Senegalese soldiers to actively participate in monitoring 
operations without a formal agreement. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Emphasizing that Wade was not totally responsible 
for the sub-region's inertia, Chambas claimed that Eyadema 
was ill suited for the role of mediator.  Eyadema did not 
grasp that time was of the essence and that bringing peace 
grew more difficult with each passing day. Instead, Eyadema 
was content to keep the talks on the slow track, at one 
point forecasting the talks could last months. Eyadema 
reveled in the press coverage and attention; meetings were 
often replete with protocol and frills but short on 
substance. The Togolese leader seemed to be using the 
meeting as a vehicle to enhance his domestic image rather 
than forge genuine progress toward an Ivoirien peace. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Chambas believed Gbagbo suffered from similar 
desultoriness.  Gbagbo did not understand that delay 
advantaged the rebels not Abidjan. The longer the rebels 
controlled the North the more they could consolidate power, 
the more accustomed to leadership they would become. Their 
willingness to cede control would diminish as a function of 
time.  If the current situation persists, the de facto 
partition of Cote d'Ivoire could become an accomplished 
fact. For instance, Chambas noted that significant trade 
between the rebel-held areas and neighboring states was 
occurring.  Chambas hoped Gbagbo would not let himself be 
captive to regime hard-liners who favored the military 
option; according to Chambas, Gbagbo needed to become more 
active in talking to the rebels and opposition political 
leaders to discuss the issues associated with national 
reconciliation and expanding the political space and 
participation. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Chambas said that neither Malian President Toure nor 
Burkina's Campaore have been active players recently. 
Wanting to get involved, Toure had hosted the talks between 
the Gbagbo and Campaore; hopes that the talks would be the 
vehicle to begin a dialogue to resolve bilateral 
differences were quickly dashed; the talks rambled and were 
inconclusive.  Toure blamed Gbagbo for letting a golden 
opportunity slip because he was unfocused and vague at the 
meeting.  At least for now, Toure has decided not to waste 
more political capital on Gbagbo until the Ivorien shows 
more seriousness.  Meanwhile Chambas surmised that Campaore 
is relatively comfortable since attention has shifted from 
him and accusations of complicity have dwindled. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Chambas expressed his hope that the Paris peace 
talks would prove fruitful.  He believed the only way to 
find a political solution to the crisis was to bring all of 
the important actors to the table.  Specifically, he noted 
that former President Bedie, former Prime Minister 
Ouattara, and General Guei's political heir, presumably his 
son, must be included for the process to be worthwhile. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Chambas did not expect member states to increase 
their troop contributions at this time.  He said the force 
commander, Senegalese Brigadier General Papa Khalil Fall, 
and his staff were planning for 1,300 troops. Chambas 
discounted rumors of a Senegal augmentation, stating that 
his latest information was that Senegal would not deploy 
more than 250 soldiers. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Chambas further noted that Nigerian soldiers would 
not be joining the ECOWAS force any time soon.  Obasanjo 
had decided against sending troops due to domestic 
political considerations.  His opponents would make it a 
campaign issue and opposition in the National Assembly 
would try to block his request.  (NOTE: The Nigerian 
constitution requires that Obasanjo seek Assembly approval 
for the deployment.  END NOTE.)  Chambas said the GON could 
not seriously consider deploying troops to Cote d'Ivoire 
until after the April elections. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
WHO WILL BE THE NEXT ECOWAS CHAIRMAN 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) Despite Wade's erratic performance, Chambas thought 
Wade would be re-elected as Chairman at the ECOWAS Summit 
later this month. The rotation should go to an Anglophone 
country and Gambia's Jammeh had been lobbying for the 
position. Jammeh visited Obasanjo in December to ask for 
his support. Chambas said Obasanjo's response fell far 
short of an endorsement with Obasanjo simply telling the 
Gambian he was not opposed to Jammeh seeking the 
Chairmanship. Chambas did not think Jammeh would garner 
much support and felt Presidents Kufuor and Kabbah would be 
better choices if Wade's return somehow was blocked. 
Liberia's Taylor was out of the question. Chambas said, 
however, that Kuofor would not lobby for the position but 
would serve if drafted. 
 
 
--------------- 
TROUBLE IN TOGO 
--------------- 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Finally, the discussion turned to recent events in 
Togo.  Chambas was troubled by the recent change to Togo's 
constitution to allow Eyadema another term in office (REF 
C).  He commented that over the course of the last year, 
Eyadema had been signaling that he had no intention of 
leaving office at the end of his term.  Chambas worried 
that failure to include the Togolese opposition in the 
political process would put Togo on the same path as Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶14.  (C) Chambas is an old friend of the Ambassador's. 
This was a relaxed evening and he was at ease.  Chambas 
provided an interesting and very candid reading of the 
internal frictions plaguing ECOWAS Heads of State and their 
efforts in Cote d'Ivoire.  Implicit in his analysis was 
that he was not in a position to stop the internecine 
squabbling.  He seemed to think that Obasanjo, if 
sufficiently engaged, was best placed to serve this 
function.  We agree.  The upcoming ECOWAS summit will be 
important. Without a truce between the ECOWAS leader, they 
will continue to squabble and their disaccord will hamper 
the Ivoirien process. 
JETER