This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR H. THOMAS; 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11-14-12 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS ECON SOCI CE LTTE
SUBJECT:  Tigers gradually expand network of control in 
the east, as security forces watch and Muslims fret 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 2101 
 
-      (B) Colombo 1180, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.  Reasons 
1.5 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  A Mission team visited Sri Lanka's 
Eastern Province on November 12.  On the surface, the 
situation in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts seemed 
calm, with the ceasefire sparking increased business 
activity and civilian bustle.  Amid this positive news, 
there were clear and troubling indications that the 
Tamil Tigers are gradually strengthening their political 
and military position.  GSL security forces seemed 
marginalized, with human rights observers expressing 
deep concern about LTTE activities.  Muslims were 
increasingly worked up about the apparent surge in LTTE 
influence.  Given the disturbing trends acting under the 
surface calm, continued communal friction and violence 
appear a near certainty.  END SUMMARY. 
 
=============================== 
Calm on the Surface in the East 
=============================== 
 
¶2.  (SBU) DCM and polchief visited Sri Lanka's Eastern 
Province on November 12.  The visit focused on the 
province's Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, with the 
team stopping in the towns of Batticaloa, Karativu, and 
Akkaraipattu.  During the course of the visit, the team 
also closely observed the prevailing situation along a 
80-mile stretch of the main coastal road from Vandeloos 
Bay in the north to Arugam Bay in the south. 
 
¶3.  (C) On the surface at least, the situation seemed 
quite calm.  Compared to visits by Mission teams earlier 
this year (see Ref B), there were very few government 
security forces patrolling the roads.  Most of the 
military checkpoints had also been dismantled, a factor 
greatly easing freedom of movement for civilians. 
Markets were bustling in all of the towns.  A relatively 
poorer area than Colombo, there remained very few cars 
on the roads in the east, but there was significant 
traffic in buses, tractors (often used to carry 
passengers), and scooters.  Due to an easing in 
government regulations per the February ceasefire 
accord, the fishing industry -- which is important in 
the east -- was back on its feet to a large extent, a 
factor contributing to an improved economic outlook. 
 
============================================= ==== 
Tigers Strengthen Political and Military Position 
============================================= ==== 
 
¶4.  (C) Amid this positive news, there were clear and 
troubling indications that the Tamil Tigers are 
gradually expanding their network of political and 
military control.  In terms of the optics alone, the 
Tiger presence was a bit jarring.  The team, for 
example, passed well over a dozen "political" offices 
newly opened by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Tamil-dominated towns.  The offices were 
clearly marked with large, professionally made signs 
portraying a roaring Tiger flanked by two assault guns. 
Red and yellow streamers (the LTTE colors) hung outside 
the offices, boldly announcing their presence. 
 
¶5.  (C) Beyond the amazing optics, interlocutors also 
told a tale of expanding Tiger control.  Reciting for 
the team a long litany of concerns about LTTE 
activities, Colonel Silva, the Batticaloa-based 
commander of the Sri Lankan Army's 233 Brigade, 
confirmed recent newspaper reports that the LTTE was 
opening up "courts" and "police posts" in areas the 
group controls in the east.  (Note:  This a new trend. 
The LTTE has been opening up such offices in the areas 
it controls in the north for some time, but only lately 
has it begun to do so in the east.)  Silva confirmed 
reports that the LTTE had basically intimidated Tamils 
in the east to use its "police" and "court" system, even 
kidnapping Tamils living in government-controlled areas 
to ensure their appearance in "court."  K.L.M. 
Sarathchandra, the commander of the highly trained 
Special Task Force (STF) police in the Batticaloa/Ampara 
sector, told the team that Tamils -- a plurality of the 
population in the east -- were basically avoiding the 
GSL police and legal system.  Sarathchandra and Silva 
indicated that the security forces -- while concerned -- 
really could not do much to stop the LTTE from these 
activities without undermining the ceasefire. 
 
¶6.  (C) In addition to its efforts to enhance its civil 
apparatus, the LTTE also seems to be steadily augmenting 
its military position.  Colonel Silva estimated that 
LTTE cadre numbers in the east had increased to 8,000 at 
present from about 2,000 before the ceasefire went into 
effect.  Many of these cadre were dealing with political 
matters, but all of them had received at least some 
military training.  In the meantime, the LTTE was also 
working to strengthen its base fortifications, 
stockpiling arms and ammunition, and expanding its 
network of military bases.  Sarathchandra noted that the 
LTTE had recently constructed a new base in northern 
Ampara, which was its closest yet to the coast.  Despite 
the apparent surge in LTTE military strength, Silva 
indicated that he was confident that his forces could 
defend their positions adequately if the Tigers were to 
launch a surprise attack.  Silva and Sarathchandra, 
however, both allowed that government security forces 
were stuck in static positions and increasingly 
marginalized as a force in the east.  DCM noted that any 
notion that the Sri Lankan security forces would 
completely withdraw from the north and east, as some 
pro-LTTE Tamils were advocating, was a non-starter. 
 
============================= 
Human Rights Concerns re LTTE 
============================= 
 
¶7.  (C) Human rights observers expressed deep concern 
about LTTE activities.  Father Harry Miller, an Amcit 
Jesuit priest who has lived in the east since 1948, told 
the team that the LTTE was steadily increasing its 
pressure on the local Tamil population.  The LTTE was 
"taxing" Tamils and also forcibly recruiting youths.  If 
citizens objected to LTTE demands, they were threatened 
and harassed into backing down.  Miller related that the 
school he teaches at had been a target:  the LTTE had 
recently dragooned a number of schoolchildren to do work 
at one of its camps.  The children had been released, 
but one had died in a fall off a tractor. 
 
¶8.  (C) Confirming the thread of Miller's comments, Helen 
Peters, the acting head of the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) office in Batticaloa, also 
told the team that her office had received dozens of 
reports that the LTTE had seized houses owned by Tamils 
in the district.  The LTTE's apparent belief was that no 
one should have more than one house -- if they did, it 
was important that they contribute it to the cause, 
i.e., the LTTE and its push for Tamil rights.  Peters 
and Miller stressed that security forces were 
essentially doing nothing to counter the LTTE's 
activities.  The SLMM was trying to keep track of the 
situation and was raising concerns on human rights 
issues during meetings with LTTE officials, however. 
(Note:  Miller's comments expressing concern that 
government security forces were taking too soft an 
approach were a bit of a change in tune for him.  For 
many years, he had consistently complained about GSL 
human rights violations against Tamils and not about 
LTTE activities.) 
 
================= 
Deep Muslim Anger 
================= 
 
¶9.  (C) Muslims are increasingly worked up about the 
apparent surge in LTTE influence.  In a meeting with a 
group of Muslims at Southeastern University, the team 
was told that Muslims felt that the LTTE was slowly but 
surely working to take over the Eastern Province. 
M.L.A. Cader, the vice-chancellor of the university, was 
adamant that eastern Muslims had to take steps to ensure 
that the government in Colombo heard their concerns. 
Muslims felt they were being "abandoned" and "sold out" 
by a government eager to make peace at any price with 
the LTTE.  Cader bitterly criticized Rauf Hakeem, the 
head of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), asserting 
that Hakeem did not care about eastern Muslims and was 
only interested in maintaining his ministerial position 
in the government.  On the human rights side, Cader 
admitted that "LTTE pressure" on Muslims was a bit less 
of late.  Cader thought that this was clearly a tactic 
on the LTTE's part meant to quiet critics, while the 
group continued its efforts to isolate Muslims and 
marginalize the security forces.  In response to Cader's 
concerns, the U.S. team underscored strong support for 
the peace process, stressing that the U.S. urged all 
sides to work together and exercise restraint. 
 
¶10.  (C) (((Note:  The U.S. team repeatedly asked 
interlocutors about continuing reports of Muslim 
extremism in the east.  Most observers had little clear- 
cut information about the matter and Muslim 
interlocutors denied it was a factor.  Nonetheless, the 
team did notice many new mosques under construction and 
various "Islamic foundation" offices operating in Muslim 
towns.  It is hard to see how eastern Muslims could 
afford to pay for the construction of all the new 
mosques, so it would seem possible that Middle Eastern 
money is coming in, as some claim.  When queried, Sri 
Lankan security forces replied that they had not seen 
any Arabs or Pakistanis visiting the region.  GSL 
officials added that they just were not sure what was 
going on in Muslim areas, however.  They had heard of 
small extremist groups with names like "Jihad" and 
"Osama" operating in the east, but did not think they 
were much of a threat to the peace.  Pro-LTTE Tamils 
that the team met with repeatedly claimed that Muslims 
were radicalized, and armed and dangerous.  One pro-LTTE 
figure, V. Kamaladas, the head of a local NGO Forum for 
the east, basically indicated that the U.S. and the LTTE 
should join together to defeat the Muslims!  End 
Note.))) 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶11.  (C) It is good news that the ceasefire seems to be 
working to allow increased economic activity in the 
east, a factor which may act to reinforce the peace 
process.  Moreover, the LTTE seems to have loosened its 
grip on the Muslim community to a large extent.  These 
factors are net positives, but given the disturbing 
trends acting under the surface calm, most especially 
the LTTE's surge in influence, renewed Muslim-LTTE 
friction appears a near certainty.  Communal battle 
lines are hardening (as witnessed by the sprouting of 
LTTE offices and new mosques) and it is probable that 
flashpoints will erupt again soon.  The GSL, meanwhile, 
seems inclined to hope for the best, but its major focus 
appears to be ensuring that the peace process with the 
LTTE is not disrupted.  That said, despite its apparent 
marginalization, the government still seems intent on 
remaining a force in the east.  There is no indication 
that it plans to withdraw its troops on the ground, for 
example, a policy which if put in motion could prove 
profoundly destabilizing.   END COMMENT. 
¶12.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS