This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
LONDON FOR C.GURNEY -- PASS TO A/S KANSTEINER AND AMB. 
JETER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 11/04/12 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AFENIFERE LEADER SAYS "NO" TO A NORTHERN 
PRESIDENT 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 2990 
 
 
CLASSIFED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 23 Lagos meeting 
with Ambassador Jeter, Afenifere leader Senator 
Abraham Adesanya labeled the impeachment threat 
against Obasanjo a ruse to return national political 
power to the North. Although not an Obasanjo 
supporter, Adesanya was adamant that the Presidency 
remain in Southern hands after the 2003 elections. 
Adesanya felt a national conference was needed to 
establish a national consensus before unbridled 
political competition degenerated into something more 
regrettable -- disunion. The Afenifere head believed a 
key to alleviating the mounting tension surrounding 
the 203 election was the swift enactment of a 
constitutional amendment limiting the President and 
Governors to one five-year term in office. End Summary 
 
 
 --------------------------------------------- ---- 
 OBASANJO TRICKED THE NORTH; NOW THEY WANT HIS JOB 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
¶2. (C) On October 23, Ambassador Jeter met Senator 
Adesanya, head of "Afenifere," the preeminent Yoruba 
socio-cultural organization, at Adesanya's Lagos 
residence. Adesanya was joined by former Babangida era 
Foreign Minister A. Bola Akinyemi (1985-87), now a 
close Adesanya aide.  Ambassador Jeter was accompanied 
by his Staff Assistant and PolCouns. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Adesanya, a rather spry and energetic 
octogenarian, began the substantive discussion by 
claiming that Obasanjo was wandering in a political no 
man's land because he had broken rank with the 
Northern establishment who "selected" him into office 
in 1999.  The North misread Obasanjo, thinking he was 
the same malleable Head of State who allowed his 
deputy Shehu Yar'Adua, a Northerner, to call many of 
the shots from 1976-79. In his second coming, Obasanjo 
was bent on being his own man, to the chagrin of 
Northern king makers who thought their electoral 
support had tied enough strings to Obasanjo to control 
him, Adesanya postulated. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
TIME FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NOW! 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) While visibly delighted that Obasanjo's 
bullheadedness had foiled these perceived Northern 
machinations, Adesanya nonetheless criticized 
Obasanjo's stubbornness in not embracing the idea of a 
national conference. Obasanjo was out of step with 
dominant thought in his own Southwestern region, 
Adesanya complained. The President's lack of 
commanding support in Yorubaland was traceable, to a 
large extent, to his ambivalence regarding a national 
conference. Obasanjo was apprehensive the conference, 
once convened, might veer from the stated purpose of 
Nigerian unity to become the prelude to Nigeria's 
dismemberment. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Yet, most Yorubas supported the idea and still 
wanted Nigeria to remain united; however, Adesanya 
explained that his people were absolutely tired of 
investing more in Nigeria than what they derived from 
it while other areas (i.e. the North) gave little and 
got much. A national conference was needed to 
establish the heretofore-elusive national consensus. 
The conference also was required to determine "who we 
are and what we will do" as Nigerians, he expounded. 
Without such a harmonizing conference, a terrible day 
of reckoning awaited the country, Adesanya forecasted. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Adesanya dismissed the present constitution and 
its 1979 antecedent as not fitting the bill.  Both 
instruments were, in part, the work of conferences of 
eminent persons.  However, these conferences were 
convened and controlled by then reigning military 
governments. Moreover, military Heads of State, 
including Obasanjo in 1979, could and did unilaterally 
change the documents presented to him by the 
deliberative assembly. Because these constitutions 
were, from their inception, subject to the caprice of 
a single individual, the documents never gained the 
sanctity and the respect usually reposed in the 
parchment containing a nation's organic law. 
---------------------- 
PATRIOTS TO THE RESCUE 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Adesanya, also a key member of the "Patriots" 
by virtue of his leadership of Afenifere, said he 
endorsed the Patriots' public statement asking 
Obasanjo to forego a second term.  While asking 
Obasanjo not to seek reelection, he stressed the 
Patriots had opposed the impeachment threat against 
Obasanjo. "Why did the House wait so long to object to 
Obasanjo's alleged wrongdoings?" queried Adesanya. 
Due to their prolonged silence on some matters and 
active complacency on others, the House " was 
estopped" from fustigating the President to the point 
of seeking his removal.  If Obasanjo must go, the 
lawmakers should go as well, declared Adesanya. At 
this late stage in the electoral calendar, the 
Patriots believed that impeachment was remarkably ill 
timed. Adesanya denigrated impeachment advocates as 
political "troublemakers" bent on shifting power from 
the Southwest back to the North, since VP Atiku would 
have assumed the Presidency upon Obasanjo's removal. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The Northern politicians mistakenly thought 
they could threaten Obasanjo with impeachment because 
they supported his 1999 election more than his own 
Yoruba clan. However, on becoming President, Obasanjo 
also came to represent the South's ability to govern 
the nation. Thus, impeachment was not just about 
Obasanjo and his alleged wrongs. Northern moves to 
impeach him were tantamount to a coup in the eyes of 
the South and thus had kindled regional antagonism, 
Adesanya declared. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
A SOUTHERN PRESIDENT, JUST NOT OBASANJO 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶9. (C) The Patriots believed power should remain in 
Southern hands after the coming election.  Adesanya 
explained the group was established several years ago 
by Southwestern and Southeastern politicians 
frustrated that the North had controlled national 
politics by playing the two Southern zones against 
each other.  In the Patriots, the Southwest was 
represented mainly by members of Afenifere and the 
Southeast by Ohaneze Ndigbo.  Later, the Union of 
Delta States brought the South-South into the fold. 
Membership was also extended to some key opinion 
makers from the Middle Belt as well. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
FIVE TIMES ONE IS BETTER THAN FOUR TIMES TWO 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) The Patriots backed the proposed 
constitutional amendment of one five-year term for the 
President and State Governors, believing the change 
would reduce political tension.  Adesanya claimed that 
politics was becoming too rabid because many office- 
holders sought to secure second terms even in the face 
of adamant, powerful opposition against their return. 
The only way to avoid spiraling tension was to 
constitutionalize the one-term requirement.  The 
former Senator commented that the requirement had the 
salutary benefit of postponing elections for a year -- 
hopefully giving the woefully unprepared Independent 
National Electoral Commission time to plan for 
elections in 2004 instead of early 2003. 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Adesanya further explained that, if Obasanjo 
were given an extra year but not allowed to contest 
again, he would have an incentive to ensure that INEC 
was effective and impartial. Obasanjo's political 
legacy would not be based on his re-election but on 
the quality of his oversight of the first successful 
civilian-to-civilian election and transfer of power in 
Nigeria's history.  Adesanya felt the amendment could 
be passed quickly, provided the State Legislatures 
acted fast. However, he acknowledged that most State 
Governors would oppose the measure and that, unlike 
the President's relationship with the National 
Assembly, the state executives exercised great 
influence over their respective Houses of Assembly. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
NORTHERN CANDIDATES PROSPECTS IN THE SOUTH 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
¶12. (C) Responding to questions from Ambassador Jeter, 
Adesanya predicted that VP Atiku would have trouble 
gaining support in the Southwest if he wrestled the 
PDP nomination from Obasanjo. While Obasanjo was not 
highly popular, he was Yoruba and "this transcended 
personality."  Atiku's candidacy would be negatively 
viewed as a premature " power shift" because 
Northerners believed the Presidency was their 
birthright and could not countenance seeing an 
independent Southerner at the helm. Adesanya predicted 
strong opposition would also confront Atiku in the 
South-South and the Southeast. 
 
 
¶13.  (C) The Afenifere leader discounted that Atiku 
could make inroads by selecting a Yoruba, such as 
longtime Atiku friend Lagos State Governor Tinubu, as 
his Vice Presidential running mate. Suggesting Tinubu 
was already in Afenifere's doghouse, Adesanya quipped 
Tinubu was having too much trouble running Lagos to 
aspire to the headache of governing the rest of 
Nigeria.  Adesanya doubted if Tinubu would have the 
effrontery to team with Atiku. Chuckling "we will 
cross that bridge when we get to it," Adesanya left 
the clear impression that he would relish the chance 
to teach the Lagos Governor a few old-fashioned 
lessons about internal Yoruba politics. 
 
 
¶14. (C) Regarding former Head of State Babangida, 
Adesanya said he would also find difficulty in the 
Southwest. Adesanya expostulated that former Head of 
State Mohammedu Buhari's candidacy was wholly bad and 
incapable of generating support due to Buhari's 
perceived Northern Moslem chauvinism. (Comment: Former 
Babangida Foreign Minister Akinyemi told the 
Ambassador in an aside before the meeting with 
Adesanya that Babangida would win 40 percent of the 
vote in the Southwest. While the old guard might 
oppose Babangida, Akinyemi thought Babangida would be 
supported by numbers of the younger-generation 
politicians and the professional class. The extensive 
network Babangida had developed and the favors doled 
out over the years would help immensely in the 
Southwest, Akinyemi thought. End Comment.) 
 
 
¶15. (C) Adesanya contended that any Southern 
politician perceived as a front man for Northern 
interests would have a difficult time gaining support 
in the Southwest.  Reports that Alex Ekwueme was being 
courted as a potential candidate by the Northern 
establishment would hurt the esteemed Igbo in the 
Southwest, Adesany gauged. The South, particularly the 
Southwest, will no longer be duped by Northern 
political maneuvering, Adesanya concluded. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶16. (C) Senator Adesanya had the look and energy level 
of a man a score or more younger than his eighty 
years. (Adesanya recently celebrated his 80th 
birthday.) Regarding President Obasanjo, Adesanya gave 
a Yoruba perspective markedly different from that of 
the Ooni of Ife's unabashed support for the President 
(reftel).  While both men claim to represent the true 
Yoruba perspective, the Ooni saw Obasanjo as 
indispensable to Nigeria's stability; Adesanya said 
Obasanjo could go but the Presidency must remain below 
Nigeria's Mason-Dixon line, at least, for the next 
presidential term. 
 
 
¶17.  (C) The point on which both the Ooni and Adesanya 
agree is that Northern politicians are attempting to 
recapture power in 2003.  Both men are allied in 
asserting that the Yoruba Southwest will react 
vehemently to this prospective retaking of political 
power by the North.  End Comment. 
ANDREWS