This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001741 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/OP/NEA 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
MANILA FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
LONDON FOR POL - RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2012 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS STAGE MAJOR ATTACKS IN EAST AND WEST 
 
REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1693 
     ¶B. (B) KATHMANDU 1674 
     ¶C. (C) KATHMANDU 1589 
     ¶D. (D) KATHMANDU 0379 
 
Classified By: Amb. Malinowski.  Reason:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU)  In their largest actions against the security 
forces since the onset of the monsoon in May, late September 
7 Maoist insurgents attacked a police post in a remote area 
of eastern Sindhuli District, about 100 km southeast of 
Kathmandu, and the local government headquarters in 
Arghakanchi District, about 200 km southwest of Kathmandu, 
late September 8.  At least 90 police and 17 soldiers have 
been killed in both attacks.  Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldiers 
pursued and and have engaged Maoists fleeing northwest after 
the attack in Arghakhanchi.  As of COB September 9, fighting 
between the RNA and Maoists was continuing on the border 
between Arghakhanchi and Pyuthan Districts.  The success and 
scale of both operations, which occurred almost exactly 24 
hours but more than 300 km apart, indicate that the Maoists 
likely used the monsoon lull from June to August to 
consolidate and reorganize their forces after losses incurred 
in May.  The twin attacks will force Prime Minister Deuba to 
consider possible re-imposition of the state of emergency, 
which expired August 28.  End summary. 
 
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POLICE POST IN EAST OVERRUN . . . 
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¶2.  (U) In the early morning hours of September 8, Maoist 
insurgents attacked a remote police post in Bhiman, Sindhuli 
District, approximately 100 km southeast of Kathmandu.  At 
least 49 policemen (out of a total force of 73) were killed 
and 22 wounded.  The remaining two policemen were reported 
missing.  The Nepali press reported six bodies of suspected 
Maoist guerrillas were found in the vicinity of the police 
post. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The attack began about 11:45 p.m. the night of 
September 7.  Many of the more senior policemen killed were 
reportedly shot at close range in the head, indicating that 
they may have surrendered before being executed.  As in 
previous attacks on remote installations, the insurgents cut 
down trees to barricade roads and prevent reinforcements from 
reaching the site.   Unlike previous attacks on police posts, 
however, in which the Maoists looted most of the weapons from 
their fallen enemy, many of the dead policemen's .303 Enfield 
rifles were found still lying near their bodies. 
 
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. . . AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IN WEST 
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¶4.  (SBU) At about 11:30 p.m. the night of September 8, 
insurgents attacked the district headquarters in 
Arghakhanchi, about 200 km southwest of Kathmandu, hitting 
the police headquarters first.  Radio communications with the 
district were cut almost immediately thereafter, complicating 
the flow of information from the site.  Fighting continued 
for about five hours thereafter.  A total of 161 regular 
police, 30 members of the paramilitary Armed Police Force 
(APF), and 50 soldiers of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) were 
stationed at the headquarters.  Initial reports indicate 32 
policemen, 9 members of the APF, and 17 RNA soldiers were 
killed in the attack.  An additional 22 policemen, including 
the highest-ranking officer in the district, 2 members of the 
APF, and 4 soldiers were wounded. 
¶5.  (SBU)  An RNA helicopter was unable to reach the site 
until approximately nine hours after the battle began, 
reportedly because of adverse weather conditions.  One of the 
helicpoter crew said that he observed a number of local 
government offices in flames, as well as many bodies 
scattered on the ground.  The Chief District Officer, the 
ranking civil servant in the district, was in Kathmandu at 
the time of the attack.  Initial reports list the Assistant 
Chief District Officer as missing.  There were no other 
reports of potential civilian casualties. 
¶6.  (C)  According to a source at RNA Headquarters, unlike 
the attack in Sindhuli, the insurgents succeeded in stealing 
a significant number of weapons from both the police 
headquarters and from the military barracks.  RNA 
reinforcements are pursuing Maoist combatants, who are headed 
northwest toward the border with the neighboring district of 
Pyuthan.  As of COB September 9, fighting was continuing on 
the Arghakhanchi-Pyuthan border, under the direction of the 
commander of the 3rd Brigade. 
 
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MORE PRE-BANDH VIOLENCE 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Before the twin attacks on Sindhuli and 
Arghakhanchi, Maoists continued their campaign of violence in 
apparent preparation for their self-proclaimed general 
strike, or "bandh," September 16, by destroying local 
government offices in two districts near Kathmandu.  A total 
of nine Village Development Committee (VDC) offices and 
several health posts were destroyed over the past week in 
Kavre District, which is about 25 km southeast of Kathmandu. 
On September 7 armed Maoists destroyed eight VDC buildings in 
Sindhupalchowk District, about 45 km northeast of Kathmandu, 
and another two VDC buildings in Tehrathum District in the 
far-eastern part of the country. 
 
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INDIAN COOPERATION 
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¶8.  (C)  On September 8 Nepal's Ambassador to India Bekh 
Thapa confirmed to the Ambassador that the Indian government 
had handed over to Nepali authorities Bamdev Chhetri, the 
Secretary of the banned Indian-Nepal Unity Society.  Chhetri 
 
SIPDIS 
was reportedly arrested in Delhi.  Thapa said Chhetri had 
been under surveillance by the Indian authorities for some 
time before his arrest.  According to Nepali police sources, 
following his arrest in Delhi Chhetri was turned over to 
Indian border police, who then turned him over to police in 
Nepalganj, in southwestern Nepal, where the RNA took custody 
of him.  Chhetri is the highest-ranking Maoist turned over to 
Nepali authorities by the Indian government. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶9.  (C)  The operation in Arghakhanchi is the first attack on 
a district headquarters since February, when the Maoists 
launched a devastating assault in Achham, in far-western 
Nepal, that leveled the capital (Ref D).  The attacks in 
Sindhuli and Arghakhanchi mark the first resumption of the 
Maoists' classic tactic--large-scale, nighttime attacks on 
fixed positions held by the security forces--since May, right 
before the onset of the monsoon.  With the monsoon now over, 
most observers were expecting a resumption of hostilities 
from the Maoists.  Over the past few weeks RNA sources have 
told us their intelligence had indications of preparations 
for a major Maoist attack in the east (Ref C).  We had not 
heard, however, of indications of a two-pronged attack--just 
one day apart--in separate parts of the country.  The success 
of these two operations indicates that the Maoists, however 
bruised and battered they may have been by a series of 
defeats in May and June, still command sufficient resources 
and manpower and have adequate communications capability to 
launch two near-simultaneous attacks over wide distances in 
different parts of the country.  Although the RNA is engaging 
the Maoists on the Pyuthan-Arghakhanchi border, the fact that 
the government did not see these attacks coming--in spite of 
its purported intelligence reports--and that the security 
forces were unable to repulse them will do little to instill 
public confidence in in the ability of the RNA and police to 
protect the general population from Maoist violence before 
and during the September 16 bandh and November 13 general 
elections.  The Prime Minister, whose attention has been 
distracted from the conflict by intra-party political 
wrangling, will now have to refocus on the security situation 
in the country, including possible re-imposition of the state 
of emergency, which expired August 28. 
MALINOWSKI