This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC LEADER TSVANGIRAI ON THE WAY FORWARD 
 
REF: HARARE 1136 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political section chief Matt Harrington. 
Reasons: 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai told us his 
party is pursuing a four-pronged strategy in the election 
aftermath: participating in the (now stalled) inter-party 
dialogue; challenging the election result in court; 
organizing mass action; and encouraging increased 
international pressure on the Mugabe regime.  President 
Obasanjo reportedly told the MDC the talks would continue 
despite ZANU-PF's request for a suspension, even if he had to 
travel to Harare personally.  Tsvangirai is skeptical the 
court case will result in overturning the election result, 
but will expose the fraudulent tactics the ruling party 
employed to win.  The party's supporters are waiting for 
Tsvangirai's word to proceed with strikes and peaceful 
 
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demonstrations, but the MDC leader wants to ensure the timing 
is right before giving such an instruction.  Tsvangirai 
acknowledged that some radical elements have encouraged the 
party to engage in violent resistance, but he claims to have 
discouraged them and appears genuinely committed to peaceful 
change.  End Summary. 
 
Inter-party talks 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a May 14 breakfast with MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai, the Ambassador, joined by polchief, asked about 
 
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the opposition's thinking on the way forward.  Tsvangirai 
replied that the MDC is pursuing a four-pronged strategy 
focused on increasing the pressure on President Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF.  The first element is the (stalled) inter-party 
dialogue.  Tsvangirai expressed his belief that Mugabe had 
instructed his negotiating team to pull back because he 
feared he would not be able to control where the talks led. 
He reported that Nigerian President Obasanjo had told MDC 
Vice-President Gibson Sibanda several days before in Abuja 
that the talks would go on even if Obasanjo had to travel 
personally to Harare to make that happen.  Although the 
facilitators are trying to convince ZANU-PF to reverse its 
position, the MDC, he said, is now operating on the 
assumption that the talks will not resume.  To reengage, the 
MDC would have to be convinced that the ruling party was 
sincere about making progress, and did not insist on 
precondictions for dialogue.  "Look," Tsvangirai stressed, 
"I've come under significant pressure for participating in 
these talks at all," given the serious doubts about Mugabe's 
legitimacy.  "Many of our supporters are afraid we're going 
to get hoodwinked."  (Comment:  later on May 14, the Nigerian 
High Commissioner told us the facilitators are actively 
pressing for resumption of the talks and were scheduled to 
meet with President Mugabe at noon.  They were strung along 
by the ruling party side without a definitive answer most of 
May 13.) 
 
Legal challenge 
--------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The second element of the MDC's post-election 
strategy is the recently-filed court challenge of the 
election results.  ZANU-PF, he said, seems at a loss as to 
how to respond.  He is dubious that the election result will 
be overturned, asking "who would have the courage to deliver 
such a ruling?"  The real value of the legal case, however, 
is that it provides a public forum for the exposure of the 
ruling party's electoral tactics. 
 
Mass action 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Ultimately, Tsvangirai thought peaceful mass action 
in the form of strikes and demonstrations might be the most 
effective course of action.  He noted that he has been 
holding well-attended rallies around the country, where the 
crowds have pressed hard for the party to "do something" to 
stanch the continued political and economic decline.  The 
Ambassador asked whether the MDC would lead such an effort, 
or whether it would be more appropriate or effective for an 
organization such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) to be in the forefront.  The MDC is the appropriate 
actor, he replied, as the Zimbabwean crisis is caused by 
broad political and economic issues and is not, at its core, 
a labor problem.  People around the country are waiting for 
his word to launch mass action, Tsvangirai said, but he wants 
to ensure the timing is right.  Asked whether such action 
could be imminent, the MDC leader replied in the affirmative. 
 (Note:  Tsvangirai's special advisor, Gandi Mudzingwa, told 
us several days earlier that mass action could begin as early 
as late May.  End Note.) 
International pressure 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Continued international pressure on the Mugabe regime 
is crucial to a positive resolution of the crisis here, 
Tsvangirai insisted.  Targeted sanctions were helpful, and he 
 
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urged that those measures currently in place be broadened and 
toughened.  The degree of international attention on Zimbabwe 
would also be an important factor in the timing of mass 
action.  Tsvangirai said he wanted to avoid giving the 
instruction to proceed if the international community was, at 
that moment, consumed by major developments or crises in 
another part of the world. 
 
Paramilitary planning 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador told Tsvangirai that some people -- 
most of them outside the MDC's formal party structure -- 
have, in recent conversations with us, advocated an 
unconventional paramilitary campaign against the government. 
Such an approach, he warned, could give the government the 
excuse it has long sought to crush the MDC.  It would also 
have little prospect of success, since the instruments of 
force are overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the 
ruling party.  The Ambassador said we had strongly 
discouraged these interlocutors from engaging in such 
activity and he hoped that Tsvangirai would do the same if 
approached.  The MDC leader replied that every party contains 
radical elements, and he acknowledged that some had urged him 
to pursue the road of violent resistance.  He said that some 
ex-Rhodesians who wanted the MDC to adopt their violent ideas 
were also being turned aside.  Tsvangirai agreed that such an 
approach could have disastrous consequences and, despite 
criticism from some quarters that he is a weak leader, 
continues to believe in and press for peaceful change. 
 
Less violence, but more discrimination in food distribution 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Tsvangirai believed that violence against MDC 
supporters in rural areas has begun to ease.  His primary 
worry in rural areas is the political manipulation of food, 
particularly that MDC supporters are being denied access to 
scarce food supplies controlled by the government's Grain 
Marketing Board. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Tsvangirai did not seem disappointed by ZANU-PF's 
reluctance to continue with the inter-party dialogue.  He had 
low expectations anyway, and ZANU-PF's apparent intransigence 
can only help the MDC's diplomatic efforts to ramp up the 
pressure on the Mugabe regime.  However, if the facilitators 
convince the ruling party to come back to the table, the MDC 
will feel immense pressure to follow suit, notwithstanding 
Tsvangirai's rejection of preconditions.  The opposition 
 
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party has been working actively with its structures around 
the country to organize mass action, but it is not clear to 
us how successful those efforts have been.  MDC rallies have 
had good turnouts for a non-election period.  We believe 
Tsvangirai remains convinced for now that peaceful resistance 
 
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is the best way to effect positive change and we will 
continue to strongly counsel him in this direction. 
SULLIVAN