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Viewing cable 02HANOI528, VIETNAM'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS: WHAT DID WE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02HANOI528 2002-03-07 10:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071004Z Mar 02

 2002HANOI00528 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2038

PAGE 01        HANOI  00528  01 OF 02  071026Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00    
      FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   NSAE-00  SSO-00   
      SS-00    DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /002W
                  ------------------70C626  071026Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5712
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 
NSC WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM (P.LEWIS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECLASS 3/8/12 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL PGOV PINS SOCI VM CB ETMIN HUMANR RELFREE
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS: WHAT DID WE 
LEARN? 
 
REF:  A) HO CHI MINH CITY 00201, 00202, 00203 
 
B) HO CHI MINH CITY 00039 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: EMI LYNN YAMAUCHI, CONSUL GENERAL, 
REASON 1.5(D) 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  00528  01 OF 02  071026Z 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  DURING A 2.5-DAY VISIT TO DAK 
LAK, GIA LAI, AND KON TUM PROVINCES, CONGENOFFS MET 
WITH MONTAGNARD RETURNEES FROM CAMBODIA AND WITH 
PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES.  REFTELS A ARE THE 
DETAILED ACCOUNTS.  THESE ARE OUR CONCLUSIONS. ECONOMIC HARDSHIP 
AND LAND DISPUTES SEEM TO BE THE PRIMARY REASONS WHY THIS GROUP 
OF RETURNEES HAD LEFT.  WE FOUND THE PROVINCIAL 
AUTHORITIES WELL-INTENTIONED ABOUT PROVIDING MATERIAL 
SUPPORT TO THEIR RETURNEES, BUT WORRIED ABOUT 
RESOURCES FOR THE LONG-TERM.  THERE WAS NO ATMOSPHERE 
OF OVERT FEAR OR REPRESSION IN THE THREE VILLAGES WE 
VISITED, NOR DID ANY RETURNEES CLAIM PHYSICAL 
MISTREATMENT AT THE HANDS OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) ECONOMICS, NOT RELIGION:  UNLIKE MANY OF 
THOSE ETHNIC MINORITIES WHO FLED VIETNAM DURING SPRING 
2001, WE BELIEVE THE RETURNEES WE MET LEFT PRIMARILY 
FOR ECONOMIC REASONS.  THEY GREW COFFEE, COTTON, CORN, 
AND CASSAVA, CROPS WHOSE PRICES HAD DIPPED OR WHICH 
WERE NOT BIG MONEYMAKERS TO BEGIN WITH.  THE CHAIRMAN 
OF DAK LAK'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION ACKNOWLEDGED 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT ECONOMIC HARDSHIP 
IN THE VILLAGES. 
 
3. (C) SOME VILLAGE LAND ALLOCATIONS WERE ON THE SMALL 
SIDE - GIVEN LARGE FAMILY SIZE (5.5 CHILDREN AMONG 
ETHNIC MINORITIES IN KON TUM).  WE HEARD ABOUT ONE 
SPECIFIC LAND DISPUTE INVOLVING ETHNIC MINORITIES - AS 
PLAINTIFFS, DEFENDANTS, AND CORRUPT LOCAL OFFICIALS. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00528  01 OF 02  071026Z 
ETHNIC MINORITY VILLAGE AND COMMUNE LEADERS "SOLD" 
LAND BELONGING TO ANOTHER VILLAGER WITHOUT HIS 
PERMISSION, AND ISSUED LAND-USE CERTIFICATES TO THE 
NEW ETHNIC MINORITY OWNERS.  ACCORDING TO THE VILLAGER'S WIFE, HE 
LEFT FOR CAMBODIA WHEN HIS SECOND PETITION FOR A HEARING HAD GONE 
UNANSWERED. 
 
4. (SBU) WE DO NOT BELIEVE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION WAS 
THE REASON THESE VILLAGERS LEFT VIETNAM.   MOST OF THE 
VILLAGERS WE MET DURING THE TRIP WERE PROTESTANTS (NOT 
PARTICULARLY SURPRISING BECAUSE ETHNIC MINORITIES 
COMPRISE A SIZEABLE PERCENTAGE OF PROTESTANT AND 
CATHOLIC BELIEVERS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS), WHO 
PRACTICED THEIR FAITH IN VARYING DEGREES.  THE 
RETURNEES ANSWERED OUR QUESTIONS ABOUT RELIGION 
MATTER-OF-FACTLY AND CALMLY.  RESIDENTS OF ONE VILLAGE 
TOOK CONGENOFFS TO THEIR WORSHIP HOUSE.  ALL OF THE 
PROTESTANT RETURNEES WE SPOKE TO SAID THEY WERE 
ALLOWED TO PRACTICE THEIR FAITH, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. 
 
5. (C) ONE RETURNEE SAID THAT IT WAS "DIFFICULT" FOR HIM TO 
PRACTICE HIS FAITH BOTH BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AND AFTER HIS 
RETURN FROM CAMBODIA, BUT HE DID NOT/COULD NOT GIVE US 
FURTHER DETAILS. 
 
6. (SBU) ARE THE RETURNEES/VILLAGERS AFRAID?: WE DID 
NOT DETECT OVERT FEAR AMONG THE VILLAGERS.  SOME 
TENSION AND CONFUSION AMONG THE RETURNEES, PERHAPS, AS 
THEY WERE NOT CERTAIN WHY THEIR VILLAGE CHIEFS WERE 
SUMMONING THEM TO MEETINGS.  WE SAW NO UNIFORMED 
MILITARY OR SECURITY IN THE VILLAGES, AND PEOPLE WERE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00528  01 OF 02  071026Z 
NOT LOOKING BACK OVER THEIR SHOULDERS AS THEY SPOKE 
WITH US.  IN THE CASE OF THE GIA LAI RETURNEES, THEY 
HAD BARELY BEEN BACK IN THEIR VILLAGES FOR 18 HOURS, 
BEFORE THEY HAD TO PACK UP GAIN TO COME MEET WITH US. 
 
7. (C) WE LOOKED FOR ANY SIGNS OF BEATINGS (LIMPS, 
BRUISES, ETC.) ESPECIALLY ON ANY RETURNEES WHO WERE 
WEARING SHORT-SLEEVED SHIRTS OR SHORTS.  WE DID NOT 
SEE ANY.  THE ONLY VILLAGERS WHO CLAIMED PHYSICAL 
ABUSE WERE THOSE WHO SAID THEY HAD BEEN BEATEN IN THE 
CAMBODIAN CAMP BY OTHER ETHNIC MINORITY REFUGEES, WHO 
DID NOT WANT THEM TO RETURN TO VIETNAM. 
 
8. (SBU) WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL 
OFFICIALS?: THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES 
CONSIDER THEMSELVES KINGS OF THE HILL IN THEIR 
PROVINCES.  IT WAS ONLY WITH PERSISTENT PRESSURE FROM 
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THAT THEY AGREED TO MEET WITH 
US.  IN THE WORDS OF ONE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, "EVEN IF 
THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF CALLED ME, I STILL CALL 
THE SHOTS."  THIS CHAIRMAN DID, IN THE END, AGREE TO 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2039 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  00528  02 OF 02  071026Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  DS-00 
      FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   NSAE-00  SSO-00 
      SS-00    DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /002W 
                  ------------------70C63C  071026Z /38 
O 071004Z MAR 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5713 
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 
NSC WASHDC 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HANOI 000528 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL/IRF, PRM (P.LEWIS) 
 
MEET WITH US.  THIS AND OTHER STATEMENTS LEAD US TO 
BELIEVE THAT PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT, COMMUNE AND 
VILLAGE-LEVEL LEADERS PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE IN HOW 
RETURNEES ARE TREATED - REGARDLESS OF INSTRUCTIONS 
FROM THE GVN. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  00528  02 OF 02  071026Z 
 
9. (SBU) PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES INSISTED ON THEIR 
GOOD INTENTIONS IN DEALING WITH ETHNIC MINORITY ISSUES. THE 
CHAIRMAN OF DAK LAK'S COMMITTEE ON RELIGION 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHILE ETHNIC MINORITY POLICIES HAD 
GOOD INTENTIONS, IMPLEMENTATION VARIED, AND IN SOME 
INSTANCES "WAS NOT COMPLETE."  THAT IS AN 
UNDERSTATEMENT.  WE DO NOT SEE HOW PROVINCIAL 
AUTHORITIES ON DOWN (WITH A VERY SMALL TAX BASE - NO 
LARGE CORPORATIONS TO TAX, NEXT TO NO FDI, AND ETHNIC 
MINORITY POPULATIONS MOSTLY EXEMPT FROM TAXES) CAN 
LONG SUSTAIN THE SPECIAL ETHNIC MINORITY PROGRAMS THEY 
OPERATE, LET ALONE IMPROVE THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING. 
CURRENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS RUN THE GAMUT FROM MICRO- 
LENDING TO SUSPENDING PAYMENTS ON LOANS TO 
OUTRIGHT DONATIONS OF RICE, CLOTHING, SEEDS, AND CASH. 
 
10. (C) LOCAL AUTHORITIES COMPLAINED ABOUT HOW THE 
ETHNIC MINORITIES SPENT THE CASH ON "BOOZE AND BIKES", 
BUT THEIR REAL WORRY WAS ELSEWHERE.  AT LEAST TWO 
COMMUNE AND PROVINCIAL-LEVEL OFFICIALS SAID THEY DID 
NOT KNOW IF THEY COULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RETURNEE 
FAMILIES IF THEIR FIELDS WERE NOT PLANTED BEFORE THE 
RAINY SEASON BEGINS.  HAVING SEEN THE HARDSCRABBLE 
EXISTENCE IN THESE VILLAGES, THAT RINGS TRUE. 
 
11. (U) DAK LAK, GIA LAI, AND KON TUM PROVINCES ARE 
AMONG THE POOREST IN VIETNAM.  DESPITE THE WONDERS OF 
ELECTRICITY, TELEVISION, AND MOTORBIKES, THE VILLAGES 
WE VISITED SEEM CUT OFF FROM EACH OTHER.  THEIR LIVES 
ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY "60 METERS", IN THE WORDS OF ONE 
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VILLAGE CHIEF. 
 
12. (C) THE EDUCATION LEVEL AMONG THE RETURNEES WE MET 
WAS ANYWHERE FROM ZERO TO FOURTH GRADE.  THESE ARE NOT 
STUPID PEOPLE, BUT THEIR SENSE OF TIME AND SPACE IS 
VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS.  THEIR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND 
CONDITIONAL OR HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS IS ALMOST NON- 
EXISTENT.  OR AT LEAST NON-EXISTENT IN THE VIETNAMESE 
LANGUAGE.  LIKEWISE THEIR ABILITY TO ANALYZE OR ANSWER 
"WHY".  SOME QUESTIONS HAD TO BE REPEATED, REFINED, 
AND REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM. 
 
13. (C) HOW USEFUL ARE THESE TRIPS TO THE CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS?: WE BELIEVE THESE TRIPS - EVEN WITHOUT 
COMPLETE ACCESS OR PRIVACY - ARE WORTHWHILE.  WE 
ACTUALLY SEE CONDITIONS IN THE VILLAGE, INTERACT WITH 
RESIDENTS, AND EXPERIENCE THE REMOTENESS/ISOLATION 
THAT CHARACTERIZE THEIR LIVES.  THIS GIVES US THE 
CONTEXT IN WHICH TO JUDGE THE VARIOUS STORIES, RUMORS, 
AND RHETORIC WE HEAR.  HOWEVER, OUR ABILITY TO ASSESS 
THE VERACITY OF THE INFORMATION WE OBTAIN IS LIMITED, 
GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN REFTELS A. 
THEREFORE WE PREFER TO RELY ON THE "FRIENDS OF 
FRIENDS" WHO TRAVEL DOWN FROM THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
THREE OR FOUR TIMES A YEAR - OR ON MINORITY CONTACTS 
IN HCMC WHO HEAR THINGS FROM THEIR FAMILIES. 
 
14. (U) WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS?:  IF THE GVN AGREES TO MEET WITH 
US, AMBASSADOR AND CONGEN PLAN TO TRAVEL TO THE CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS OVER EASTER. 
BURGHARDT 
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