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AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
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Viewing cable 01HARARE2731, SADC DIPLOMATS PROVIDE READOUT ON SEPTEMBER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HARARE2731 2001-09-18 05:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

180528Z Sep 01


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO0603

PAGE 01        HARARE  02731  01 OF 04  180546Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  USNW-00  DODE-00  DOEE-00  
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00    
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     PMB-00   DSCC-00  
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W
                  ------------------20B926  180546Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9734
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF; AF/S; AND AF/RA 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/06 
 
TAGS: PREL ZI
SUBJECT: SADC DIPLOMATS PROVIDE READOUT ON SEPTEMBER 
10 AND 11 MEETING IN HARARE 
 
REF: LILONGWE 1773 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM REWHITEHEAD DUE TO 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  CHARGE AND DCM HELD A SEREIS OF 
MEETINGS WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS/COUNSELORS OF 
MOZAMBIQUE, MALAWI, AND SOUTH AFRICA LATE LAST WEEK TO 
OBTAIN THEIR VIEWS ON SEPTEMBER 10 AND 11 MEETINGS 
BETWEEN MUGABE AND THE ZIMBABWEANS AND SADC CHIEFS OF 
STATE.  ALL THREE EXPRESSED SOME DEGREE OF PESSIMISM, 
BUT THERE WERE CLEAR NUANCES OF OPINION.  THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN WAS MOST OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POTENTIAL GOZ 
ADHERENCE TO SOME ASPECTS OF THE ABUJA AGREEMENT.  THE 
MALAWIANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS BOTH COMPLAINED ABOUT 
NEGATIVE COVERAGE IN THE GOZ PRESS ABOUT MULUZI AND 
MBEKI FOR THEIR ALLEGEDLY PRO-UK AND U.S. STANCES DURING 
THE MEETING.  THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND MOZAMBICANS ALSO 
EXPRESSED DISCOMFORT WITH THE MILITANCY AND LACK OF 
DISCRETION OF TSVANGIRAI AND THE MDC.  CERTAIN IMPORTANT 
AGENDA ITEMS, INCLUDING THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTION OBSERVERS, WERE NOT COVERED DUE A LACK OF TIME. 
THE NEXT STEP IS A FOLLOW-UP BY A TEAM OF SADC 
MINISTERS, NOT YET SCHEDULED BUT HOPEFULLY BEFORE THE 
BRISBANE SUMMIT.  THIS PRESENTS US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO APPROACH OUR FRIENDS IN SADC AND THE COMMONWEALTH TO 
URGE THAT THESE ELECTORAL ISSUES ARE RAISED AT THE 
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHOGM).  END 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02731  01 OF 04  180546Z 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
MOZAMBIQUE 
---------- 
 
2.  (C) HIGH COMMISSIONER ANTONIO SUMBANA STATED THAT, 
IN THE WAKE OF THE MEETINGS, PERHAPS "WE SHOULD 
CONCLUDE" THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL REMAIN EMBROILED IN 
CONFLICT.  HE LABELED THIS A PROBLEM FOR MOZAMBIQUE, 
WHICH REMAINS CLOSELY LINKED TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
SERVICES OF BOTH ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA.  HE SAID 
THAT THE HARARE EETING CONCENTRATED ON LAW AND ORDER, 
WITH THE SDC DELEGATIONS STRESSING THE NEED FOR 
TRANSPARENY ON THE PART OF THE GOZ, AND GOZ ACTION 
RATHER TAN WORDS.  IN RESPONSE, CHINOTIMBA AND THE WAR 
VTERANS CHARGED INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 
SUMBANA SAID THAT THE GOZ PERCEIVE SOUTH AFRICA AN 
MOZAMBIQUE AS WESTERN PROXIES.  THE ZIMBABWEANSCLAIMED 
THAT VIOLENCE REMAINS ISOLATED AND THAT SCURITY FORCES 
REACT WHEN THEY ARE INFORMED OF INIDENTS.  THE GOZ ALSO 
STRESSED THAT THEIR ACTION ARE LEGAL.  SUMBANA SAID 
THAT THE SADC DELEGATINS COUNTERED BY URGING THE GOZ TO 
DELIST QUALIFID PROPERTIES AS PROMISED IN ABUJA, ESCHEW 
VIOLENC, AND SEEK DIALOGUE. 
 
3.  (C) SUMBANA CONTINUED HAT THE GOZ ATTEMPTED TO PUT 
A POSITIVE SPIN ON HINGS.  THEY CITED THE UNDP ROLE 
ACCEPTED N ABJA AND SAID THAT A UNDP TEAM WOULD ASSESS 
THE LAND DISTRIBUTION SITUATION.  SADC DELEGATES POINTED 
TO THE UK COMMITMENT IN ABUJA AND ADVISED MUGABE TO SIT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02731  01 OF 04  180546Z 
DOWN WITH UK HIGH COMMISSIONER DONNELLY TO DISCUSS 
BRITISH UNDERTAKINGS.  THEY SAID THAT SADC WAS AWARE OF 
THE PROBLEM WITH AGRICULTURAL INPUTS FOR RESETTLED 
PERSONS, TO WHICH THE ZIMBABWEANS DECLARED THAT SADC 
NEEDED TO BE PART OF THE SOLUTION.  MUGABE REACTED 
CAREFULLY TO SADC STATEMENTS THAT THE GOZ NEEDS TO LOOK 
FOR POSITIVES, SINCE CONFRONTATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO 
SPLIT SADC.  THE SADC DELEGATES AGREED WITH THE 
ZIMBABWEANS THAT LAND REFORM IS ACCEPTABLE BUT SAID THAT 
THE CURRENT METHODS BEING USED ARE NOT. 
 
4.  (C) THE NEXT PHASE OF THE MEETING CONSISTED OF 
TRIPARTITE ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THE SADC AND GOZ 
DELEGATIONS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPOSITION POLITICAL 
PARTIES, LABOR, THE CHURCHES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY.  (FOR 
SPECIFICS, SEE THE COMMUNIQUE FAXED TO AF/S.)  SUMBANA 
SAID THAT THE SADC DELEGATES WERE AWARE THAT THE 
ZIMBABWEANS HAD TRIED TO STAGE-MANAGE THE EVENT BY 
PACKING THE SCHEDULE WITH THEIR SUPPORTERS, INCLUDING 
WAR VETERANS, A PET LABOR CONFEDERATION, AND RUMP NGOS. 
TO SOME DEGREE THIS STRATEGY BACKFIRED, AS EXEMPLIFIED 
BY WAR VETERAN DEMANDS THAT THE GOZ GIVE THE VETS HOMES 
AND MONEY TO INVEST AS WELL AS LAND. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO0604 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02731  02 OF 04  180546Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  USNW-00  DODE-00  DOEE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------20B937  180546Z /38 
O 180528Z SEP 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9735 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 HARARE 002731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF; AF/S; AND AF/RA 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/06 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02731  02 OF 04  180546Z 
TAGS: PREL ZI
SUBJECT: SADC DIPLOMATS PROVIDE READOUT ON SEPTEMBER 
10 AND 11 MEETING IN HARARE 
 
5.  (C) ACCORDING TO SUMBANA, THE COMMERCIAL FARMERS 
UNION OFFERED A NUANCED AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL VIEW OF 
WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE.  SUMBANA SAID THAT TSVANGIRAI, 
WHO TOOK THE LEAD FOR THE MDC, WAS "TOO MILITANT."  HE 
SAID THAT THE MDC MUST BECOME MORE PRAGMATIC AND ATTEMPT 
TO DEPERSONALIZE ITS APPROACH TO MUGABE.  SUMBANA SAID 
THAT THE MDC MUST FORGE A STRATEGY FOR RECONCILIATION, 
INCLUDING SOME POSSIBLE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MUGABE 
AND OTHER SENIOR ZANU-PF OFFICIALS.  GIVE AND TAKE WOULD 
BE THE KEY TO SUCCESS.  SADC WAS TRYING TO SET UP TALKS 
BETWEEN THE GOZ AND MDC, BUT MDC LEADERSHIP WAS 
DIFFICULT. 
 
6.  (C) SUMBANA EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE 
GOZ HAVE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN SADC STATES 
AND THE ZIMBABWEAN OPPOSITION IN ORDER NOT TO STOKE THE 
PARANOIA OF THE GOZ.  HOWEVER, THE MDC HAD SHOWN A LACK 
OF DISCRETION IN ITS DEALINGS WITH OUTSIDERS, PREFERRING 
TO SCORE PUBLIC RELATIONS POINTS RATHER THAN ADVANCING 
NEGOTIATIONS.  HE CITED A MEETING IN LATE 2000 IN SOUTH 
AFRICA BETWEEN AN OFFICIAL OF THE MOZAMBICAN MINISTRY OF 
HOME AFFAIRS AND THE MDC.  DESPITE AN AGREED COMMUNIQUE, 
THE MDC HAD GONE TO THE PRESS AND SPILLED THE DETAILS OF 
THE DISCUSSION, INACCURATELY CLAIMING THAT THE 
MOZAMBICAN HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER HAD PARTICIPATED. 
SUMBANA SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE MALAWIANS OR 
SOUTH AFRICANS HAD MANAGED TO CARRY ON A DISCREET 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02731  02 OF 04  180546Z 
DIALOGUE WITH THE MDC. 
 
7.  (C) SUMBANA BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SOME OF MOZAMBIQUE'S 
IMMEDIATE INTERESTS IN A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO 
ZIMBABWE'S POLITICAL/ECONOMIC CRISIS.  IN ADDITION TO 
MAJOR TRADE AND INFRASTRUCTURE TIES, AN ESTIMATED 16,000 
MOZAMBICANS LIVE IN ZIMBABWE, MOST IN THE CAPACITY OF 
COMMERCIAL FARM WORKERS AND MINERS.  SINCE MANY ARE 
SECOND GENERATION AND FOR ALL PURPOSES HAVE BECOME 
ZIMBABWEANS, THERE ARE NO ACCURATE FIGURES BEYOND THE 
5,000 OR SO WHOM THE MOZAMBICAN HIGH COMMISSION BELIEVES 
CAN LEGALLY CLAIM MOZAMBICAN CITIZENSHIP. 
 
8.  (C) THE CHARGE STRESSED THAT ONCE SADC HAS GAINED 
MUGABE'S CONFIDENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THE 
NEED FOR CLEAN AND PEACEFUL ELECTIONS, PREFERABLY 
BUTTRESSED BY PRE-ELECTION VOTER EDUCATION.  ABOVE ALL 
ELSE, THERE SHOULD BE NO ATTEMPT TO DELINK POLITICS FROM 
ECONOMICS.  SUMBANA REPLIED THAT A GO-SLOW APPROACH, 
WITH PRIORITIES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED, WAS BEST.  HE SAID 
THAT PRESS REPORTS OF A SADC DEADLINE FOR ZIMBABWEAN 
ACTION WERE INACCURATE.  A TEAM OF MINISTER WILL FOLLOW 
UP AND PROVIDE THE REPORTING MECHANISM. 
 
------ 
MALAWI 
------ 
 
9.  (C) DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER ELIAS CHIJOTA SAID THAT 
HIS BOSS, CURRENTLY ILL AND OUT OF THE OFFICE, HAD 
ATTENDED MORE OF THE SESSIONS THAN CHIJOTA HAD.  HE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02731  02 OF 04  180546Z 
REPEATED THE MESSAGE (REFTEL) THAT THE GOM IS NOT 
PLEASED BY ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT MULUZI IN THE OFFICIAL 
GOZ PRESS DUE TO MULUZI'S FRANK COMMENTS ON THE 
DETERIORATING SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE REGION.  CHIJOTA SAID THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD 
SKEPTICISM AMONG MALAWIAN POLICYMAKERS ABOUT THE GOZ'S 
COMMITMENT TO MEASURES THEY HAD ACCEPTED IN ABUJA, 
INCLUDING AN END TO VIOLENCE AND NEW FARM OCCUPATIONS. 
HE SCOFFED AT THE LIST OF OUTSIDE PARTICIPANTS THAT THE 
GOZ "HAD IMPOSED" FOR THE SERIES OF TRILATERAL SESSIONS 
BUT NOTED THAT MDC, CFU, AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES HAD 
AT TIMES MADE MUGABE AND THE GOZ SQUIRM.  HE CONCLUDED 
THAT THERE WAS NO WAY THE GOZ COUD OBSCURE THE TRUTH. 
 
10.  (SBU) CHIJOTA CLAIMEDTHAT THE GOM HAS SPECIAL 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE INCRASINGLY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN 
ZIMBABWE, SINCE A MANY AS 2 MILLION INDIVIDUALS LIVING 
HERE CAN CLIM MALAWIAN ANCESTRY.  WHEN DCM EXPRESSED 
SURPRIE AT THIS NUMBER, CHIJOTA STATED THAT A LACK OF 
ECORDS PREVENTS ANY TRULY ACCURATE ESTIMATE.  HOWEVER, 
THE NUMBERS ARE HUGE, AND THIS MASS RISKS BECOMING 
STATELESS PERSONS IF THE GOZ PERSISTS IN PURSUING 
PRESENT HARD-LINE POLICIES AGAINST FARM WORKERS.  HE 
ADDED THAT THUS FAR, TO HIS SURPRISE, VIRTUALLY NO ONE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO0605 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02731  03 OF 04  180546Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  USNW-00  DODE-00  DOEE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
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      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------20B942  180546Z /38 
O 180528Z SEP 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9736 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 HARARE 002731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF; AF/S; AND AF/RA 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/06 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02731  03 OF 04  180546Z 
TAGS: PREL ZI
SUBJECT: SADC DIPLOMATS PROVIDE READOUT ON SEPTEMBER 
10 AND 11 MEETING IN HARARE 
 
HAD TURNED UP AT THE HIGH COMMISSION TO REQUEST 
REPATRIATION TO MALAWI. 
 
------------ 
SOUTH AFRICA 
------------ 
 
11.  (C) HIGH COMMISSIONER A.J.D. NDOU OFFERED A 
SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE MEETING THAN HAD HIS 
MOZAMBICAN COUNTERPART.  HE LED OFF WITH A PREAMBLE ON 
THE SENSITIVITIES IN THE ZIMBABWE/SOUTH AFRICAN 
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP STEMMING FROM THE PRE- 
INDEPENDENCE SCHISM BETWEEN THE ZANU/CHINESE/PAC POLE 
AND THE ANC/ZAPU POLE.  MANDELA'S METEORIC ACCESSION TO 
GLOBAL PROMINENCE IN THE EARLY 1990'S HAD COMPLETELY 
OVERSHADOWED MUGABE'S ROLE AND FURTHER EXACERBATED THE 
STRAINS.  NDOU SAID THAT CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES MUST BE APPROACHED FROM THIS HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE.  THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY THE GOZ HAD 
ACCUSED SOUTH AFRICA (AND MALAWI) OF CARRYING THE WATER 
FOR THE UK AND US ON THE LAND REFORM ISSUE. 
 
12.  (C) NDOU CHARACTERIZED THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING 
AS MIXED.  ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO 
CONCLUDE THE AGENDA, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT ITEM OF 
ELECTION MONITORING.  NDOU SAID IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF 
THE EVENT HAD BEEN MINIMIZED IN THE LAST-MINUTE RUSH TO 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02731  03 OF 04  180546Z 
AGREE ON A JOINT COMMUNIQUE.  HE SAID THAT MUGABE HAD 
BEEN CLEARLY DISCOMFITTED BY HIS FIRST FACE-TO-FACE 
MEETING WITH TSVANGIRAI IN THREE YEARS.  HE ADDED THAT 
TSVANGIRAI WAS WELL SPOKEN AND DID NOT RISE TO THE JIBES 
 
SIPDIS 
OF MUGABE'S ENTOURAGE, INSTEAD INSISTING THAT IT WAS 
TIME FOR EVERYONE TO ADMIT THAT ZIMBABWE WAS IN A 
CRISIS.  NDOU SAID THAT TSVANGIRAI HAD STRESSED THAT 
CONFRONTING COMMON PROBLEMS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN 
SCORING PUBLICITY POINTS. 
 
13.  (C) IN SPITE OF THE DOWNSIDES, NDOU CONTINUED, 
THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PLUSES.  THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A 
BROAD INTERPARTY COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE CRISIS HAD 
FAILED, BUT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT TO FORM A 
MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE.  NDOU SAID THAT HE 
THOUGHT THAT MUGABE WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH ON SOME ABUJA 
COMMITMENTS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT ZIMBABWE AND THE 
UK EACH HAD A VERY DIFFERENT PERCEPTION ON WHAT HAD BEEN 
AGREED THERE. 
 
14.  (C) NDOU SAID THAT PERCEPTIONS REMAIN A LARGE PART 
OF THE PROBLEM.  THE SADC DELEGATES HAD URGED THE GOZ 
SIDE TO UNDERSTAND THAT, WHATEVER THE GOZ VIEW, THERE 
WAS AN INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF LAWLESSNESS IN 
ZIMBABWE.  NDOU SAID THAT BREAD AND JOBS ARE THE ISSUES 
THAT PREOCCUPY MOST ZIMBABWEANS, NOT LAND.  HOWEVER, 
MUGABE AND MANY IN THE GOZ SEEM GENUINELY TOO BELIEVE 
THAT LAND IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE.  SADC ATTEMPTS TO 
PROMOTE THE TWIN THEMES OF THE ECONOMY AND THE LAND 
DURING THE MEETINGS HAD FAILED TO MOVE THE GOZ OFF ITS 
FOCUS ON LAND.  NDOU SAID HE FELT THAT AN INCREASINGLY 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  02731  03 OF 04  180546Z 
ISOLATED MUGABE HAD BEEN MISLED BY HIS INNER CIRCLE ON 
THIS POINT, ESPECIALLY CHIEF ZANU PROPAGANDIST CUM 
INFORMATION MINISTER JONATHAN MOYO, "WHO IS NOT GOOD 
FRIENDS WITH THE TRUTH."  IN DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES IN 
VARIOUS SADC CAPITALS, ZANU-PF HAD ACCUSED NDOU AND 
OTHER SADC AMBASSADORS OF DISTORTING THE FACTS ABOUT 
WHAT WAS ACTUALLY GOING ON IN ZIMBABWE. 
 
15.  (C) NDOU SAID THAT THE SADC MEMBERS HAD URGED THE 
ZIMBABWEANS TO GO TO THE IMF AND TRY TO NORMALIZE 
RELATIONS, A MOVE THAT THE DONORS WOULD NOTICE.  NDOU 
ADDED THAT NEGOTIATION, NOT THE "GO TO HELL" APPROACH 
HERETOFORE ADOPTED BY THE GOZ, WAS NEEDED.  HE ADMITTED 
THAT QUIET DIPLOMACY WAS NOT WORKING:  "THE ZIMBABWEANS 
WILL AGREE IN PRIVATE, THEN CONTRADICT THESE 
UNDERSTANDINGS AS SOON AS THEY WALK OUT THE DOOR." 
 
16.  (C) NDOU DID NOT VIEW THE ABUJA AGREEMENT AS A 
MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH FOR THE UN.  HE SAID THE LAND REFORM 
POSITION AGREED TO BY THE UNDP IN DECEMBER, 2000 HAD 
BEEN IRREVOCABLY ALTERED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS ON THE 
GROUND.  ZIMBABWEAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUDENGE'S 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORMER UNDP POSITION WAS MEANINGLESS. 
NDOU SAID THAT SADC AND MBEKI HAD WORKED TO GET UNSYG 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTO0606 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  02731  04 OF 04  180546Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  USNW-00  DODE-00  DOEE-00 
      SRPP-00  DS-00    EUR-00   VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00 
      L-00     VCE-00   AC-01    NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OMB-01   PA-00 
      PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  R-00     PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------20B947  180546Z /38 
O 180528Z SEP 01 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9737 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 HARARE 002731 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF; AF/S; AND AF/RA 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER 
 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/06 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  02731  04 OF 04  180546Z 
TAGS: PREL ZI
SUBJECT: SADC DIPLOMATS PROVIDE READOUT ON SEPTEMBER 
10 AND 11 MEETING IN HARARE 
 
ANNAN MORE INVOLVED IN THE EQUATION.  IN AN ASIDE, NDOU 
SAID THAT MBEKI'S RAPID DEPARTURE FROM THE CONFERENCE 
HALL, REPORTED IN THE OPPOSITION PRESS AS MBEKI STORMING 
OUT IN REACTION TO WAR VETERAN STATEMENTS, HAD IN FACT 
BEEN A RUSH UPSTAIRS TO FIELD A PRE-ARRANGED PHONE CALL 
FROM ANNAN.  HE SAID THAT THE GOZ HAS REJECTED A 
PROPOSED VISIT BY THE UNDP LAND REFORM ASSESSMENT TEAM 
BECAUSE OF A DIFFERENCE OVER TERMS OF REFERENCE.  NDOU 
SAID THAT THE VISIT OF THE SADC MINISTERIAL FOLLOW-UP 
TEAM HAS NOT YET BEEN SCHEDULED, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTS 
THIS TO OCCUR BEFORE THE BRISBANE CHOGM MEETING. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
17.  (C) NEIGHBORING SADC COUNTRIES ARE INCREASINGLY 
CONCERNED WITH THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MUGABE'S POLICIES ON 
THEIR OWN WELFARE AND INCREASINGLY WILLING TO TELL HIM 
SO TO HIS FACE.  THIS PROVIDES AN OPENING FOR US, IF THE 
SADC MINISTERIAL FOLLOW-UP COMES OFF BEFORE BRISBANE, TO 
URGE REGIONAL STATES TO ADDRESS THE FULL AGENDA OF 
ELECTORAL ISSUES: VOTER TRAINING, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION 
MONITORS, AND AN OPEN AND TRANSPARENT VOTING PROCESS. 
AN INCREASINGLY ISOLATED MUGABE MAY BE FORCED TO LISTEN 
TO HIS COUNTERPARTS, AS HE DID ON SEPTEMBER 10 AND 11, 
WHETHER OR NOT HE LIKES THE MESSAGE THEY BRING.  END 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  02731  04 OF 04  180546Z 
COMMENT. 
 
ROTH 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>