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Viewing cable 98ISLAMABAD6509, PAKISTAN: A CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98ISLAMABAD6509 1998-08-31 06:14 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
O 310614Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9619
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
COMUSNAVCENT //POLAD
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPB J5//
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 006509 
 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, DS, AND S/CT; CENTCOM/CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD; 
LONDON FOR POL/SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR RAVELING 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  8/29/03 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PK
SUBJECT:  PAKISTAN:  A CONVERSATION WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN R. SCHMIDT, POLITICAL COUNSELOR. 
REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1.   (C)  SUMMARY:  WITH HER RIVAL NAWAZ SHARIF IN DEEP POLITICAL 
TROUBLE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER BENAZIR BHUTTO IS SEEKING TO 
RESHAPE HER IMAGE AND REVIVE HER OWN TATTERED POLITICAL FORTUNES. 
IN A WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION WITH POLCOUNS ON AUGUST 27, SHE 
CONDEMNED THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, ADVOCATED 
DRASTICALLY REDUCING THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, CALLED FOR THE END 
OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN THE CIVIL SERVICE AND EXPRESSED 
INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN AN ALL-PARTY CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT 
WHEN AND IF THE NAWAZ REGIME FALLS .  WILLING ENOUGH TO ADMIT HER 
OWN MISTAKES, SHE SEEMED ANXIOUS TO PORTRAY HERSELF TO A U.S. 
AUDIENCE AS A MODERATE, SECULAR, PRO-WESTERN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
CURRENT POLITICAL FORCES AT LARGE IN THE COUNTRY.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.   QNGERS FROM THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT.  ALTHOUGH NO 
FRIEND OF NAWAZ SHARIF, BENAZIR EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE 
POLITICAL WEAKNESS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, DESPITE ITS 
OVERWHELMING PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY, WAS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS 
OF THE EXTREMIST ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS PARTIES, PREEMINENTLY THE 
JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI AND THE JAMAAT-ULEMA-I-ISLAMI.  SHE FEARED THAT, 
IF THE SHARPLY DETERIORATING ECONOMY BEGAN TO BRING PEOPLE OUT 
INTO THE STREETS, THESE ELEMENTS WOULD MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH 
SYMPATHETIC RETIRED GENERALS FROM THE ZIA ERA TO SPEARHEAD A 
FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC TAKEOVER.  SHE NOTED THAT THE NEWSPAPERS 
WERE FULL OF ARTICLES BY INFLUENTIAL FORMER GENERALS MAKING 
COMMON CAUSE WITH THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT.  (COMMENT:  WE DOUBT SHE 
REALLY BELIEVES THAT HEADLINE-GRABBERS SUCH AS FORMER COAS MIRZA 
ALSAM BEG AND FORMER DG/ISI HAMEED GUL ARE A THREAT.) 
 
3.   (C)  ON THE ARMY.  BENAZIR SAID SHE THOUGHT THERE WERE ALSO 
PLENTY OF ACTIVE DUTY MID-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS SYMPATHETIC TO THE 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST CAUSE.  THE TOP ARMY LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER, 
REMAINED SOLID AND MODERATE.  INDEED, SHE CONCEDED THAT ARMY 
INTERVENTION OF SOME SORT COULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO AVERT A 
FUNDAMENTALIST TAKEOVER IF THE NAWAZ GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO CRUMBLE. 
SHE THOUGHT THE ARMY COULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE BY SETTING UP A 
TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM 
ALL MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING HER OWN PPP AND NAWAZ'S 
PML (WITHOUT NAWAZ, OF COURSE).  BUT SHE WAS HIGHLY SKEPTICAL 
THAT THE ARMY COULD RULE EFFECTIVELY ON ITS OWN BASED ON ITS PAST 
PERFORMANCE. 
 
4.   (C) ON NAWAZ.  BENAZIR MADE NO EFFORT TO HIDE HER DISLIKE OF 
NAWAZ SHARIF, WHOM SHE REGARDED AS BOTH WEAK AND NOT VERY BRIGHT. 
SHE APPEARED TO HARBOR AN EVEN GREATER DISLIKE FOR HIS BROTHER 
SHAHBAZ, WHO SHE CHARACTERIZED AS MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT ALSO MORE 
BRUTAL, RELATING A BRIEF ANECDOTE ABOUT HOW HE HAD ORDERED A 
HAPLESS BUREAUCRAT THROWN INTO A SEWER IN A MOMENT OF PERSONAL 
PIQUE.  INTERESTINGLY, SHE WAS INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE NAWAZ'S 
GROWING FLIRTATION WITH ISLAMIZATION TO HIS OWN LIGHTS RATHER 
THAN SIMPLY TO POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM.  SHE CONTENDED THAT NAWAZ'S 
FATHER HAD BEEN VERY CLOSE TO "TALIBANISH" (HER WORD) ULEMA 
(RELIGIOUS LEADERS) IN LAHORE AND HAD INCULCATED THESE SORTS OF 
VALUES IN THE YOUNG NAWAZ.  SHE SAID THAT NAWAZ HAD DONE THE SAME 
TO HIS OWN SON, NOTING THAT THE YOUNGER SHARIF HAD REFUSED TO 
GIVE HIS AGE WHEN INTERVIEWED RECENTLY ON TELEVISION IN KEEPING 
WITH A CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC SUPERSTITION. 
 
5.   (C) ON HER OWN MISTAKES.  ASKED WHAT SHE WOULD DO 
DIFFQHAD IT TO DO ALL OVER AGAIN, BENAZIR SAID SQ 
WOULD ENDED THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM THAT LAID THE BASIS FOR THE 
WIDESPREAD PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF HER AS CORRUPT.  SHE LAMENTED 
THAT THERE HAD DEVELOPED IN PAKISTAN A SYSTEM IN WHICH EACH 
INCOMING GOVERNMENT PACKED THE CIVIL SERVICE WITH ITS OWN 
CRONIES.  THIS WAS A RECIPE FOR BOTH INCOMPETENCE AND CORRUPTION. 
SHE HAD BEEN AS GUILTY OF THE PRACTICE AS ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT 
LEADER BUT NO MORE SO.  SHE NOTED THAT SHE HAD YET TO BE 
CONVICTED ON ANY CORRUPTION CHARGE DESPITE TWO YEARS OF 
GOVERNMENT DIGGING.  NONETHELESS, THE PRACTICE OF PATRONAGE WAS 
DESTRUCTIVE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT AND NEEDED TO BE REPLACED BY AN 
INDEPENDENT, PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVICE.  THIS WOULD BE A KEY 
ELEMENT OF HER POLICY WERE SHE EVER TO RETURNQT: DURING THIS 
EXCHANGE, SHE DID NOT MENTION HER HUSBAND, 
WHO WAS HER CHIEF BAG MAN AND PATRONAGE DISPENSER.) 
 
6.   (C) ON THE ECONOMIC FAILINGS OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. 
HER CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES WAS STANDARD FARE. 
SHE SAID THE EFFORT TO FORCE THE INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS 
(IPPS) TO RENEGOTIATE THE CONTRACTS SIGNED BY HER REGIME HAD HAD 
A CHILLING EFFECT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT.  IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR 
GOVERNMENTS TO HONOR THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY THEIR PREDECESSORS 
EVEN IF THEY DID NOT LIKE THE TERMS.  OTHERWISE, THE 
PREDICTABILITY AND CONFIDENCE SO ESSENTIAL TO ATTRACTING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT WOULD BE LACKING.  BENAZIR WAS ALSO HIGHLY CRITICAL OF 
THE GOVERNMENT DECISION TO FREEZE HARD CURRENCY ACCOUNTS IN THE 
WAKE OF ITS NUCLEAR TESTS.  SHE BELIEVED THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO 
CLUE ABOUT HOW TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION SAVE FOR 
BEGGING FROM RICH ARAB NEIGHBORS AND THROWING ITSELF ON THE MERCY 
OF THE IMF. 
 
7.   (C) ON OTHER ASPECTS OF HER OWN PROGRAM.  IN ADDITION TO 
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CIVIL SERVICE, BENAZIR SAID SHE STRONGLY 
FAVORED DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS.  GOVERNMENT-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES SHOULD BE SOLD OFF AND THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT 
MINISTRIES AND BUREAUCRATS SHARPLY REDUCED.  THE MILITARY BUDGET 
WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE REDUCED.  PAKISTAN COULD NOT PRETEND TO 
MATCH INDIA SOLDIER FOR SOLDIER AND MACHINE FOR MACHINE AND WOULD 
NEED TO TAILOR ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS REALITY. 
AS FOR THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, SHE SAID SHE FAVORED SHUTTING DOWN 
THE MADARASSA SCHOOLS THAT WERE CHURNING OUT SO MANY YOUNG 
FUNDAMENTALISTS.  HER BASIC THEME, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE BEST WAY 
TO COMBAT FUNDAMENTALISM WAS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMY BY ENDING 
CORRUPTION, DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT AND ATTRACTING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT. 
 
8.   (C) ON RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND THE WEST.  BENAZIR TOLD 
POLCOUNS SHE HAD SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD 
AGREED TO SIGN THE CTBT DURING THE SHAMSHAD-TALBOTT TALKS IN 
LONDON ON AUGUST 25.  SHE HOPED THIS WAS TRUE, SINCE PAKISTAN 
COULD NOT AFFORD A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH INDIA OR BAD RELATIONS 
WITH THE UNITED STATES.  SHE SAID THAT ONE POSITIVE RESULT 
FLOWING FROM THE MAY NUCLEAR TESTS WAS ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S. 
THE TESTS HAD FORCED THE UNITED STATES TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION 
TO PAKISTAN.  PAKISTAN NEEDED ACTIVE U.S. ENGAGEMENT AND SHE 
HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN 
THE REGION. 
 
9.   (C) ON THE TALIBAN AND BIN LADEN.  BENAZIR SAID SHE HAD 
STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS AND WAS STRONGLY 
OPPOSED TO TERRORISM OF ANY KIND.  BUT SHE FELT THE U.S. SHOULD 
HAVE PURSUED USAMA BIN LADEN THROUGH THE UN PROCESS IN THE FIRST 
INSTANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE AUGUST 20 CRUISE MISSILE STRIKES 
HAD ALIENATED PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE ISLAMIC WORLD.  SHE 
SAID SHE WAS NO FAN OF THE TALIBAN, WHOM SHE VIEWED AS AN 
EXTENSION OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT IN PAKISTAN.  INDEED, SHE WAS 
FEARFUL THAT RETURNING TALIBAN MIGHT SERVE AS FOOT SOLDIERS FOR 
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS IN A FUTURE CONFRONTATION WITH AUTHORITIES. 
 
10.  (C) ON WHAT IS GOING RIGHT IN PAKISTAN.  DESPITE HER 
OPPOSITION TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND FEAR OF ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM, BENAZIR SAID SHE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN MANY 
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN IN THE TEN YEARS SINCE THE 
DEATH OF ZIA (AUGUST 17, 1988) AND RETURN OF DEMOCRACY.  ALTHOUGH 
SHE HAD FELT ITS STING MORE THAN ANY OTHER PAKISTANI POLITICIAN, 
SHE WAS PROUD OF THE FACT THAT PAKISTAN HAD DEVELOPED A 
REMARKABLY FREE PRESS, WHICH SHE BELIEVED WAS AN ESSENTIAL 
UNDERPINNING OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY.  SHE SAID SHE ALSO BELIEVED 
THAT THE JUDICIARY HAD ACHIEVED A LARGE MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE, 
ALTHOUGH IT REMAINED UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM POLITICAL 
AUTHORITIES.  SHE ALSO THOUGHT THAT ORDINARY PAKISTANIS HAD BEGUN 
TO THINK FOR THEMSELVES AND TO QUESTION WHAT THEY WERE TOLD BY 
THE GOVERNMENT AND BY POLITICIANS RATHER THAN PASSIVELY ACCEPT 
SIMPLISTIC SLOGANS AS WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CASE. 
 
11.  (C) ON HER CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION.  BENAZIR SAID SHE 
THOUGHT THE WEAKNESS OF THE NAWAZ GOVERNMENT HAD IMPROVED HER OWN 
POLITICAL POSITION IN THE COUNTRY.  SHE THOUGHT SHE WAS STRONG IN 
RURAL AREAS, BUT REMAINED WEAK IN URBAN PUNJAB.  SHE RUED THE 
FACT THAT THE ELECTORAL WEAKNESS OF HER OWN PPP PARTY (REDUCED IN 
THE LAST ELECTION TO ITS SINDHI BASE) HAD FORCED HER TO MAKE 
COMMON CAUSE WITH SOME OF THE SMALLER, MORE EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS 
PARTIES UNDER THE  PAKISTAN AWAMI ITIHAT (PAI) UMBRELLA.  BUT SHE 
FELT THAT HER PARTY WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF 
OPPOSITION ON ITS OWN.  MORE RECENTLY, SHE HAD ALSO BEGAN 
REACHING OUT TO SOME OF THE NATIONALIST REGIONAL PARTIES, SUCH AS 
THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE-BASED ANP.  HOWEVER, WHEN ASKED 
HOW SHE COULD MANEUVER FROM WHERE SHE WAS NOW BACK INTO A 
POSITION OF POWER HER ONLY COMMENT WAS A RUEFUL "THAT IS THE 64 
DOLLAR QUESTION." 
 
12.  (C) COMMENT.  BENAZIR WAS RELAXED AND TALKATIVE DURING A 
CONVERSATION THAT STRETCHED ON FOR NINETY MINUTES.  HER COMMENTS 
WERE CLEARLY CALCULATED TO GO DOWN WELL WITH AN AMERICAN AUDIENCE 
AND SHE CLEARLY SEEMS TO BE POSITIONING HERSELF AS A MODERATE, 
SECULAR, MORE WESTERN-ORIENTED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT 
GOVERNMENT AND ITS EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTALIST FOES.  SHE HAS 
RECENTLY TURNED FOR ADVICE TO A MODERATE FORMER MILITARY OFFICER, 
RETIRED GENERAL TALAT MASOOD, WHO IS NOTED FOR PROMOTING THE NEED 
FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN PAKISTAN.  AS FOR WHETHER 
BENAZIR BELIEVES WHAT SHE IS SAYING, THAT IS HARD TO SAY.  HER 
BEST CHANCE OF ONE DAY RETURNING TO POWER IS ALMOST CERTAINLY AS 
PART OF A COALITION RATHER THAN ON HER OWN.  THAT MIGHT NOT BE A 
BAD THING, GIVEN THAT, LEFT STRICTLY TO HER OWN DEVICES, SHE 
WOULD REMAIN BEHOLDEN TO THE LANDLORDS OF HER FEUDAL SINDH BASE, 
AND THESE ARE NOT THE SORT OF PEOPLE INTERESTED IN ENDING 
PATRONAGE AND PROMOTING INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC REFORMS.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
MILAM