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Viewing cable 96ISLAMABAD8053, AFGHANISTAN: TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
96ISLAMABAD8053 1996-09-19 12:41 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
O 191241Z SEP 96
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2057
INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
USIA WASHDC 5806
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BONN 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 
AMEMBASSY ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008053 
 
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, NEA/NGA, AND EUR/CEN; USIA FOR NEA; 
LONDON FOR POL - TUELLER; PARIS FOR POL - ALLEGRONE; ROME 
FOR POL - NDEMPSEY 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  9/19/06 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PREL AF IR
SUBJECT:  AFGHANISTAN:  TALIBAN REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING 
OPTIONS FOR SOROBI AND HAS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN 
 
REFS:  (A) ISLAMABAD 8005; (B) ISLAMABAD 7971 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR TOM PRICE. 
REASON: 1.5 (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  (C) MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN 
AFFAIR'S ADVISER, TOLD POLOFF AND AARMA THAT VARIOUS 
OPTIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED FOR THE TALIBAN'S ATTACK ON 
SOROBI.  ACCORDING TO JALIL, RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE 
"WARM," BUT IRAN IS TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE.  JALIL 
ASSERTED THAT FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME IN 
KANDAHAR.  HE WARNED THE UN SPECIAL MISSION THAT IT 
SHOULD NOT SET UP ITS MAIN OFFICE IN KABUL.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
OPTIONS FOR SOROBI 
------------------ 
 
3.  (C) POLOFF AND AARMA MET WITH MULLAH ABDUL JALIL, THE 
TALIBAN'S DEPUTY FOREIGN AFFAIR'S ADVISER, AND COMMANDER 
HAJI BASHIR, A MEMBER OF THE TALIBAN'S GREATER SHURA, ON 
SEPTEMBER 18.  MULLAH JALIL BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY 
STATING THAT THE TALIBAN ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS OPTIONS 
ON HOW TO ATTACK SOROBI.  SOROBI IS NOW UNDER SIEGE FROM 
THE EAST AND THE SOUTH, HE CONTINUED, AND WILL BE UNDER 
SIEGE FROM THE WEST SOON.  HOWEVER, THE TALIBAN ARE 
CAUTIOUS BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THE KABUL REGIME HAS 
FORTIFIED THE SOROBI AREA HEAVILY WITH TANKS AND 
ARTILLERY, HE SAID.  THUS, THE TALIBAN ARE TAKING THEIR 
TIME TO DECIDE ON THEIR BATTLE PLANS.  JALIL NOTED THAT 
THE KEY TALIBAN DECISION-MAKERS WHO WILL DECIDE NEXT 
STEPS ARE MILITARY COMMANDER BORJAN, AND POLITICAL 
LEADERS MULLAH MOHAMMED RABBANI AND MULLAH ABDUL RAZAK. 
 
4.  (C) HAJI BASHIR, WHO HAD RECENTLY RETURNED FROM 
JALALABAD, SAID THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SEIZED AN IMMENSE 
AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IN THEIR 
TAKEOVER OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE.  HE CLAIMED THAT THE 
TALIBAN HAD CAPTURED OVER 150 TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL 
CARRIERS.  ACCORDING TO HAJI BASHIR, THE SEIZURE OF THESE 
ITEMS, AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION, MEANT THAT 
TALIBAN SUPPLY LINES HAD BEEN SHORTENED, AND THEY DID NOT 
NOW HAVE TO SEND FOR EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FROM 
KANDAHAR.  HE ADDED THAT JALALABAD AIRPORT IS IN GOOD 
CONDITION; AN AN-32 FROM KANDAHAR ARRIVED THERE ON 
SEPTEMBER 17.  (NOTE:  AS REPORTED SEPTEL, JALIL AND HAJI 
BASHIR ALSO SAID TERRORIST TRAINING BASES IN PAKTIA 
PROVINCE HAD BEEN CAPTURED, ALTHOUGH THE "ARAB" OCCUPANTS 
OF THE CAMPS HAD FLED.  THEY HAD NO IDEA OF THE 
WHEREABOUTS OF SAUDI FINANCIER OSAMA BIN LADEN.  END NOTE.) 
 
----------------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM WARM... 
----------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) ASKED ABOUT PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTS THAT GENERAL 
DOSTAM PLANS TO SEND 2,000 SOLDIERS TO KABUL TO DEFEND IT 
AGAINST THE TALIBAN (REF B), JALIL WAS DISMISSIVE, AND 
EMPHATIC THAT RELATIONS WITH DOSTAM ARE "WARM."  HE SAID 
HE DOUBTED THAT DOSTAM WOULD EVER ENTER INTO ANY 
RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMANDER MASOOD, WHOM HE DOES NOT 
TRUST.  JALIL ALLOWED THAT THE TALIBAN WERE CLOSELY 
SCRUTINIZING DOSTAM'S ACTIVITIES, BUT WERE CONVINCED AS 
OF THIS POINT THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE ANY 
"AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS" AGAINST THE TALIBAN. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
BUT THE IRANIANS ARE STIRRING UP TROUBLE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) HOWEVER, JALIL EVINCED DEEP CONCERN THAT THE 
IRANIANS WERE TRYING TO PUSH DOSTAM TOWARD AN 
ANTI-TALIBAN ALLIANCE WITH THE KABUL REGIME.  EXPANDING 
ON THIS POINT, JALIL SAID THE TALIBAN KNEW THAT IRANIAN 
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLAHUDDIN BORUJERDI IS CURRENTLY 
IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF ADVOCATING SUCH AN INITIATIVE (REF A). 
HE DOUBTED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS 
ENDEAVOUR, BUT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD KEEP TRYING. 
 
7.  (C) HAJI BASHIR RELATED THAT THE TALIBAN HAVE HAD 
BORDER FLARE-UPS WITH THE IRANIANS IN THE LAST MONTH. 
TWICE, HE ASSERTED, IRANIAN SOLDIERS HAVE ENTERED AFGHAN 
TERRITORY AND PROCEEDED TO THE AFGHAN BORDER TOWN OF 
ISLAM QALA, WHERE THEY ENCOUNTERED TALIBAN RESISTANCE. 
IN ONE INCIDENT, HE RECOUNTED, SIX UNIFORMED IRANIAN 
SOLDIERS WERE CAPTURED WITHIN THE BORDERS OF 
AFGHANISTAN.  HAJI BASHIR SAID THE IRANIANS WERE LATER 
RELEASED WHEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO PREVENT 
SUCH INCIDENTS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE. 
NONETHELESS, JALIL NOTED, TEHERAN RADIO'S PASHTU AND DARI 
SERVICES CONTINUED TO PRESS AN ANTI-TALIBAN MESSAGE, 
WHICH INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TALIBAN ARE WORKING 
FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. 
 
------------------------- 
ZAHIR SHAH IS NOT WELCOME 
------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) JALIL SAID THAT THE TALIBAN DID NOT TAKE THE 
SEPTEMBER 12 STATEMENT OF FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH THAT HE 
WAS WILLING TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN VERY SERIOUSLY.  FOR 
ONE THING, HE SAID THE FORMER KING IS JUST TOO OLD.  IN 
ADDITION, NONE OF THE FACTIONS REALLY SUPPORTED THE 
FORMER KING, ALTHOUGH SOME--LIKE DOSTAM--CLAIMED THAT 
THEY DID.  THE BASIC POINT, JALIL CONTINUED, IS THAT AS 
FAR AS THE TALIBAN ARE CONCERNED THEY ALREADY HAVE A 
LEADER, AMIR MOHAMMED OMAR, AND DO NOT NEED ANOTHER ONE. 
 
------------------------------- 
UN SPECIAL MISSION SEEN AS WEAK 
------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) JALIL WAS ALSO DISMISSIVE WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE UN 
SPECIAL MISSION ON AFGHANISTAN (UNSMA).  HE SAID THE NEW 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, DR, NORBERT HOLL, "KEPT PROMISING 
SOLUTIONS TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT BUT FAILED TO PRODUCE 
ANYTHING."  JALIL WAS ADAMANT THAT THE TALIBAN "WANT TO 
WORK WITH THE UNITED NATIONS," BUT SAID THEY SUSPECT THE 
UN IS "PRO-KABUL" AND ANTI-TALIBAN.  JALIL INVITED UNSMA 
TO SET UP SHOP IN JALALABAD AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, NOTING 
THAT THE SITUATION WAS "SAFE" THERE.  HE WARNED UNSMA IN 
THE STRONGEST TERMS NOT TO SET UP ITS AFGHAN HEADQUARTERS 
IN KABUL IF IT WANTS TO MAINTAIN "A SPIRIT OF 
COOPERATION" WITH THE TALIBAN.  POLOFF AND AARMA TOLD 
JALIL THAT IT WAS IN THE TALIBAN'S OWN BEST INTEREST TO 
ENGAGE UNSMA IN A "COOPERATIVE SPIRIT" SINCE IT WAS 
WORKING FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN.  (COMMENT:  RECENTLY 
STEPHEN EVANS (PROTECT), ONE OF DR. HOLL'S ADVISERS, 
OPINED TO POLOFF THAT KABUL WOULD BE THE ONLY LOGICAL 
PLACE FOR UNSMA TO SET UP SHOP--"JALALABAD IS NO LONGER 
NEUTRAL, SO ONLY THE CAPITAL REMAINS."  END COMMENT.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
-------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) JALIL CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE 
TALIBAN HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE UNITED STATES BASED ON 
ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE DURING THE WAR 
AGAINST THE SOVIETS.  HE ADDED THAT THE TWO ALSO SHARED A 
COMMON INTEREST IN HALTING IRANIAN "AGGRESSION," AND HE 
URGED USG SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN NOW THAT THEY CONTROL 
TWO-THIRDS OF AFGHANISTAN.  POLOFF RESPONDED THAT THE USG 
DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY OF THE FACTIONS, BUT RATHER SUPPORTS 
THE FORMATION OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT.  IN THIS 
SPIRIT, THE USG WANTS TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE TALIBAN 
WHENEVER POSSIBLE, POLOFF NOTED. 
 
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COMMENT 
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11.  (C) JALIL PROVIDED NO HINT THAT THE TALIBAN INTEND 
TO WORK CLOSELY WITH UNSMA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  IN 
ADDITION, JALIL APPEARED QUITE CERTAIN THAT THE TALIBAN 
WOULD REJECT THE FORMER KING'S OFFER TO RETURN TO 
AFGHANISTAN.  THIS LEAVES ONLY A CONTINUATION OF WAR--AT 
LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, AND JALIL PROVIDED EVERY SIGNAL 
THAT THE TALIBAN ARE AIMING FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION TO 
THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. 
 
12.  (C) IN THE WAKE OF THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY SUCCESSES, 
JALIL'S REMARKS ALSO INDICATE GROWING TENSION BETWEEN 
KANDAHAR AND TEHRAN.  IF THE TALIBAN CARRY THEIR 
OFFENSIVE CLOSER TO KABUL, THIS TENSION COULD GROW. 
 
 
SIMONS