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Viewing cable 93PRETORIA5586, FIGHTING PERCEPTIONS AND SUBSTANCE: THABO MBEKI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
93PRETORIA5586 1993-04-27 10:24 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Pretoria
R 271024Z APR 93
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1137
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMCONSUL DURBAN
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 005586 
 
CAPE TOWN ALSO FOR EMBASSY, LONDON FOR MCKINLEY 
 
E.O.  12356:  DECL:  OADR 
TAGS: PGOV SF
SUBJECT:  FIGHTING PERCEPTIONS AND SUBSTANCE: THABO MBEKI 
 
REFLECTS ON THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
1.  CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2.  AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ANC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
DIRECTOR AND SENIOR NEGOTIATOR THABO MBEKI APRIL 23 TO 
OBTAIN A READOUT ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN THE 
NEGOTIATIONS.  MBEKI WAS CONFIDENT THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE 
REACHED ON A DATE CERTAIN FOR ELECTIONS BY THE END OF 
MAY.  THE SAG'S PROPOSAL OF EARLY FEBRUARY 1994 WOULD 
GIVE NO HEARTBURN TO THE ANC.  REGARDING THE TRANSITIONAL 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (TEC), HE WAS LESS SANGUINE, NOTING 
THAT VIRTUALLY NO WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON THE SUBCOUNCILS 
FOR PUBLIC FINANCE, LOCAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT AND 
THAT THERE ARE CONTINUING PROBLEMS ON SECURITY FORCES 
OVERSIGHT.  HE COMPLAINED OF A PERCEPTION, FANNED BY 
ELEMENTS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT, THAT THE ANC 
LEADERSHIP IS NOT IN CONTROL OF A PRO-INSURRECTION 
FACTION WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION.  THAT PERCEPTION, 
COMMUNICATED AS FACT IN ANALYSES REACHING DE KLERK'S 
DESK, MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO CUT A DEAL ON THE TRANSITION 
WITH THE SAG, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PRESSURE IS ON TO DO 
SO. 
 
3.  THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SAG IS WORRIED 
ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE MODERATES TO MAINTAIN LEADERSHIP 
IN THE ANC, IT CAN DO NO BETTER THAN MAKE THE NEGOTIATING 
PROCESS CREDIBLE TO THE MAJORITY, THUS STRENGTHENING THE 
POSITION OF ANC MODERATES.  MBEKI ALSO WORRIED ABOUT HOW 
TO DEAL WITH THE CONCERNED SOUTH AFRICANS GROUP (COSAG), 
PARTICULARLY THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY, WHICH HAS NOT YET 
BOUGHT INTO THE GAMEPLAN OF A CONSTITUTION DRAFTED BY AN 
ELECTED BODY.  AMBASSADOR ADVISED THE ANC TO PROPOSE A 
REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ON REGIONALISM, SHORED UP BY THE 
BUSINESS COMMUNITY.  SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD WEAKEN ANY 
REASON FOR THEIR WALKING OUT. 
 
4.  WE FOUND MBEKI GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE 
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ADHERE TO THE ENVISAGED TIME FRAMES, 
BUT CONCERNED THAT THE SAG MAY LOOK FOR WAYS TO BACKTRACK 
ON COMMITMENTS AS THE DEADLINE FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
APPROACHES.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
ELECTION DATE NOT A PROBLEM BUT MAJORITY RULE? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5.  MBEKI LED OFF BY SHOWING AMBASSADOR A SAG PROPOSAL 
FOR THE SHAPE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.  MBEKI POINTED 
OUT THAT IT APPEARED REASONABLE AFTER A CURSORY 
EXAMINATION, EXCEPT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL OF 
LEADERS.  THAT NEW BODY, A SORT OF SUPER CABINET 
CONSISTING OF THE LEADERS OF EACH OF THE POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GONU), WOULD 
TAKE DECISIONS ON MAJOR POLICIES BY MAJORITY VOTE, EACH 
LEADER HAVING ONE VOTE.  THE NET EFFECT IS TO LESSEN THE 
POWER OF THE CABINET AND THE VALUE OF THE PROPORTIONAL 
ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE PARTICIPANTS.  THE ANC, WHILE 
NOT OPPOSED TO SOME SORT OF COUNCIL, WILL HAVE TO SEEK 
MODIFICATION OF BOTH ITS DEGREE OF AUTHORITY AND 
PROCEDURE. 
 
6.  ON THE ISSUE OF A DATE FOR ELECTIONS, MBEKI FORESEES 
NO PROBLEM.  THE TWO PRESIDENTS, MANDELA AND DE KLERK, 
MET IN MARCH AND AGREED TO USE THE MONTH OF APRIL TO 
PERSUADE THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES OF THE NEED TO MOVE ON 
THIS QUESTION.  THE SAG HAS PROPOSED A DATE IN EARLY 
FEBRUARY 1994, TO WHICH THE ANC AND ITS ALLIES CAN AGREE. 
MBEKI IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IFP, WHICH HAS A COMPLETELY 
DIFFERENT SCENARIO FOR WHEN ELECTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE. 
AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT BOTH SAG AND ANC WORK ON THE 
IFP TO CHANGE ITS POSITION.  HE ADDED THAT, AS BUTHELEZI 
TRAVELS TO LONDON THE FOLLOWING WEEK, THE ANC MIGHT 
SUGGEST THE BRITISH PRESS HIM AS WELL. 
 
---------------------------------- 
TEC: PLENTY OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  "IT SEEMS PEOPLE FORGOT CODESA'S DECISIONS," MBEKI 
MUSED IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ABOUT THE STATE 
OF AGREEMENT ON THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE TEC. 
NOTHING HAS HAPPENED SINCE LAST YEAR ON THE SUBCOUNCIL 
DEALING WITH PUBLIC FINANCE.  CONFUSION REIGNS ON THE 
FUNCTION OF A SUBCOUNCIL FOR REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT, TO WHICH THE ANC CONTRIBUTED BY SUGGESTING 
THAT THE NEGOTIATORS GO BACK TO THE USE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 
FOUR PROVINCES.  THIS GOES COUNTER TO THE ANC'S OWN 
POSITION ON USE OF NINE OR TEN REGIONS AND MBEKI SAID THE 
ANC WOULD GO BACK TO THIS IN THE NEXT BILATERAL WITH THE 
SAG.  IT IS UNCLEAR NEVERTHELESS HOW SUCH A SUBCOUNCIL 
WOULD IMPACT ON THE PROCESS OF GOVERNING, REINCORPORATION 
OF THE HOMELANDS OR PREPARATIONS FOR THE ELECTION.  BROAD 
AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED WITH THE GOVERNMENT REGARDING 
THE SUBCOUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SINCE PIK BOTHA, NOW 
CONCERNED ABOUT HIS PLACE IN HISTORY AS LEADER OF THE 
ANTIAPARTHEID FORCES IN THE NATIONAL PARTY, WANTS TO MOVE 
AHEAD QUICKLY. 
 
8.  UMKHONTO WE SIZWE COMMANDER JOE MODISE HAD BEEN SENT 
THAT MORNING TO CAPE TOWN TO MEET WITH HIS MILITARY 
COUNTERPART IN A BID TO UNBLOCK NEGOTIATIONS ON THE 
SUBCOUNCIL PERTAINING TO THE SECURITY FORCES.  MBEKI 
OPINED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS MUST MOVE AWAY FROM THE 
PHRASE "JOINT CONTROL" WHICH THE SADF THINKS IS TOO 
LOADED.  THE ANC WANTS THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY TO SAY 
WHAT HAPPENS VIS-A-VIS THE ARMED FORCES.  THUS, JOINT 
SUPERVISION MIGHT BE THE MORE APT TERM.  THE ANC DOES NOT 
WANT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE SADF.  MBEKI TOLD 
MODISE TO MAKE THAT POINT VERY CLEAR TO THE SADF. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE INSURRECTIONIST FACTION 
--------------------------- 
 
9.  IN THIS CONNECTION, MBEKI EXPLAINED THAT PART OF THE 
PROBLEM ON CLINCHING A DEAL ON THE SECURITY FORCES IS THE 
FACT THAT, IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT, THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO 
SAY THAT THE ANC'S CURRENT PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP MAY SOON 
BE REPLACED BY AN INSURRECTIONIST FACTION.  IF THE SAG 
AGREES TO JOINT CONTROL WITH THIS LEADERSHIP, THEN THE 
SUCCESSORS WILL HAVE THE LEGAL INSTRUMENT WITH WHICH TO 
WREAK HAVOC WITH THE SECURITY FORCES.  IT IS A POINT OF 
"ULTRASENSITIVITY" IN THE SAG.  SUCH AN ANALYSIS HAS EVEN 
REACHED DE KLERK'S DESK AND HAS BEEN PRESENTED AS FACT. 
HOW TO DISPEL SUCH PERCEPTIONS?  THEY HAVE REPERCUSSIONS 
ON ANC POLICY MAKING, GIVING HARDLINERS AMMUNITION AND 
RESONANCE WHEN THEY ARGUE THAT SAG FAILURE TO MOVE AT THE 
NEGOTIATING TABLE MEANS IT WANTS TO CLING TO POWER. 
 
10.  CONTINUING, MBEKI VOICED CONCERN OVER EXAGGERATED 
MEDIA FOCUS ON THE "ANGER" OF THE ANC RANK AND FILE 
FOLLOWING CHRIS HANI'S ASSASSINATION.  OLIVER TAMBO AND 
HE WENT TO HANI'S HOME FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION AND 
DID NOT FIND THE PEOPLE MILLING AROUND TO BE ANGRY.  THE 
RANK AND FILE WERE OUTRAGED AND UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY IN 
A REVOLUTIONARY OR UNCONTROLLABLE SENSE.  MARCHERS IN 
JOHANNESBURG APRIL 17, HE SAID, IN FACT BEAT LOOTERS AND 
TURNED THEM OVER TO THE POLICE.  AMBASSADOR COMMENTED 
THAT, PUT IN PERSPECTIVE, THE AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE WAS 
MINIMAL IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO TURNED 
OUT FOR VARIOUS EVENTS MARKING HANI'S DEATH.  IF THE SAG 
IS WORRIED ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE ANC LEADERSHIP IT 
IS DEALING WITH, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, THEN THE 
GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REINFORCE THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THAT LEADERSHIP.  THE WAY TO DO SO IS 
THROUGH MAKING THE NEGOTIATIONS CREDIBLE IN TERMS OF REAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THEREBY MAKING THE ANC'S LEADERSHIP, WHICH 
IS COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATIONS, UNCHALLENGEABLE. 
 
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HOW TO DEAL WITH COSAG? 
----------------------- 
 
11.  "WHAT HAPPENS IF WE ARE UNABLE TO CONVINCE COSAG?" 
MBEKI PONDERED, ONCE THE SAG AND ANC HAVE REACHED 
AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSITION.  COSAG COULD 
VERY WELL BLOCK THE PROCESS, A FACT THAT MIGHT REQUIRE 
UNSPECIFIED UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE SAG.  BUTHELEZI 
MIGHT WELL WALK OUT.  THE SAG AND ANC HAVE NOT YET 
DECIDED WHETHER THE PROCESS WOULD THEN MOVE FORWARD 
WITHOUT HIM.  AMBASSADOR REMARKED THAT BUTHELEZI IS 
ALREADY UNHAPPY WITH THE SPEED AT WHICH THE PROCESS IS 
MOVING.  IT BEHOOVES THE ANC TO PROPOSE A REASONABLE 
SETTLEMENT ON REGIONALISM, BUTHELEZI'S MOST LEGITIMATE 
CONCERN.  JOE MATTHEWS, AT THE ASPEN CONFERENCE, HAD 
SUGGESTED THAT THE ANC AND IFP MIGHT NOT BE SO FAR APART 
ON THIS ONE.  IF THIS ISSUE IS ADDRESSED ADEQUATELY AND 
BUTHELEZI'S BUSINESS COMMUNITY SUPPORTERS BEGIN SAYING 
"WE WANT A SETTLEMENT," HIS ARGUMENTS FOR WALKING OUT 
WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED, ALTHOUGH ONE COULD NOT 
RULE OUT A BUTHELEZI WALKOUT EVEN THEN.  MOREOVER, SUCH 
AN APPROACH WOULD AVOID THE NEED TO RIDE ROUGHSHOD OVER 
BUTHELEZI.  MBEKI AGREED AND NOTED THAT A CONVENIENT DATE 
HAS NOT YET BEEN FOUND TO MEET WITH THE IFP FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS. 
 
12.  AMBASSADOR INFORMED MBEKI THAT HE HAD MET WITH 
BOPHUTHATSWANA "PRESIDENT" MANGOPE IN DECEMBER AND FOUND 
HIM UNMOVING ON THE QUESTION OF REINCORPORATION.  MBEKI 
REPLIED THAT MANGOPE SEES THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL AND 
WANTS IN PLACE A REGIME WITH WHICH HE IS COMFORTABLE 
BEFORE REINCORPORATING.  THE SAG HAS PRESENTED MANGOPE A 
PAPER ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT REINCORPORATING, AND 
ROELF MEYER URGED BUTHELEZI TO GET HIS ALLIES TO MOVE ON 
IT.  PIK BOTHA HAS GIVEN THE ANC ASSURANCES THAT THE SAG 
WILL KEEP THE PRESSURE ON.  THE ANC, MBEKI SAID, WILL 
MEET MANGOPE AGAIN TO TRY TO PERSUADE HIM TO JOIN THE 
NEGOTIATIONS' CONSENSUS. 
 
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COMMENT 
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13.  WE FOUND MBEKI GENERALLY UPBEAT ABOUT THE 
APPROACHING ENDGAME.  HE WAS MOST CONCERNED THAT SAG 
JITTERS AS THE FINALITY OF IT SINKS IN MAY CAUSE IT TO 
BACKTRACK ON AGREEMENTS.  HE SAID AS MUCH MERELY BY 
SHOWING US THE SAG'S PROPOSAL FOR THE SHAPE OF THE 
INTERIM GOVERNMENT. 
 
14.  WE FOUND MUCH TO THINK ABOUT IN MBEKI'S ASSESSMENT 
THAT UNCHALLENGED, ERRONEOUS PERCEPTIONS HAVE A NOXIOUS 
IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.  THERE IS A DANGER 
OF CHALLENGE TO ANC LEADERSHIP FROM THE LEFT, BUT IT IS 
MORE OUTSIDE THAN WITHIN THE ANC.  MOREOVER, WE CONCUR 
THAT THE POPULAR MOOD HERE IS NOT ONE OF DESTRUCTION.  WE 
INTEND TO UNDERSCORE THAT POINT IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND 
IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT FIGURES AND THE 
BUSINESS COMMUNITY, WHILE UNDERSCORING THE NEED FOR 
SPEEDY RESULTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO PRESERVE 
THAT SITUATION.  END COMMENT. 
 
LYMAN