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INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 7158
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7317
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6565
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RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 9292
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3150

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/CTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM ENRG SENV TRGY KNNP KRAD
FR 
SUBJECT: G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: FRENCH CLAIM INTERAGENCY 
BATTLE KEY TO OVERALL POLICY 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Kim Krhounek, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
, (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lack of engagement by relevant French 
ministries and political buck-passing of responsibilities 
appear to be the primary impediments to greater French 
political support for extension of the G8's Global 
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction (GP). The current perception is that the GP 
focuses exclusively on Russian nuclear issues, which has led 
to declining political interest in France, particularly 
within the two biggest funding ministries -- the Ministries 
of Industry and Energy --  who have effectively handed off 
all responsibility to junior partners the MFA and MOD.  The 
French claim that while they could probably support - in 
theory - the extension of the GP beyond 2012, any commitment, 
even in principle, would only be possible if the MFA is able 
to get better inter-agency buy-in and bring the bigger 
ministries back on board.  Post's analysis is that French 
support will ultimately be a question of political will and 
sufficient pressure at senior levels, particularly by the 
office of the Presidency, which has a strong lead on 
non-proliferation issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) MFA GP Action Officer Paul Furia said February 22 that 
when France made its original ten-year commitment to the GP 
in 2002, the Ministries of Industry and Energy were the 
largest contributors, with the MFA and MoD as "junior 
partners."  This was largely due to the focus on removing 
radioactive materials from, and clearing up, Russian military 
sites, which were projects for which these ministries had 
technical expertise.  However, according to Furia, beginning 
in 2006 these ministries began lobbying the Prime Minister's 
office to allow them to leave their GP responsibilities to 
the MFA and MoD, claiming that these ministries had primary 
responsibility for disarmament and non-proliferation.  The 
creation in 2007 of the "super ministry" that would become 
the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development, and 
Oceans (MEEDAT) encouraged this shift by absorbing many of 
the GP-relevant competencies while allowing GP priorities to 
get lost among the new ministry's other competing duties. 
Additionally, Furia said the GP began to lose political 
significance for the GOF as it came to be seen as little more 
than a means for Russia to finance its nuclear clean-up. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In this context, Furia said France has welcomed U.S. 
and Canadian suggestions that, moving forward, the GP should 
be considered less as a specific set of Russia-focused 
projects and more as a larger effort to prevent the spread of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials. 
While cautioning that the GP would lose political relevance 
were it to become a simple "accounting exercise" in which any 
existing projects are used to account for funding 
commitments, Furia said French officials were intrigued by 
the U.S. example of considering relevant projects by 
agriculture or public health authorities, for example, as 
part of the overall GP effort.  Having not considered the GP 
in this light before, Furia added, the GOF was currently 
looking at what assistance priorities outside the MFA and MoD 
might fit into this rubric. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Furia stressed, however, that France was not 
currently in a position to commit to a GP extension beyond 
¶2012.  While in theory the MFA could support an extension, 
Furia said France does not want to do so unless the GOF is 
certain of what financial commitments will be involved.  If 
the MFA can convince Prime Minister Fillon that other 
ministries - MEEDAT, or the ministries of agriculture, 
health, or industry - should be involved, Furia said 
continuing at existing levels of funding may be more of a 
possibility.  Existing U.S. and Canadian plans to enlarge the 
GP beyond Russia and focus on projects beyond nuclear 
decommissioning that are relevant to these ministries could 
help encourage the involvement of other GOF actors. 
Additionally, Furia reiterated a French suggestion to move 
the GP from the Non-Proliferation Directors Group of the G8 
to the Nuclear Safety and Security Group, which he claimed 
would help the MFA make the case that the GP is wider than 
just non-proliferation and that the MEEDAT should become 
involved. 
 
¶5. (C) Furia admitted, however, that the Prime Minister's 
office has not so far shown a great deal of interest in the 
 
topic, although he hoped that the upcoming preparatory 
meeting in Montreal would attract more senior attention by 
requiring France to consider its policy options. 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT: Although Furia's description of the GOF's 
interagency buck-passing explains France's inability to 
fulfill its existing commitments and its reluctance to take 
on new ones, it does not provide a recipe for engaging France 
on supporting an extension of the GP.  It is in any case 
questionable whether even ministries with bigger budgets than 
the MFA have funds available to support future GP projects. 
Ultimately, although the Prime Minister has the authority to 
assign responsibilities to various ministries, the GOF's 
reaction to U.S. proposals will depend on political will, and 
senior Presidency staff will likely have to be convinced. 
END COMMENT. 
PEKALA