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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/12 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 
4, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-017. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 4, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 5:10 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side gave an opening 
statement on the U.S.-Russian agreement on the relationship between 
missile defense and strategic offensive arms (SOA) as it related to 
Russia's compromise on telemetry and the use of unique identifiers 
(UIDs).  Poznikhir stated that the United States had backed away 
from its previous position on other issues as well.  After the 
statement the U.S. side asked questions to clarify the Russian 
position on the most contentious points of its proposal, entitled 
Basic Approaches of the Russian Side to the Exchange of Telemetric 
Information, dated February 2.  These points included:  the 
launching side determination of telemetry files for exchange; the 
concept of parity; the elimination of self-contained dispensing 
mechanism (SCDM) telemetry; the delay in implementation of 
telemetry exchange; and the suspension of the exchange in the event 
of a disagreement.  The most enlightening clarification was in 
response to questions about suspending the exchange in the case of 
disagreement.  The Russian side asserted that if it had concerns 
about the development of a U.S. missile defense system or the use 
of telemetric data to support missile defense system development, 
then Russia would be forced to suspend the exchange of telemetric 
data.  The other Russian verbal responses confirmed what was in 
Russia's written proposal:  parity would not be determined by type 
of flight test, either ICBM or SLBM; the initial exchange of 
telemetric information would occur after a complete calendar year 
had expired; choice of which flight tests to be exchanged would be 
determined solely by the conducting Party; and a Party could not 
request the exchange of telemetric data for a specific flight test 
of the other Party.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Poznikhir Opening Statement; Siemon 
Responds to Statement; U.S. Questions on Russian Approach to 
Telemetry; Flight Test Versus Launch; What Parity Means. 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
 
POZNIKHIR OPENING STATEMENT 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Poznikhir began the meeting with a strong statement on what 
he described as "the U.S.-Russian agreement on strategic offensive 
forces and missile defense" as it related to the Russian position 
on telemetry and the use of UIDs.  Poznikhir emphasized that the 
agreement by the Russian side to include provisions for the 
exchange of telemetry was only possible if the United States 
honored its agreement to include provisions in the treaty text on 
the relationship between strategic offensive forces and missile 
defense.  Acceptance by the Russian side of the use of UIDs was 
also only possible if the United States honored its commitment to 
delete specific treaty provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs.  The Russian side believed that the United States was now 
moving away from the agreements reached during the meetings between 
Admiral Mullen-General Makarov in January in Moscow on the 
interrelationship between missile defense and SOA and on the 
requirement to delete treaty provisions that were specific only to 
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.  If the United States did not 
honor its commitments in these two areas, the Russian side would be 
forced to move away from the inclusion of telemetry and UIDs in the 
treaty. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) The Russian side noted that it expected to receive a 
proposal from the U.S. side on Saturday, February 6, updating its 
position on the relationship between missile defense and SOA. 
After a review of this proposal the Russian side would determine 
either that it was ready to move forward or whether it would step 
back as Russia believed the United States had done.  The Russian 
side emphasized that it would not accept any one-sided provisions 
or obligations within the new treaty. 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
SIEMON RESPONDS TO STATEMENT 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Siemon noted that the relationship between missile defense 
and SOA was important to discuss, but not within the Telemetry 
Working Group.  It was natural for each side to review its 
positions and sometimes view the other side as walking back.  Each 
side had ideas on what it had given up.  He believed that no one 
from the U.S. side who had attended the recent Mullen-Makarov 
Moscow meetings came away with this understanding of the Russian 
position on either the relationship between telemetry and missile 
defense or the relationship between UIDs and mobile ICBMs.  Siemon 
commented that there had been no mention of missile defense 
concerns during the portions of the Mullen-Makarov meetings when he 
was in the main conference room.  Ending the discussion on 
Poznikhir's statement, Siemon noted that neither side should enter 
into an agreement if it believed it was placed at a disadvantage. 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
U.S. QUESTIONS ON RUSSIAN 
 
APPROACH TO TELEMETRY 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) After this preliminary discussion, Siemon asked questions 
related to the Russian proposal on Basic Approaches of the Russian 
Side to the Exchange of Telemetric Information, dated February 2, 
¶2010. 
 
 
 
Begin text. 
 
 
 
Proposal by the Russian Federation 
 
 
 
2 February 2010 
 
 
 
Basic approaches of the Russian side to the exchange of telemetric 
information 
 
 
 
¶1.   Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity 
basis, on no more than five ICBM and SLBM launches per year. 
 
The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an 
equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches conducted by the Parties, 
and in an agreed amount. 
 
 
 
¶2.   The launches, for which telemetric information will be 
provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party. 
 
 
 
¶3.   As part of the annual exchange of telemetric information, the 
Parties shall provide the recording media and interpretive data of 
the telemetric information provided. 
 
The recording media should contain the recording of all telemetric 
information, broadcast during the launch, until the upper stage 
propulsion unit of the ICBM and SLBM ceases to function. 
 
 
 
Telemetric information relating to the functionality of the 
self-contained dispensing mechanism, and produced within the 
re-entry vehicle and broadcast from it, shall not be exchanged. 
 
 
 
¶4.   Parties shall not broadcast telemetric information related to 
the functioning of ICBM and SLBM stages from a re-entry vehicle. 
 
 
 
¶5.   Each Party shall carry out an initial demonstration of the 
 
 
recording media and playback equipment to be used, and shall 
provide to the other Party all associated equipment. 
 
 
 
¶6.   The Party conducting the launch of ICBMs or SLBMs shall 
independently determine the method for recording telemetric 
information on the recording media. In connection with this, it 
shall provide to the other Party the method to playback the 
telemetric information from the recording media, enabling 
conversion of the telemetric information contained on the recording 
media to the format produced on board the missile before it is 
broadcast. 
 
 
 
Types of modulation, methods, modes and formats of recording, as 
well as methods of telemetric information encryption on recording 
media used by the Parties shall not impede the processing of the 
telemetric information provided by the other Party. 
 
 
 
¶7.   Considering that the new agreement does not contain 
limitations which could be verified with the help of telemetric 
information, the names of parameters, necessary for determining 
acceleration and separation times of ICBM and SLBM stages, as well 
as the times of reentry vehicle separation commands and their 
location in the telemetry frame shall not be specified in the 
annual data exchange on ICBM and SLBM launches. 
 
 
 
¶8.   During ICBM and SLBM launches, the telemetric information of 
which will not be exchanged, each Party shall have the right to use 
any method to prevent access to all data as well as to any part of 
the telemetric information that originates on board the missile and 
is broadcast or encapsulated. 
 
 
 
¶9.   The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out 
within the first 65 days after the beginning of the calendar year 
for launches that were conducted in the previous year. 
 
 
 
¶10.  The provisions on the exchange of telemetric information shall 
take effect on the first calendar day of the year following the 
year in which the Treaty entered into force. 
 
 
 
¶11.  On an annual basis, the Parties shall review the conditions 
and procedures for future exchange of telemetric information on 
ICBM and SLBM launches within the framework of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission. In the event that one of the Parties 
raises a question as to the need for changing the amount and volume 
of the telemetric information provided, the exchange of telemetric 
information shall be suspended until an agreement on this change 
can be reached. 
 
 
 
¶12.  The basic provisions that govern the conditions and method for 
 
 
the exchange of telemetric information shall be set forth within 
the Protocol to the Treaty. Additional details of telemetric 
information exchange shall be specified in the Annex on procedures 
for the exchange of telemetric information. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Siemon asked what the status was of the three telemetry 
paragraphs for the Protocol that the sides had agreed on at the 
last meeting in Moscow.  Poznikhir believed the paragraphs in the 
Protocol needed to be broader.  He believed the sides together 
should decide what belonged in the Protocol and what should be put 
into the Tier III Annex.  In START, the main ideas were placed in 
the Protocols and the details were placed in the Annexes.  He 
believed the sides should follow this example; however, the Russian 
side was waiting for the U.S. position on this question.  Siemon 
used START's treatment of the initial demonstration of playback 
equipment as an example of the U.S. position.  The START Telemetry 
Protocol included the broader concept of the demonstration and the 
Annexes included the many details. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side would take the agreed language 
of the three paragraphs and work it into a draft Protocol.  The 
sides could use this draft to determine what should be included in 
the Protocol and what could be placed into the Tier III Annex.  A 
decision could also be made about which provisions would be 
recorded in the annex and which would be better resolved through 
discussion within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) While on the subject of the initial demonstration of 
playback equipment, Siemon asked whether it was sufficient to 
provide information for purchase of commercially-available 
equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration.  Poznikhir 
replied that a Party should have the ability to procure both the 
equipment used in START and newly demonstrated equipment.  He did 
not clarify who would be responsible for the purchase.  When asked 
whether it was necessary to conduct demonstrations if the equipment 
purchased during START was still functioning, Col Ryzhkov indicated 
that he believed that demonstrations would still be necessary. 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
FLIGHT TEST VERSUS LAUNCH 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) In reference to the text in the Russian proposal on 
telemetry language, Siemon asked why the Russian side had changed 
the agreed language to use the term "launch" versus the term 
"flight test."  Ryzhkov replied that under START the Parties had 
exchanged telemetry on both test launches and space launches that 
incorporated a first stage of an accountable item.  However, the 
example that the Russian delegation preferred to follow was the 
 
 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched 
Ballistic Missiles, dated May 31, 1988.  This agreement used the 
term "launch" which was considered broader language and covered all 
types of launches.  Poznikhir noted that with the expiration of 
START, the 1988 agreement was the only existing agreement outlining 
launch notification obligations--it had no expiration date and it 
unambiguously described information related to launches. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Siemon stated that most launches in START were test 
launches that used ICBMs or SLBMs that were accountable under the 
treaty.  There also were space launches to place objects into the 
upper atmosphere or space and these typically used the first stage 
of accountable ICBMs and SLBMs.  These two types of launches were 
the only test launches that were subject to the START Treaty. 
Siemon indicated that there were other launches that used 
accountable first stages that were not test launches--for example, 
the launch to destruct 40 SS-N-20 SLBMs in the late 1990s.  These 
launches were exempted from the exchange of telemetry since they 
did not have telemetry packages.  Siemon asked whether the Russian 
side believed this type of launch would also be exempt from 
telemetry exchange under the new treaty.  Poznikhir responded that 
he believed this would be the case, but added they could add 
telemetry packages if the U.S. side thought they should.  Siemon 
responded that the United States would prefer that Russia not add a 
telemetry package and that launches to destruct be excluded from 
the telemetry exchange. 
 
 
 
----------------- 
 
WHAT PARITY MEANS 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) In reference to the exchange of telemetry, Siemon asked 
whether "on a parity basis" meant a "one-for-one exchange" for each 
ICBM and SLBM flight.  Poznikhir indicated that parity was based on 
quantity:  an equal number of launches shared; no more than five. 
Parity would not be determined by type of flight test, either ICBM 
or SLBM.  The Party that conducted the flight test would determine 
on which test flights telemetric information would be exchanged. 
The group collectively then went through several hypothetical, 
numeric examples to describe parity.  The Russian side believed 
neither side should be forced to conduct a flight test if its 
numbers were disparate.  He indicated the receiving Party would 
have no part in this selection.  Poznikhir said this language was a 
clear and purposeful Russian choice.  Following this line of 
questioning, Siemon asked when a flight test of a prototype was 
conducted could the receiving Party request that the telemetry from 
this specific flight test be part of the exchange.  Poznikhir 
responded negatively; the conducting Party solely selected the 
launches to be exchanged.  Ms. Pura asked whether discussions would 
be conducted throughout a year to determine on which flight tests 
telemetry would be exchanged.  Poznikhir responded that as the 
Russian text proposed, the exchange of telemetric information would 
be carried out within the first 65 days after the beginning of the 
calendar year for launches that were conducted in the previous 
year.  No other discussions were necessary.  After being 
 
questioned, Poznikhir also indicated that telemetry would be 
exchanged through Diplomatic Channels.  The details of implementing 
the exchange could be located in the Annex. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Siemon stated the U.S. side needed to clearly understand 
the entire process of the selection and exchange of telemetric 
information prior to the treaty and protocol being sent for 
signature.  This was especially important since the annex would be 
part of the ratification package. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Siemon asked about the Russian-proposed provision for the 
exchange of telemetric information to take effect on the first 
calendar year following the year when the treaty entered into 
force.  When would the first exchange occur if the treaty entered 
into force in 2010?  Poznikhir responded that the first exchange 
would be in January 2012.  Siemon replied that basing the exchange 
on the calendar year would result in a time period where the 
implementation of a treaty requirement would be denied.  This would 
mean that for the START Follow-on Treaty, which was to have a 
duration of 10 years, there would only be 9 years of 
implementation.  For past treaties, the concept of a treaty year 
had been used rather than a calendar year chosen by one of the 
Parties.  Poznikhir stated he would take this issue back to his 
lawyers for discussion. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Referencing the text on the annual review for further 
exchange of telemetric information to be held within the framework 
of the BCC, Siemon stated he was confused by the Russian use of the 
word "suspended."  He understood that after the last Mullen-Makarov 
meeting that Parties would meet annually to agree on the exchange 
of telemetric information and if agreement did not occur, the 
Parties would continue the existing practice.  He had expected to 
see the word "continued" and was surprised to see "suspended" in 
the Russian-proposed text.  Was the Russian use of "suspended" a 
mistake?  Poznikhir replied to this well-developed question with a 
very short answer:  "No, there was no mistake in the Russian 
proposal."  If telemetry was being used to enhance missile defense, 
this raised a question with regard to Russian national security. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) During this discussion of annual reviews of the proposed 
exchange of telemetric data, General Venevtsev reiterated that if 
Russia had concerns about the development of a U.S. missile defense 
system or the use of telemetric data to support missile defense 
system development, then Russia would be forced to suspend the 
exchange of telemetric data. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Ahlm 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Mr. Hanchett (RO) 
 
Mr. LaPointe 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Ms. Smith (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Poznikhir 
 
Mr. Luchaninov 
 
Mr. Malyugin 
 
Col Pischulov 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
 
Gen Venevtsev 
 
Col Voloskov 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON