VZCZCXYZ0089
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0448/01 0501351
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191351Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6720
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020 
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP
SUBJECT: U.S. FORCES DETAINEE UPDATE; UPCOMING TRANSFER OF 
TAJI TIF; DETAINEE TRANSFER ISSUES 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 199 
 
Classified By: A/PMCouns W.S. Reid III for reasons 1.4(b) & (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary. At this time, there are 5,830 detainees in 
U.S. custody, evenly distributed between the two U.S. theater 
internment facilities (TIFs) - Taji and Cropper.  United 
States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) operations are under way to set 
the detainee populations in both the Taji and Cropper TIFs in 
preparation for the March 15 transfer of the Taji TIF to the 
GOI.  The TIF, valued at $107 million, includes Iraqi 
correction officer (ICO) housing and dining facilities, water 
and sewage treatment plants, and a new entrance check point 
(ECP).  By transferring the Taji TIF to the GOI, the U.S. 
will expand the GOI's detention capabilities by approximately 
2,000 bed spaces, which will allow the GOI to transfer 
detainees from overcrowded GOI detention facilities to the 
new Taji TIF.  In addition to the facilities, USF-I plans to 
transfer approximately 3,000 medium-threat detainees to the 
GOI.  Currently, about 1,000 of the Taji TIF detainees are 
release eligible, meaning the U.S. cannot transfer them to 
the GOI without an arrest warrant, detention order, or 
conviction order.  As the time for transfer is fast 
approaching, the USG will continue to stress to the GOI the 
importance of GOI-produced detainee transfer paperwork prior 
to the facility transfer and the consequences of its failure 
to do so.   End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
USF-I DETAINEE UPDATE 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) As of February 17, there were 5,830 detainees in U.S. 
custody. That number included three third-country nationals, 
137 enduring security threats, 1,851 dangerous radicals, and 
37 former regime element officials (to include Sultan Hashim, 
former Saddam-era Minister of Defense). Since January 1, 
2009, USF-I has released 7,985 detainees, transferred to the 
GOI 1,655 detainees, captured 286 individuals, and recaptured 
33 persons. 
 
¶3.  (S) Approximately 1,600 of the nearly 6,000 U.S.-held 
detainees are release eligible (i.e. detainees for whom the 
GOI has not provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention 
order or conviction order). These release-eligible detainees 
include 342 dangerous radicals, 38 enduring security threats, 
and 374 medium-threat AQI detainees. If the GOI does not 
provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction 
orders to the U.S. for these detainees by July 1, USF-I will 
be required under the Security Agreement to release many of 
these individuals.  (Note and Comment: USF-I will transfer 
the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15 (reftel). In order to 
accommodate new captures and some of those detainees who have 
been designated as enduring security threats and dangerous 
radicals, USF-I will maintain a 360-bed space facility in 
Compound Five, located near Camp Cropper.  USF-I currently 
only plans to maintain a guard force of 100 personnel - only 
enough to safely guard 122 detainees, as originally planned. 
If a greater detainee population is envisioned, USF-I will 
need to deploy a larger guard force. End Note and Comment.) 
 
¶4.  (S) MG David Quantock, Deputy Commanding General - 
Detainee Operations (DCG-DO), previously addressed the lack 
of detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and 
Qof detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and 
again will address this issue with Joint Subcommittee on 
Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal, Ministry 
of the Interior, National Information and Investigation 
Agency (NIIA), at the next JSC-DA on February 20. At that 
time, MG Quantock will stress the importance of the detainee 
transfer paperwork and the danger of releasing enduring 
security threat and dangerous radical detainees from the U.S. 
TIFs without first prosecuting them under the Iraqi justice 
system. (Note: Until the Iraqi national elections on March 7, 
USF-I will only release low-threat detainees.  However, it is 
envisioned that USF-I will reassess this release policy after 
the elections should the GOI fail to provide detainee 
transfer paperwork on those release-eligible detainees in 
U.S. custody in preparation for the transfer of the Cropper 
TIF in July. End Note.) 
 
----------------------- 
TAJI TIF INFRASTRUCTURE 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Upon transfer, the Taji TIF will be able to safely 
house approximately 5,000 detainees. (Note: Although the TIF 
will be transferred with 3,000 detainees, the GOI will gain 
an additional 2,000 bed spaces in which to transfer detainees 
from other Iraqi detention facilities. End Note.) In addition 
to the detainee housing facilities, the TIF includes a water 
treatment facility, with a 3-day storage capacity of 1.7 
million liters; a sewage treatment plant; a $500,000 kitchen 
facility to provide meals to the detainee population; a 
$700,000 detainee property warehouse; and 17 generators. 
(Note: Although USF-I will provide generators to the GOI, a 
project is in place to connect the Taji TIF to the existing 
Iraqi power grid at a cost of $4 million. End Note.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In order to house and feed the Iraqi correction 
officer (ICO) force rotations, USF-I built a $4 million ICO 
village and a $8.5 million ICO dining facility (DFAC), which 
can serve approximately 1,000 ICOs.  The ICO village will 
consist of 24 barracks, administrative support facilities, 
and morale, welfare and recreation facilities that can be 
used by the ICO force during their work rotations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Previously, while reviewing the facility, the GOI 
complained that it had to cross a USF-I military installation 
for access to the TIF and were unable to access the TIF 
directly from the main road ("Route Tampa").  To remedy this, 
USF-I is in the process of connecting the new ECP to Route 
Tampa by a service road.  The ECP will have a parking lot, 
separate female search trailer, badging trailer, playground, 
and waiting area. 
 
------------------- 
TAJI TIF POPULATION 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) USF-I currently plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the 
GOI with medium-threat detainees only, to include Shia and 
low-threat AQI detainees.  In order to accomplish this, USF-I 
is shifting high-threat detainees and their personal property 
from the Taji TIF to the Cropper TIF and at the same time is 
shifting low- and medium- threat detainees and their personal 
property from the Cropper TIF to the Taji TIF.  The shift of 
the high-threat detainees is 100% complete, while the shift 
of the low- and medium-threat detainees is 80% complete. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Once these transfers are complete, Taji TIF will 
have a detainee population end state of 2,965, which will 
include 1,039 release-eligible detainees  and 1,926 
transfer-eligible detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI 
has provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order 
or conviction order). (Note: At this time, there are 
approximately 1,600 detainees in U.S. custody who are release 
eligible. End Note.) 
 
¶10.  (S) Comment.  It is clear that USF-I, with the transfer 
of this top-notch facility, is setting the GOI up for 
success.  Whether the GOI is able to maintain this momentum 
and capitalize on the options this facility provides is 
another matter.  The GOI has until this time been unable to 
provide transfer paperwork on the final 1,600 detainees, 
although the USG has stressed over time the importance of 
this issue.  This failure by the GOI could halt USF-I plans 
to transfer its remaining detainee population, minus some 
enduring security threats and dangerous radicals, to the GOI 
Qenduring security threats and dangerous radicals, to the GOI 
in July.  It is unclear whether the GOI will focus its 
efforts on this issue in the run-up to the March elections, 
which are quickly approaching. Following the distraction of 
the national elections, there must be a concerted effort to 
focus the caretaker government on the necessity of providing 
sorely needed transfer documents to facilitate the continued 
detention of these high-threat detainees. Should the 
caretaker government fail to provide this paperwork, it would 
represent a considerable security risk.  Consequently, we 
would need to place this issue high on the agenda with the 
newly-formed government this summer.  End Comment. 
FORD