VZCZCXRO9624
PP RUEHKW RUEHSL
DE RUEHUNV #0009/01 0151445
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151445Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0492
INFO AFGHA/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCRI/VIENNA CRIME COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1820
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0119
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 
TAGS: AF SNAR UNCND IR
SUBJECT: PREVIEWING THE MARCH 2010 COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC 
DRUGS 
 
REF: A. UNVIE 570 
     ¶B. UNVIE 172 
     ¶C. UNVIE 005 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for 
reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The March 2010 Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND) provides the United States with an excellent 
opportunity 
to highlight the Obama Administration's forthcoming National 
Drug Control Strategy and its top priorities in the 
international drug policy arena.  As this March is the 
Administration's first substantive foray into the CND, other 
member states will be watching to see how our language 
departs 
from the previous administration, what issues we advance, and 
whether we continue to be a leader in international drug 
control efforts.  The dynamics of this year's CND, will be 
influenced by an activist Iranian Chair, ongoing ideological 
difference over how best to address the world drug problem, 
and the ever-deepening financial and administrative 
difficulties of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
Director Kerlikowske's participation will provide vivid 
evidence of the Administration's commitment to international 
cooperation on counter drug issues, but we need to be ready 
for the compromises and half steps that multilateral 
diplomacy 
demands.  The CND Chair, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh, 
clearly 
desires a successful Commission meeting that reflects well on 
both Iran and him personally, especially after disputes in 
the 
Iranian leadership undercut the success he believed he had 
made in October during the Tehran Research Reactor 
negotiations.  Nevertheless, the stakes in greater bilateral 
relationship with the U.S. and debate within the Iranian 
leadership on engagement could cause Tehran to intercede and 
make it more difficult for the U.S. to achieve its goals at 
the CND.  Keeping any engagement with Soltanieh limited to 
CND 
business and low-key will improve chances for success. 
Meanwhile, the Afghan delegation, with yet to be decided 
leadership, will be looking for U.S. help to ensure that 
Kabul 
is not singled out for its leading role in the international 
drug trade. END SUMMARY 
 
------------------------------- 
Chance for Obama Administration 
To Put Best Face Forward 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Last year, after months of intense and sometimes 
bitter negotiations, member states adopted a political 
declaration reviewing the past ten years of drug control and 
formulating an action plan for the next decade.  While the 
documents were ultimately agreed to by consensus, intractable 
issues like "harm reduction," human rights, and the false 
dichotomy between eradication and alternative development 
(among others) were not resolved. Ten months later, some 
delegations (mostly in the EU) still express frustration over 
the 2009 outcome documents and complain that while the world 
drug situation has changed, thinking in many parts of the 
world (including in the U.S.) has not sufficiently evolved. 
 
¶3.  (U) As this will be the Obama Administration's and ONDCP 
Director Kerlikowske's first substantive foray into the CND, 
many national delegations are eager to see what face we put 
forward-especially in light of last year's negotiations over 
"harm reduction".  In this regard, the CND provides a 
fantastic opportunity to roll-out the new National Drug 
Control Strategy, and send the message that the United States 
is eager to partner with other countries in tackling this 
threat.  Most importantly, a demonstration of our serious 
commitment to raising the profile of international 
counternarcotic efforts will reassure other delegations that 
the U.S. continues to be a serious leader in developing and 
advancing pragmatic and proven policies to counter the 
supply, 
trafficking and abuse of drugs.  In order to build this 
alliance, we should reach out soon both here in Vienna and in 
key capitals to float U.S. ideas and priorities. Key targets, 
include many delegations in the G77 (and especially Argentina 
and Algeria, current and likely future G77 President), the EU 
(Madrid and Brussels), Mexico and Canada, among others. 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000009  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Critical that U.S. Keeps CND, 
UNODC Mandate Focused 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The last year has seen intense negotiations on the 
financial and administrative situation of the UNODC (the UN 
Office which gets its guidance from the CND and Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ).  Via CND 
resolutions, member states have tasked UNODC with growing 
number of mandates, even as its funding situation continues 
to worsen (Ref A).  We have consistently called upon CND 
member states to refrain from unduly expanding UNODC's 
mandate 
(especially without simultaneously dedicating voluntary 
resources to fulfill these new directives), and to instead 
focus any new mandates (via resolution or otherwise) around 
UNODC's increasingly thematically and regionally organized 
work, as well as the drug conventions.  It will be important 
that the U.S. continue to lead by example in this regard, and 
discourage other delegations from using the CND as a 
"Christmas tree" where we hang nationally specific issues 
that 
are not of international priority nor squarely relevant to 
the 
drug conventions.  We also must work with other partners to 
ensure that any new mandates coming out of the CND are 
sufficiently funded.  This will require early and frequent 
consultations with allies in the EU, Canada, Japan and 
Australia delegations that all have proven records of fiscal 
discipline. 
 
-------------------------- 
Iran Chair Keen to Succeed 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  The CND Chair plays an important substantive role in 
the outcome of the meeting, and a special complicating factor 
this year is the chairmanship of Iranian Ambassador Ali 
Asghar 
Soltanieh.  Soltanieh is a nuclear physicist who relishes the 
role of champion for the "downtrodden".  Promising 
delegations 
that he would spare no effort and would be at the service of 
all delegations, Soltanieh has indicated plans to play a 
prominent role in this year's meeting. 
 
¶6.  (C)  He clearly desires a successful CND that will 
reflect 
positively on Iranian leadership and perhaps even more so, on 
him personally, especially given the high profile failure of 
his work on the Tehran Research Reactor negotiations to pass 
muster in Tehran. Iran's interactions with the UNODC and 
support of regional initiatives, the country's serious 
domestic 
drug problem and its interest in advancing the general 
objectives of the UNODC in controlling the flow of narcotics 
out of Afghanistan. Iran wishes to be seen as a regional 
leader in counternarcotics efforts (Ref B).  As the U.S. is a 
traditionally major player in the CND, and since we (almost 
alone) cannot work through the collectivity of a regional 
group, Soltanieh needs to cultivate a constructive, if not 
collegial, relationship with the U.S.  At the same time, Iran 
could use the opportunity of the CND to criticize or confront 
the U.S. on any resolutions pursued or on the lack of support 
for flexible funding for regional efforts, especially given 
the high cost in lives and dollars Iran has paid for its 
counternarcotics efforts, which it repeatedly argues benefit 
the whole world.  Soltanieh's work as Vice Chair of the 2009 
CND and within UNODC fora leads us to believe that he would 
want to resist such efforts to tarnish the perception of him 
as a fair arbiter, but he is likely not strong enough to 
press 
back against the Iranian leadership in Tehran, which he has 
admitted in other venues has conditioned his flexibility (Ref 
C).  Keeping any engagement with Soltanieh low key and 
related 
only to the key business of the CND would probably serve both 
his and our interests and prevent individuals in Tehran from 
feeling the need to publicly undercut our interactions.  At 
the same time, limited engagement could start to build modest 
bridges in an area of common interest and help to achieve 
U.S. 
goals at the CND, including the passage of multiple 
resolutions where Soltanieh could be either a help or a 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000009  003 OF 003 
 
 
hindrance. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (U)  Another U.S. priority for this CND relates to 
Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Ambassador tell us he does not yet know who will 
represent his government in Vienna, but he is aware of 
previous instances where Russia or Pakistan have sought to 
introduce resolution language that shines a spotlight on 
Afghanistan's role in the international drug trade.  Without 
whitewashing Afghanistan's huge drug problem, we will want to 
ensure that the CND does not detract from the effort to 
maintain a positive, multilateral-focus for our Afghan 
counterdrug 
effort. Early articulation of agreed U.S. goals for the 
CND including a positive message of international 
partnership, 
will help us to deliver a successful CND. With an 
international 
audience eager to hear from the Obama Administration, the 
U.S. 
is primed to deliver outcomes worthy of our place as leader 
in 
international drug control efforts.  The challenge will be to 
harness that message to the unpredictable political dynamics 
of Vienna and the legacy of unresolved differences from last 
year's 
CND. END COMMENT 
DAVIES