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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
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P 161357Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0342
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0013
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 0001
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS XM AS NR RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA DOWNPLAYS NAURU'S RECOGNITION OF ABKHAZIA 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 1765 
     ¶B. TBILISI 1739 
     ¶C. TBILISI 1735 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary and comment.  Georgian officials downplayed 
the significance of Nauru's apparent December 14 recognition 
of Abkhazia's "independence," which Russia reportedly 
encouraged with an offer of $50 million to the island nation. 
 Although officials are discussing with Australian 
counterparts whether the recognition is actually final, 
Reintegration Minister Yakobashvili joked in public about 
Russia's apparent purchase of the recognition, calling it a 
"comedy," while Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria told us 
privately the step was not so important, even if it was true. 
 The relaxed approach represents a welcome shift from 
Georgia's more manic reaction to previous recognitions by 
Venezuela and Nicaragua, an approach that we have actively 
encouraged with our Georgian counterparts.  Georgia has also 
recognized and expressed appreciation for successful U.S. 
efforts to discourage additional recognitions from Latin 
American countries, and our efforts may have contributed to 
helping the Georgians keep these individual steps in 
perspective.  End summary and comment. 
 
NAURU RECOGNIZES -- OR DOES IT? 
 
¶2. (SBU) According to the website of the Abkhaz de facto 
authorities and press reports, Nauru sent Foreign Minister 
Kieren Keke to visit Abkhazia, Georgia December 14, after a 
weekend visit to South Ossetia, Georgia.  During the stop in 
Sukhumi, he reportedly signed an agreement on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Abkhazia, thereby 
effectively recognizing its so-called independence.  Both de 
facto "president" Sergey Bagapsh and de facto "foreign 
minister" Sergey Shamba took a triumphant tone in public, 
noting that Nauru was a full-fledged member of the UN and 
that the size of a country did not undermine the legitimacy 
of its bestowal of recognition.  Shamba noted that Abkhazia 
now had secured the recognition of both the largest country 
in the world (Russia) and the smallest, with Abkhazia 
considering itself a "medium-sized country" on that spectrum. 
 Keke told journalists that he hoped that the step would help 
establish stability and peace between two countries; that 
other countries would follow suit; and that relations between 
the two countries would become close, "even though Abkhazia 
and Nauru are geographically far apart from each other." 
Shamba added that Keke had promised to promote recognition of 
Abkhazia among its neighbors in the Pacific region. 
 
¶3. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria told us privately 
that Georgian government officials were discussing the 
situation with Australian counterparts.  According to their 
initial information, Nauru's recognition was not a final, 
irreversible step.  Furthermore, it appeared puzzling to the 
Australians, because Nauru typically follows Australia's lead 
on foreign policy issues; the Australian officials told the 
Georgians they would be in contact about their concerns with 
Nauru.  Bokeria indicated the Georgian government did not 
intend to issue a formal statement on Nauru's recognition, 
for two reasons.  First, since there was a possibility that 
Nauru's recognition could be reversed, Georgia did not want 
QNauru's recognition could be reversed, Georgia did not want 
to risk angering the Nauruans with a public statement 
condemning the move.  Second, and more fundamentally, Georgia 
did not consider Nauru's recognition significant, and 
therefore did not want to confer any undeserved significance 
to the step with a public statement of concern. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In public comments, Reintegration Minister Temuri 
Yakobashvili dismissed the step as insignificant, even 
laughable: "It seems there was a New Year's Sale, and the 
Russians bought this recognition for 50 million dollars.  I 
think that, if we take a serious look at this, it more 
resembles a comedy. . . This changes nothing in international 
politics, and if someone is happy that Nauru -- which two 
days ago no one had ever heard of --has joined Nicaragua and 
Venezuela, then let them be happy.  I believe this changes 
nothing in reality." 
 
SITUATION LOOKS GOOD IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
¶5. (C) MFA American Division Director Otar Berdzenishvili 
recently told us about a trip senior MFA officials took to 
Latin American capitals in November in order to gauge the 
 
TBILISI 00002240  002 OF 002 
 
 
likelihood of additional recognitions following Venezuela's 
step in September.  They discovered more support for 
Georgia's position than expected, which Berdzenishvili 
attributed to assistance rendered by U.S. officials in the 
region.  Costa Rican officials said they not only supported 
non-recognition, but would lobby other countries on Georgia's 
behalf.  Bolivian officials told him their country would not 
recognize the breakaway regions, despite Russian pressure to 
do so; Cuba said the same thing, adding that it was happy 
with the current "thaw" in U.S.-Cuban relations and did not 
feel obligated to take marching orders from Moscow. 
Colombian officials said they would not recognize, as did 
Panamanian officials, although they expressed concerns about 
Nicaragua's intentions.  Brazilian officials said they were 
committed to a non-recognition policy.  The Argentines said 
they were disappointed with the U.S. position in Honduras, 
but would nevertheless urge the Venezuelans to revoke their 
recognition; they would also work with their Bolivian 
counterparts, and they believed Uruguay would not recognize. 
Ecuadorian officials had no plans to recognize, although they 
appeared to Berdzenishvili to be less supportive. 
Berdezenishvili expressed sincere gratefulness for U.S. 
efforts to promote Georgia's position in the region. 
 
COMMENT: A WELCOME CHANGE 
 
¶6. (C) After Venezuela recognized Abkhazia's "independence," 
and stories spread about possible recognition by Belarus, 
Georgian officials generally reacted swiftly and with great 
trepidation, concerned lest any one such step lead to a 
subsequent "cascade of recognitions" (see reftels).  After 
repeated interventions by U.S. officials at various levels 
that overreacting to individual countries' decisions does 
more harm than good, it appears that Georgia is getting the 
message.  Our efforts in Latin America have also helped 
convince Georgia that we continue to back Georgia's position 
in the international arena and seem to have helped calm the 
Georgian impulse to react strongly to a perceived piece of 
bad news. 
BASS