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OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #2071/01 3511005
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O 171005Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4155
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0091
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0259
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
NSC FOR J.BADER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019 
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KDEM OVIP BURNS WILLIAM ID AF
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' DECEMBER 10, 2009, MEETING WITH 
INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NATALEGAWA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) December 10, 2009; 4:15 p.m.; Bali Democracy Forum; 
Bali, Indonesia. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
Under Secretary William Burns 
Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, Embassy Jakarta 
Scot Marciel, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Dan Rochman, Embassy Jakarta political officer (notetaker) 
 
INDONESIA 
--------- 
 
Marty Natalegawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Bunyan Saptomo, Director, Directorate of North and Central 
America, Department of Foreign Affairs 
Department of Foreign Affairs notetaker 
 
¶3.  (C) SUMMARY  In a December 10 meeting with Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa on the margins of the 
second annual Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), Under Secretary 
Bill Burns stressed the importance of translating the 
Comprehensive Partnership (CP) into  tangible achievements, 
such as the signing of the Peace Corps MOU, in advance of an 
anticipated Presidential visit next year.  In response to U/S 
Burns' suggestion that Indonesia move forward on ratification 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty prior to the United 
States, Natalegawa said the GOI was considering that step. 
Natalegawa said the GOI was studying Japanese and Australian 
regional architecture proposals but did not want to act too 
quickly to add to the list of existing structures.  He said 
Indonesia would continue its efforts on Burma and the Middle 
East and was thinking seriously about how it could help in 
Afghanistan.  Natalegawa said the onus was on Iran to respond 
positively to the IAEA Tehran Research Reactor proposal.  On 
climate change, the GOI was working to craft specific 
sectoral targets for emissions reductions in support of 
President Yudhoyono's ambitious overall targets.  Natalagawa 
noted he hoped to have an opportunity to visit Washington in 
coming months to help set the stage for a Presidential visit 
to Jakarta.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BDF AND COMPREHENSIVE PARTNERSHIP 
 
¶4.  (C) FM Natalegawa stressed how pleased he and President 
Yudhoyono were that U/S Burns could participate in the BDF. 
The BDF's potential to promote democratization came from its 
inclusivity and the fact that it was not simply a discussion 
among likeminded nations.  Natalegawa noted that U/S Burns' 
visit to Bali and Jakarta for bilateral Strategic 
Consultations was one in an ongoing string of productive 
high-level bilateral interactions, including discussions 
between Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono and between FM 
Natalegawa and Secretary Clinton at the Singapore APEC 
Leaders Meeting that underscored the deepening and 
strengthening of U.S.-Indonesia relations.  Natalegawa noted 
that the Secretary's call to him in advance of President 
Obama's speech on Afghanistan reflected the value of close 
consultations on key issues.  With the increasing pace of 
high-level discussions as background, it was important to 
reach a number of early achievements, such as the signing of 
the Peace Corps MOU, to sustain momentum for a potential 
visit by President Obama in mid-2010, Natalegawa concluded. 
 
¶5.  (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. side also committed 
to translating the CP into tangible achievements.  Beyond the 
Peace Corps MOU, it would be beneficial to conclude the 
science and technology agreement in advance of the planned 
visit to Indonesia of Presidential Science Envoy Bruce 
Alberts in mid-January.  Fast action on the proposed Defense 
Cooperation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
agreement would also help lay the groundwork for a successful 
Presidential visit. 
 
NONPROLIFERATION 
 
¶6.  (C) U/S Burns noted Indonesia's admirable record of 
leadership on nonproliferation issues.  By signing the 
Additional Protocol, Indonesia had set a strong example for 
 
JAKARTA 00002071  002 OF 003 
 
 
other Southeast Asian nations.  Similarly, it would be 
beneficial if the GOI moved forward quickly on ratification 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  Doing so in 
advance of the United States would further solidify 
Indonesia's leadership role, and could provide a positive 
influence on ratification efforts in the United States. 
Natalegawa agreed that the anticipated visit of President 
Obama gave added incentive to make progress on all elements 
of the CP, including nonproliferation.  While Indonesia's 
intention has been to begin ratification immediately after 
the United States, the option of doing so first had begun to 
look increasingly attractive. 
 
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND BURMA 
 
¶7.  (C) FM Natalegawa said Indonesia was studying Japan's 
proposed East Asia Community and Australia's Asia-Pacific 
Community proposals but did not want to act too quickly.  The 
situation was fluid, so a new structure, if locked in, could 
become quickly outdated.  The general regional trend was 
toward greater regional integration, and Indonesia continued 
to feel that the United States must be a key actor in the 
region.  The GOI remained to be convinced that any of the 
proposals currently on the table would be the best addition 
to current structures.  Meanwhile, within the existing 
framework, the GOI felt it had an important role to play on 
problem-solving within Southeast Asia, including on Burma, 
where it would continue to work behind the scenes to 
encourage the Burmese generals to open dialogue with the 
opposition and ethnic groups. 
 
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA 
 
¶8.  (C) U/S Burns and Natalegawa agreed on the importance of 
staying in touch on Iran and North Korea nuclear issues.  On 
Iran, U/S Burns pointed out that the IAEA's Tehran Research 
Reactor proposal offered at the Geneva talks was a promising 
beginning, but Iran had backed away from its initial 
acceptance, in part due to domestic difficulties. 
Nevertheless, the administration's patience was not 
unlimited, and if Iran continued to refuse to take meaningful 
steps, we would have to consider other steps.  Natalegawa 
said Iran's internal situation was not conducive for positive 
movement and agreed that the ball was firmly in Iran's court. 
 Indonesia would do what it could to convince Iran to take 
advantage of the opportunities before it. 
 
MIDDLE EAST AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶9.  (C) Natalegawa said Indonesia's contribution to Middle 
East peace efforts had been modest and focused on Palestinian 
capacity building, including training for Palestinian 
diplomats.  Indonesia hoped to be able to play a similar 
"niche" role in Afghanistan through police training. 
Natalegawa noted that because of intense interest in the 
Middle East among the Indonesian public, the GOI was somewhat 
constrained in what it could do publicly on that issue.  U/S 
Burns expressed appreciation for Indonesian efforts on the 
Middle East, encouraged the GOI to consider steps it could 
take to reach out to Israel, and said it would be useful to 
maintain close contact on both that issue and on efforts in 
support of Afghanistan. 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
¶10.  (C) Turning to climate change, Natalegawa said it was 
not productive to focus solely on whether emissions reduction 
commitments were legally binding or simply political 
commitments.  What was more important was inclusiveness. 
Developing countries must not see climate change as a matter 
to be left to the developed world to solve.  President 
Yudhoyono's ambitious stance on Indonesian emissions 
reflected the seriousness with which he took the issue. 
Indonesia was working aggressively to craft specific sectoral 
targets for emissions reduction, since it did not make sense 
to get international assistance to support its efforts before 
those efforts were defined, Natalegawa added. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT 
 
¶11.  (C) FM Natalegawa said the coming six months would be 
extremely busy but also productive, in preparation for the 
anticipated visit of President Obama.  The FM added that he 
 
JAKARTA 00002071  003 OF 003 
 
 
was considering a visit to Washington in advance of a 
Presidential visit to Indonesia in order to help shape the 
agenda. 
 
¶12.  (U) U/S Burns cleared this message. 
 
HUME