VZCZCXRO1048
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDH #0295/01 3531206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191206Z DEC 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0336
INFO RUEHZM/GCC C COLLECTIVE
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0006
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0447

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAHRAN 000295 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS AND JEREMY BERNDT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KIRF PREL SA YM PINR PHUM
SUBJECT: SAUDI BORDER CONFLICT WITH YEMEN RAISES FEAR OF SECTARIAN 
BACKLASH AGAINST SHIAS 
 
REF: A. A. DHAHRAN 222 
     ¶B. B. DHAHRAN 217 
     ¶C. C. DHAHRAN 258 
     ¶D. D. RIYADH 270 
 
DHAHRAN 00000295  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph Kenny, Dhahran Consul General, Department 
of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Prominent members of the Eastern Province (EP) Shia 
community are growing increasingly worried that the conflict in 
Yemen will spur a backlash against their community.  The 
attitude is prevalent among Shia youth as well. Statements by a 
Yemeni official, as well as a recent circular issued by 
conservative Saudi clerics, have charged Shia in the Middle East 
region with supporting the Houthi rebels of northern Yemen. 
Prominent Saudi Shia have come out to unequivocally declare 
their allegiance to the SAG.  However, from observations in the 
Eastern Province all the way to Najran, the feared backlash has 
not occurred.  Sentiment is mixed, with the Shia leadership 
expressing unequivocal support of the SAG versus the everyday 
Shia who maintains a more nuanced view.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
Growing Concerns of a Backlash 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶2. (S) On November 23, PolOff traveled to the predominantly Shia 
city of Qatif and met with Sheikh Mohammed al-Mahfoodh 
(protect), a respected Shia with a political and scholarly 
orientation and a moderate commentator on Islamic affairs (Note: 
al-Mahfoodh was also one of a number of politically active Shia 
who went into exile during the early 1980's and returned after a 
deal was struck with King Fahd in 1993 which allowed politically 
exiled Shias to return to KSA.  End Note.)  Also, in attendance 
was Mohammed al-Shayookh (protect), a Shia political commentator 
and activist with strong ties to the Qatif area; and Hussein 
al-Alak (protect), the managing editor for Rasid.com online news 
site (ref a).  Al-Mahfoodh expressed deep concern over a recent 
circular issued by Wahhabi clerics (with 42 signatories) that 
called for all Muslims to be aware of Shia plots, and accused 
Iran of being responsible for the Houthi uprising in Yemen. 
(Note:  PolOff has not seen a copy of the circular, though 
rasid.com claims to have received a copy.  End Note.) 
Al-Shayookh echoed his concerns, noting that the longer the 
conflict lasts, the greater the chance for a sectarian backlash 
against the Shia.  (Comment:  To date, there are no reported 
cases of reprisals against Shia for alleged association or 
support of Houthis in Yemen.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
Shia Pledge Allegiance to the King 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Prominent members of the Shia community have publicly 
voiced support for the SAG.  In mid-November, Sheikh Hassan 
al-Saffar, a moderate and influential Saudi Shia scholar, issued 
a statement condemning the "violations of Yemeni infiltrators" 
and affirmed his loyalty to the Kingdom.  He objected to 
involving Saudi Arabia (and the region) in a war in which they 
have no interest.  He went on to state that "We are all partners 
in this nation and we must have present a unified stance with 
the leadership against any outside aggression."  (Note:  PolOff 
received the statement via email from Jafar al-Shayab (protect), 
a writer, advocate, and Chairman of the Qatif Municipal Council. 
 The statement was also featured on Rasid.com.  End Note.) 
Sheikh al-Saffar also called on Muslim world media to stop using 
inflammatory sectarian language. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Other prominent figures of the Shia community spoke out 
in mid-November against the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr 
al-Qurbi, who accused Shia in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and 
Bahrain of providing financial, political, and sectarian support 
to Houthi rebels.  Dr. Tawfiq al-Saif, a well-regarded 
researcher who specializes in Shia political jurisprudence, and 
Najeeb al-Khunaizi, a public Shia figure and political activist, 
condemned the statement and voiced unwavering support for the 
SAG.  Dr. al-Saif added: "Safety of our country's soil is the 
 
DHAHRAN 00000295  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
responsibility of the government and the nation and the Shia are 
part of the nation . . . Support to Houthi rebels just because 
they are Shia is not true and the distinction between sectarian 
position and the patriotism is firm and clear." 
 
 
 
Contrasting Views from Shia on the Street 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶5. (S) The leadership's pronouncements stand in contrast to the 
view on the street.  On November 22, PolOff met with Isa 
al-Muzel (protect), Qatif Municipality Council Member, to 
discuss the growing concerns of a sectarian backlash against the 
Shia community.  Al-Muzel expressed concern regarding the strong 
show of support by some Shia leaders on behalf of the SAG. 
Although he recognized the need to respond to questions of Shia 
loyalty to the SAG, he deemed it politically dangerous for them 
to do so in such an unequivocal manner.  The average Shia, said 
al-Muzel, is not in favor of such open and vocal support of the 
SAG, especially when religious discrimination against Shia of 
the EP continues unabated. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Such views were echoed by a small group of up-and-coming 
young Qatifi activists (ages ranging from 18 to 25) with whom 
PolOff met in a meeting arranged by Hussein al-Alak (protect) on 
November 23.  The group was led by Mohammad al-Sadiq (protect), 
a young writer employed as a Human Resources Administrative 
Coordinator for the SaudiReadyMix Company.  Although the group 
expressed support for the SAG, they preferred an immediate 
cessation of hostilities.  They expressed deep frustration of 
constantly having to reassert their loyalty to a government that 
continues to close down their mosques and discriminates against 
them based on religious orientation.  (Note: In predominantly 
Shia Qatif, Shia mosques remain open and have not suffered from 
the government crackdown in towns and neighborhoods where 
Shiites do not make up the majority of the population, such as 
Al-Hasa, Dammam, and al-Khobar (ref b).  End note.) 
 
 
 
Najran:  Closer to the Conflict 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (S) On December 13, PolOff met with Ali Borman Al-Yami 
(protect), an influential Ismaili businessman originally from 
Najran.  Al-Yami has direct access to the Governor of Najran, 
Prince Mishal bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and is working with 
him to establish a Najran-based holding company (ref C).  He 
travels to Najran often, most recently in late November. 
Al-Yami expressed little concern that sectarianism will affect 
the predominantly Ismaili Shia province of Najran, going so far 
as to say that even the longtime Houthi residents of Najran are 
detached from the conflict and have not been targeted, even as 
the border conflict has intensified. 
 
 
 
Al-Yami also spoke of Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar's attempts in 
recent weeks to reach out to the Shia in the Najran region and 
to have Al-Yami assist in reaching out to them.  Al-Yami 
remarked that he dissuaded Al-Saffar from making the trip, and 
expressed his wishes not to get involved in religious matters. 
Al-Yami was unclear as to Al-Saffar's motives, other than a 
desire to reach out to Shia in Najran.  Al-Yami was not aware 
that Al-Saffar ever made the trip to Najran. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) The Shia of the Eastern Province (EP) have little in 
common culturally or ideologically with the Shia of northern 
Yemen. Thus, Shia-based sympathy in the EP should not be 
assumed.  The statements issued by leaders of the Shia community 
are a concerted reaction to allegations that they are not loyal 
to the SAG.  They are fearful that as the conflict draws on, 
 
DHAHRAN 00000295  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
accusations of sympathizing with the Shia of northern Yemen will 
increase.  As a result, they have sought to emphasize their 
support of the SAG in the media.  To date, Post is unaware of 
any instances of a backlash against the Shia here.  Should this 
occur, it will contribute further to the discrimination already 
experienced by Eastern Province Shia and hence raise sectarian 
tensions considerably, especially among the Shia youth (ref D). 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Najranis, on the other hand, do have deep cultural, 
religious, and tribal ties to the Shia of northern Yemen (ref 
C).  However, the cordial relationship between the Governor of 
Najran, Prince Mishal bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and the 
majority Suleimani Shias of Najran is an important incentive to 
dissuading Najranis from involvement in the conflict.  Should a 
crackdown against the Shia of Najran occur, it would tarnish the 
reportedly good relations between the Governor and populace.  To 
date, Post is not aware of any instances of a backlash against 
the Najran region Shia on the grounds that they support the 
Houthis in Yemen.  End comment. 
CG: JKENNY