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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1383, BRAZIL: BLACKOUT -CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA1383 2009-12-01 11:27 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3880
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1383/01 3351127
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011127Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5511
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0013
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 0151
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 0079
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0130
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUMIASA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR RACHEL WALSH, LUIS ROSELLO 
DOE FOR GARY WARD, RUSS ROTH 
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ANNE DRISCOLL, LORRIE FUSSELL 
DEPT FOR WHA/FO, WHA/EPSC, WHA/BSC 
DEPT ALSO FOR EEB MATT MCMANUS, BRIAN DUGGAN 
DEPT PASS DHS AND USTDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 011/2/2019 
TAGS: ENRG ECON KSEC ECIP EINV PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: BLACKOUT -CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cherie Jackson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
REFTELS:  A) 2008 BRASILIA 672, B) 2008 BRASILIA 593, C)2008 SAO 
PAULO 260 
 
1. (S)SUMMARY:  On November 10 at 22:13, Brazil experienced a 
blackout that plunged 18 of Brazil's 27 states into darkness for 
periods ranging from 20 minutes to 6 hours. A government commission 
is investigating, with a draft report and recommendations expected 
mid-December.  GOB has recently begun to focus more attention on 
infrastructure security, both within the President's office and at 
Mines and Energy (MME), while an intensive process is also underway 
to develop recommendations to avoid outage problems in the future. 
The newly heightened concerns about Brazil's infrastructure as a 
result of this blackout, combined with the need to address 
infrastructure challenges in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup and 
2016 Olympics, present the United States opportunities for engagement 
on infrastructure development as well critical infrastructure 
protection and possibly cyber security.  Mission encourages USG 
agencies, including DOD, DHS, FCC, TDA and others, to explore these 
opportunities in the near-term.  END SUMMARY 
 
THE EVENT 
2.  (U) On November 10 at 22:13, Brazil experienced a blackout that 
plunged 18 of Brazil's 27 states into darkness for periods ranging 
from 20 minutes to 6 hours.  The blackout represented a loss of 
28,000 megawatts - or 45 percent of total Brazilian consumption at 
that instant - of electricity and left an estimated 87 million 
residents without power.  Scrutiny has been intense and speculation 
rife over the cause of the incident, in large part due to the recent 
announcement of Rio as the host of the 2016 summer Olympics. 
 
WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED SO FAR? 
3.  (C) On November 18, Econoff met with Plinio de Oliveira, the 
President of ONS, the governmental agency responsible for the 
nation's interlinked electricity grid, along with Wilkens Geraldes 
Filho, ONS's Director of Statistical Analysis, and Elione Vierira de 
Araujo, a top engineer.  They had spent much of the past week 
researching the incident and presenting explanations as to what 
happened.  Geraldes and Olivera joined the conversation late after an 
impromptu meeting with the Director General of ONS to discuss the 
incident.  The team gave Econoff the same presentation they gave 
after the incident to Energy Minister Lobao.  On November 20, Econoff 
met separately with Jose Coimbra, Chief of Staff to Minister of Mines 
and Energy Edison Lobao, and Ildo Wilson Grudtner, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Electrical Energy, who was the Ministry official called 
in to work the issue the night of November the 10th and with overall 
responsibility for electrical sector planning. 
 
4.  (C) Based on those detailed discussions, the following is what 
the government now says occurred.  The source of the outage was a 
substation close to Sao Paulo called Itaburi on the Tijuco Preto 
powerline, which supplies Sao Paulo and then Rio with power from the 
Itaipu dam (a binational hydroelectric dam on the border with 
Paraguay responsible for 12,600MW of energy or 20 percent of Brazil's 
energy supply.  Brazil's energy matrix is heavily hydro dependent - 
80 percent - with the rest a combination of thermo, nuclear, and some 
bioelectricity.).  At that point in the system there are three 
separate power lines that connect Itaipu into Sao Paulo carrying 765 
kilovolts of 60HZ AC supply.  There is a separate supply line from 
Itaipu into Sao Paulo north of the Tijuco Preto power line, which 
carries 50 Hz of DC power.  The Sao Paulo/Rio region is also linked 
by separate lines to the southern part of the country, as well as to 
the north and north east, which are also interlinked with one 
another.  Overall system consumption for the day was 60 GW, well 
below total system capacity of 105 GW. 
 
5.  (C) At 22:13, there was a short circuit in one of the three 
Itaburi lines in what they call the "B" cycle.  13.5 milliseconds 
later, cycle "A" experienced a short circuit in the second line.  3.2 
milliseconds after that, the substation at Itaber went out, knocking 
out the third and final line, completely disrupting the flow of the 
southern supply line from Itaipu into Sao Paulo.  When this happened, 
automated controls took over to preserve the system.  The generators 
at Itaipu shut down when they detected the disruption in 
 
BRASILIA 00001383  002 OF 005 
 
 
transmission, thereby also shutting down the northern supply line to 
Sao Paulo.  The interlinked systems in the northeast and northern 
regions of the country, detecting oscillation in the supply coming 
from Sao Paulo, shut off the transmission lines to protect those 
regions.  In the southern region of the country, which was also 
providing energy supply to Sao Paulo, the sudden changes in frequency 
triggered ERAC (an emergency system in each substation monitoring 
balance between the supply and the load) isolating the southern 
section from the rest of the grid.  These changes preserved the rest 
of the system and permitted a quick return to service for most of the 
country, but left the major population centers without power for up 
to six hours. 
 
WHAT FACTORS EXACERABATED THE EVENT? 
6.  (C) Geraldes described the events of November 10 as unusual, not 
in the interruption of the system, but in the confluence of events 
that led to the overall catastrophic scale of the blackout.  He said 
that a similar disruption taking out the same line had occurred in 
the past but the system had been operating in such a way that the 
flow was redistributed with very little disruption.  In the November 
10 case, reservoirs were full due to recent abundant rainfalls and 
the thermal plants, which are often tapped to augment flow, were not 
operating.  The interlinked system which allows electricity from any 
part of the country to be distributed to any other part was exporting 
power from the primary hydroplants in the South to the Sao Paulo/Rio 
region.  According to Geraldes, in prior instances, the situation was 
reversed, with flow exported from Sao Paulo to the south during 
periods of less plentiful rainfall and the disruption had very little 
effect on the overall supply. 
 
7.  (C) Grudtner said international standards generally call for a 
system to have capacity allowing unimpeded operation with one 
transmission line inoperable.  At the time of the incident, the 
Brazilian system was operating at a capacity of unimpeded operations 
with two lines down, but the incident took out all three lines 
feeding into Sao Paulo.  Additionally Coimbra pointed out, each of 
the lines which were disabled have recovery times of ten seconds, but 
the short circuits occurred within milliseconds of one another, 
disabling the transmission system with automatic shutdowns before the 
lines were able to recover.  Geraldes called it the worst possible 
configuration of factors that led to a cascade effect. 
 
WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT DOING TO INVESTIGATE FURTHER? 
8.  (C) A government commission composed of ONS and the Brazilian 
electricity regulator ANEEL is investigating exactly what happened on 
November 10.  The commission has 30 days from its formation on 
November 13 to complete a draft of its findings, including possible 
recommendations.  The government will then submit the draft report to 
an independent group of non-governmental experts and academicians for 
review.  The government will finalize the report after that review. 
In the absence of the final report, neither ONS nor MME offered a 
definitive explanation for what caused these outages.  However, they 
both maintained that the short circuits are consistent with either a 
lightning strike (although ONS took pains to show satellite photos 
demonstrating that there were not storms in that area at that 
particular time) or a combination of low barometric pressure combined 
with high winds and high humidity.  ONS also showed photos of 
transmission towers with visible discoloration, which they say 
further supports these two theories and rules out damage from trees, 
physical sabotage, or hackers.  (Note: there was no way for Econoff 
to verify the location of the towers in the photos, the times of the 
discoloration, nor the cause.  End Note.) 
 
9.  (C) Oliveira and Geraldes further ruled out the possibility of 
hackers because, following some acknowledged interferences in past 
years, GOB has closed the system to only a small group of authorized 
operators, separated the transmission control system from other 
systems, and installed filters.  Coimbra confirmed that the ONS 
system is a CLAN network using its own wires carried above the 
electricity wires.  Oliveira pointed out that even if someone had 
managed to gain access to the system, a voice command is required to 
disrupt transmission.  Coimbra said that while sabotage could have 
caused the outages, this type of disruption would have been deadly, 
and investigators would have found physical evidence, including the 
body of the perpetrator.  He also noted that any internal attempts by 
system employees to disrupt the system would have been easily 
 
BRASILIA 00001383  003 OF 005 
 
 
traceable, a fact known to anyone with access to the system. 
 
THEORIES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, PRESS, AND OTHER AGENCIES 
10.  (U) In the days immediately following the event, government 
officials were quoted giving explanations ranging from a downed 
powerline hit by a tree, storm damage, to the more general and 
on-message short circuit.  Meteorologists and energy analysts 
questioned the government's weather explanations.  Brazil's National 
Institute of Space Research (INPE), which monitors atmospheric 
activity, stated they recorded no lightning strikes on the day of the 
blackout in the immediate vicinity of the transmission lines in 
question.  Adriano Pires, founding director of the Brazilian Center 
for Infrastructure and a highly-regarded Rio-based energy expert, 
ruled out the government's explanations, instead blaming an outdated 
national grid unable to keep pace with demand.  In order to avoid 
future widespread outages, Pires told Rio Econoff, the Brazilian 
government needs to diversify its sources away from Itaipu by 
increasing thermoelectric generation and focusing less on just 
operating costs.  Press reports have also suggested that, in order to 
handle the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, the GoB needs to 
upgrade its transmission lines and build smaller-scale power plants - 
independent of the national grid - closer to high energy consumption 
centers, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
 
11.  (C) In the meeting with Brasilia econoff, ONS officials 
uniformly rejected the claims of an outdated grid, noting that the 
current grid was brought up to date after the 2001 blackouts, and now 
meets and exceeds international performance criteria and serves some 
98% of the country.  Coimbra laughed at the suggestion that more 
construction of thermo plants is the solution, not only because there 
are existing thermo plants which are not being utilized due to high 
generation costs, but because even had they been in use, the thermo 
plants would need 12-13 hours to power up after a power failure. 
Itaipu was operating again at full capacity less than 30 minutes 
after the disruption. 
 
12.  (S) Two days after the incident, according to a credible source, 
security officials in Brazil were attributing the outage to "human 
error" on the part of a Brazilian national who is a system operator. 
Accordingly to the source, that operator was under investigation. 
Source is unavailable for further comment on whether evolving 
assessments may have affected that hypothesis and the status of that 
particular investigation is unknown.  There was also private 
speculation in at least one conversation among some government 
officials, apparently based in part of the coincidental "60 Minutes 
program" just days earlier suggesting vulnerabilities in the 
Brazilian system, that U.S. private sector interests may have 
engineered the blackouts to gain better commercial access to the 
grid. 
 
INTERIM STEPS TO PREVENT SECURITY AND OUTAGE INCIDENTS 
13.  (C) Geraldes acknowledged that the spotlight of the Olympic 
Games brings an increased scrutiny of the system.  ONS has a protocol 
to guard against electricity disruptions which has been utilized 
during special events such as the Pan Am Games in 2007 and will be 
used in upcoming events including the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 
Olympics.  The protocol includes running all thermal plants, many of 
these located close to major cities including Rio, during the event 
to ensure multiple sources of generation.  Regular maintenance is 
deferred during the event to minimize the possibility of disruption 
and regular transmission patterns are maintained to ensure the 
consistency of normal flow.  Geraldes acknowledged actual physical 
security was a low priority under this protocol and said no special 
plans were made even during events.  As Geraldes said, "That has been 
less of a concern for us than for you."  However he agreed that there 
could be an increased focus on physical security in advance of the 
games, particularly after this incident has called attention to 
possible weaknesses in the system. 
 
14.  (C) The perspective from MME was somewhat different.  Coimbra 
noted that "we are not immune from the kinds of threats that you have 
seen in recent years."  There is a group in President Lula's office 
known as the Cabinet for Infrastructure Security (GSI) that is 
looking at infrastructure security. Coimbra recalled that they were 
the first to contact him after the incident.  Grudtner is tasked with 
leading the Ministry's own effort on physical security and he said 
 
BRASILIA 00001383  004 OF 005 
 
 
that the MME working group is in the process of defining which 
installations are of greatest concern/most integral to the system, 
and therefore in need of physical protection. 
 
15.  (C) ONS officials told Econoff that there was also an intensive 
process going on at the Energy Planning Agency, EPE, to develop 
recommendations for how to avoid outage problems in the future.   One 
immediate measure Brazil has undertaken to guard against a repeat 
occurrence during the investigation period is reducing the amount of 
flow in any one direction to take the pressure off the system - but 
with the by-product of increased reliance on the more expensive 
thermo plants, increasing the price of electricity.  Another 
longer-term option under consideration would be to build newer, 
larger, and therefore stronger transmission equipment; an expensive 
option that the ONS contacts intimated would not be worth the price 
to avoid a highly unlikely repeat of the November 10 blackout. 
 
16.  (SBU) ONS shared the country's five year plan for energy which 
plans for significant increases in energy demand, to be largely met 
in the near term with new hydro plants and increases in oil-fueled 
electric plants.  While projections show sufficient electricity to 
meet demand, Geraldes cautioned the picture could change if there are 
unanticipated delays in completing the Belo Monte hydro plant due to 
come on line in April of 2014, just a few months in advance of the 
July World Cup. 
 
17.  (C) Though MME's Coimbra did not offer any thoughts for what 
might be technological recommendations after this event, he did say 
that one area of focus for the GOB in a lessons learned-type exercise 
would be improving communications with the public during such events, 
as well as in advance of anticipated maintenance that could cause 
temporary outages.  He was interested in learning more about the U.S. 
Emergency Broadcast system as one possible way of handling this 
challenge.  Econoff committed to research the U.S. program and send 
information to see whether cooperation on this front was feasible. 
 
MANAGING THE POLITICS 
18.  (C) Both MME and ONS were eager to put the November 10 blackout 
in perspective.  ONS offered a slide that showed other comparable 
international blackouts over the last 30 years, including the four 
day East Coast blackout in 2003, detailing both the extent and 
duration of the blackouts; a comparison in which the Brazil blackout 
fared well.  Coimbra told Econoff that an American engineering 
association had sent an official letter of congratulations to the 
Center for Electrical Research, CEPAL, on the rapid recovery of the 
system and inviting them to a U.S. conference in the first part of 
next year to share their experiences.  Both ONS and MME point out how 
quickly most of the system came back (the majority of the affected 
areas experienced outages of 20 minutes and the longest outage was 
six hours in Sao Paulo).  As Grudtner said, the electrical sector was 
happy because the system functioned as it should have and came back 
comparatively quickly, but the politicians are not.  Meanwhile, he 
noted wryly, the press is pleased to have fodder for its reports. 
Congress has called for hearings on the incident which have had to be 
postponed because experts were traveling to the area on a fact 
finding mission in order to complete the investigation report. 
 
COMMENT: NOTABLE OPENNESS TO DIALOGUE WITH USG 
19.  (C) Brazilian officials were strikingly open to discussing the 
incident with Embassy personnel, non-defensive in response to 
questions, and forthcoming with their information and assessments. 
The willingness of the President of ONS and MME Chief of Staff to 
meet on such a technical issue and provide detailed information to 
the Embassy demonstrates the importance they place on ensuring the 
USG has an understanding of the blackout and Brazil's capability to 
handle major events in the future.  Blackouts in Brazil are not 
uncommon (in fact Rio experienced another blackout on November 23 
which has been attributed to disruptions in transmission, possibly 
due to stolen cables).  However, the scale of the November 10 
blackout, which garnered undesired international attention, may 
prompt Brazil to seek long-lasting solutions to weaknesses in and 
threats to its electricity supply.  Heading into a major election 
year, the GOB will likely want to show they are taking measures to 
rebuild public trust.  In light of the openness displayed by GOB 
officials in discussing this event, combined with a desire to show 
progress on addressing the issue, the USG has an opportunity to work 
 
BRASILIA 00001383  005 OF 005 
 
 
with the GOB as they seek to identify possible improvements that will 
yield real results in the physical security and reliability of its 
network. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR USG ENGAGEMENT - SEIZE THE MOMENT 
20.  (C) Having devoted much time and many resources to correcting 
problems in national electricity supply that were endemic in 2001, 
the GOB is proud of its interlinked national transmission system and 
has tended to view the blackouts that do occur as isolated incidents 
or as problems with local distribution systems.  On recent visits to 
the United States, Energy Deputy Minister Zimmermann suggested that 
transmission and long-range distribution might be a subject in which 
Brazil has expertise it could share with the United States in an 
energy cooperation agreement.  While GOB will be highly resistant to 
the idea that other countries are more advanced than they are in 
transmission and distribution, GOB officials do acknowledge there is 
some room for improvement in their system.  We will know more about 
the immediate cause of Brazil's major blackout in a few weeks but in 
the meantime, there are opportunities for the USG to take advantage 
of GOB's openness, highlighting the outage as reason for more 
engagement as well as preparations toward the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympics. 
 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES 
21.  (C) This would be an excellent occasion to encourage the 
military to military Communication and Information Security 
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), noting that although this incident 
does not appear to have been the result of an attack on the system, 
such an event is possible and signing this agreement would permit 
cooperation were one to occur.  We could also consider a 
cybersecurity working group.  Brazil might be open to pursuing 
cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, and MME has 
already told us they would be interested in learning more about our 
emergency broadcasting system.  It is clear that physical security 
has not heretofore been a major focus for planners but officials 
acknowledge the possibility of an attack and are working on 
developing protections, another possible area for fruitful 
cooperation as a follow up from DHS visit in the later part of 2008. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES 
22. (C) Regarding infrastructure development, USTDA is now exploring 
the possibility of sponsoring an orientation visit or a field study 
on electrical power.  Up to this point, USTDA has not pursued 
cooperation in the electrical area.  Most infrastructure projects in 
this centralized electrical system are at the federal level, which 
generally translates into more bureaucracy and longer implementation 
times than projects undertaken at the state or local level.  There 
are, however, electrical distribution issues which need to be 
addressed at the state and local levels that could benefit from USTDA 
involvement, possibly offering another means of engagement to help 
Brazil solve its electrical challenges.  Prior to this event, the 
Energy Ministry had highlighted Smartgrid technology as one area that 
would be of interest to them in cooperation, perhaps more so now. 
 
23. (C) Mission encourages USG agencies, including DOD, DHS, FCC, TDA 
and others, to explore these opportunities in the near-term.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
24. (U) This cable has been coordinated with ConGens Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo. 
 
JACKSON