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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI2383, EAST AFRICA REGIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM OFFICERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI2383 2009-11-20 09:44 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #2383/01 3240944
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200944Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1585
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0662
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0286
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 5342
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6690
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0233
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3392
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 2367
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0295
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS 1730
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0515
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
S E C R E T NAIROBI 002383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PASS TO COMOROS OFFICER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2034 
TAGS: PTERDJ PREL PGOV ER ET KE SU TZ UG YM
SUBJECT: EAST AFRICA REGIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM OFFICERS 
MEETING 
 
Classified By: POLOFF Samuel Madsen, reasons 1.4 b,d 
 
1. (U) Counterterrorism action offices from nine East 
African posts plus the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of 
Africa (CJTF-HOA) the USAID and the Office of the State 
Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
(S/CT) met in Nairobi, Kenya on September 29 for in depth 
discussions on issues relating to countering violent 
extremism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen.  The conference 
was a follow-on to the Chiefs of Mission level meeting of 
the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) that 
was held in Nairobi on June 2. 
 
 2. (U) A principal focus for the meeting was how CT 
officers in the region's missions could work more 
effectively together and with S/CT to regionalize our 
counter extremism programs.  The conference began with a 
briefing on S/CT's projections for funding for CT programs 
over the next three fiscal years. The participants were 
very pleased to learn that funding levels are expected to 
rise in the coming years and S/CT will seek to make the 
funding system easier to understand and use as well as be 
more flexible in meeting the needs of the posts in the 
field. 
 
3.  (C) The conference reviewed the recently finalized S/CT 
documents "East Africa Counterterrorism Strategy" and "East 
Africa Counterterrorism Strategy Recommendations." In 
discussing these documents the participants made several 
observations: 
 
Counterterrorism capacity building 
 
- The lack of law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial 
capability in the countries of East Africa and Yemen are 
well known. 
- The U.S. should focus on what the local police and courts 
can do and strengthen their existing capabilities where 
possible. 
- The U.S. needs to work with the countries of the region 
to identify areas of common interest. Related to this is 
the need to be careful about the terminology that we use. 
The political and security force leadership in many of the 
countries of the region are reluctant to become involved in 
programs identified as involving "counterterrorism." 
However, piracy, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, 
and the rule of law are areas in which there is a general 
enthusiasm for engagement and programming.  With labeling 
as "counterterrorism," the training and assistance that 
would address these issues would also improve those nations' 
ability to confront violent extremism. 
 
Working with the Inter Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) 
 
Participants with experience in working with IGAD made the 
following observations: 
 
- IGAD's capacity for effectively using resources is weak. 
USAID's regional office has pulled back somewhat from IGAD 
due to the organization's inability to utilize resources 
effectively. 
 
- There are disagreements and a struggle for influence 
among Ethiopian and Sudanese officials in the IGAD senior 
leadership. 
 
- IGAD has done some good work, particularly the Sudan 
peace deal.  IGAD allows the international community to put 
an "African face" on efforts to confront issues in the East 
Africa region.  Working under the IGAD banner offers 
regional legitimacy to international programs.  However, 
IGAD must be partnered or contracted with other legitimate 
organizations in order to assure that the work is properly 
done. 
 
- S/CT should communicate with the USAID technical offices 
 
regarding how to work effectively with IGAD. 
 
- The IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism 
(ICPAT) will cease to exist next year due to the expiration 
of its mandate.  We expect IGAD will replace it with an 
agency dedicated to dealing with broader rule of law issues. 
 
4. (S/NF) The participants from East Africa diplomatic 
missions described the state of CT cooperation in their 
individual countries: 
 
Ethiopia: 
 
- Cooperation with the police is good and growing.  The ATA 
program is having a positive impact on relations and on the 
police's capabilities. 
 
- The possibility of extremist attacks remains an ongoing 
concern.  The Embassy has on a couple of occasions canceled 
events due to threat reporting. 
 
- While relations with the host government are generally 
good the Ethiopians are known for being very slow to 
respond to demarches. 
 
Djibouti: 
 
- Cooperation with the Djiboutians is very good. There is a 
good two way flow of information regarding terrorist 
activities and threats. 
 
-  The Government of Djibouti is very concerned about its 
neighbors.  There is considerable concern about extremists 
entering the country from Somalia and Yemen.  Border 
security is a principal security focus for the government. 
 
-  Embassy Djibouti is anxious to reinvigorate the ATA 
program and is eagerly looking forward to the upcoming ATA 
assessment. 
 
Uganda: 
 
- The Ugandan People's Defense Force is the key player in 
the African Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) force that is 
supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 
Somalia.  The Ugandans are concerned about the potential 
for extremist attacks inside Uganda as revenge for their 
key role in AMISOM. 
 
- The U.S. has good ties with the Ugandan police services. 
The Embassy does have concerns regarding corruption and 
human rights abuses within the Ugandan security services. 
 
- Uganda has a substantial population of ethnic Somalis, 
many of them 2nd and 3rd generation residents.  The vast 
majority of Ugandan Somalis do not support extremism and 
are wary of new arrivals from Somalia who could potentially 
tarnish the reputation of the well entrenched Ugandan 
Somali community. 
 
- There are continued allegations that the Allied 
Democratic Front (ADF), which is currently located in 
eastern DRC but traditionally composed largely of Ugandans, 
may have ties to some Islamic extremist organizations. 
 
Yemen: 
 
- The U.S. has provided lots of training for Yemen's 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) as well as for their 
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), with mixed success.  The CTU 
still requires lots of hand holding. 
 
- The Embassy is working with the Yemeni Navy and Coast 
Guard on maritime security.  These services still have only 
very limited patrolling capability, mostly around ports. 
 
- USAID is redrafting its strategy for Yemen.  They are 
 
shifting their primary targets for assistance to those 
regions considered to be most vulnerable to extremism. 
Yemen continues to suffer from water and food shortages. 
 
- The Government of Yemen talks the talk on 
counterterrorism but tends to be more talk than action. 
The Yemeni government is currently distracted by lots of 
other issues, including tribal and secessionist rebellions 
that absorb all of the Yemeni military's efforts and 
resources.  The Yemeni government disagrees with the 
Embassy over whether the rebels should be defined as 
terrorists (the Yemeni's say yes while the U.S. disagrees). 
 
- The Yemenis are reluctant to use their well-trained 
forces for difficult missions.  They need to be "pushed 
from the nest." 
 
- The Yemeni government maintains relationships with 
individuals of ill-repute, some of whom are linked to 
various extremists. 
 
Sudan: 
 
- U.S. relations with the Government of Sudan are tense and 
our bilateral relationship can be frustrating.  The 
International Criminal Court indictment against President 
Bashir complicates the situation.  However, we do enjoy 
generally good cooperation and information exchanges on 
counterterrorism. 
 
- Khartoum itself is characterized as generally safe for 
U.S. personnel.  However, southern Sudan is much more 
dangerous.  This stems from basic instability and 
lawlessness rather than terrorism. 
 
- There continue to be rumors of extremist cells operating 
within Sudan but most appear to be moribund.  The consensus 
is that foreign terrorist group cells that operate inside 
Sudan are tolerated as long as they don't conduct any 
operations within the country. 
 
- The new Sudanese intelligence chief is much less 
forthcoming with information than was his predecessor. 
 
- The Sudanese police are capable of investigating 
terrorist cells if the government wants them to. 
 
- The political and security situation within Sudan remains 
volatile.  Elections are scheduled for April 2010 and the 
south is to hold a referendum on independence in 2011. 
There is a substantial likelihood of an implosion within 
Sudan that could affect the entire region. 
 
Kenya: 
 
- Our relations with Kenya remain generally good, although 
some within the government and political elites have 
expressed irritation at the U.S. government's continuing 
push for government implementation of fundamental political 
reforms. 
 
- Many within the government continue to view terrorism as 
a foreign problem. They see the 1998 Embassy bombing and 
the 2002 attack on the Israeli owned hotel and airliner as 
being directed at the U.S. and Israel rather than at Kenya. 
 
- We are working to develop good relations with the new 
chief of the Kenyan Police Service.  Early indications are 
positive.  We continue to provide training for the Kenyan 
military and security services, but human rights concerns 
have limited some of these efforts. 
 
- We have had some success with helping the GOK establish 
a basic maritime security program.  The ATA program in Lamu 
is producing well qualified mariners.  Current efforts 
include selecting some of the better qualified Kenyan 
graduates to serve as trainers. 
 
 
- The GOK remains very concerned about the situation in 
Somalia and supports efforts to strengthen the TFG. 
Extremists within Somalia, including al-Shabaab, allegedly 
continue their efforts to recruit ethnic Somali Kenyans 
for fighting within Somalia (For additional reporting on 
al-Shabaab activities in Kenya see IIR 7 733 0119 09, 
TD-314/043516-09, TD-314/037675-09 and TD-314/007864-09). 
Cross border raids and kidnappings are likely to become 
more frequent as the militants perceive such actions to be 
low risk and highly profitable. 
 
- The Kenyan Parliament continues to resist passage of 
needed Counterterrorism and Anti-Money Laundering 
legislation, although on the latter there may be movement 
in the current session of Parliament.  Corruption continues 
to hinder CT and rule of law efforts. 
 
Eritrea: 
 
- There is no CT cooperation between the U.S. and the 
Government of Eritrea. 
 
- The GOE has actively sought to reduce the USG presence in 
Eritrea, including suspending public outreach programs, 
arresting local staff, and restricting in-country travel. 
 
- The GOE supports a variety of external rebel and 
terrorist groups that are hostile to Eritrea's enemies. 
These include Ethiopian rebel groups (OLF and ONLF), 
Sudanese rebel groups (JEM, SLA/Unity and other smaller 
Darfuri groups), Somali rebel groups (Hizbul Islam) and at 
least one unnamed group opposed to the Djiboutian 
government. 
 
- The top GOE leaders apparently believe their government 
is invulnerable to internal opponents or terrorist groups. 
However, there has recently been an increase of violent 
attacks within the country. 
 
Tanzania: 
 
- CT cooperation is good.  The Tanzanian government would 
like to work with the U.S. to increase regional CT efforts, 
particularly in training.  There is a regional immigration 
center in Moshi, Tanzania funded by the International 
Organization for Migration. The Tanzanians would like to 
see regional efforts to counter smuggling, narcotics 
trafficking, trafficking in persons, etc. 
 
5. (U) Due to time limitations the participants were not 
able to discuss extensively regional forensics.  However, 
there was general agreement that most of the countries in 
the region would very much like training and equipment on a 
variety of forensics disciplines.  However, there are 
likely to be legal and practical obstacles to extensive 
sharing of forensics information among the countries of the 
region.  Additional training and legal modernization is 
needed before the police, prosecutors and courts in the 
region can effectively process, present and evaluate 
forensic evidence. 
 
6. (U) Comment:  Participants found the conference 
generally useful.  Most indicated they felt future meetings 
would be valuable and they would be interested in 
participating. The EARSI coordinator will work with S/CT to 
obtain funding for similar events in the future. Future 
planners should consider making this a two day event. 
 
This report was cleared by Embassies Addis  Ababa, Asmara, 
Dar es Salaam, Djibouti and Nairobi. 
RANNEBERGER