VZCZCXRO2404
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3811/01 3340550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 300550Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3456
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003811 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AID ECON PHUM PREL SOCI PGOV EIND ETRP ELAB
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PRESSURE TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC 
ORPHANAGES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  NGOs recently approached Embassy Kabul 
with the news that the Afghan Ministry of Labor, Social 
Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MOLSA) has issued order to 
close some residential orphanages for the winter.  This 
practice, apparently routine for the winter months, is a way 
both to avoid costly heating bills and manage budget 
shortfalls.  The Ministry denies that residential orphanages 
close for the winter; however, PRT evidence suggests 
otherwise.  In addition to humanitarian concerns, children 
with nowhere to go could be vulnerable to insurgent madrassa 
recruitment.  Further, the Department of Orphanages is beset 
by wide-ranging systemic problems.  Embassy attention has 
already proven partially effective in drawing MOLSA attention 
to these problems.  However, continued Embassy pressure will 
be necessary to ensure MOLSA enforces its policies, monitors 
its facilities, and keeps every orphanage open year-round. 
Embassy Kabul will also work with other donors and NGOs to 
address these issues. This cable is the second in a series on 
children at risk in Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
- - - - - - 
Background 
- - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) During a series of ten meetings conducted November 
2-23, Poloff met with child protection specialists, NGOs, and 
Ministry officials to assess the conditions of children in 
orphanages that reportedly were facing possible winter 
closures and to gain further clarification on ministry 
policies and practices.  As in many developing countries, 
orphanages function partly as crisis centers for children at 
risk and as boarding schools for the chronically poor; 
orphanages provide food, shelter, and education for children 
age 4-18 when their extended families cannot or will not 
provide for them.  In Afghanistan, an orphan is a child 
lacking a father; fewer than 40 percent of the children in 
the orphanages lack both parents.  Ministry of Labor, Social 
Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MOLSA) runs two types of 
facilities supporting more than 12,200 children at risk:  32 
orphanages, which serve as 24-hour residential centers for 
children age 4-18; and 22 Day Care Centers (DCCs), which are 
non-residential crisis centers for vulnerable children to 
receive food, education, medical attention, and structured 
activity, including vocational training. The only USG-funded 
program for this population is the Access English Language 
program administered through the Embassy's Public Affairs 
section. (NOTE: There are 10 privately-run orphanages in 
country; Ministry officials acknowledge that these facilities 
are better-run than the state facilities. This cable only 
addresses conditions in the state-run facilities.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Tracking Down Rumored Closures 
- - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  On November 12, Poloff met with Wasil Noor, Deputy 
Minister of Social Affairs, MOLSA, to discuss an NGO report 
that the Ministry was shuttering orphanages as part of its 
annual money-saving campaign.  Noor flatly denied the report, 
insisting that even during the three-week H1N1 school closure 
in November orphanages did not evict children.  He insisted 
that during emergency closures and annual holidays, which are 
timed to Ministry of Education school closures, the children 
themselves make the decision whether to stay or leave. 
Poloff explained that information from the PRTs suggests that 
this progressive policy is not being carried out in 
provincial facilities.  Indeed, PRTs reported that in 
previous years, staff shuttered the orphanages in several 
locations (Farah, Gardez, Ghor, Laghman, and Paktya) and some 
orphanages were entirely closed during the H1N1 closure 
(Farah, Khost, Nangarhar, and Paktika).  (NOTE: PRT officials 
and USAID field officers will make unannounced visits to the 
orphanages throughout the winter to check whether the policy 
is being enforced.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In response to Poloff's inquiry regarding MOLSA's 
monitoring policies, Noor said they schedule one or two trips 
per year to each facility.  However, he complained that 
security concerns made monitoring difficult.  Poloff asked if 
unannounced visits were part of the monitoring protocol; Noor 
responded that they were not.  (Note: During a November 23 
meeting with Mr. Ahmad Komail, MOLSA's Director of External 
Relations, Komail insisted that unannounced visits were the 
norm. End Note.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rampant Corruption and Abuse 
- - - - - - - - - - -  - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU)  MOLSA officials acknowledge that the state-run 
orphanage system is riddled with corruption.  Funds 
 
KABUL 00003811  002 OF 003 
 
 
reportedly do not reach their proper destination.  While Noor 
told us that MOLSA has sufficient budget for its needs, 
lower-level officials complain about the low-levels of 
funding.  NGOs with whom Poloff met allege that some 
lower-level staff are involved in a range of corrupt and 
abusive practices, including: (a) black market activities in 
donated goods; (b) violent abuse against children, including 
sexual abuse; (c) facilitating bride price transfers for 
girls; (d) stealing food; (e) assisting local police in 
prostituting the children; (f) allowing the children to 
supervise one another, which in some cases leads to children 
inflicting physical and psychological violence on one 
another; (g) gross levels of absenteeism; and (h) permitting 
extremely unhealthy living conditions to flourish.  One MOLSA 
official claimed that girls are frequently raped by the 
staff. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Conditions in many orphanages are substandard: 
buildings are inadequately heated, have poor or nonexistent 
plumbing facilities, lack sufficient materials for schooling, 
and the children often complain they don't have enough to 
eat.  Malnutrition and physical and mental illness are 
common, and frequently go untreated. By law, no government 
building may use heaters before December 15, a money-saving 
strategy with potential health consequences for young 
children.  Poloff asked if an exception could be made for the 
orphanages, and was told that a presidential decree is 
required for such an exception. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Noor asserted that he is aware of the &lack of 
capacity8 of his provincial staff and their penchant for 
dipping into the till.  After Poloff shared PRT photos of the 
Chagcharan orphanage in Ghor as an example of a facility that 
requires closer supervision, Noor responded that if MOLSA had 
access to a US Embassy air flight, they would arrange for 
monitors to travel to Ghor immediately. 
 
- - - - - - - -  - - - 
Interagency Solutions 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (U) Following Noor's request, we worked with the Ghor PRT 
to arrange a US Embassy air flight for two MOLSA monitors to 
visit the Chagcharan orphanage Nov. 21-24.  The trip was 
successful from a monitoring perspective; the MOLSA team 
found the living conditions at the orphanage "unbearable," 
and submitted a detailed report with ten recommendations 
addressing both immediate and long-term concerns at the 
Chagcharan facility.  One MOLSA recommendation was for 
on-site MOLSA representation and/or frequent monitoring 
visits. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comment and Action Plan 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) As a result of these reports, the Embassy has formed 
an internal interagency group to share information and 
brainstorm ways to address the orphanage crisis in 
non-monetary ways.  In addition to humanitarian interest, we 
are concerned that when orphanages close for the school 
holidays, children without families will gravitate toward 
madrassas influenced or run by extremist interests as 
shelter, although we do not have hard evidence that this is 
happening.  The same applies to 18 year-olds, who must leave 
the facilities at the end of their grade 12 studies.  It is 
clear that on the basis of our inquiries, MOLSA is responding 
proactively, at least in Kabul.  We have requested copies of 
their monitoring policies, and will continue to consider 
non-financial incentives to encourage MOLSA to carry out 
their mandate. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Ensuring that the Government of Afghanistan 
shelters and feeds this small but susceptible population 
twelve months of the year is a small step that can reduce the 
likelihood that these juveniles becomes vulnerable to 
insurgent exploitation and madrassa recruitment. Embassy 
Kabul plans to pursue the following actions: 
 
--Continue to pressure GIROA to enforce their policies, 
especially keeping orphanages open year-round; 
--On a space-available basis, allow MOLSA monitors to travel 
to provincial orphanages on US Embassy air flights; 
--Conduct unannounced visits by USAID field and PRT officials 
at the provincial orphanages, especially during school 
holidays, to ensure year-round operation; 
--Pressure GIROA to address winter heating problems; 
--Develop public diplomacy strategies to raise awareness of 
children's rights and to raise the profile of orphanages as 
valuable examples of Islamic alms-giving institutions, 
deserving of community support; 
 
KABUL 00003811  003 OF 003 
 
 
--Place a child protection advisor within MOLSA; 
--Urge effective ministerial appointments; and 
--Work to mobilize other embassies and international NGOs to 
join us in these efforts. 
 
¶11. (SBU) As GIROA moves forward with its renewed commitment 
to appointing competent and capable people in key ministries, 
MOLSA should be included as a ministry requiring immediate 
attention. We will urge that MOLSA should replace current 
staff with leaders with demonstrated commitment to social 
welfare reform. 
¶12. (SBU) Further, Embassy Kabul will continue to give 
attention, including at the highest levels, to impress upon 
GIROA officials that existing resources must be used 
correctly.  More funding is not a solution, and in the 
short-term could simply exacerbate the problem of potential 
corruption, without systemic reforms of monitoring practices. 
 It would be a mistake to direct more funding to the 
orphanages without first strengthening MOLSA's capacity to 
manage its budgets and to respond internally to misdirected 
funds.  Such reforms can yield significant results.  End 
Comment/Action Plan. 
Eikenberry