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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR AR BR BL PY
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON U.S.-BOLIVIA DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA, 
PARAGUAY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 114036 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4(b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1. SUMMARY.  In a meeting November 19 with PolCouns, 
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) South America 
1 (Southern Cone) Department head Minister Joao Luiz Pereira 
Pinto (protect) described Brazil-Bolivia relations as 
frustrating and indicated a continuing interest in trilateral 
counternarcotics efforts with the United States after the 
elections.  Pinto described Brazil's efforts to engage a 
difficult Argentine government more intensely in light of 
current trade disputes, and expressed no concern about the 
recent changes of military chiefs in Paraguay.  End Summary. 
 
- - - BOLIVIA: BILATERAL FRUSTRATION, TRILATERAL INTEREST - - 
- 
 
¶2. (C) During a friendly discussion November 19, PolCouns 
delivered points reftel to Pereira Pinto regarding our 
continuing dialogue with Bolivia.  Pinto was grateful for the 
information and expressed continued interest in finding ways 
to cooperate after the Bolivian elections.  Pinto described 
the current Brazil-Bolivia relationship as frustratingly 
difficult to manage, noting Bolivia has no ambassador in 
Brasilia, that Brazilian offers of assistance have gone 
unanswered, and that where Bolivia has agreed to training or 
consultations, it has sent unqualified candidates or 
low-level officials with no authority to make decisions. 
 
¶3. (C) PolCouns asked whether press reports of three recent 
intercepts by the Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) of drug aircraft 
coming from Bolivia into Brazil signaled greater intelligence 
sharing.  Pinto said that he did not believe so, but 
acknowledged that information sharing between the BRAF, 
federal police, and MRE  was not good, and that there was no 
systematic effort to collect statistics on what was coming 
across the border. 
 
¶4. (C) Pinto's principal preoccupation with Bolivia stemmed 
from a Brazilian federal deputy's effort to block the 
donation of four helicopters to Bolivia--Brazil's sole 
response to a request by Bolivia for assistance after DEA was 
expelled.  The problem arose out of concern that the Bolivian 
government was forcing Brazilians resident in Bolivia to 
leave the country.  According to Pinto, although Bolivia had 
two years ago required the few hundred Brazilians to move out 
of a fifty-kilometer band along the border, they had been 
offered resettlement within Bolivia.  However, Brazil's 
"roving consulate" (a van that offers consular services to 
the dispersed Brazlian population in the border area) has 
recently found that, with the situation deteriorating, most 
Brazlians now prefer to return to Brazil. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: Although we find that Brazilian diplomats 
posted abroad are often much more amenable to working with 
the United States than their counterparts in Brasilia, in 
this case, it appears that there is broad and high-level 
interest in working with the USG.  Even the normally prickly 
head of the MRE transnational crimes department has conceded 
a need to work together on this issue.  Nonetheless, we will 
need to proceed carefully on the law enforcement side to 
avoid activating Brazilian sensitivities over sovereignty and 
any appearance of a less than fully equal partnership.  End 
comment. 
 
- - - ARGENTINA: FOR A TROUBLESOME NEIGHBOR, MORE ATTENTION - 
- - 
 
¶6. (C) With Argentine President Kirchner having visited that 
morning, Pinto told PolCouns that the visit had been 
important to "reduce tensions."  But the Argentines did not 
understand that Brazil could not overlook in an election year 
trade barriers that might not otherwise have been a 
significant issue.  Pinto did not have kind words for the 
GOA, describing Kirchner's government as "authoritarian 
without any of the tools of authoritarianism." He noted that, 
whereas Brazilian polling showed Argentine media and academic 
opinion had become much more positive with regard to Brazil 
over the past year, government opinion--for which, he said, 
 
BRASILIA 00001360  002 OF 002 
 
 
read the Foreign Ministry--was still  overwhelmingly 
negative.  Suffering from problems of its own making, he 
said, the GOA was seeking to blame Brazil. 
 
¶7. (C) For Pinto, the most notable development of the 
Lula-Kirchner meeting had been the agreement to meet even 
more frequently--every 90 days, with a commission of the 
Brazilian ministers of foreign affairs, trade (MDIC), and 
finance, and the Argentine ministers of foreign affairs, 
economy, industry meeting every 45 days.  Comment: The 
strategy bears a remarkable resemblance to Lula's approach 
with Venezuelan President Chavez, with whom he also holds 
quarterly meetings.  As the potential for conflict with 
neighbors rises, Lula sees personal, presidential-level 
contact, combined with more frequent ministerial-level 
contacts, as the best way to reduce tensions and minimize 
conflicts, particularly where resolution of the problems 
might not be possible at lower levels or in the short term. 
End comment. 
 
- - - PARAGUAY: BUSINESS AS USUAL - - - 
 
¶8. (C) Asked about how Brazil saw the recent replacement of 
military chiefs in Paraguay, Pinto said that Brazil did not 
see any cause for concern.  Because the Paraguayan Minister 
of Defense is not the most senior official in the chain of 
command, he said, it frequently creates rivalries that need 
to be managed.  For Pinto, the issue of most concern 
continues to be the handling of thousands of so-called 
"Braziguayos," Brazilians who have settled, often illegally, 
in Paraguay and whose status and rights are a constant 
irritant in relations. 
JACKSON