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Viewing cable 09ALGIERS973, NEA A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ALGIERS973 2009-11-02 07:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Algiers
VZCZCXRO5879
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0973/01 3060706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020706Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8047
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 1024
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0120
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1965
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6800
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON ETRD KPAL KWBG IS AG
SUBJECT: NEA A/S FELTMAN MEETING WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN 
MINISTER MEDELCI 
 
ALGIERS 00000973  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce.  Reasons:  1.4 (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In an October 20 meeting with Algerian FM Medelci, 
visiting NEA A/S Feltman said we wished to deepen 
counterterrorism and regional security cooperation with 
Algeria.  Medelci focused on the economy and the Middle East. 
 Algeria was an open economy that needed foreign and U.S. 
investment, within and outside the energy sector.  He claimed 
that recent laws imposing conditions on investors and traders 
would not undercut foreign investor management control of 
their investments.  Algeria hoped for USG support in its 
effort join WTO and to revive discussions under our bilateral 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.  Medelci welcomed 
the new U.S. approach to Middle East peace and urged it to 
play an active mediating role in the process.  At the same 
time, he expressed skepticism that PA President Abbas could 
pursue negotiations absent a complete settlements freeze and 
a PA accord with Hamas.  Algeria would not move to normalize 
relations with Israel before a peace settlement, but neither 
would it do anything to make this more difficult.  Medelci 
said we should follow up on the DASD Huddleston visit by 
standing up a more comprehensive counterterrorism and 
military cooperation program.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman met Algerian 
Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci at the MFA October 20.  MFA 
Americas Department Director General Fatiha Bouamrane 
Selmane, MFA U.S. Desk Director Ali Drouiche, and an MFA 
contract translator also attended.  Feltman was accompanied 
by the Ambassador, staff assistant Schwedt, and Embassy 
Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker).  A/S Feltman stressed the Obama 
administration's foreign policy emphasis on partnership and 
touched on the themes of the U.S. relationship with Algeria. 
Algeria was the only country he was visiting in the region 
and the main purpose of the trip was to establish additional 
links between our two governments.  A/S Feltman described as 
fruitful our counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria in 
Africa.  We should follow through on the recent meeting 
between AF A/S Carson and Algerian Minister Delegate for 
Africa and the Maghreb Messahel in New York and the visit of 
DASD Huddleston to Algeria.  We supported Algeria's regional 
CT efforts, which we hoped would lead to the planned summit 
of regional leaders in Bamako.  In bilateral relations, the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was creating new 
initiatives in terms of social and economic development, 
including with programs specifically related to women.  Our 
commercial relationship was good but should expand.  He 
thanked Medelci for the GOA's decision to authorize Air 
Algerie's purchase of Boeing aircraft.  Another opportunity 
in this regard was the bid by the Harris Corporation to 
invest in an Algerian production facility that would produce 
radios for the military. 
 
Economy Opening Up, Needs Investment 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) Medelci led off by discussing our strategic economic 
relationship centered in energy.  Yet achieving sustainable 
development required diversification within and beyond the 
energy sector.  Algeria's long experience as a "closed 
economy" still affected Algerian behavior.  Nevertheless, the 
private sector was now active everywhere, even in energy. 
Outside energy, Algeria had to make itself attractive to 
foreign investment.  It had channeled oil receipts to 
infrastructure development, including in the areas of water, 
railroads, roads, telecommunications, and training. 
Conditions for investment were more favorable than ever.  He 
rated Algeria a good location for U.S. firms to use to export 
to Europe, the Maghreb, and the rest of Africa. 
 
4. (C) Algeria was knocking on the door of WTO, but so far it 
had been barred.   Nevertheless, areas of disagreement have 
been identified, and the GOA hoped Europe and the U.S. would 
support Algeria's accession.  "We are now in a position to go 
much faster," he said.  "We have settled some issues and can 
go fast on others.  There are some bilateral issues.  We will 
make proposals, and we hope the US response will be 
positive." 
 
5. (C) Medelci averred that conditions were favorable for 
 
ALGIERS 00000973  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
advancing economic ties.  The politics of national 
reconciliation was now in its final phase in Algeria after 
the domestic conflict of the 1990s.  "We want a stable, 
democratic country, open to all," he declared.  The measures 
the government had just implemented allowing foreign 
investment only with 51-percent Algerian ownership would 
still leave the investor in control, because the Algerian 
share would be split among two or more entities.  "We will 
come to you," he said.  "We will invest 51 percent, but you 
will be the manager, and we will provide access to 
financing."   Algeria needed investment and technology 
transfer, such as oil and gas exploration software and 
know-how to build a solar energy industry.  It also needed 
investment in pharmaceuticals and agriculture, two sectors in 
which it was vulnerable and imported three-quarters of its 
needs.  Algeria would particularly like to see US 
pharmaceutical companies develop their products in Algeria 
and make it their base for Africa. 
 
6. (C) He acknowledged the need to make progress on some 
legal conventions, including a Customs agreement.  But 
Medelci noted that we were close to concluding both the 
Customs accord and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. 
Although there were two or three issues to resolve on an Open 
Skies agreement, we should pursue that as well.  This would 
open the way for direct air service between Algiers and New 
York, and that would be a very good sign. 
 
7 (C) A/S Feltman responded by emphasizing that the USG theme 
of partnership extended to the economy.  He said that, in 
this spirit, he could say we want to be supportive of 
Algeria's WTO accession, but this was an area in which the 
USG could indeed be a tough negotiator.  We should revive 
talks under our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, 
which could touch on all trade and investment issues 
affecting WTO accession.  The recent changes in the law have 
raised some questions; TIFA could be a bilateral forum to 
discuss this.   There are U.S. companies that want to invest 
in Algeria; Harris Radio is a case in point.  But U.S. 
investors look for both political and legal stability. 
 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
8. (C) Medelci said we should exchange information on 
counterterrorism more frequently.  On the Middle East, 
Senator Mitchell's phone call to him had initiated 
U.S.-Algerian consultations.  After the Gaza war, we had to 
improve relations between Gaza and the West Bank and allow 
Palestinians to reestablish their national cohesion.  This 
would be nearly impossible as long as Gaza remained cut off 
from imports of goods such as construction materials and 
pre-fab housing needed for reconstruction.  Demonizing Hamas 
would not work.  It was not associated with al-Qa'ida.  There 
needed to be acceptable and durable teams representing both 
the Palestinians and Israelis.  Medelci believed it would be 
even harder to unite the Israelis than the Palestinians, and 
he recalled he had made this point to Senator Mitchell. 
Medelci professed ignorance of Israeli internal politics but 
claimed that Israel's public positions were counter to U.S. 
efforts.  President Obama and his readiness to talk to all 
sides, however, had improved the overall climate.  Due to its 
own internal situation, Algeria could not play with fire and 
move to normalize ties with Israel before negotiations had 
yielded a real result.  However, Algeria could perhaps help 
in other ways. 
 
9. (C) A/S Feltman related our strategy and tactics on Middle 
East peace to the President's overall message on partnership 
and building credibility.   He said we hoped such actions as 
ending combat operations in Iraq, joining the Human Rights 
Council, and closing Guantanamo would have enhanced U.S. 
credibility.  Another factor is the decision to engage with 
Iran in the G3 plus 3 format; this too is related to the 
peace process in that it enhances our overall credibility. 
We are trying to build an atmosphere in which negotiations 
can actually succeed, and all of these factors play into it. 
We sought to be transparent with our Arab partners.  The U.S. 
administration had engaged Syria from the beginning, in a 
track complementary to the Israeli-Palestinian track. 
Medelci noted that Palestinian Authority President Abbas was 
ready to enter negotiation but beginning where previous talks 
 
ALGIERS 00000973  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
with the Olmert government had left them, not from square 
one.  He also required a halt in settlements.  The foreign 
minister observed that Abbas was being forced to jettison 
these conditions.  If he entered negotiations without 
preconditions, however, he would lose the upcoming 
Palestinian elections. 
 
10. (C) Feltman said we want to be sure that Palestinian 
institutions remain functional, so that they can inherit a 
state.   We therefore appreciated Algeria's very important 
role earlier this year in making available $26.2 million of 
its contribution available early to the Palestinian 
Authority.   We now ask that it consider making available the 
rest of its $60 million pledge.  This cash support will help 
ensure that Palestinian institutions exist when statehood 
comes.  Another way that Algeria can help is in international 
institutions.  We are trying to build the right atmosphere 
for negotiations; there are a lot of resolutions and decrees 
in international fora that make that task more difficult.  We 
could use Algeria's help in ensuring that some of these 
things don't happen.  This should be politically easier to do 
than an overt gesture on normalization, but nevertheless 
important.  We noted, for example, the very positive work of 
Algeria at the Human Rights Council in working with us and 
Egypt to secure a positive statement on freedom of expression. 
 
11. (C) Feltman signaled, however, that the U.S. position on 
Hamas was unlikely to change.  Unless Hamas accepts the 
Quartet Principles, we will not be engaging Hamas; the U.S. 
Congress would not be with us if we attempted to do so. 
Another important issue is the status of the Palestinian 
security services.  We don't want to see the West Bank turn 
into Gaza.  If Hamas were to gain control of the security 
services it would not make the job of getting to peace 
easier; on the contrary.  We will not be able to make 
progress with Israel if Hamas takes over security on the West 
Bank. 
 
12. (C) Medelci said that he had no doubts about the Obama 
Administration's position but still doubted Abbas would enter 
negotiations absent a halt in settlements.  The U.S. 
influence was centrally important, but the Arabs had no 
confidence in Israel.  He claimed that every time we came 
close to resolving the conflict, Israel pulled back.  In the 
wake of the Gaza war, it would be difficult for Abbas to 
negotiate over the status of a territory being progressively 
eroded by settlements.  Medelci complained that UN Security 
Council resolutions were not enforced.  The international 
community acted in the peace process as if there were no UN. 
We were asking the main actors to solve the conflict without 
any constraints. 
 
13. (C) FM Medelci went on to say that the only new and 
positive element in the mixture was President Obama's public 
positions.  Israeli policy was only toughening.  The October 
25 Arab ministerial might produce an inner-Palestinian accord 
and might bring Senator Mitchell back to the region.  There 
was no other road to peace except negotiations, but these 
could bear fruit only under the right conditions.  Medelci 
was skeptical Israel would respect commitments it made on 
settlements.  The U.S. plays an important role.  It needs to 
be the arbiter.  Otherwise, there are no rules.  He pledged 
that Algeria would not change its policy of support for the 
Palestinian Authority and it would not express public 
hostility to Israel. 
 
Guantanamo Detainees 
-------------------- 
 
14. (C) Medelci expressed satisfaction that the USG was 
working on closing Guantanamo.  Algeria would treat the case 
of every Algerian detainee in the spirit of justice and 
taking into account the will of the individual to return to 
Algeria. 
 
Counterterrorism, Western Sahara 
-------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) Medelci said we should follow up on the DASD 
Huddleston visit to create a program of counterterrorism 
cooperation program.  Algeria would try to follow the 
suggestions of UN Personal Envoy Chris Ross on the Western 
Sahara. 
 
ALGIERS 00000973  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
16. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
17. (U) A/S Feltman has cleared this message. 
PEARCE