VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0288/01 2780440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050440Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3047
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH

UNCLAS ULAANBAATAR 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT FOR KCC WILLIAMSBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASES XP MG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - ULAANBAATAR 
 
REF: STATE 074840 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Fraud continues to be widespread and a serious 
problem among Mongolian applicants.  In addition to the persistent 
low-level NIV fraud, post has been struggling with significant fraud 
in asylum cases and in immigrant visa cases.  Post has also 
encountered several instances of applicants with legitimate 
passports issued in fraudulent identities.  The Government of 
Mongolia has limited or ineffective checks and controls on its key 
documents.  Passports, civil registry documents, court degrees, and 
school records are routinely issued with false information.  The 
Government of Mongolia has improved its passport issuances 
procedures and is prosecuting the former head of the passport office 
for fraud, but there are still a lot of false passports circulating 
and false breeder documents are easy to come by.  The fraud is 
prevalent in all types of applicants and all socio-economic 
categories from the obviously poor and unemployed to famous 
musicians and even to Members of Parliament. The fraudulent 
applicants are primarily economic migrants or individuals wishing to 
visit family members illegally present in the United States.  Post 
has seen no evidence of fraud being used to cover terrorist or 
organized criminal activity.  Ulaanbaatar's new Fraud Prevention 
Unit is now fully functional and working closely with the RSO and 
with DHS.  The unit has successfully identified several visa brokers 
and forwarded their names to the police.  However, the police do not 
prioritize document fraud and have not prosecuted anyone.  The Unit 
has also identified fraud in several asylum, immigrant, and 
petition-based NIV applicants leading to their revocation and has 
blocked several small-scale attempts at alien smuggling (primarily 
familial).  (End Summary) 
 
---------------------- 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ulaanbaatar is a high fraud post in one of the poorest 
countries in Asia.  Unemployment is high and there is a wide-spread 
belief in seeking improved fortunes abroad.  Even well-off, 
well-connected individuals, such as the children of members of 
parliament, are eager to live in the United States.  There are large 
numbers of economic migrants in Russia, China, South Korea, and in 
the United States.  Current media estimates are that there are up to 
30,000 Mongolians living in the United States - the overwhelming 
majority presumed to be illegally resident.  The largest Mongolian 
communities in the United States are found in four cities: 
Washington D.C./Arlington, VA, San Francisco/Oakland, Chicago, and 
Denver.  However, in response to the increasing illegal populations, 
over the last few years the Embassy has been cracking down on fraud 
and has improved adjudication standards.  The Embassy has also made 
a concerted effort to reach out to qualified applicants and 
encourage them to apply and to highlight our fraud prevention 
successes.  These efforts have led to a reduction in the number of 
unqualified applicants and lowered the overall refusal rate from 70% 
to 50% over the last year. 
 
¶3. (SBU) One additional factor that can create challenges in the 
fraud environment is that prior to 2003 passports were inconsistent 
in their transliteration of Mongolian names.  Furthermore, in all 
passports prior to 2003 the given and the patronymic names were 
reversed.  This inconsistency - especially in the transliteration of 
names - can make matching identifies difficult.  Post would 
recommend that Mongolian name check algorithms be updated to reflect 
the previous switching of given and family names and variance in 
transliteration. 
 
------ 
¶B. NIV 
------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) There is wide-spread fraud in NIV applications - although 
almost all of it focused on reaching the United States for economic 
or familial motives. Fraud is prevalent in all visa categories. 
False documents are endemic in all visa categories. 
 
¶5. (SBU) STUDENT FRAUD: There is wide-spread fraud in student visa 
applications.  The most common form of fraud is in false bank 
documents or in lying about family members in the US.  Given the 
fraud, we place very little faith in bank statements or even bank 
books; instead we rely on more in-depth interviews to identify 
whether their lifestyle is consistent with the claimed resources. 
Perhaps the worst fraud is in students applying for English Language 
Training in the United States which is an excellent route to work 
illegally in the United States.  These applicants rely on relatively 
unsophisticated fraud and often include false bank statements, 
employment letters, study contracts, etc.  Applicants will 
occasionally borrow money for a short period to boost their 
balances.  In response to the overwhelming fraud and abuse of this 
category, post has essentially stopped issuing visas for ESL study 
in all but the most exceptional circumstances. 
 
¶6. (SBU) GROUP-FRAUD: It is almost de rigour for any group to 
include non-qualified applicants as part of the group.  These 
add-ons are sometimes friends or family of the group organizer and 
sometimes have paid to join in.  As a result of this wide-spread 
practice, we work closely with the Commercial and Public Affairs 
section in screening groups very carefully. 
 
¶7. (SBU) WORK VISAS:  Post handles a very small number of H, L, P, 
and O visas. However, this category is certainly not exempt from 
fraud.  Indeed, the fraud involved in work visa categories is 
generally significantly more sophisticated than in other categories. 
 We have also seen fraud in P visas 
 
¶8. (SBU) BUSINESS AND TOURIST VISAS:  Given the poverty and economic 
uncertainty in Mongolia, there is little legitimate tourist travel 
to the United States from Mongolia.  Most applicants are traveling 
for business or to visit family.  Often the fraud will include lying 
about visiting family in the US - some otherwise qualified people 
will lie about family in the US out of a misplaced fear that we 
would refuse them or because a family member is there illegally. 
Business conferences or tourist trips are a common route for 
applicants attempting to disguise family members in the US. 
 
¶9. (SBU) PERFORMER VISAS: We have also had several problems with 
professional performers (including several famous musicians) 
traveling on tourist visas to perform in the United States.  We 
carefully monitor Mongolian-language websites in the US where these 
performers often advertise.  Our efforts have led to the revocation 
of visas and a finding of 6(c) for some top Mongolian performers. 
Disturbingly, some of these applicants were assisted by officials 
from the Mongolian Embassy in Washington. 
 
¶10. (SBU) RELIGIOUS VISAS: We do not have any particular fraud 
concerns relating to religious visas.  There have been some isolated 
fraud cases particularly with fake Buddhist lamas, but it does not 
appear to be a popular route for fraudulent applicants. 
 
¶11. (SBU) DIPLOMATIC VISAS: Mongolian diplomatic personnel stationed 
abroad - both in the US and in third-countries - and other Mongolian 
government officials have been linked to several fraudulent 
applicants and to alien smuggling.  Diplomatic personnel will often 
attempt to claim extended family members as their children.  We try 
to review birth certificates carefully and to match travel patterns, 
but this is a difficult fraud to catch.  We have identified several 
fraudulent applicants linked to "diplomatic" personnel in 
third-countries.  We urge all posts to exercise caution when 
adjudicating Mongolian nationals in third-countries, even if they 
are associated with the Mongolian Embassy or claim to be Government 
officials.  Mongolians seem to believe that they have a better 
chance of qualifying in third-countries. 
 
----------------------- 
¶C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Ulaanbaatar began adjudicating immigrant visas at post in 
September 2008.  Previously immigrant visas were adjudicated at US 
Embassy Seoul.  To date, post has issued approximately 160 immigrant 
visas (including Ks and DVs) and refused 28 applicants.  Despite the 
low number of refusals, fraud is a serious concern with immigrant 
visas. 
 
¶13. (SBU) FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRANT VISAS:  We have serious concerns 
relating to family-based immigrants visas.  The majority of our 
cases so far have been American husbands petitioning for the 
children of their Mongolian wives.  Many of the wives went to the 
United States illegally and then were able to get legal status 
through questionable marriages.  Given the ease of acquiring false 
documents (including divorce certificates) and the number of 
Mongolians illegally present in the United States with children left 
behind in Mongolia, we are concerned about the possibility of 
family-based petitions as a route for alien smuggling.  The 
family-based cases filed at post seem to be significantly better 
than petitions filed in the United States with little or no fraud 
detected. 
 
¶14. (SBU) We have also identified problems with fianc or IR/CR 
cases.  Several of the applicants have met the profile for Mongolian 
prostitutes working in Beijing on short-term visas.  Unfortunately, 
we are unable to confirm or sustain any ineligibilities either under 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude or under 
(212(a)(D) Prostitution or Commercialized Vice.  The Chinese 
government does not do criminal record checks for individuals there 
on short-term visas.  We do not have sufficient evidence to revoke 
the petition of these applicants. 
 
¶15. (SBU) EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRANT VISAS:  We have adjudicated 
only a handful of employment-based immigrant visas. 
Misrepresentation of their prior experiences in order to qualify for 
the visa appears to be common.   The lack of good business and 
employment records makes it difficult to confirm fraud in this 
area. 
 
----------- 
¶D. DV FRAUD 
----------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Fraud is generally not an issue with diversity visa 
applicants.  Some applicants may have presented false high school 
certificates But it is very difficult to  check those. 
¶17. (SBU) One separate issue is that a lot of cases arrive at post 
inappropriately flagged for fraud reviews based on name 
discrepancies between the DV application and the DS-230.  This 
discrepancy is a result of a difference in translation relating to 
family name.  Mongolians typically have three names - their given 
name, their patronymic/surname, and a clan or tribal name.  The clan 
name can also be considered their family name.  We therefore do not 
consider the name discrepancy to be a fraud indicator for Mongolian 
applicants. 
 
----------------------- 
¶E. ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD 
----------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) We have yet to experience any fraud relating to passports. 
 Most Americans applying for Passports in Mongolia have a long 
history of travel.  We do pay particular attention to children of 
Mongolian nationals born in the United States as we consider this 
the most likely route for fraudulent applications. 
 
--------------- 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Post has no reason to suspect fraud in either individual 
adoption cases or in the local adoption process.  We meet often with 
local officials responsible for adoptions, visit the key orphanage 
and government officials and review police procedures regarding 
abandoned children. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Government of Mongolia has revised their adoption 
procedures to ensure greater government oversight of international 
adoptions.  GoM has vigorous screening procedures to ensure that 
children placed for adoption are indeed orphans.  The first step is 
a search for the parents by the local police when a child is first 
placed into an orphanage. The orphanage will occasionally request 
additional searches as well.  When a child is selected for adoption, 
a review committee overseen by the Ministry of Social Welfare and 
Labor will carefully screen children to confirm that they are indeed 
orphans or otherwise eligible for adoption. 
--------------------- 
¶G. USE OF DNA TESTING 
--------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Post has just begun limited use of DNA testing.  We are 
not aware of any social customs that would affect DNA testing, but 
we are constrained by limited local testing ability. 
 
---------------------- 
¶H. ASYLUM and OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Visa 92/93s present some of the worst fraud of all visa 
categories.  Fraud is rampant and pervasive. We are repeatedly faced 
with obvious fraud in the underlying asylum claim, and also fraud in 
the relationships.  We would urge much closer screening of asylum 
claims.  Many of the asylum claims could be easily verified or 
disapproved if post were consulted in advance.  Post stands ready to 
assist in verifying these claims as requested. 
 
------------------------- 
¶I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL 
------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) ALIEN SMUGGLING: Alien smuggling is a problem, but is not 
organized.  Alien smuggling  is to done on a small scale by visa 
brokers (assisting individual applicants), by family members, or 
business colleagues. 
 
¶24. (SBU) There is an active community of visa brokers and visa 
centers who promise to help people apply for visas.  Some of these 
centers are legitimate and focus on translation and help with visa 
forms, but many are brazenly fraudulent.  They will openly advertise 
online and in newspapers . Visa brokers, some of whom may have links 
to organized crime, charge around $200 US to prepare the documents 
with a bonus of $5,000 to $10,000 if the applicant is successful in 
obtaining a visa.  Visa brokers tend to pair applicants together for 
purported business travel.  The brokers then provide an entire 
packet of information to the applicants.  These applicants often 
have contacts in the United States who have arranged a job for them, 
but who are unable to otherwise qualify for visas. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Family-based alien smuggling is a particular problem in 
Mongolia.  Family groups are large with custody often being shared 
among various family members.  Many families are also separated with 
parents living and working illegally in the United States which 
creates lot of incentive for relatives to attempt to smuggle the 
child into the US.  Given the unreliability of birth certificates, 
this can be difficult problem to catch. One fraud indicator is if 
the birth certificate has been recently re-issued (e.g. there is a 
significant gap between the birth and the issuance date).  Original 
birth certificates are less likely to be fraudulent. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Another group of alien smugglers is business people who 
will arrange fake employment letters, sponsorship agreements, etc. 
for friends or colleagues.  It seems to be done more as a favor for 
friends then in any systematic way to make money.  We see similar 
activities by government and/or diplomatic officials. 
 
¶27. (SBU) TRAFFICKING:  The consular section has not encountered any 
cases of trafficking between Mongolia and the United States.  See 
the Trafficking in Persons Report for more background about 
trafficking in Mongolia. 
 
¶28. (U) ORGANIZED CRIME: Nothing to report. 
 
¶29. (U) TERRORIST TRAVEL: Nothing to report. 
 
---------------------- 
¶J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶30. (SBU) Post enjoys an excellent relationship with the RSO Office 
which places a high priority on preventing visa and passport fraud. 
We now have an in-house FPU, but continue to work closely with the 
RSO and his team of two investigators.  We handle routine fraud 
in-house, and involve the RSO and his investigators in more serious 
fraud including alien smuggling, passport fraud, or anything that 
involves a potential criminal element. 
---------------------- 
¶K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, and CIVIL REGISTRY 
---------------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Document fraud is rampant in Mongolia.  This is true for 
unofficial documents like bank statements, employment letters, 
letters of invitation, and for official documents like birth 
certificates, marriage documents, and even passports. The issuance 
of official documents is dispersed among many different offices and 
regions of the country and corruption is widespread.  Falsely-issued 
marriage, birth and divorce certificates, along with fake diplomas 
and grades are easily available.  The good news is that there is a 
central civil registry that keeps accurate records of birth and 
marriage certificates and they respond to written requests for 
confirmation of a document.  This can take several weeks, but their 
response is largely trust-worthy. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Passport fraud is prevalent in Mongolia.  It was 
especially rampant in 2003 - 2004, but revised procedures have made 
fraudulently issued passports less common.  The new passports are 
more difficult to alter, but with little control of breeder 
documents, passport fraud is still possible.  The government is 
currently prosecuting some officials involved in fraudulently 
issuing passports.  We are cooperating with local authorities, but 
to limited effect. 
 
¶33. (SBU) There is a small but active trade in passports with US 
visas.  These passports are often  altered using photo-substitution 
and used for travel to the United States.  One applicant admitted 
purchasing a passport with a U.S. visa for $3,500. 
 
------------------------- 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
------------------------- 
 
¶34. (SBU) Local government officials are not concerned with consular 
related fraud and provide minimal support.  We have referred several 
visa broker cases to the police to no effect.  The only exception is 
when the cases involve false or fraudulently-issued official 
government documents.  Even in these situations, the police take 
little action.  We have raised this in our annual bi-lateral 
negotiations, but we do not expect much change. 
 
--------------------------- 
¶M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶35. (U) Nothing to report. 
---------------------- 
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING 
---------------------- 
 
¶36. (U) The Unit consists of two individuals who work on fraud 
part-time. The FPM is a second-tour officer with FSI training on 
Fraud Prevention as well as previous experience as fraud prevention 
manager in his previous consular tour.  The investigator is an 
experienced visa clerk who has received the relevant FSI training, 
but would benefit from additional on-the-job training.  We sent our 
LES to Guangzhou last summer to review fraud practices. This was an 
excellent learning experience. 
 
Hill