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Viewing cable 09NAHA67, DPJ SENSES USG FLEXIBILITY ON FRF RENEGOTIATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAHA67 2009-10-05 09:30 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO1525
PP RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0067/01 2780930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050930Z OCT 09
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1124
INFO RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/18WG  KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1110
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1193
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP - FO/J 
SECDEF FOR OSD-GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/ HILL/BASALLA/ 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J4/J5 
NSC FOR RUSSELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/5/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS JA
SUBJECT: DPJ SENSES USG FLEXIBILITY ON FRF RENEGOTIATION 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Raymond F. Greene, Consul General . 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
1. (C) Summary: The Hatoyama administration is working towards 
an early decision over implementation of the 2006 Futenma 
Replacement Facility (FRF) plan, but deep rifts remain between 
the Defense and Foreign Ministry leadership.  Defense Minister 
Toshimi Kitazawa's September 25-26 visit to Okinawa has 
solidified his view that implementing the package as negotiated 
remains the best option for both Okinawa and the Alliance. 
Strong statements in favor of the current FRF plan from Okinawan 
leaders, including the Governor, have undermined the political 
argument within the DPJ government for revising the bilateral 
agreement.  Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada 
continues to harbor doubts over the cost and environmental 
impacts.  Furthermore, senior Japanese officials say that he is 
confident the U.S. government will instead accept the merger of 
Futenma MCAS and Kadena Air Base, while continuing to implement 
the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.  Okinawan 
leaders have forcefully pressed back against the Kadena merger 
option, while Japanese bureaucrats have warned that the U.S. 
will not accept a delinking of the FRF and Guam moves.  Both 
groups urge the U.S. to be clear on its position over FRF 
implementation during private meetings with Hatoyama Cabinet 
officials.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
2. (C) Senior Ministry of Defense (MOD), Foreign Ministry 
(MOFA), and Cabinet Office officials say that the Hatoyama 
government is intent on reaching a consensus on implementation 
of the Alliance Transformation package before the President 
visits Tokyo in November at the very latest.  Foreign Minister 
Okada, Defense Minister Kitazawa, Okinawa Affairs Minister Seiji 
Maehara, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirafumi Hirano held their 
first joint meeting on October 2 in an effort to formulate a 
common position.  Osamu Izawa, Foreign Policy Assistant to CCS 
Hirano, said that the ministers have decision-making authority 
on the issue -- as long as they agree, Prime Minister Hatoyama 
will go along with their recommendation.  Izawa added that 
Hirano will then be charged with selling the decision to 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa 
and the two coalition partners, likely a tougher task than 
bringing the PM on board.  The most immediate challenge, he 
added, will be to bridge the wide gap that has emerged between 
Defense Minister Kitazawa, who favors implementing the current 
package, and Foreign Minister Okada, who continues to harbor 
doubts about both the contents of the package and the level of 
U.S. commitment to implementing it. 
 
 
 
3. (C) MOD Parliamentary Vice Minister Akihisa Nagashima told 
the Consul General on September 30 that his ministry's focus now 
is on finding a quick way to back away from the DPJ's campaign 
pledges to reopen the realignment package.  ""We need to just get 
this FRF discussion over with and turn our attention to more 
positive-sum issues in the Alliance"", he added.  Nagashima said 
that the September 25-26 visit by Defense Minister Kitazawa 
(accompanied by Nagashima and top MOD bureaucrats) was critical 
to forming the MOD's position in support of the existing plan. 
He commented that Okinawan leaders made clear they want the 
Schwab FRF plan -- as the most pragmatic solution to the Futenma 
issue -- to proceed as scheduled and strongly oppose the ""Kadena 
option"" espoused by FM Okada and Okinawan Affairs Minister 
Maehara.  Nagashima noted that he reversed his position on the 
Kadena option after meeting with Okinawan leaders, some of whom 
assailed him personally over his past support for collocating 
USAF and USMC aircraft at Kadena Air Base. 
 
 
 
Internal Divisions 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
4. (C) MOD Defense Policy Bureau Director-General Nobushige 
Takamizawa confirmed to the Consul General on October 1 that 
Nagashima has had a change of heart on Kadena, but added that 
Nagashima has still tasked the Ministry to do a study on Kadena 
 
NAHA 00000067  002 OF 004 
 
 
as a backup in case the Camp Schwab FRF plan fails to happen. 
Takamizawa said that Nagashima's concerns are fueled by the 
continued reluctance of Foreign Minister Okada to implement the 
current FRF plan.  In internal meetings, Okada has cited both 
the negative environmental impact and cost, especially at a time 
when the DPJ is seeking to scale down major public works 
projects.  In addition, Okada is convinced that the U.S. is 
flexible, especially if Japan were to offer a concession related 
to Afghanistan.  Takamizawa said that Okada also believes that 
the proposal to draw down 12 USAF F-15s at Kadena will open the 
door to reconsidering the collocation of Marine aircraft there. 
MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau Deputy Director General Masafumi 
Ishii offered a similar assessment, adding that Okada seems 
confident he can get the U.S. to accept the Kadena merger in 
exchange for a continuation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(MSDF) refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. 
 
 
 
5. (C) MOFA U.S.-Japan Security Division Director Takei 
Funakoshi said that Okada's calculations are based in large part 
on input from Okinawan-elected People's New Party (PNP) Policy 
Chief Mikio Shimoji.  He said Shimoji has assured Okada that 1) 
there are only 25 aircraft currently at Futenma MCAS, thus it 
would not impose a significant burden on the airfield; 2) there 
are senior U.S. officials who are sympathetic to the Kadena 
merger plan; and 3) the U.S. is willing to trade additional 
assistance in Afghanistan for concessions on the FRF.  Funakoshi 
added that Okada has rejected assertions by bureaucrats that the 
U.S. will never accept delinking the FRF from the Marine Guam 
relocation, which the Hatoyama government has informally agreed 
internally to keep funding.  ""We tell him that there is no way 
Congress will fund Guam without the FRF,"" Funakoshi stated, ""but 
he won't believe that until he hears it directly from the 
U.S.-side."" 
 
 
 
Okinawan Views Take Back Seat 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
6. (C) Funakoshi said that, after Defense Minister Kitazawa's 
Okinawa visit, Okada now understands that the DPJ will pay a 
political price in Okinawa by pursuing the Kadena option.  The 
impact would be mitigated, however, if the U.S. agreed to 
implement the other elements of the realignment package.  For 
their part, local leaders are becoming increasingly concerned 
over the direction of DPJ thinking and the Hatoyama government's 
tin ear to local realities.  During an October 3 public meeting 
with Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, Okinawa Minister Maehara stated 
that doubted that the FRF could be successfully completed and 
said that the DPJ government would study other options.  Nakaima 
strongly insisted back that the Hatoyama government should 
implement the plan now in light of the willingness of Nago 
leaders to host the facility.  Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro 
expressed exasperation to the Consul General over the DPJ's 
efforts to tamper with the Nago relocation plan, something he 
has personally worked towards for 13 years.  ""After all that 
time and here we are just months away from success,"" he stated, 
""and they are putting it all at risk for no reason.""  He added 
that ""no one around Kadena wants those aircraft, but we do -- 
this should be easy.""  Kadena Mayor Atsusane Miyagi separately 
echoed this sentiment, asserting that ""moving Futenma to Kadena 
isn't burden reduction, it is just burden reallocation."" 
 
 
 
Sending a Clear Message 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
7. (C) Local press in Okinawa speculated that Maehara's 
confident public statements about changing the FRF plan 
reflected DPJ success in recent high-level consultations with 
 
NAHA 00000067  003 OF 004 
 
 
the U.S. government.  Under a front page headline ""Opening 
Pandora's Box,"" the Ryukyu Times on October 5 asserted that the 
U.S. government has signaled to Foreign Minister Okada a 
willingness to renegotiate the FRF.  Reacting to this sort of 
media speculation, Okinawan leaders as well as MOFA and MOD 
officials have urged the U.S. government to lay down a firm 
marker with DPJ Cabinet officials on Kadena specifically and the 
FRF more generally.  The Cabinet Office's Izawa said that the 
U.S. should not overestimate the ability of the new government 
to come to the right conclusion on its own.  ""We are in the 
midst of a very chaotic policy process and ministers have very 
little time to digest complicated information,"" he added, ""it is 
important that senior U.S. officials be respectful, but very 
clear when it comes to your positions if you want them to make 
the right decisions.""  MOD Vice Minister Nagashima suggested to 
the Consul General that explicit U.S. statements over the 
problems with Kadena, including in public, are helpful in 
shaping the internal discussion. 
 
 
 
MOD Seeking a Positive-Sum Solution 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
8. (C) Nagashima said that MOD is trying to find a way to shift 
the focus of discussions from changing past agreements to 
creating new momentum in the Alliance.  ""We used the FRF to 
differentiate ourselves from the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] 
during the campaign, but we know now this is too costly in terms 
of our relations with both the U.S. and Okinawa,"" Nagashima 
commented.  He added that ""what we need to do instead is to 
insert some positive-sum ideas to show that we are different."" 
Nagashima said that he will push for a shift in public focus 
from base realignment to expanded roles, missions, and 
capabilities (RMC) for the SDF.  ""We should also press for joint 
training between the GSDF and the U.S. Marine Corps to show the 
value of the Marine presence in Okinawa,"" he added.  Nagashima 
highlighted these themes during a public symposium in Tokyo on 
October 1, stating that rather than getting wrapped up in 
renegotiating the FRF, the DPJ government should demand that we 
implement our past RMC agreements with equal vigor.  Among a 
list of initiatives, Nagashima said that Japan should ""insist"" 
on the SDF's right to train and operate in Guam given the 
billions it is investing there for USMC facilities.  Nagashima 
also suggested that the DPJ review LDP decisions that left MOD 
paying for most of a realignment bill that really should be 
funded out of the central budget. 
 
 
 
9. (C) MOD's Takamizawa outlined a similar strategy he is 
pushing with the political leadership for keeping the FRF on 
track while allowing the DPJ to show progress on implementing 
past commitments to the public and coalition partners.  ""We 
should compile a package that includes implementing the FRF, 
expanding joint training, training relocation measures within 
Okinawa, and starting a dialogue on environmental issues related 
to U.S. bases,"" he added.  MOD Local Cooperation Bureau Director 
General Inoue separately emphasized to the Consul General that 
the environmental concerns raised by the base-hosting Governors 
like Kanagawa's Matsuzawa (DPJ) and Okinawa's Nakaima should not 
be dismissed out of hand.  ""They are not seeking SOFA 
revisions,"" he continued, ""but rather practical transparency 
measures to address real public concerns over the impact of 
environmental accidents within base areas.""  DG Inoue noted that 
base-hosting governors are strong supporters of the realignment 
package, and potential allies in the effort to walk the DPJ down 
from their manifest.  Takamizawa said that the U.S. side need 
not feel pressure to agree right away to any specifics if the 
Japanese side presents a ""package"" of initiatives to support FRF 
implementation.  ""If the U.S. side just agrees to a process to 
discuss these issues, it will provide the DPJ significant 
political cover to continue the FRF."" 
 
 
 
 
NAHA 00000067  004 OF 004 
 
 
Comment: Keeping Up the U.S. Front 
 
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10. (C) The DPJ government will be actively probing for U.S. red 
lines in the coming days so they can formulate at least a 
general policy direction ahead of the Defense Secretary visit 
later this month.  They will likely focus on our level of 
flexibility on Kadena and willingness to delink the FRF from 
other elements of the realignment package.  Advocates of the 
Kadena merger are calculating that the reaction from Okinawa to 
their plan will be tempered if the U.S. agreed to maintain the 
course on the Guam relocation and base consolidation. 
Maintaining clear linkages will significantly raise the 
political bar for the DPJ government to make any changes to the 
existing plan.  More broadly, local Okinawan leaders and Tokyo 
bureaucrats have taken considerable political risks by endorsing 
the current FRF plan as the only viable option from an 
operational perspective.  A clear confirmation from the U.S. 
side that this is indeed the case will help them make the case 
that the current plan is the best one for both the Alliance and 
for Okinawa. 
GREENE