VZCZCXRO4464
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #2682/01 2930950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200950Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8670
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 7183
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0557
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7606
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002682 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR OES & EAP 
COMMERCE FOR NOAA 
USDA FOR FAS 
STATE PASS TO EPA, USGS, USACE,USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV EAGR ECONQH
SUBJECT:  CHINA SPARKS HYDRO DEBATE AT MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION 
 
REF: 09PhnomPenh474 
 
BANGKOK 00002682  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1. (SBU)SUMMARY. The unprecedented active participation of Chinese 
officials breathed life into the Mekong River Commission's 
previously tame annual stakeholders meeting in Chiang Rai on October 
15-16.  Government and NGO representatives engaged in a lively 
debate with the Chinese, who presented their own scientific studies 
to show minimum impact from their proposed mainstream dams.  They 
said that environmental and social factors weigh heavily in their 
dam decisions, and they want to be sensitive of the concerns of 
downstream users.  The head of the Chinese delegation suggested to 
ESTHoffs that China and the U.S. begin a policy dialogue regarding 
the lower Mekong countries, to enhance communication and perhaps 
engage in joint projects.  The meeting stimulated ideas on what the 
USG can do to advance its Lower Mekong Initiative, such as support 
for scientific studies, and some meeting reps said they are looking 
for real commitment from the U.S.  END SUMMARY. 
 
MRC STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) The Mekong River Commission (MRC) held its second annual 
stakeholders meeting October 15 - 16 in Chiang Rai, Thailand.  In 
addition to representatives from the four member states - Thailand, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam - there were representatives from the 
MRC's two dialogue partners, Burma and China.  The major donors to 
the lower Mekong countries, including USAID equivalents SIDA 
(Sweden), GTZ (Germany), AUSaid, and DANIDA (not present, but 
sponsored) participated, as well as representatives of the Swiss 
embassy, ASEAN secretariat and the European Commission.  A number of 
local NGOs active in river issues, as well as international NGOS 
such as International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World 
Wildlife Federation (WWF), and International Rivers took part. 
Present also were representatives from the Stimson Center and 
another U.S. consultant that have existing analytical projects in 
the region.  Regional ESTH Hub assistant and OES/PCI Asia officer 
also attended. 
 
CHINESE PARTICIPATION MAKES FOR A LIVELY MEETING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶3. (SBU) China is a MRC "dialogue partner," along with Burma. 
Earlier, MRC representatives told ESTHoffs that although there had 
not been much active participation from China in the past, recent 
cooperation had been good.  MRC representatives had solidified plans 
to take a study trip later this year to Yunnan to view dam sites and 
discuss downstream effects.  In the Chiang Rai meeting, China's 
presence was a catalyst, forcing member countries to be more focused 
and productive in their discussions, rather than using China's 
absence as an excuse for not reaching consensus on difficult issues. 
 There were a total of six Chinese representatives, of which two 
made substantial contributions to the meetings.  Chinese Deputy 
Director for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Lu Haitien, as head of delegation, was the principal 
spokesperson.   Mr. Zhou Shichun, a senior engineer from Ecosystem 
Study Commission for International Rivers, made the main 
presentation on environmental impact analysis of China's proposed 
Lancang (upper Mekong) River dams. 
 
¶4. (SBU) China's formal presentation centered on analyses of the two 
dams in the process of construction on the Lancang River. 
Mr. Zhou stressed key baseline features of the potentially affected 
area: it is not heavy in fish, it is not a major source of flow for 
the lower Mekong River, and riparian land is not generally used for 
farming.  The Chinese concluded that the two dams' impacts on the 
environment were not significant.  The Chinese reported that the 
postponement of a third dam due to potential significant impact to 
fish migration demonstrates their commitment to environmental 
protection.  Other interlocutors pointed out that, at least for the 
lower Mekong flows, the number of migratory fish was so high and so 
often during the year that models from colder rivers were inadequate 
models to predict how many fish could survive fish ladders or 
flow-through turbines (3 million per hour in Cambodia's Tonle Sap 
Lake which drains into the Mekong River compared to a maximum 2 
million per year in the U.S. Columbia River). 
(Note: At the USGS DRAGON program summit in Siem Reap in June, 
described in reftel, Chinese hydrologists from Yunnan presented data 
that two existing mainstream Mekong dams did not affect 
significantly downstream flow to Laos.  Several participants noted, 
 
BANGKOK 00002682  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
however, that the dams on the Chinese Mekong would add an order of 
magnitude to flow manipulation.  End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) With regard to the Chinese assertion that the planned dams 
would not significantly affect downstream flow, NGO representatives 
asked what if in the future China were to need the water for 
irrigation or human consumption in a way not planned now.  The 
Chinese responded that the upper Mekong is not an area that is 
currently irrigated, that there are not many riparian farms and 
there are no plans to channel this water elsewhere in China.  Other 
interlocutors noted that China could need more of the upper Mekong 
flow, and thus reduce dam flow through, if climate change (e.g. the 
reduction of water from Tibetan glaciers) or migration to the area 
altered China's demand for upper Mekong water.  The Chinese 
participants stressed many times that they had important economic 
interests in the Lower Mekong Region.  They were participating in 
the MRC meeting not just to talk, but to listen; they would take 
back to their government not just the comments but the emotions 
expressed at the meeting. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  A representative from Cambodia complained of improper 
practices of Chinese companies.  Mr. Lu responded by pointing out 
that Chinese companies had invested and taken risks in Cambodia when 
no other country would do so.  He also urged the Cambodian 
representative to report these poor practices to both the Cambodian 
and Chinese governments so that the rule of law could be enforced. 
Mr. Lu pointed out that if there were environmental problems with 
Chinese dams, those problems would come back to haunt China and they 
would lose face and influence in the lower Mekong.  China stressed 
that it was doing careful environmental analysis and that its 
standards were stronger than those of the MRC.  He compared 
hydropower development to driving a car: an undeniable right, but 
one that also comes with risks to oneself and others. 
 
CHINESE ASK TO ENGAGE WITH THE U.S. 
-----------Q---------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) In a private conversation, MFA's Q asked the U.S. 
representatiQs to consider beginning a policy dialogue with China 
regarding development in the lower Mekong Region; he said that China 
already had a similar dialogue with Japan.  He said that the 
creation of a dialogue would eliminate the guesswork about each 
other's activities, as well as reduce competition.  Perhaps 
establishing the dialogue at the director general level, he 
suggested that we could first build trust and communication, and 
then advance to potential joint projects.  ESTHoff responded that 
the proposal was of interest and said that the idea would be floated 
in Washington to consider where such a dialogue could fit into 
existing regional and bilateral relationships. 
 
FOOD vs. ENERGY SECURITY 
----------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) As the effect on migratory fish from mainstream and 
tributary dams was debated, so was the future of subsistence 
fishing.  Some participants noted that as trade corridors improve 
with development, trade in the Mekong fishery could become more 
profitable and therefore a more important part of the rural 
economies.  However, it was also postulated that the economic 
benefits of this trend may not be sustainable if the markets for 
high value species dominate, as would likely occur. Furthermore, 
experts pointed out that as an alternative to sustainable fisheries, 
aquaculture was not without its own environmental and economic 
impacts.  An NGO representative claimed development partners were 
willing to invest in "fuel for cars" but not for "fuel for people," 
alluding to the fierce debate on the trade-offs between fisheries 
and electricity in achieving development goals.  Several local NGOs 
noted that hydropower and fish-related food security issues were 
already the main topics of local election platforms. 
 
CAMBODIAN REP ASKS ABOUT U.S. COMMITMENT 
---------------------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) The Cambodian government representative noted that the 
Lower Mekong Initiative, as he understood it, was welcome but 
overdue - this appeared to him to be the first engagement of the USG 
that affected Cambodia.  He noted that USG efforts to recover 
missing-in-action servicemen from the Indochina conflict were 
well-known to Cambodians but not development assistance.  The 
Cambodian made the point privately that China is Cambodia's big 
brother in the neighborhood, and Cambodia had to get along: was the 
U.S. just passing through on a whim, or will this new Mekong 
 
BANGKOK 00002682  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
engagement be here to stay? He expressed the view that if his 
country was being asked to choose between these two development 
partners, it made sense to choose the one with regional proximity, 
despite misgivings towards China. 
 
COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) Several gaps were apparent from the MRC meeting that could 
provide avenues for USG cooperation and may be suitable topics of 
discussion for the October 22-23 Lower Mekong Initiative meeting in 
Phnom Penh.   Much of the data and research on environmental impact 
analysis of China's dam projects had not been translated into 
English for regional or international audiences, and thus could not 
be made available for peer review and critique.  The local NGOs 
exhibited not just capacity problems, but seemed to feel a lack of 
validation that their views had been sufficiently incorporated into 
planning. They were very concerned with disaster planning, whether 
it originated from natural disaster or dam design failure. From the 
science perspective, it was apparent from discussions with various 
donors and NGOs that there had been insufficient data accumulated on 
ground water, soil, and irrigated agriculture aspects of the lower 
Mekong.  While there had been studies of fish migration patterns and 
the feasibility (for conservation purposes) of dams that permitted 
fish to migrate, there was not enough consensus on the science to 
make decisions clear-cut for policy makers.  Finally, a regional 
environmental regulatory framework would be needed to reduce unease 
with China's unilateral ability to capture and release upstream 
water flow with the construction of dams. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The USG's Lower Mekong Initiative could be used to bring 
greater regional clarity to the key political debates on food 
security, energy security and poverty reduction, and climate change. 
 Each year there is normally an International Visitor Program (IVP) 
which targets NGO capacity building; for the next cycle a 
LMI-oriented IVP could help build capacity for the NGOs that work on 
lower Mekong fishery issues, with the goal of them becoming 
responsible and effective actors.  Other IVPs could study 
irrigation, groundwater, and soil components of river use.  (Note: 
Embassy Bangkok will soon have a USDA soil/water Embassy Science 
Fellow for three months to assess the state of knowledge in Thailand 
and if possible some of the other lower Mekong countries.  End 
Note.) Another IVP could study hydropower in the U.S., especially 
smaller scale hydropower, as an earlier trip dealt with large scale 
projects built many years ago.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is 
redesigning a Snake River turbine in Washington to improve fish 
survival, and is interested in sharing lessons learned from their 
research.  A profitable IVP could take resource managers to Alaska, 
where migratory fisheries are managed for native subsistence, 
commercial and tourism uses.  END COMMENT. 
 
ENTWISTLE