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Viewing cable 09TOKYO1764, RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TOKYO1764 2009-08-03 06:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1764/01 2150619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 030619Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5088
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/CT FOR HILLARY BATJER JOHNSON AND PAUL SCHULTZ, NCTC, 
AND DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019 
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV CVIS ASEC KHLS
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR UPDATES ON INFORMATION ON 
HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES-INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENTNG 
AND SHARING 
 
REF: A. (A)06 STATE 190832 
     B. (B)07 STATE 133921 
     C. (C)08 STATE 048 120 
     D. (D) STATE 32287 
 
Classified By: CDA James Zumwalt. Reasons: 1.4(b, d) 
 
1. (SBU) Immigration Data Bases and Traveler Information 
Collection: -- What computerized immigration databases are 
used to track entries and exits? 
 
The Immigration Bureau tracks entries and exits for all 
travelers, both  foreign and Japanese, on a nationwide 
computerized database. The system  records name, passport 
number, date of birth, citizenship, and fight number. 
Records of immigration entries and exits are updated 
immediately. Primary  storage for records on Japanese 
travelers is on a host located at Narita  International 
Airport with backup located at Kasai International Airport. 
Primary storage for immigration records for foreigners is 
located on a host  at Kansai with backup at Narita. -- Is the 
computerized immigration database  available at all ports of 
entry (POEs)? 
 
All ports of entry in Japan, with the possible exception of 
some isolated  seaports with low vessel traffic, have the 
ability to input entry and exit  records into the data base 
and to make queries. 
 
If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but not 
all, how does  the host government  decide which POEs will 
receive the tool? 
 
Some isolated seaports with low vessel traffic do not have 
connectivity to  the JIB mainframe. 
 
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems? For  example, limited training, power brownouts, 
budgetary restraints, corruption,  etc.? 
 
Computer systems and equipment used by the Immigration Bureau 
are modern and  efficient. The limitations of the computer 
systems are not technological;  they are self-imposed 
restrictions on cooperation with other agencies within  Japan 
and with foreign immigration authorities. Corruption within 
the  Immigration Bureau is not a concern. 
 
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? 
 
Records of immigration entries and exits are updated 
immediately. Watchlists  maintained by JIB and available at 
the ports of entry are updated within 10  minutes of input. 
 
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) on  collecting information from travelers arriving in 
the country? 
 
In addition to biographical information on the passport, 
Japan (since  November 2007) collects biometric information 
(facial photograph and digital  scans of both index fingers) 
from all foreigners arriving at air and sea  ports. 
Diplomats, certain permanent residents, and U.S. military 
members  entering Japan under the Status of Forces Agreement 
are exempt from providing  biometrics. 
 
-- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, 
sea, and land POEs  and for domestic flights? 
 
Policies for entry and exit at air and sea ports are the 
same. Passengers on  domestic flights are not required to 
provide any identification at check in  or prior to boarding. 
 
 
-- What agency oversees the collection of traveler 
information? 
 
Immigration Bureau collects and manages all information on 
travelers. 
 
-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that information  with foreign governments? 
 
The Immigration Bureau has legal authority to share 
information  internationally with only other Immigration 
authorities. 
 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data on  incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is 
 
 
this data used for intelligence or  law enforcement purposes 
to screen travelers in a systematic way? Does host 
government have any existing treaties to share PNR data? 
 
The Immigration Bureau has access to PNR data on incoming 
commercial flights  and uses this data in conjunction with 
API data to screen travelers. The  government does not have a 
treaty to share PNR data with the U.S. 
 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger informationsystems 
(APIS),  interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic  travel authority systems been 
effective at detecting other national security  threats, such 
as wanted criminals? 
 
The Immigration Bureau initiated APIS on January 4,2005, as a 
voluntary  program. Under APIS, airlines and ships are 
required to report passenger and  crew manifests (names and 
certain identifying information) in advance of  arrival. As a 
voluntary program, only about 30% of air carriers provided 
passenger manifest information. Effective February 1,2007, 
APIS reporting for  flights inbound to Japan was made 
mandatory (as a result of the May 24,2006  revisions to the 
Immigration Control Act). There is no requirement to report 
passenger information on flights outbound from Japan. It is 
also not a  requirement to submit the manifest information 
electronically although nearly  all carriers do. Carriers 
must submit passenger manifests 90 minutes prior to  arrival 
of the aircraft to a joint Immigration and Customs computer 
server.  The server is managed by the Immigration Bureau. 
Manifest information is run  electronically against the 
Blacklist and Nyushin List (Entry Refusal List).  Police 
officers will respond to any Blacklist matches. Immigration 
will  refuse entry to Nyushin (Entry Refusal List) matches. 
Japan Customs  electronically runs the APIS data against its 
own Watchlist. 
 
2. (SBU) Watchlisting: 
 
Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs? What  domestic sources of information 
populate the name-based watchlist, i.e. names  of deported 
persons, terrorist lookouts, criminal wantslwarrants? If host 
 government maintains a watchlist, how many records does the 
watchlist  contain, and how many are terrorist-related? -- 
Which ministry or ofice  maintains the watchlist? 
 
-- What international watchlists do the host government use 
for screening  individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly 
lists, UN, etc.?-- What  bilaterdmultilateral watchlist 
agreements exist between host government and  its neighbors? 
 
The Immigration Bureau maintains 3 Watchlists for entry 
control purposes. All  3 Watchlists are available at the 
ports of entry that handle regularly  scheduled airline 
flights. The Watchlists are updated within 10 minutes of  new 
input. The first Watchlist is called the Blacklist. It 
consists of  biographical information on known and suspected 
terrorists, members of  domestic terrorist organizations 
(Japan Red Army), identifications received  from foreign law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, Japanese police 
wanted persons, and InterPOL wanted persons. The Blacklist 
also contains  fingerprints of known and suspected terrorists 
obtained from InterPOL,  pictures and fingerprints of 
previously deported foreign nationals, and  figerprints of 
wanted persons. The second Watchlist is called the Nyushin 
List (entry refusal list) which consists of non-criminal 
information related  to eligibility for admission. The 
Nyushin List contains previous immigration  violators 
(primarily deportees and overstays) who are barred from 
re-entering  Japan. It also contains some overlap with 
Blacklist information. The third  Watchlist is the Youchui 
List (Lookout list) which consists of suspected  violators, 
possible matches, and warnings. These 3 Watchlists total 
about  600,000 records. 
 
Ports of entry have read only access to the Watchlists. Only 
the Narita  Airport Data Center has the ability to add or 
delete names from the lists.  Ports of entry have to send 
additions and deletions to the list to Narita.  The 
Watchlists match at entry and exit against exact names and 
similar names  based on common alphabet characters (e.g. 
Mohammad, Muhamid). Other agencies  within Japan can add 
names to the lists but must make the request in writing  to 
Immigration Bureau Headquarters. Approved requests are sent 
to the Narita  Airport Data center for input. 
 
3. (SBU) Biometrics: 
 
 
 
-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, 
land, sea)? If no,  does host government have plans to 
install such a system? If biometric  systems are available at 
some POEs, but not all, how does the host government  decide 
what POEs will receive the tool? 
 
Yes 
 
-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host 
government use, i.e.  fingerprint identification, facial 
recognition, iris recognition, hand  geometry, retinal 
identification, DNA-based  identification, keystroke 
dynamics, gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant? 
 
Under the amended Immigration Control Act, which entered into 
force on  November 20,2007, foreign nationals (excluding 
diplomats, SOFA personnel,  special permanent residents, and 
those under 16 years of age) are required to  provide 
electronic scans of both index fingers and a facial photo as 
part of  entry inspection. The system is similar to the 
US-VISIT system. 
 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What 
are the systems  and models used? Are all passengers screened 
for the biometric or does the  host government target a 
specific population for collection (i.e. host  country 
nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a 
one to one  comparison (ensure the biometric presented 
matches the one stored on the e- Passport) or one to many 
comparisons (checking the biometric presented  against a 
database of known biometrics)? 
 
The biometric collection system is in place at all active 
ports of entry.  Japanese nationals and certain foreign 
nationals are excluded from the  requirement to provide 
biometrics. Finger scans are electronically registered  and 
matched against a data base of fingerprints of previous 
deportees to  prevent terrorists and those previously 
deported from entering under new  identities. 
 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host 
government know of any  countermeasures that have been used 
or attempted to defeat biometric  checkpoints? 
 
During January 2009, a Korean female generated significant 
press interest by  claiming that she had spoofed the Japan 
biometric system and was able to re- enter Japan after being 
deported by applying a special tape over her fingers.  The 
tape allegedly changed her prints such that she was not 
detected at  entry. The Immigration Bureau investigated and 
the results were inconclusive;  however, as a result of that 
incident, Immigration Inspectors have been  instructed to pay 
closer attention to passengers to ensure their fingers are 
not covered with tape. The Immigration Bureau is also working 
with the  manufacturer to enhance the equipment's capability 
to detect unnatural  prints. 
 
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of  travelers coming into the country? 
 
All foreign nationals (excluding diplomats, SOFA personnel, 
special permanent  residents, and those under 16 years of 
age) are required to provide  electronic scans of both index 
fingers and a facial photo as part of entry  inspection. 
-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's 
fingerprint system? 
 
Immigration Bureau 
 
-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UKl or RTID  compliant? 
 
Unknown 
 
-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which 
agency collects  the fingerprints? 
 
Prints are flat. Immigration Bureau collects the prints. 
 
4. (SBU) Border Control and Screening: 
 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security  interest? 
 
Biographical data from passports is matched against 
computerized watchlists  to detect persons who may be of 
security interest. 
 
 
 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host- country  nationals? What is the frequency of 
travelers being "waived through" because  they hold up what 
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose  information 
is not actually recorded electronically? 
 
Entry and exit information is kept for both Japanese and 
foreign country  nationals. Travelers are not "waived 
through". All travelers must go through  immigration 
inspection. In order to speed up immigration procedures, 
Japan  Immigration introduced automated gates on November 
20,2007. Japanese  nationals who have had their biographical 
information and fingerprints  registered in advance or 
foreign nationals who meet certain requirements  (having a 
reentry permit, registered fingerprints and facial 
photograph) may  bypass inspection by immigration officers. 
What is the estimated percentage  of non-recorded crossings, 
entries and exits? Extremely low. Among the  foreign 
nationals deported during 2007, there were 342 found to have 
entered  Japan without inspection. 9,152,186 foreign 
nationals entered Japan during  2007. 34219,152,186 = 0.003%. 
 
 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use  other criminal data when making decisions 
on who can enter the country? If  so, please describe this 
authority (legislation, mandates, etc). 
 
Immigration Bureau can deny entry to foreigners with criminal 
histories. If  the Immigration Bureau has reason to believe a 
foreigner has a criminal  history, the Immigration Bureau may 
request the criminal history details from  the foreigner's 
home country and use that information as part of the entry 
decision process. 
 
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and  denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into  the country? Which 
agency would question, detain, or deny entry? 
 
Immigration Bureau has authority to make entry decisions. By 
process,  Immigration Inspectors in the primary inspection 
booths receive "hit"  notification but no details. Hits are 
handled in secondary inspection where  detailed information 
resulting in the hit is available. The purpose is to 
expedite primary processing. Immigration Bureau's goal is to 
get the  passenger from aircraft exit to completion of 
primary processing in 20  minutes. Immigration Inspectors 
have authority to question, detain, and deny  entry. Criminal 
arrests must be made by the Police. 
 
-- How well does information sharing function within the host 
government,  i.e., if there is a determination that someone 
with a valid host-government  visa is later identified with 
terrorism, how is this communicated and  resolved internally? 
 
 
Japan's bureaucracy is famously stovepiped. As a result, 
there is no unified  government-wide terrorism watchlist. 
Immigration, Customs, Police, and the  Public Security 
Intelligence Agency maintain separate lists. 
 
5. (SBU) Passports: 
 
-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport 
containing  biometric information? If so, what biometric 
information is included on the  document, i.e. fingerprint, 
iris, facial recognition, etc.? If not, does host  government 
plan to issue a biometric document in the future? When? 
 
Yes.  The biometric information is mainly facial recognition, 
ie. a  photograph. 
 
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing  biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required  to read the biometric 
information with any other governments? If so, which 
governments? Does the host government issue replacement 
passports for full or  limited validity (i.e. the time 
remaining on the original passports, fixed  validity for a 
replacement, etc.)? 
 
The Government of Japan does share the public key required to 
read the  biometric information.   Unknown if they share this 
with other governments.   Replacement passports are issued as 
full  validity.  They are considered new  passports. 
Temporary passports are issued for one year validity or  one 
 
 
trip  back to Japan "emergency passports" depending on 
circumstances. 
 
-- Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures for dealing  with "habitual" losers of 
passports or bearers who have reported their  passports 
stolen multiple times? 
 
It is more difficult for persons who are "habitual" losers of 
passports to  obtain new passports, but  similar to the USG, 
it is not impossible.  When a  person who is a "habitual" 
loser of passports applies  for a new passport, it  is 
identified through a namecheck procedure and they undergo 
more rigorous   questioning.   -- Are replacement passports 
of the same or different  appearance and page length as 
regular passports (do they have something along  the lines of 
our emergency partial duration passports)? 
 
Replacement passports are of the same appearance, except for 
the "return to  Japan" emergency  travel documents.   -- Do 
emergency replacement passports  contain the same or fewer 
biometric fields as regular-issue passports? 
 
Emergency replacement travel documents contain a facial 
biometric with a  photograph, but they are  not/not 
e-passports.  Replacement passports are  regular issue 
passports and as such they contain the  same biometric 
fields.    -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase 
in the number of  replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of 
prior travel) passports used to  apply for U.S. visas? 
 
No,. 
 
-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number 
series or  otherwise identified? 
 
No. 
 
6. (SBU) Fraud Detection: 
 
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud  involving documents followed up? 
 
There are very few instances of fraud.  Fraud is reported to 
the local  police, who investigate  according to need. 
 
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of  circulation, or made harder to use? 
 
Potentially fraudulent documents are not removed out of 
circulation.   Fraudulent documents are  removed out of 
circulation. 
 
 7. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security: 
 
-- What are the country's policies on records related to the 
questioning,  detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the  country? How are those records 
stored, and for how long? 
 
The vast majority of immigration encounters occur at ports of 
entry.  It is  unknown how those records  are stored or for 
how long. 
 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive  data? 
 
The Immigration Bureau protects personal identification 
information through a  combination of encryption and access 
restriction. Personal identification  information is 
encrypted and transmitted between server centers and desktop 
clients on a "closed network" via leased communication lines. 
User access to  the system is by biometric authentication. 
 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the  implementation of new databases of records? 
 
Unknown, but likely to be stringent.  Privacy laws in Japan 
are robust and  very narrowly interpreted. 
 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer  systems that hold personally identifying 
information? 
 
Unknown, but it is highly likely there are laws relating to 
security features  for government computer  systems.   -- 
What are the rules on an individual's  ability to access data 
that homeland security agencies hold about them? 
 
 
 
Unknown 
 
-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus  case files (for example, records about 
enforcement actions)? 
 
Unknown 
 
-- Does a non-citizen resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain  these types of data? 
 
Unknown. 
 
8. (SBU) Identifying Appropriate Partners: Department would 
appreciate post's  in-house assessment of whether host 
government would be an appropriate  partner in data sharing. 
Considerations include whether host government  watchlists 
may include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition 
to  terrorists), and whether host governments would share or 
use U.S. watchlist  data inappropriately, etc. 
 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country from entering  into a formal data-sharing agreement 
with the U.S.? 
 
Privacy laws are very strictly interpreted.  Ministries are 
highly stove- piped and do not share  information with each 
other, or even within bureaus  of the same Ministry. 
 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to adequately  provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information? 
 
Yes, but it is a question of developing the political will to 
pass  legislation which would allow data- sharing including 
safeguards for the  protection of nondisclosure.  There are 
concerns that Japan does  not have  system and a means to 
protect classified information. 
 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally? Is there  a single consolidated database, for 
example? If not, do different ministries  share information 
amongst themselves? 
 
Very little information is shared internally.  There is no/no 
consolidated  terrorist screening database.   Ministries do 
not willingly share information  among themselves.  Some 
sharing does occur. 
 
-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal 
statutes that do  so? 
 
Unknown. 
ZUMWALT