VZCZCXRO0217
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #0543 2370537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 250537Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4657
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0254
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0057
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1224

C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL XT XM RS CO VE SW SP
SUBJECT: SWEDEN, COLUMBIA AND THE FARC 
 
REF: A. A STATE 83014 
     ¶B. B STATE 86734 
     ¶C. C MADRID 00833 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Marc Koehler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Swedish Foreign Ministry officials noted 
their dismay with recent evidence that Swedish arms, 
originally sold to Venezuela, were diverted to the FARC. 
They said this evidence would be sufficient to prevent any 
future proposed arms sales from Sweden to Venezuela and 
promised that they would consult with other MFA officials 
about the broader EU measures proposed in Ref A.  We think 
briefings by USG experts on the scale of Venezuelan-FARC 
cooperation could help the Swedes gain traction with other EU 
Member States.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Swedish MFA officials noted their dismay with the 
discovery that three M-136 AT4 anti-tank missiles had been 
diverted from Venezuela to the FARC in Colombia during an 
August 21 meeting with Poloffs regarding ref A points.  Maria 
Lundqvist, Head of Americas Department and Ulf Lindell, 
Deputy Director for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, noted 
that Sweden had, through its regional ambassador in Bogota, 
pressed Alejandro Fleming, Venezuela's Vice Minister for 
European Affairs, for a thorough explanation of how the 
missiles ended up in FARC hands.  So far. they have received 
no formal or definitive response.  Swedish Ambassador 
Nordstrom will visit Venezuela in mid-September to arrange 
high-level meetings to clarify the situation.  Our Swedish 
MFA contacts welcomed the information presented in ref B, 
adding that it would help the MFA combat Venezuelan 
misrepresenations of U.S. presence in Colombia.  They stated 
that briefings by USG experts to Sweden and other EU Member 
States on the scale of Venezuelan-FARC cooperation would be 
helpful given an overall low level of knowledge about such 
ties. 
 
¶3. (C) Lindell said that Sweden's relevant autonomous agency, 
the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP), had not 
received any requests for export licenses to Venezuela since 
¶2006.  He noted that the ISP takes a number of factors into 
account when granting licenses, including evaluating the risk 
that the sold product would be diverted from the recipient 
country.  While careful to point out that MFA officials could 
not influence the independent ISP's decisions, Lindell opined 
that any future applications would almost certainly be 
declined based on Venezuela's failure to prevent the 
diversion of the anti-tank missiles. 
 
¶4. (C) Lindell responded that ref A suggestions about Russia 
and joint EU action were constructive, but he deferred 
comment pending further MFA consultations.  He noted that 
while the EU could adopt a common position regarding arms 
sales to Venezuela, it would still fall to each Member State 
to enact legislation putting it into effect.  He stated that 
AK-47 sales would be raised in mid-October at the Wassenaar 
General Working Group. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: Despite the MFA's encouraging responses, we 
worry that under present circumstances, Sweden can do little 
more than restrict its already-thin bilateral sales to 
Venezuela.  Stockholm's relations with Moscow are currently 
strained -- planning for the EU-Russia summit has stalled and 
Moscow has refused to attend the meeting if it is held in 
Stockholm.  In this context, Swedish officials at more senior 
levels will be reluctant to confront Russia on its MANPADS 
sales.  And while Sweden could put Venezuela on the EU agenda 
during the September Gymnich or GAERC, the recalcitrance 
expressed by Spain (ref C) likely reflects views of other EU 
Member States as well.  Against that backdrop, the requested 
briefings by USG experts would likely be essential if the 
Swedes are to get traction on this issue in Brussels.  End 
Comment. 
BARZUN