VZCZCXRO3353
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1669/01 2151401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031401Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0596
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019 
TAGS: PROV PINR SOCI KDEM SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG PREVIEWS OUTREACH TO ABGAL AND TO 
PUNTLAND; DESCRIBES SUPPORT TO AHLU SUNNAH WAL JAMA'A 
 
Classified By: Somalia Unit Counselor Bob Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b, 
d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The TFG Prime Minister, Somalia's Envoy to 
Kenya Ambassador Nur "Americo," and the TFG Minister for 
Women and Family Affairs Fauziya Mohammed Sheikh shared their 
impressions of the functioning of the Transitional Federal 
Government as a result of their recent interactions in 
Mogadishu.  Ambassador "Americo" and the Minister both 
insisted that President Sharif had fully recovered from 
setbacks on the Mogadishu battlefield as well as from the 
June 18 assassination of key Minister of National Security 
Omar Hashi.  Sharif was now determined to reach out to the 
Abgal, who to all appearances have not supported him to date 
in Mogadishu. He was also perhaps ready to make some Cabinet 
changes.  According to the Prime Minister, the TFG was 
providing significant aid to Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) in 
the central regions, including a July 31 charter flight 
delivery of ammunition and weapons.  The Prime Minister 
seemed reluctant to meet with Puntland President "Faroole," 
as President Sharif has been urging him to.  End summary. 
 
Rumored Abgal Outreach 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Somalia's Envoy to Kenya Mohammed Ali Nur "Americo" 
told Somalia Unit immediately after his return to Nairobi 
from Mogadishu on July 28 that President Sharif was finally 
determined to reach out to his own Abgal clan after months of 
ignoring complaints that they were not adequately represented 
in the TFG --where the President is the only Abgal.  Sharif's 
neglect seemed to have contributed to the apparent failure of 
the Abgal to fight for the TFG during al-Shabaab's takeover 
of the Mogadishu Abgal neighborhoods of Medina, Karaan, and 
Abdi Aziz. 
 
¶3. (C) During "Americo's" visit to Mogadishu, Sharif, for the 
first time according to "Americo," was willing to discuss his 
problems with the Abgal.  "Americo" found Sharif to be "very 
talkative," which he ascribed in part to the absence from 
Mogadishu of Deputy Prime Minister and Sharif confidante 
Sharif Hassan.  "Americo" (himself an Abgal) arranged a lunch 
for Sharif in Mogadishu with a prominent Abgal elder, and had 
plans to host a larger lunch in Nairobi for influential 
Kenya-based clan members. On July 31, "Americo" reported that 
the TFG had decided to appoint three new Abgal government 
officials in an effort to build loyalty among members of the 
clan.  The rumored appointees were: 
 
-- Hassan Sheikh (Hawiye/Abgal/Wa'esli) would head a 
newly-created Ministry of Finance; 
 
-- Ambassador Isse Dereh (Hawiye/Abgal/Wabudhan/Daud) would 
receive a high-ranking TFG position to be determined; 
 
-- Dr. Osman Duffleh (Hawiye/Abgal/Isse) would become the 
Minister of State for Health. 
 
(Note:  There seems to be a sound tactical logic to the 
inclusion of these three sub-clans.  Hassan Sheikh hails from 
the same sub-clan as former TFG Prime Minister Gedi and 
rumored Hassan Dahir Aweys financier Mahmoud Omar Adani. 
Warlord Musa Sude Yalahow, whose militia has backed the TFG 
in Mogadishu, is from the Wabudhan, while Duffleh and Dereh 
are influential figures in their own right.) 
 
¶4. (C) There was also talk, "Americo" said, of appointing an 
Abgal General to the TFG security forces, but some worried 
that the sudden appearance of so many Abgal in the TFG would 
spark a backlash.  (Note:  none of the para 3 appointments 
have been announced to date.)  "Americo" believed that 
Sharif's ICU background meant that he remained skeptical of 
clan politics, but that he now understood that he must build 
clan support if the TFG was to survive. 
 
¶5. (C) Minister for Women and Family Affairs Fauziya Mohammed 
Sheikh (Digil & Mirifle/Elay), who had recently left 
Mogadishu, complained about President Sharif's isolation, 
even from members of his own government. "Only the Islamists" 
and the Prime Minister see him, she said. (Note:  by 
"Islamists," Fauziya likely meant ARS members of the TFG.) 
She had not met Sheikh Sharif since the TFG went to 
Mogadishu, and she worried that the TFG was being "held 
hostage by the Hawiye."  As expected, she backed fellow clan 
member, Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan who, she said had 
been the force behind the signing of the Price Waterhouse 
Cooper agreement. 
 
NAIROBI 00001669  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
Rumored Ouster of Interior Minister, 
Minister of Information.  Ouster of 
Intelligence Chief Mohammed Sheikh 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Although rumors of an impending Cabinet re-shuffle 
abound, the Prime Minister, Ambassador "Americo," and 
Minister Sheikh did not believe that sweeping changes were in 
the cards.  "Americo" said that President Sharif had told 
him, however, that he intended to remove Minister of Interior 
Sheikh Abdiqadir Ali Omar (Hawiye/Saleebaan).  Sharif thought 
that Omar at a minimum had not been effective as Minister. 
(Omar was Deputy Chairman of the ICU when it ousted the 
warlords from Mogadishu in 2006, and it was believed that his 
allegedly powerful personal militia had been his ticket to 
the Interior Minister job. Many of his militia switched sides 
during their first battle with al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam in 
Mogadishu, however.  More recently, Omar's subordinates had 
been linked to the July 14 kidnapping of two French 
government employees in Mogadishu.) 
 
¶7. (C) While "Americo" was in Mogadishu, President Sharif 
helped arrange the departure for Cairo of Omar's second wife 
and planned, in a few weeks, to have Omar follow him, 
"Americo" said.  "Americo" did not know who might replace 
Omar if the plan were realized. 
 
¶8. (C) In a July 31 conversation, Ambassador "Americo" 
reported that a decision had also been made to remove 
Minister of Information Farhan Ali Mohamud (Hawiye/Habr 
Gedr/Duduble).  Slated to replace Mohamud was current 
Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Abdirahman 
Abdishakur Warsame (Hawiye/Habr Gedr/Ayer).  No explanation 
was given for the alleged removal, but Mohamud had earlier 
signalled to the Somalia Unit that he was considering 
resigning, and Somalia Unit had little success in persuading 
Mohamud to return to Mogadishu in order to work with the two 
USG-hired consultants currently in place there.  "Americo" 
believed that Mohamud might be offered another position in 
the TFG. 
 
¶9. (C) Mohamud's replacement with Warsame, if it occurs, 
would have the effect of removing a prominent member of the 
original TFG that merged with the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia/Djibouti (ARS) wing at the end of 
¶2008.  Mohamud rarely spoke to the press, but was seen as 
very effective when he did so.  Some ascribed Mohamud's 
infrequent contacts with the media to his Duduble clan roots, 
arguing that a comparatively large number of Duduble are 
allied with al-Shabaab, and that Mohamud did not want to 
cross his sub-clan. (Note:  When he spoke to the press, 
however, Mohamud was generally harshly critical of 
al-Shabaab.) Warsame comes from the ARS wing of the unity 
government.  Like Mohamud, he is a British citizen. 
 
¶10. (C) Somalia Unit continued to push the TFG to allow 
Intelligence Chief Mohammed Sheikh to remain in his job, 
following a July 21 decision to scapegoat him for the July 14 
kidnapping of two French intelligence officers in Mogadishu. 
On July 30, the Prime Minister told us that Sheikh would 
remain in the government, and Deputy Prime Minister Sharif 
Hassan, who was present at the meeting, said he was 
determined to have Sheikh re-instated.  (Note:  Sharif Hassan 
has great influence with President Sharif, is Mohammed 
Sheikh's patron, and is of the same major clan 
(Digil/Mirifle) as Mohammed Sheikh.)  A subsequent 
conversation with Minister of National Security Abdullahi 
"Sanbaloshi" seemed to suggest, however, that Sheikh remained 
on track to become "Sanbaloshi's" deputy. 
 
Friction with Other Ministers; 
Some Tension with Prime Minister 
Over Failure to Meet Puntland 
President 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) "Americo" described President Sharif as unhappy with 
the amount of time that TFG ministers spent away from 
Mogadishu.  "Americo" thought that the President was somewhat 
disenchanted with Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan, who 
returned to Mogadishu only August 2 after a long absence, 
which included a trip to Malaysia to see his family. 
 
¶12. (C) President Sharif's relations with Prime Minister 
Sharmarke (Darood/Harti/Majertein/Osman Mahmoud) were also 
frayed, "Americo" said.  The current source of friction was 
 
NAIROBI 00001669  003 OF 003 
 
 
the Prime Minister's reluctance to travel to Puntland for a 
meeting with President "Faroole." (Note:  "Americo" had met 
with President "Faroole" in Dubai on the weekend of July 17 
in order to prepare a Presidents Sharif - "Faroole" meeting.) 
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Abdirizak Osman 
"Jurile," (Darood/Harti/Majertein/Dashishe) who comes from a 
Puntland clan, like Sharmarke, told Somalia Unit that he 
sensed that the Prime Minister's relations with President 
"Faroole" had soured for some reason following their April 15 
dinner that both "Faroole" and the Prime Minister told us at 
the time went very well. 
 
¶13. (C) President Sharif had attempted to force the Prime 
Minister to travel to Puntland on the weekend of July 31, but 
the Prime Minister claimed that President "Faroole" would 
have returned from Dubai and Djibouti only the day before, 
and that there in any event was not enough time to prepare 
the meeting.  When Somalia Unit saw the Prime Minister on 
July 30, he claimed that he would travel to Puntland before 
the Secretary's August 6 meeting with President Sharif, but 
with the Prime Minister's return to Mogadishu on August 1, we 
understand the meeting with "Faroole" was not likely to take 
place.  (Further complicating the prospect of a PM - 
"Faroole" meeting, we understand was a recent letter from 
Minister of Livestock Abukar Abdi Osman to the Government of 
Saudi Arabia requesting that the Saudis allow the import from 
Somalia only of livestock shipped from the port of Mogadishu. 
Such a request would almost certainly complicate efforts by 
the TFG to improve relations with "Faroole.") 
 
Alleged Progress in Cooperation 
with Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) The Prime Minister reported July 30 that the TFG was 
providing concrete support for Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) 
in the central regions.  A TFG-chartered plane carrying 
weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies to ASWJ would fly 
from Mogadishu to Guriel (Galgaduud Region) on July 31, from 
where it was scheduled to transfer about fifteen wounded ASWJ 
troops to Diredawa, Ethiopia, for treatment.  He also claimed 
that the TFG on two occasions had provided financial support 
to ASWJ.  Noting the large number of Somalis attempting to 
solicit assistance for ASWJ, Sharmarke said that the TFG in 
the end had established direct communications with ASWJ 
military commanders and would provide assistance directly to 
them.  (Note:  Somalia Unit has not yet confirmed that the 
July 31 flight took place.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) Although many of the TFG's overtures discussed above 
remain in the planning stage, it is heartening to detect, at 
last, an intention to more actively seek possible allies 
among clans and in neighboring regions, as well as to shore 
up the alliance with ASWJ. The removal of the Ministers of 
Interior and Information, if it occurs, still falls far short 
of the wholesale Cabinet re-shuffle that many believe is 
needed, and that President Sharif himself forecast when he 
made his appointments in March.  Sacking the Minister of 
Interior would at least remove one person who has been an 
unequivocal negative for the struggling TFG, but much more 
remains to be done, and the TFG continues to move too 
tentatively to accomplish the enormous number of pressing 
tasks that urgently confront it. 
RANNEBERGER