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Viewing cable 09KINGSTON634, JAMAICA: A SERIOUS LAG EFFECT FOR POST RECESSION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KINGSTON634 2009-08-25 18:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kingston
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0634/01 2371851
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251851Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7981
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0575
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0607
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2416
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000634 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (JMACK-WILSON) (RALVARADO) (VDEPIRRO) 
(WSMITH) 
WHA/EPSC (MROONEY) (FCORNEILLE) (AWONG) 
INR/RES (RWARNER) 
INR/I (SMCCORMICK) 
SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS AND FAS 
TREASURY FOR ERIN NEPHEW 
EXPORT IMPORT BANK FOR ANNETTE MARESH 
USTDA FOR NATHAN YOUNG AND PATRICIA ARRIAGADA 
OPIC FOR ALISON GERMAK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2039 
TAGS: ECON ETRAD EFIN ENRG EIND PREL PGOV PIND TRYS
IADB, IBRD, IMF, SOCI, ASEC, KCRM, XL, JM 
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: A SERIOUS LAG EFFECT FOR POST RECESSION 
GREEN SHOOTS 
 
REF: A. KINGSTON 614 
     B. KINGSTON 581 
     C. KINGSTON 422 
     D. KINGSTON 223 
     E. KINGSTON 427 
     F. KINGSTON 626 
     G. KINGSTON 622 
     H. KINGSTON 531 
 
Classified By: Isiah L. Parnell Charge d'Affaires, a.i. for reasons 1.4 
 (b and d) 
 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
--------------------- 
 
1. (C) Despite signs of stability in the Jamaican dollar and 
moderating inflation, the island nation is still far from 
seeing post-recession green shoots.  Even when an economic 
recovery takes hold in the United States, it will do little 
to pull Jamaica out of its ongoing economic malaise.  Major 
changes are needed in the market orientation of the island 
and, to date, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) seems unwilling 
to make the difficult choices needed to address its triple 
intrinsic challenges of high energy costs, high security 
costs, and a lack of business diversification.  Furthermore, 
two of the three main pillars of the economy, bauxite and 
remittances, have suffered serious declines.  Only the third 
pillar, tourism, has remained robust.  There is cause for 
concern as the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP)-led GOJ continues 
to muddle along and undergo changes of key personnel in the 
face of daunting challenges.  The island appears to be one or 
two events away from a potentially steep and precipitous 
economic downward spiral.  A devestating hurricane, a high 
profile violent incident against tourists, or the loss of 
PetroCaribe benefits could well be the tipping point. 
END SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS. 
 
Breaking Track Record of Moribund Growth 
----------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) After a series of measures by the Central Bank 
(BOJ), the Jamaican dollar has stabilized, skyrocketing 
interest rates are declining slightly, and inflation is 
moderating (Reftel A).  The BOJ reduced interest rates 
another 100 basis points on August 20.  The GOJ also is on 
the verge of a standby agreement with the IMF which should 
provide USD 320 million in special drawing rights by early 
September, in addition to a possible USD 1.2 billion, 
affording the GOJ some much needed breathing room in the near 
term (Reftel B).  Although these are noteworthy improvements 
given the extraordinary global economic crisis, there are 
still fundamental weaknesses in the economy that need to be 
addressed in a long-term strategic manner if Jamaica is to 
ever break with its two-decade history of moribund economic 
growth averaging just over one percent a year. Even when the 
U.S. benefited from a major economic boom in the 1990s, there 
were no spillover benefits for Jamaica, which still endured 
years of anemic growth. 
 
Addiction to Debt 
----------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The Jamaican economy has been supported by 
increasing reliance on debt since the 1970s, which has led 
the country to become the fourth most indebted in the world. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is 114 percent, and is expected to 
climb to 120 percent before year's end. (NOTE: The rate was 
once as high as 212 percent in the 1980s, but declined during 
a brief period of economic growth.  END NOTE).  Until the GOJ 
can begin to better collect tax revenues already owed or grow 
the business community to create a wider tax base, it will 
continue to face budget shortfalls.  (NOTE: the GOJ only 
collects about 40 percent of the tax revenue it is owed, but 
there are some signs of improvement in collections, in part 
as a result of assistance provided by the U.S. Mission and 
the U.S. Treasury,s Office of Overseas Technical Assistance. 
END NOTE). 
 
 
 
Debt Spending, Party Is Over 
---------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The onset of the global economic downturn and an end 
to loose credit conditions dried up Jamaica,s supply of debt 
financing.  The eventual downgrade of the island by 
international ratings agencies has further frozen Jamaica,s 
access to credit markets. Standard and Poor,s lowered the 
country to CCC  in August (Reftel A), and Fitch Ratings 
warned on August 20 that it will downgrade Jamaica,s rating, 
which currently stands as B, with a negative outlook, if the 
country cannot secure a borrowing deal with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  The inability to continue borrowing at 
the same pace has forced the GOJ to reluctantly work with 
existing revenues and acknowledge its budget shortfalls. 
 
A Good Debtor Gets Tested 
------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) GOJ has a long history of paying its debt, an 
obligation specified as the highest priority in its 
Constitution.  However, its ability to continue to service 
this debt is being tested.  The GOJ is seeking an interest 
rate reduction from bondholders in exchange for longer term 
notes (Reftel C.)  Prime Minister Bruce Golding has been 
adamant that any move not be perceived as a default or 
blemish on Jamaica,s history of paying its debts.  Golding's 
concern may have restrained him in negotiating aggressively 
with bondholders for a concession.  The GOJ has no choice but 
to quickly secure a deal with the IMF, which will restore 
confidence in Jamaica and provide an avenue for the country 
to address some of the structural reforms that are long 
overdue. 
 
Remittances Down 16 Percent Since January 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Jamaica is heavily dependant on remittances sent 
from the Jamaican Diaspora in the United States (53 percent) 
and United Kingston (19 percent).  Total remittances for 2008 
were USD 2.02 billion and equal to nearly 20 percent of GDP; 
it is these funds that help a significant number of Jamaicans 
to survive day to day.  The money is used to pay for basics 
such as food and rent.  Since January, remittance inflows to 
Jamaica have fallen 16 percent, and the slide is likely to 
continue as unemployment remains high in the U.S. and U.K. 
markets. The Bank of Jamaica (Central Bank) reported that 
inflows fell to USD 854 million from January to June of 2009. 
 This is down from USD 1 billion for the same period in 2008. 
 If the trend continues for the year at the same pace, 
Jamaica would expect USD 300 million less in revenues.  The 
likelihood of a jobless recovery in the U.S. remains high, 
indicating further declines in remittance inflows are likely, 
at least in the near term. 
 
Energy: The Noose That Strangled Bauxite 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) At a price of 31 cents per kilowatt hour, Jamaica 
has some of the highest energy rates in the region and has 
severely hindered the bauxite sector.  Three of the four 
plants on the island have closed down and the country has 
faced significant job losses in the bauxite sector (Reftel 
D).  The GOJ appears to have suffered from a culture of risk 
aversion; the Energy Ministry was unwilling to choose between 
coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and therefore did not 
make any choice at all to improve energy diversification. 
This approach left them completely reliant on petroleum 
products for electricity generation, and thus has made energy 
costs a binding constraint on economic growth (Reftel E). 
Jamaica will have a significant challenge trying to compete 
in manufacturing against its more energy rich neighbors.  In 
2005, JAMALCO bauxite (joint venture between the GOJ and U.S. 
firm Alcoa) postponed indefinitely a plan to double capacity 
until the GOJ could demonstrate the ability to provide more 
affordable energy.  In 2008, Bauxite export earnings were USD 
 
 
1.3 billion.  For 2009, bauxite export earnings are expected 
to decline to USD 650 million, and the situation would have 
been even more dire had world bauxite prices not begun to 
recover recently as a result of slightly improved world 
demand. 
 
Where Jamaica Should Focus 
-------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) In the energy sector, Jamaica needs to focus on 
reducing power consumption, which is far less expensive than 
generating new power.  There are opportunities to expand wind 
and solar energy, but most of these efforts have been very 
small-scale.  The GOJ needs to implement legislation for more 
energy efficient building codes and net billing (or net 
metering) to encourage conservation and reduce demand (Reftel 
F).  Unfortunately, there has been a fair amount of talk on 
the subject but little tangible progress.  Jamaica enjoys the 
benefits of reduced costs for petroleum under the PetroCaribe 
agreement with Venezuela, but it has not prepared for the 
eventual day when those benefits might be curtailed or lost 
completely (Reftel G). 
 
Subjected to the Whims of Oil and Chavez 
---------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Until the GOJ is able to bring a mix of fuel sources 
to the island, whether coal, LNG, or increased use of 
renewable energy, it will not be able to break the binding 
constraint of high energy costs, and thus will remain subject 
to the volatile rise and fall of world oil prices or the 
whims of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.  Oil prices are up 
60 percent for the year as of August 3, and Chavez has hinted 
at, and then backed away from, making revisions in the terms 
of the PetroCaribe agreement (Reftel G).  Both of these 
trends should raise alarms within the GOJ. 
 
Crime Trending Higher, May Bleed Into Tourism? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
10. (SBU) Major crimes are up 20 percent for the first seven 
months of the year, with a spike in robbery (up 18 percent), 
break-ins (up 79 percent), and larceny (up 127 percent) 
(Reftel H).  As economic conditions deteriorate, it is 
difficult not to attribute this spike in crime to the 
economy.  Minister of National Security Dwight Nelson claimed 
murder is down 10 percent and rape is down 24 percent (Reftel 
H), but crime reports in the press would seem to suggest 
otherwise.  The trend appears to indicate that as economic 
conditions worsen, there is the potential for rising violent 
crime related to robberies or break-ins.  If this sudden 
upward trend in crime becomes directed toward tourists, 
Jamaica could see a decline in the last pillar of its economy 
that has remained robust during the global downturn.  Jamaica 
also faces exposure to natural disaster risks, particularly 
as it enters this year,s hurricane season.  Any significant 
storm damage could discourage visitors, deprive the island of 
much needed hard currency revenues, and result in job losses 
in a sector that has, to date, done well. 
 
No Clear Handle on Crime 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) Despite admitting that crime is a priority in nearly 
every public venue, the GOJ still appears to lack a clear and 
convincing plan for how it will tackle the island,s violent 
crime problem.  Minister of National Security Dwight Nelson 
has spoken of &crushing the criminal gangs8 within a few 
years, but in reality the GOJ has been slow to use some of 
the legislative tools at its disposal (Reftel H).  For 
example, the GOJ has promised aggressive implementation of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act, but the Jamaica Constabulary Force 
(JCF) continues to rely on an older and less robust 
legislative instrument to seize criminal assets.  The 
Financial Investigative Division (FID) Act awaits passage and 
key Anti-Crime bills continue to languish in Parliament. 
Meanwhile, concerns about crime and its associated costs on 
 
business operations creates an impediment to investment on 
the island.  Guard services average USD 7,000 per year and 
the cost for installation of electronic access and camera 
surveillance averages USD 4,500.  Both of these types of 
security are present at an overwhelming majority of business 
locations, and thus drive up the cost of doing business. 
 
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS 
-------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Jamaica is seeing some positive signs, in that it 
appears to have stabilized the currency and reduced 
inflationary fears.  However, the island is far from 
improving its long-term economic prospects, even if the U.S. 
economy begins to see positive growth.  Until the JLP-led GOJ 
begins to make difficult decisions that will address the 
triple intrinsic challenges of high energy costs, high 
security costs, and a lack of business diversification, 
little economic growth should be expected.  The island 
appears susceptible to a potentially steep and precipitous 
economic downward spiral brought on by issues of crime and 
exposure in its energy sector.  END COMMENT AND ANALYSIS. 
PARNELL