VZCZCXRO9957
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHWR #0738/01 1980952
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170952Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8600
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/CE FOR MARY GLANTZ; T FOR COSTA NICOLAIDIS; OSD FOR 
BRAD MITCHELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV MAPP MARR PL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MULL BRIEFS MOSCOW SUMMIT TO POLES; 
HEARS SOFA AND PATRIOTS IN RETURN 
 
Classified By: CDA Quanrud for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 
 ¶1.  (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Stephen Mull reassured senior 
GOP officials July 8 that President Obama had protected U.S. 
redlines during the Moscow Summit and bartered neither 
European missile defense (MD) plans nor future NATO 
enlargement to gain Russian cooperation on ballistic missile 
defense.  Poles were reassured and grateful for the 
timeliness of Mull's visit.  FM Radoslaw Sikorski set a 
positive tone, saying "better U.S.-Russia relations are also 
good for Poland" and congratulating the Administration on a 
successful summit.  Understanding that an MD decision was 
still pending, Sikorski sought assurances that last August's 
bilateral Declaration on Strategic Cooperation remained in 
force, while Mull stressed that the U.S. needed to understand 
more completely how the proposed U.S. Patriot 
rotation/deployment fit into Polish air defense thinking. 
The Polish side hoped that the next plenary SoFA negotiations 
will bring the two countries closer to final agreement, but 
Sikorski and others pressed for the U.S. to schedule the 
first Patriot rotation this year under the auspices of the 
NATO SoFA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SIKORSKI SETS POSITIVE TONE 
 
¶2. (S)  In conversations with FM Sikorski, Mull outlined the 
current state of play in post-START negotiations, as well as 
U.S. thinking on Russian insistence on linking offensive and 
defensive systems.  Sikorski welcomed the explanation that 
the U.S. would not agree to limits on either numbers or 
locations for defensive systems.  In response to Mull's 
confirmation of the President's threat-driven mandate for the 
ongoing MD review, Sikorski praised the U.S. for not 
conceding MD to Russia  -- "you made it clear that your 
decision will be based on your assessment of the threat - 
good." 
 
¶3. (S) Sikorski noted that better U.S.-Russia relations was 
also good for Poland.  That said, should the U.S. decide to 
drop the European Interceptor Site (EIS), we would need to 
calibrate carefully how to manage Russian glee.  Poland had 
made a serious political investment, and a hasty walk away 
from the EIS would not look good for either Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk or, frankly, for Sikorski himself.  Mull 
emphasized that the fate of the EIS was tied to the 
assessment of Iran's ICBM capability. 
 
¶4. (S) Sikorski asked if the U.S.-Polish Declaration on 
Strategic Cooperation was still in force, and was assured on 
that point.  Mull acknowledged that there had been mixed 
expectations with respect to the Patriots, but that in any 
case, we needed to finish the SoFA talks to move forward.  A 
Pentagon team would visit in a few weeks to walk through 
details about the Patriots and to get a better sense of how 
Poland envisioned its own air defense systems.  Sikorski 
thought we could find a way ahead on the SoFA by examining 
recent examples of other U.S. SoFAs.  That said, Poland would 
like the U.S. to accept the NATO SoFA as a legitimate basis 
for the initial Patriot rotation, so that we could keep to 
the 2009 deadline established in the Declaration. 
 
FLEXIBILITY ON SOFA? 
 
¶5.  (S)  SoFA negotiations were more central in Ambassador 
Mull's earlier meeting with Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw 
Komorowski and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Kremer. 
Komorowski said several times that the GoP could not 
negotiate a bad agreement because it would risk a tough 
ratification battle in Parliament from the more nationalist 
Law and Justice (PiS) party. He hoped for significant 
progress during the July 13 experts meeting and July 14-16 
plenary in Washington, and urged flexibility for both sides. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Komorowski previewed Sikorski's position on 
Patriots, asking Mull if there really needed to be a 
supplemental SoFA.  It was his view that the NATO SoFA, with 
a complementary MOU, would be sufficient, at least for the 
first rotation.  He said there would be substantial negative 
political effects if Patriot did not arrive on Polish soil in 
2009 per the Declaration, noting that the climate of public 
opinion would turn against the U.S.  He added that Poles had 
been disappointed with their experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as with MD and the lack of a visa waiver 
program. 
 
WARSAW 00000738  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S)  COMMENT:  The Polish leadership welcomed Ambassador 
Mull's visit, and the U.S. accomplished its goal of assuaging 
fears that Poland's interests would be sacrificed for the 
sake of better relations with Russia.  The lead-up to the 
Moscow summit had produced considerable anxiety among Poles, 
as both GoP officials and the general public questioned 
whether Poland would become yet again a bargaining chip for 
more influential powers.  We would note, however, that we are 
not home yet, and Poles will likely remain cautious until a 
final deal takes shape with Russia on the BMD threat 
assessment and other issues currently under discussion.  Our 
interlocutors were impressed that President Obama had thus 
far held firm against Russian demands to link the future of 
the European sites with U.S.-Russia cooperation on MD, and 
would welcome further high-level consultations with the U.S. 
on strategic security issues.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8.  (U) Ambassador Mull has cleared this cable. 
QUANRUD