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Viewing cable 09USNATO302, A/S'S GORDON AND GOTTEMOELLER DISCUSS MOSCOW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09USNATO302 2009-07-15 13:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Mission USNATO
VZCZCXRO7999
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0302/01 1961355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151355Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3177
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6439
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 4070
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7160
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0001
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7299
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 4183
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000302 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR A/S GORDON AND VCI A/S GOTTEMOELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 
TAGS: PREL KACT MNUC NATO EL EZ ZB
SUBJECT: A/S'S GORDON AND GOTTEMOELLER DISCUSS MOSCOW 
SUMMIT WITH BALTICS, CZECHS & POLES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). 
 
1. (SBU) This message has been cleared by EUR A/S Gordon and 
VCI A/S Gottemoeller. 
 
2. (C/NF) Summary:  On July 8, Assistant Secretary of State 
for European and Eurasian Affairs Gordon and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and 
Implementation Gottemoeller exchanged views regarding 
Russia's intentions and tactics with representatives of the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  They 
discussed Russian attempts to divide the Alliance over 
Georgia, missile defense and other differences.  While this 
group remains suspicious of Russian intentions, A/S Gordon 
and A/S Gottemoeller described the surprising successes 
achieved at the Summit, and gave insights into the 
Medvedev/Putin dynamic and its effects on counterpart 
negotiators.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
COFFEE WITH "THE USUAL SUSPECTS" 
-------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C/NF) A/S Gordon and A/S Gottemoeller exchanged 
post-Moscow Summit views with Baltic, Czech and Polish 
representatives at NATO.  Lithuanian Permanent Representative 
(PermRep) Linkevicius thanked them for the "special 
treatment" of the meeting. Describing Baltic "vigilance" on 
NATO-Russia issues, Linkevicius recounted evidence of Russian 
"negativity and unreliability" in recent months, notably its 
August 2008 invasion of Georgia. 
 
4.  (C/NF) The situation was getting worse, he added, with an 
ongoing military build-up in the sub-Caucasus, which he 
characterized as Russia "fixing a new status quo" which it 
would then push others to accept as a fait accompli.  This 
pressure would take the form of NATO and others being asked 
to "face reality"; if interlocutors accepted the new status 
quo, it would be followed by further provocations and future 
rounds of "reality-facing."  At Corfu, he added, some Allies 
were espousing the "face reality" line, but Lithuania and 
others in the room disagreed. 
 
5.  (C/NF) Linkevicius emphasized the trust which the Baltic 
states had for the U.S. -- if it hadn't been for the USG, 
none of them would have been able to join NATO -- but 
continued his negative assessment of Russia's motivations and 
actions.  Russia's Ambassador to NATO Rogozin seemed at times 
to be "laughing at" NATO, and was working to divide Allies. 
It troubled Linkevicius that we as Allies sometimes seemed to 
be making it easy for the Russians.  In A/S Gordon's 
discussion to the NAC earlier that morning on 
military-to-military cooperation, for example, he had cited 
peacekeeping cooperation as a possibility.  The problem as 
Linkevicius saw it was that Russia's philosophy of 
"peacekeeping" was arguably not congruent with the NATO 
version.  He closed by urging NATO to stick with 
previously-agreed decisions on Russia. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
GORDON: SOBER REALISM IN ORDER, BUT RESULTS POSITIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
6.  (C/NF) A/S Gordon responded that he did not want to 
overstate success in Moscow.  Recent Russian actions 
vis-a-vis Georgia with the OSCE and UN missions, as well as 
continuing questions about domestic democracy, couldn't be 
papered over.  That said, the degree of success achieved in 
Moscow was surprising, given the level of "testing" to which 
Moscow had subjected Washington in recent months.  In 
addition, the Russians had not shown any flexibility toward 
security cooperation with NATO, yet had been surprisingly 
open with the U.S. - possibly indicating a Russian desire for 
Summit success.  In any event, Gordon believed that U.S. 
unwillingness to cave on issues ahead of the Summit had 
delivered positive results. 
 
USNATO 00000302  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
MEDVEDEV-PUTIN:  GOOD COP-BAD COP? 
---------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C/NF) Estonia's PermRep Luik picked up on a "dual-track" 
theme of seeking common ground with the Russians while not 
hesitating to disagree on important issues.  He added that 
the Baltic states "fully trusted" the U.S. to pursue both 
tracks in a credible manner.  Luik asked how, given the 
importance of sending clear signals to Russia, NATO could 
pro-actively help Georgia.  Perhaps a non-recognition policy 
toward the regimes controlling South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
could help, along with possible sanctions.  The Estonian fear 
was that any concessions made to the U.S. and/or NATO by 
Medvedev would somehow be quashed or subverted by Putin.  FM 
Lavrov, meanwhile, was walking an extremely fine line between 
the two leaders, a point with which A/S Gottemoeller agreed. 
 
8.  (C/NF) A/S Gordon said that the situation in Georgia was 
doubly unfortunate:  The removal of the OSCE and UN missions 
not only meant the loss of objective eyes on the ground, but 
also lowered Georgia's international profile as a conflict 
zone.  Allies needed to find new and creative ways to keep 
this conflict in public view.  The U.S. has been consistent 
on Georgia, including through its firm stances on the OSCE 
and UN missions, consistent support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity, the recent launch of the US-Georgia Charter on 
Strategic Partnership, visits by A/S Gordon and (soon) Vice 
President Biden, and $1 billion in U.S. assistance.  The 
whole Medvedev-Putin dynamic was fascinating, and contained 
elements of good cop-bad cop.  To demonstrate USG priorities, 
though, Gordon compared the amount of time the two Russian 
leaders got with President Obama at the Summit:  Medvedev, 
President Obama's acknowledged counterpart, had a 4.5 hour 
state lunch, two one-on-one sessions, and a major press 
conference.  Putin, by contrast, only had a private 
breakfast.  Russian cooperation, he added, seemed to be 
driven by their desire to be players in, e.g., Afghanistan. 
 
9.  (C/NF) A/S Gottemoeller added that the Russians in 
START-follow-on negotiations had been playing a delicate 
game.  Her counterparts in the initial negotiations in Rome, 
which began April 24, had clearly lacked authority to make 
decisions; yet as the Summit grew closer and pressure built, 
they became more proactive.  For example, the Joint 
Understanding which Presidents Obama and Medvedev had agreed 
to sign at the Summit had remained vague and general at 
Russian insistence as late as three days before the Summit. 
Following Russian MFA consultations with Medvedev, however, 
numbers had been inserted and a detailed and specific set of 
commitments had emerged.  She added that the Medvedev/Putin 
relationship was a horse we couldn't ride from outside, but 
that we needed to steer as best we could.  She also noted 
that Russia's economic and business elites were displaying 
increasing frustration with Putin.  They had come extremely 
close to a WTO agreement, for example, which Putin had 
torpedoed at a crucial moment. 
 
10.  (C/NF) A/S Gordon added that Putin's main message in the 
Obama breakfast was the same "Soviet narrative of the last 20 
years" with which he had been lecturing us for years: USG 
hubris had led to an unbalanced security situation in Europe, 
with different classes of security citizenship.  When 
Linkevicius quoted Russian media reports that President Obama 
had said he would discuss serious issues with Putin and 
non-controversial items with Medvedev, both Assistant 
Secretaries doubted strongly that anything like that had been 
said to the notoriously inventive Russian media. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
CZECHS ON MD: IF YOU DON'T LIKE PARLIAMENT, WAIT FOR NEXT ONE 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
11.  (C/NF) Czech charge Borkovec said that NATO had been in 
the uncomfortable position at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
 
USNATO 00000302  003 OF 004 
 
 
meeting in Corfu of appearing to be demandeurs.  He described 
this as a time-tested Russian tactic, and one which they were 
attempting to use to divide Allies over Georgia.  Borkovec 
then turned to missile defense (MD), and surprisingly 
outlined a timetable for Czech ratification of their two 
MD-related treaties:  The current "temporary" government 
would likely be replaced during the elections scheduled for 
early October, after which the Czech parliament would follow 
the course of the Senate and ratify both treaties by early 
2010, if not later this year.  He followed these 
prognostications with two questions: Did the U.S. have a 
timeline for its cooperative MD threat assessment with the 
Russians as discussed in Moscow, and did we have any opinion 
on the hard line Lavrov had taken in Corfu, linking START 
follow-on chances to the proposed MD European Site? 
 
12.  (C/NF) A/S Gottemoeller replied that the technical 
threat assessment on MD would be in the hands of 
newly-confirmed Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security Ellen Tauscher, and on the Russian 
side those of Deputy FM Sergey Ryabkov.  U/S Tauscher had 
tried to contact Ryabkov following her June 27 confirmation, 
hoping to get the assessment started before the end of July. 
A/S Gottemoeller was able to pass that message to her 
counterpart, Russian post-START negotiator Anatoly Antonov, 
the day before (July 7) in Moscow.  Regarding the question on 
Lavrov's linkage of offense and defense, A/S Gordon noted the 
different stances Russia had taken with NATO in Corfu and 
with the U.S. in Moscow. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
LATVIA: NAC COULD DEVOLVE TO "NATO CAUCUS AT NRC" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
13.  (C/NF) Latvian PermRep Eichmanis repeated that the 
Russians were able to paint NATO as demandeurs, and described 
it as a Russian advantage that made "the usual suspects" 
extremely uncomfortable.  NATO is also in a "reset" situation 
vis--vis Russia; but if the Alliance continues to allow 
Russia to set the rules of the game piecemeal, we would 
remain divided and would run the risk that the NAC could wind 
up as the "NATO Caucus at the NRC."  He drew a parallel with 
Russian tactics in commercial negotiations.  In negotiating 
energy deals with, e.g., Shell or BP, the Russians would ooze 
cooperation during the first, competitive round of 
negotiations.  Once the second round began with a specific 
bidder, however, Russia's cut suddenly became 55 percent, and 
its negotiating "partner" was now staring at a choice between 
accepting 45 percent or calling off the whole process and 
shouldering the blame for failure. 
 
14.  (C/NF) Poland's deputy PermRep Bugajski made two 
specific points:  First, that Poland appreciated the 
statement made by Madeleine Albright at the Strategic Concept 
conference in Brussels the day before (July 7) -- that it was 
important to focus on the positive when dealing with Russia, 
but also important not to avoid disagreements.  Secondly, as 
others had noted, avoiding demandeur status was important. 
Poland could go along with the two-track approach to dealing 
with the Russians, as long as that process involved periodic 
assessments of how cooperation was proceeding.  Finally, he 
had two questions -- how prominently did Georgia's security 
feature in the Moscow Summit agenda; and he asked A/S 
Gottemoeller to expand on the link between offensive and 
defensive systems contained in the Joint Understanding on 
seeking reductions in strategic offensive systems. 
 
15.  (C/NF) A/S Gordon answered the first question by quoting 
President Obama's commitment to Georgia's sovereign 
integrity.  He also noted the President's requests to both 
the Georgians and Russians to avoid provocative actions.  A/S 
Gottemoeller fielded the second question by explaining that 
the language in paragraph 5 of the Joint Understanding 
linking strategic offense and strategic defense was the same 
preambular language contained in START 1, the ABM Treaty, 
President Bush's remarks in May 2001, etc.  No ground had 
 
USNATO 00000302  004 OF 004 
 
 
been broken by a preambular linking of offensive and 
defensive strategic systems in Moscow. 
DAALDER