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Viewing cable 09NICOSIA457, CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF CALLS LAST QUARTER 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NICOSIA457 2009-07-13 09:47 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0457/01 1940947
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130947Z JUL 09 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9995
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1490
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: UNFICYP CHIEF CALLS LAST QUARTER 2009 
"MOST CRITICAL" TO PROCESS 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 402 
     B. JUNE 12 PANICO-FITZPATRICK E-MAIL 
     C. NICOSIA 438 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4b and 1.4d 
 
1. (C) Summary: "We could reach irreversibility if the 
parties can identify areas of give and take in the last three 
months of the year," UNSG Special Representative Taye 
Zerihoun told Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza on 
June 29. Zerihoun, who noted tangible improvement in 
atmospherics, said that the sides had to focus on territory, 
property, and security/guarantees during the second reading 
(preferably in September) in order to engage in the 
horse-trading that hopefully might start in 4th quarter 2009, 
"the key months" according to him. Zerihoun said that both 
leaders clearly wanted to strike a deal, but, in a personal 
aside, noted that each still had to arrive at a definition of 
what exactly a deal entailed. In a clear contradiction of the 
position of UNSG Special Adviser Alexander Downer, Zerihoun 
welcomed a US Special Envoy provided the appointment came 
during the "give and take" phase, did not spook the Greek 
Cypriots (G/C), and played a role complementary to the UN, 
such as a conduit for "brainstorming" and providing 
"experts." He welcomed both the agreement to open the 
Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, as well as the USG 
financial contribution necessary for the full operation of 
the crossing. Regarding Turkey, Zerihoun said he had no doubt 
that Ankara had every reason and incentive to solve the 
problem but, at times, "still thinks like an empire." For his 
part, DAS Bryza applauded the work of UNFICYP and the Good 
Offices Mission, and said that the US wanted to help the 
process with the possible appointment of an envoy, not get in 
the way or compete with the UN. He also said that the US 
consistently used its own good offices with all the parties, 
including Ankara, to push the compromise and flexibility 
needed to reach a mutually-acceptable solution. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Zerihoun: 4th Quarter 2009 "Most Critical Moment" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C) UNSG SR Taye Zerihoun dubbed the last three months of 
2009 "the most critical phase" when the sides, he hoped, 
would be able to enter the crucial "give and take" stage: the 
actual negotiation requiring compromise and sacrifice among 
the various chapters.  To get there, however, both leaders 
needed, in the yet to commence second reading, to identify 
clear areas of "trade off" in three crucial areas: territory; 
property; security. These chapters, he hinted, could be 
bargained against other competencies. Timewise, the leaders 
would need to build on the present improved climate and 
quickly wrap up the first reading of security/guarantees, set 
to begin July 9 and the last of the six chapters, before the 
summer doldrums of August. Zerihoun said that the second 
reading possibly could take place in September, though he 
hoped, in the meantime, that the sides--possibly at the level 
of the Leaders' representatives George Iacovou and Ozdil 
Nami--could take another quick look at property, security, 
and guarantees before then. (Note: In the June 30 meeting 
with DAS Bryza, President Demetris Christofias mentioned a 
"third reading." We have not heard that before from anyone. 
End Note) 
 
3. (C) Zerihoun then gave a tour d'horizon of the six 
negotiating chapters (five of which had already been taken 
up). He noted that the progress had been uneven. 
 
--Governance: Lots of work completed, with decent convergence 
on the legislature and judiciary. Main sticking point is the 
executive (power sharing and the origin of legitimacy for the 
post-solution state) 
 
--Property: "Nowhere" in his words. Derailed by the European 
Court of Justice ruling on the Orams Case and the passions 
and tensions around it. 
 
--EU Matters: Discussed at length with many areas of 
convergence as well as some non-convergence; 
 
--Economy: Similar to the EU Chapter in terms of agreement 
and disagreement; 
 
--Territory: Low expectations in the first reading, though 
nevertheless difficult. G/Cs tried to extract as many details 
as possible despite the mutual agreement not to exchange 
maps. "The Greek Cypriots presented a map without a map," he 
joked. T/Cs don't want to solve one (G/C) problem, the return 
 
of IDPs, and create another (T/C) problem: the inability to 
house those who must relocate. 
 
--Security/Guarantees: Hope is to finish first reading as 
quickly as possible once the first reading commences on July 
9. Need to reexamine Annan Plan format to determine whether 
present "2 UN" format is applicable given that the chapter 
deals with the guarantor powers as well. Need to determine 
when guarantors need to engage. 
 
4. (C) Zerihoun said that the talks might enter a phase of 
"irreversibility" during the "give and take" phase if the 
sides could identify areas of "trade off", especially dealing 
with property, territory, and security/guarantees. He was 
quick to point out, however, that was not the case at 
present. (Note: After the July 2 Leaders' Meeting, Zerihoun 
announced the following mutually-agreed calendar of future 
meetings through Oct. 2: July 9,17,23,30; August 6; September 
3,10,17; October 2. The meetings will be interrupted by the 
sacrosanct August vacation period and UNGA, though Iacovou 
and Nami will reportedly continue to work. End Note) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
"Christofias and Talat see each other as best partners, 
but..." 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
5. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's question about the linked 
political fates of Christofias and Talat (a favorite line of 
SA Downer), Zerihoun responded that it was a "tough" 
question, noting that, at the very least, their political 
agendas were intertwined. He added, however, that Christofias 
and Talat saw each other as the best partner with whom to 
strike a deal and that the possible election of a hard-line 
T/C leader in April 2010, namely "TRNC PM" and National Unity 
Party (UBP) leader Dervish Eroglu, certainly would complicate 
the negotiations. He also had no doubt in their sincere 
desire for peace. That said, Zerihoun noted, albeit as a 
personal observation, that it seemed as if neither man had 
"sorted out" exactly what a solution meant as the sum of its 
parts. The Greek Cypriots, he said, were obsessed by a 
perceived T/C plot to come together only then to pull apart, 
this time with recognition. For their part, the T/Cs had a 
"limited capability" to think broadly about political 
equality and were obsessed with their numerical status as a 
community and the need to translate that, in certain areas, 
into numerical equality. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Appointing an Envoy: "Matter of Timing" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Zerihoun clearly was more receptive to the possible 
appointment of a US Special Envoy for Cyprus than, per REF A, 
UNSG SA Downer, in response to DAS Bryza's question regarding 
the efficacy of such an appointment in the context of 
"Cypriot-driven" solution.  Drawing on his past UN 
experience, especially in Mozambique, Zerihoun thought that 
the appointment of an envoy would be "very useful" and would 
help draw world attention to the on-going process and serve 
as a source of expert advice and ideas. 
 
7. (C) He warned, however, that such an appointment should 
come no earlier than after the first reading or, better yet, 
during the "give and take" period, in order to prevent the 
sides from blaming an envoy for their own intransigence. He 
also said that a "representative" group of envoys from 
interested countries would be beneficial so as to present a 
"united front" (provided of course the envoys agreed on basic 
principles) and not to spook the Greek Cypriots, whom he said 
otherwise were "allergic" to the idea. He was quick to point 
out, however, that the G/Cs sought closer contact with the 
US. DAS Bryza said that any US Envoy would work to complement 
the UN's efforts and supported the idea of an envoy as a 
"brainstorming center." He added, to which Zerihoun agreed, 
that, regarding the appointment of an envoy, it was probably 
best to wait and see if September brought the all-important 
"give and take" period. Ambassador Urbancic added that the US 
recognized it should not "surprise" the UN if it did decide 
to go forward with appointment of an envoy. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
"G/Cs called Turkish Army Bluff on Limnitis" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Zerihoun 
said that the sides were able to agree, after 15 months of 
haggling, to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point 
 
because it had become--unfortunately--"too big to be left 
unresolved." He said that the G/Cs had "made the necessary 
compromises" and had "called the bluff" (without going into 
detail) of the Turkish Army.  He welcomed DAS Bryza's 
announcement that the USG was willing to help out financially 
to upgrade the existing road necessary to open the 
checkpoint, and said that the T/C side of the road should be 
completed first, before the portion in the buffer zone (Note: 
The G/C side up to buffer zone is intact, but an additional 2 
km in the buffer zone and 4 km on the T/C side need to be 
repaired. End Note) Zerihoun noted that the Turkish Cypriots 
would accept G/C funds if they were "laundered" first through 
UNDP. He also said that ambulances could presently use the 
crossing in the event of an emergency. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
"No Doubt Turkey has every reason to solve..." 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's question regarding the 
blowback to Turkey's EU Accession Bid from a possible setback 
or stalemate in the process and, consequently, the wisdom of 
revisiting an initiative like the Finnish 2006 EU Presidency 
deal on Varosha/Famagusta, Zerihoun avo)DeQ !dQb!@t`*BsEb(QQQb1d Lg0d tQ`0bQd(TUb+dq`*d Aa0b1Q (` gn  rE`3Nfd+ bEQ 
#MfQd2Tc0h2D&H!sAh tQ`0pQe BcA #l!Ar(h @e(h!TeQ )D Qf1LdQ 
beb1dcEd n"`Qf ht""@cQl)daTe  !Ld b#M`%b!TeQ 3HtH" D`QQQQpPg#dsQ& H!a d!D$h#TeQd2Q Q`!d Q`! GPe!j Aq0b!LtQ *DeQd tMQ 
gEd NvEb d E $`#T 4h!T 4h!H Qd2D Q 3DrAt!f!Aa(l9d!b3QQQh)@gQd!ltf!daMf d`Af D1PcQh*RAf!@dQn# TUb+dqQ (d Ha$ "MQQ 
 Lu d T`Qd @fIa2@ Ha  "Ev!b9r!`3Lf`*D Qf#dfTa2d"t) 3Md0dQQQQHQBG@ "DtQ 1nfMb0dbAd!l1Q !d Tad3"Qd)Ldd(hbIc l!Ie `*QQd)PaQd"aQd  cQe3 sQa0 bUt0n"Q"d#pQd3B Qt#aPb D`E Q.QQ!(QQQ@Q *LtQd(fb dpQd0LaQ 0D#Ef4 3Ta0d)Dfpb @qD1@cIc( EU QhaEfQQQLe!o0HaQn2EEd)dfB!faQ 2dcAb h"E Qh!eQh3TeQb! gQ "DwMQQ 
3Ta0d3 )n T`! )@dQf aQ "daLg `aPt)bqLa0l9uQh!LpQd(Q DAQQQQB2HrA (n0Ddd @tf(HdQ 
0heDQF Qg1l f/d Ig(n2D 4h!pb3HbLdQQQPa3j Mf `*AQj!@a@2Ntc+L%In dcEd "pPa)n UrQb#Q$h0wd(dQ 
!@pQf!b`t(d Is1d!s) !P Qn0tM (hfDe2 cP  h3TrQb0 from the 
on-going UN-brokered peace process. 
 
This cable has been cleared by DAS Bryza. 
Urbancic