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Viewing cable 09NICOSIA456, CYPRUS: GREEK CYPRIOTS EXPRESS GUARDED OPTIMISM ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NICOSIA456 2009-07-13 07:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO6538
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0456/01 1940716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130716Z JUL 09 ZDK DUE TO NUMEROUS SERVICES
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9991
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1486
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GREEK CYPRIOTS EXPRESS GUARDED OPTIMISM ON 
PEACE TALKS WITH DAS BRYZA 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 379 
     B. NICOSIA 402 
     C. NICOSIA 438 
 
NICOSIA 00000456  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR FRANK C. URBANCIC FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND 1.4 
 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: A wide-range of Greek Cypriot (G/C) 
interlocutors expressed guarded optimism, tempered by an 
understanding of the problems going forward, in the on-going 
UN-brokered peace process to EUR DAS Matthew Bryza during his 
June 29-30 visit to Cyprus. President Demetris Christofias 
was careful to dampen expectations for success, though 
clearly hinted at the possibility of substantial progress: "I 
am not so optimistic given the work that remains...perhaps 
during the  given and take, sessions we can close the 
gaps." Former FM and lead negotiator George Iacovou claimed 
that the Turkish Cypriots were tabling confederal, vice 
federal, proposals, but nevertheless was committed to pushing 
forward to find common ground.  Main opposition Democratic 
Rally (DISY) Leader Nicos Anastassiades repeated his strong 
support for Christofias' negotiating efforts and, alone among 
Greek Cypriot politicians, supported the appointment of a US 
Cyprus envoy. With his back against the wall because of his 
hard-nosed nationalist base, Foreign Minister Marcos 
Kyprianou admitted that Turkey would not block a solution and 
thus urged Turkish Cypriot (T/C) Leader Mehmet Ali Talat "to 
take a gamble" at the negotiating table. House Speaker Marios 
Garoyian, on the other hand, saw Ankara's bale influence 
behind every T/C proposal and urged Bryza to "pressure" 
Turkey. For his part, Bryza voiced strong US support for the 
efforts of the two leaders to craft a "Cypriot Solution", 
while offering support when, and if, the call came. He said 
that the USG would use its good offices with all parties, 
including with Ankara, to encourage flexibility and 
compromise, and believed Turkey was committed to the present 
process. Regarding the possible appointment of a US Cyprus 
envoy, he said that if such a request came, the US would work 
with the leaders and the UN . End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Christofias: "Too Early to Make Final Assessment" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (C) Christofias provided Bryza a detailed description of 
the reunification talks, including a synopsis of each of the 
chapters that he and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali 
Talat, had discussed. He told Bryza that while "substantial 
differences" remained, it was still "too early to make a 
final assessment", noting that the all important "give and 
take" phase had not even begun. As is customary, he repledged 
his full efforts to find a solution to division of the 
island. The Cypriot President was clearly upbeat over the 
June 26 announcement to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing 
point and joked that, no matter what language Bryza used to 
call the opening, Turkish or Greek, the most important point 
was the opening itself. 
 
3. (C) On governance, Christofias noted that the two sides 
continue to disagree on how to elect the reunited nation,s 
president and vice-president. The Greek Cypriot (G/C) 
position is that there should be direct voting for both, 
ideally with a single ticket for both positions, allowing, 
however, for weighted Turkish Cypriot voting. In addition, 
Christofias says he offered Talat a guarantee that on 
substantive issues (those effecting "minority rights and 
protections") the T/Cs would have an effective veto. The T/C 
proposal, a presidential council having 4 G/Cs and 3 T/Cs 
with a yearly rotating presidency, "is simply not 
functional," according to Christofias. 
 
4. (C) "The property issue is very difficult," Christofias 
said. Although both sides agree that the pre-1974 
title-holders are the "real owners" of the property, Talat 
wants current occupants to have the right of first refusal as 
to whether they stay or receive compensation, while 
Christofias insists that the "real owners" get to make that 
decision. (Note: Talat worries that an influx of G/Cs who 
forgo compensation and reclaim property will dilute T/C 
"bizonality" and rob them of effective political control. End 
Note.) Similarly, on the economy, Christofias reported that 
Talat insists on, effectively, two economies, with parallel 
institutions controlling economic matters in the separate 
constituent states. Christofias argued that, not only is this 
inefficient, especially for a small island, but effectively 
impossible within the EU. He also said that Talat,s position 
was more hard-line that that of T/C negotiators within the 
 
NICOSIA 00000456  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
economic working group. 
 
5. (C) Territory is also "very nettlesome," Christofias 
reported. No maps have been exchanged, because the T/C side 
refuses to do so at this stage, but the proposed T/C criteria 
are indicative of future problems. Both sides believe that 
they are protecting humanitarian concerns in this regard, 
with Talat arguing that the fewest number of T/Cs should be 
forced to move again and that persons who have resided in the 
north (from Turkey) for decades should not be forced to 
leave. Christofias noted his "courageous" agreement to allow 
50,000 "settlers" to remain (Note: The 2004 Annan Plan 
allowed 45,000 End Note).  He also said that the human right 
of G/C refugees to go home must be respected. 
 
6. (C) Remaining to be discussed are "Turkish red-lines," 
especially the Treaty of Guarantee. Christofias joked that, 
even though he,s a communist, he dislikes "red" lines and 
believes that, once you begin negotiating, such conditions 
shouldn,t exist. He also argued that Cyprus has changed 
since the Treaty of Guarantee was signed in 1960: "We,re 
more mature; partly because of our tragedies."  Therefore, he 
argued, there is no longer any need for such guarantees from 
outside powers: "EU members don,t need outside guardians, 
they (the guarantors) have harmed us enough." 
 
7. (C) Bryza asked about the timing for concluding the talks. 
Christofias acknowledged that "natural time frames" exist, 
but underscored that Turkey has to help itself by recognizing 
the RoC, opening its ports to Cypriot ships, and meeting its 
obligations to the EU.  He made clear that he feels no 
pressure to help Turkey by speeding up the talks, "It,s not 
up to me, but to Turkey," but added that he supports Turkish 
accession to the EU.  In the same vein, he noted that Talat 
has reminded him that the T/C elections for "TRNC President" 
will be next April. Christofias responded that, while he has 
only one goal, "reunification," he told Talat "to have Turkey 
help him get reelected." He recognizes that he does not have 
the same "restrictions" as Talat, but said he believes that 
if Cypriots make a decision on the island,s future, "Turkey 
would not dare stand in the way because of international 
pressure." 
 
8. (C) When asked about whether a referendum was required 
instead of a decision by parliament or the government, 
Christofias said that while "people trust the negotiator 
(meaning himself) they have low expectations for a solution." 
Despite this, he believes that all the major parties would 
have no choice but to support a settlement if he asked them, 
thanks to "the popularity of Christofias," provided, of 
course, it is a Cypriot solution, "even one not completely 
satisfactory." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Iacovou: "T/Cs never refer to 'Federal state'" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
9. (C) G/C lead negotiator and former FM George Iacovou, who 
claimed that the Turkish Cypriots were tabling confederal 
schemes in almost all of their proposals, was nevertheless 
committed to the success of the present negotiations. "The 
T/Cs never refer to the 'Federal state'", he claimed, arguing 
that they wanted to create a new Cyprus where the inhabitants 
of the constituent states could live their entire lives 
without having even minimal contact with the federal 
government. Proof positive of this were the Turkish Cypriots' 
"completely unworkable proposals (on EU matters)," which, he 
said, the G/Cs nevertheless accepted. "We went along," he 
said, knowing that the end result of requiring consensus 
would be "a disaster" that would silence Cyprus in Brussels. 
He dubbed the chapter on the "Economy" a "disappointment," 
since a 15-page Working Group paper ballooned to seventy-one, 
with even more disagreement introduced. In short, he said 
that the leaders had achieved less convergence than at the 
Working Group level. He opined that the Turkish/Turkish 
Cypriot strategy was to stick to maximalist positions in the 
hope that future arbitration imposed from the outside would 
split the difference. 
 
10. (C) Iacovou said that the key issues of territory, 
property, and security/guarantees were all interconnected by 
the common thread of "settlers", G/C shorthand for anyone who 
entered Northern Cyprus post-July 1974 in a status not 
regulated by the RoC. He said that the Greek Cypriots wanted 
as many G/Cs as possible to return to the north under G/C 
administration. This desire, however, ran up against Turkish 
Cypriot claims that "facts on the ground" had changed 
 
NICOSIA 00000456  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
post-Annan, and that there was simply no room left to 
relocate Turkish Cypriots.  Christofias, he said, joked that 
to appease the T/Cs on territory he would have to give them 
"Varosha and Larnaca." (Note: Varosha is an abandoned city 
that, under UNSC Resolution 550 (1984), should be, 
pre-settlment, returned to UN control, and under the Annan 
Plan would have been one of first areas transferred to G/C 
administration. Larnaca is a large G/C city on the south 
coast. End Note.) He also said that the T/C refusal to allow 
the original property owners the right of first refusal (the 
G/C proposal) was not sustainable given the fact that neither 
the Turkish Cypriots nor the International Community had 
anywhere near the Euro 30 billion (his estimate) needed to 
compensate the original owners. 
 
11. (C) Despite his often gloomy accounting, Iacovou said 
that he was the "wrong guy" to be negative when asked by 
Bryza if he was "optimistic". He said he was going to "keep 
at it" until the end, and added that the sides had worked out 
some real bridging proposals, such as crafting a deadlock 
breaking mechanism in the judiciary. He also was clearly 
proud of the deal to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing 
point, and promised to make sure that all G/C obligations 
related to its future operation would be carried out in short 
order. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Main Opposition DISY: Continued support for Solution 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
12. (C) The leader of the pro-solution, main opposition 
Democratic Rally (DISY) Party, Nicos Anastassiades, confirmed 
to Bryza that he supports Christofias in his negotiation 
efforts and would back a "yes" vote in a referendum, just as 
the party supported the 2004 Annan Plan. Alone among the G/C 
interlocutors, only Anastassiades supported a US Cyprus 
envoy.  He said that such an envoy would be useful for 
"external issues," namely, dealing with Turkey, and for 
providing ideas during the negotiations end game to bridge 
final differences. He believed such an arbitration mechanism 
would be necessary to break final deadlocks, and that such a 
mechanism must appear unobtrusive, to contrast with the UN's 
previous efforts to force compromises on the G/Cs at the end 
of the Annan Plan process. Anastassiades, like all other G/C 
interlocutors, did not favor any further confidence building 
measures post-Limnitis/Yesilirmak. He pointed out that 
although the agreement on Limnitis/Yesilirmak produced a 
success, it robbed the talks of momentum for at least a month 
while the deal was hammered out. Furthermore, neither party, 
he argued, would be ready in the future to make any serious 
concessions on tangential issues since the end game of the 
talks is approaching. 
 
13. (C) Although not "Turkey-phobic," and even eager to meet 
with Turkish PM Erdogan, Anastassiades argued that the 
Turkish leadership nevertheless often does unhelpful things, 
such as blocking a G/C-proposed study of the state of 
abandoned Varosha's infrastructure and consistently talking 
about a negotiated Cyprus outcome that results in two states. 
Such statements, he argued, would make it harder to sell a 
solution by giving hard-liners a reason to say Turkey will 
seek a say in the future of both constituent states. On the 
other hand, the DISY leader was critical of his own 
government,s foreign minister for saying that negotiations 
would not be completed by January. Anastassiades noted that 
as a result of the Annan plan, "arbitration has been 
demonized." Nevertheless, the International Community needed 
an acceptable mechanism to provide "food for thought" to the 
negotiators. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
FM Kyprianou: "Turkey will not block a solution" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
14. (C) Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou was surprisingly 
sanguine about Turkey, arguing that it will not "block a 
solution" to the Cyprus Problem if one is hammered out and 
that, consequently, "Talat should take a gamble" in his 
negotiating strategy.  He complained that the T/Cs have made 
no public gestures to help change G/C public opinion, while 
noting that the G/Cs "have made all the concessions."  The 
USG should pressure Turkey to be more flexible on 
Cyprus-related matters to help speed the process along. 
 
15. (C) On non-CYPROB issues, Kyprianou was critical of the 
US stance on Abkhazia, arguing that since "the US chose 
independence for Kosovo," it had to live with the Russian 
 
NICOSIA 00000456  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
action in Georgia. Either way, he argued, Cyprus is confident 
of the "justice of its own position (non-recognition of 
breakaway states)." He was also critical of the T/C 
negotiating approach, arguing that the Turkish Cypriots are 
even trying "to move away from Annan."  Kyprianou argued that 
Christofias was surprised at the "harder line" taken by Talat 
which, he claimed, frustrated the President. "If they 
continue to take this approach, we cannot achieve an 
agreement this year. Even simple issues have become huge 
topics," he complained.  He blamed the harder line on the 
T/C,s failure to "move on from the 1960s," i.e. think 
supra-nationally as EU citizens, and not only as members of 
the Turkish Cypriot community. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
House Speaker Garoyian: Turkey, Turkey, Turkey! 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
16. (C) Only House President and leader of the 
solution-skeptial Democratic Party (DIKO) Marios Garoyian 
told DAS Bryza that he was simply "not optimistic" over the 
fate of the negotiations in spite of his support for the 
President, whom, he contends "is acting in good faith." 
Garoyian argued that the Turkish Cypriots interpret the 
federal basis for the talks as confederal: "If we have two 
interpretations of one principle, where will we arrive at the 
end?" 
 
17. (C) In fact, the key to a solution on all issues is 
Ankara, Garoyian contended. Although pleased with the 
announcement to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point, 
he blamed the Turkish military--and the inability of T/C 
leader Talat to influence it--for the fifteen month delay in 
the opening. Repeating the familiar refrain that "if left 
alone to our own devices, I,m sure that Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots would solve this problem by themselves," Garoyian 
stressed that Turkey was in the driver,s seat, and the US, 
as the only state able to pressure Turkey, has a crucial role 
to play in this regard. 
 
18. (C) In response, DAS Bryza noted that the US shares a 
"complex and difficult" relationship with Turkey and does not 
enjoy much, if any, leverage over Ankara, aside from our good 
offices.  That said, Bryza noted that former FM Babacan and 
FM Davutoglu have both lived up to their pledges on Cyprus 
and appeared to give the Turkish Cypriots enough room to 
negotiate on all issues, except security/guarantees, where 
Turkey, by international treaty, has its own interests. 
Turkey does, Bryza underscored, want the Cyprus issue 
resolved. In response to Garoyian's question about leveraging 
Turkey's EU Accession, Bryza noted that Turkish enthusiasm 
for the EU, while still substantial, had waned primarily 
because "the Turks are tired of being lectured to." 
Bilaterally, Garoyian welcomed Bryza's call to strengthen the 
"profound" US-Cyprus relationship.  He declared that the 
political will certainly exists in Cyprus to engage more 
deeply with the US, though admitted this had not always been 
the case in the past.  He expressed a particular interest in 
increasing contact between the Cypriot and US legislatures, 
and extended an open invitation to US Congressional visitors, 
including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. 
 
This cable has been cleared by DAS Bryza. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbancic