O 010116Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4946
INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC
AIT TAIPEI 7336
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001826 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, ISN. JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2034 
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS CH TW
SUBJECT: 2009 U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONSULTATIVE TALKS (DCT), 
SESSION 3: ADVANCING THE DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR POLICY AND 
STRATEGY 
 
Classified By: Classified by ADCM William Weinstein.  Reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  During a discussion on advancing the U.S.-PRC 
Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and Strategy as part of the 10th 
U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks (DCT), Lieutenant 
General Ma Xiaotian responded to a U.S. presentation on the 
Defense Department's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and START Follow-on 
negotiations and questions about China's own nuclear program, 
by explaining that China's nuclear posture has always been 
defensive in nature, but that in order to preserve its 
nuclear deterrent, China cannot be completely transparent. 
LTG Ma noted that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
does not preclude it from modernizing its nuclear arsenal 
technologically, but that the modernization does not imply 
any change in three of the four stages of China's strategic 
intentions.  PRC experts believe that U.S. missile defenses 
have offensive applications, such as anti-satellite weapons, 
LTC Ma stated.  In response to Michele Flournoy's, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), request to move 
forward on the next round of the U.S.-PRC Dialogue on Nuclear 
Policy and Strategy, LTG Ma replied that several obstacles, 
including China's alleged status as nuclear strike target in 
the 2002 NPR and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, have complicated 
the possibility for substantive exchanges.  Ma pressed the 
U.S. and Russia to lead in arms reductions.  End Summary 
 
U.S. Presentations 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (C)  USDP opened the session on Nuclear Policy and 
Strategy by noting that in a spirit of openness the United 
States wished to share with China the basic direction of the 
Defense Department's nuclear and strategic reviews currently 
in progress.  She added that the United States hopes that 
this would contribute to advancing the U.S.-PRC Dialogue on 
Nuclear Policy and Strategy begun in April 2008.  Dr. John 
Plumb, Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Director 
for Nuclear and Missile Defense, briefed on developments 
related to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 
United States (SPC); START Follow-on negotiations with 
Russia; and the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 
 Dr. Plumb emphasized that the U.S. seeks to reduce the role 
of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, take 
concrete steps toward the long term goal of a world without 
nuclear weapons and ensure that, as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, the U.S. maintains a safe, secure and effective 
arsenal to deter any adversary and extend deterrence to 
allies and friends. 
 
The PLA's Response 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C)  LTG Ma indicated appreciation for the brief and 
offered a presentation on China's nuclear policy.  LTG Ma 
asserted that U.S. perceptions of China's nuclear strategy 
and intentions are at times incorrect.  China's defense 
policy and nuclear posture have always been defensive in 
nature, he maintained.   China's nuclear policy was, for the 
most part, transparent, but LTG Ma suggested that China's 
intention is more important that transparency itself. 
 
¶4. (C)  Frankly speaking, there are areas of China's nuclear 
program that are not very transparent, LTG Ma continued. 
China will never enter into a nuclear arms race, therefore it 
maintains a very limited nuclear arsenal but one that is 
sufficient for its own purposes.  China had never threatened 
another country, LTG Ma claimed, and its purpose in 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal is solely for deterrence. 
Therefore China must limit transparency regarding its nuclear 
facilities, the nature of its weapons systems, and its force 
structure, he concluded. 
 
¶5. (C)  China has all along opposed nuclear proliferation 
and, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), has earnestly fulfilled its obligations, LTG Ma 
maintained.  However, a testing moratorium does not rule out 
technological advances in China's nuclear arsenal, and such 
advances do not imply any changes in China's intentions. 
Nuclear weapon states, including the United States, have all 
taken measures to continue to develop nuclear weapons 
technology, LTG Ma alleged.  As such, China's similar efforts 
should not be restricted, LTG Ma maintained.  China intends 
to keep its nuclear technology current in order to protect 
its nuclear deterrent capabilities. 
 
¶6. (C)  LTG Ma expressed concern over U.S. policy that links 
nuclear and conventional weapons, alleging that the United 
States is concurrently making efforts to reduce the size of 
nuclear weapons while increasing the size and destructive 
capabilities of conventional weapons.  LTG Ma further accused 
the U.S. of attempting to make nuclear weapons "cleaner" 
through the use of neutron bombs, while making conventional 
weapons "dirtier" through the use of depleted uranium bombs. 
LTG Ma warned that this could encourage others to follow 
suit, particularly those who were less principled or 
technologically advanced than the United States and could 
cross a dangerous threshold. 
 
¶7. (C)  LTG Ma observed that China was the only permanent 
member of the UN Security Council to commit to a no first use 
policy and to renounce the use of nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear countries and regions.  China's commitment to 
this position has never changed, LTG Ma avowed, and China has 
consistently supported a comprehensive ban on and destruction 
of all nuclear weapons.  He conceded that such an outcome 
would require arduous negotiations and was a long way away, 
but that the first step would be for all nuclear weapons 
states to adopt a similar no first use policy. 
 
¶8. (C)  China's inclusion in the 2002 NPR as one of seven 
potential targets of nuclear strike undermines trust and the 
possibility of military-to-military dialogue on nuclear 
strategy, LTG Ma relayed.  The United States can decide what 
it wants to say in its NPR, LTG Ma allowed, but added that 
China reserves the right to determine whether or not it wants 
to engage in dialogue with the U.S. on such topics. 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Turning to missile defense, LTG Ma noted that the 
U.S. had not yet responded to Russia and China's proposal to 
prevent the weaponization of outer space.  Such resistance 
naturally causes others to question U.S. intentions and 
whether the U.S. seeks to gain a comprehensive advantage in 
space.  LTG Ma added that China resolutely opposes any 
country providing missile defense to Taiwan by any means. 
 
¶10. (C)  According to LTG Ma, PRC experts believe that U.S. 
missile defenses are not entirely defensive in nature.  He 
then outlined concerns with three of four stages of missile 
defense systems, stating that only the final phase was purely 
defensive.    He noted that missile defense systems used 
airborne assets and "space weapons" to target a missile on 
ascent, which could then be attacked while it was three to 
six hundred kilometers above orbit.  Such capabilities, in 
effect, made missile defense measures an anti-satellite 
weapon, LTG Ma alleged.  USDP told Ma that the U.S. has no 
weapons in space and that the U.S. was increasingly focused 
on theater ballistic missile systems, which are purely 
defensive. 
 
China Criticizes U.S. Nuclear Policy 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C)  LTG Ma mentioned certain incidents in recent years 
that had lead China to question U.S. control mechanisms over 
its nuclear program -- particularly an incident involving 
"parts of nuclear warheads" being shipped to Taiwan and the 
nuclear weapon that was flown cross country.  He questioned 
U.S. commitment to maintaining a safe, secure arsenal.  In 
response, USDP noted subsequent corrective actions taken by 
the Secretary of Defense and the Air Force.  Ma then shifted, 
saying as the nuclear power with the largest arsenal and most 
delivery vehicles, the United States must take the lead on 
disarmament, he maintained.  China supports nuclear 
disarmament and, through negotiations, the conclusion of a 
treaty on the comprehensive ban and destruction of nuclear 
weapons, and the establishment of nuclear free zones.  It is 
the responsibility of the two countries with the largest 
nuclear arsenals to make decisive efforts, LTG Ma maintained. 
Nonetheless, China appreciates "efforts by certain 
countries" to unilaterally reduce nuclear arsenals. 
 
NPT Review Conference 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (C)  USDP asked LTG Ma how China viewed its position in 
the run up to the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty review 
conference.  The United States was discussing with Russia the 
potential for further reductions in nuclear arsenals and 
planned to submit the CTBT to the U.S. Senate for 
ratification, she advised.  This illustrates that the United 
States is committed to taking steps to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in its national security strategy and to work 
with countries like China to strengthen international 
nonproliferation regimes and IAEA safeguards.  However, she 
asked, how does China explain its investments in expanding 
and modernizing its nuclear arsenal as it heads into the NPT 
conference? 
 
¶13. (C)  LTG Ma replied that modernizing technology and 
increasing numbers were two distinct issues.  However, LTG Ma 
stated he was unprepared to reply to the question in detail 
in the DCT.  Instead, he asserted again that simply because 
China had legitimate needs to modernize its nuclear 
technology did not imply a change in intentions.  China's 
modernization of its arsenal was consistent with the goal of 
safer, more effective nuclear weapons.  In order to maintain 
its no first use policy China must be able to launch 
effective counterstrikes and therefore required modernized 
nuclear technology, LTG Ma explained.  China has exercised 
remarkable self-restraint in its nuclear deployment, he 
alleged.  In conclusion, LTG Ma noted that China welcomed 
U.S. intentions to submit the CTBT for Senate ratification. 
 
Nuclear Policy Dialogue 
----------------------- 
 
¶14. (C)  USDP noted that the first round of the U.S.-PRC 
Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and Strategy in April, 2008 had 
been productive and that the U.S. looked forward to China 
hosting the next round of discussions.  LTG Ma acknowledged 
that the dialogue could improve strategic trust and 
understanding.  In principle, he added, China supports the 
continuation of the dialogue.  However, he cautioned that 
several obstacles to its resumption remain, namely Section 
1201 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal 
year 2000 (NDAA 2000), which restricts exchanges in the 
nuclear area.  LTG Ma also cited as obstacles the 2002 NPR 
and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  These obstacles complicate 
the already fragile environment for substantive exchanges, 
LTG Ma maintained.  China hopes the U.S. will revisit its 
policies and take active measures to build a more solid 
foundation and favorable climate for future dialogues. 
 
¶15. (U)  U.S. Participants: 
 
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) 
Dan Piccuta, Charge d'Affaires 
Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(DASD) for East Asia 
David Shear, EAP/CM, Department of State 
Brig Gen Joseph Callahan, Deputy Director for 
Politico-Military Affairs - Asia, Joint Staff J5 
Brig Gen William Uhle, USPACOM Deputy J5 
RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing 
John Plumb, OSD Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy 
Craig Mullaney, OSD Principal Director for Central Asia 
Robert Gromoll Acting Director for Regional Affairs ISN, 
Department of State 
 
¶16. (U)  PRC Participants 
 
Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the PLA 
General Staff 
Major General Qian Lihua, Director, Ministry of National 
Defense Foreign Affairs Office (MND/FAO) 
Major General Yang Hui, Director, Intelligence Department, 
PLA General Staff Department 
Rear Admiral Yi Changzhi, Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy 
Major General Zhu Chenghu, Director, Department of 
International Strategic Studies, PLA National Defense 
University (NDU) 
Senior Captain Guan Youfei, Deputy Director, MND/FAO 
Senior Colonel Wang Kebin, Deputy Director, Operations 
Department, PLA General Staff Department 
Major General Zhao Ning, PRC Defense Attache in Washington 
Senior Captain Li Ji, Director, North American and Oceania 
Bureau, MND/FAO 
Councilor Ma Zhanwu, North American and Oceania Affairs, MFA 
Lieutenant Colonel Chu Weiwei, Interpreter, MND/FAO 
 
¶17. (U)  USDP has cleared this cable. 
 
 
GOLDBERG