VZCZCXRO2197
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0570/01 1570157
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060157Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000570 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UNOMIG UNSC RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA INSISTS ON NEW 'POLITICAL 
FRAMEWORK' FOR UN MISSION 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian Permrep Churkin continued to resist 
substantive negotiations, on June 5, on a draft resolution to 
extend UNOMIG beyond June 15.  Churkin insisted that Western 
partners needed to present a draft resolution within Moscow's 
preferred "political framework" before he would engage on the 
text.  He made clear that such a framework would suggest that 
the Georgia conflict is resolved and that Russia was not a 
party to it.  He said a resolution within this framework 
would also omit any reference to Georgia's territorial 
integrity and would not include Georgia within the name of 
the UN mission.  Also on June 5, Russia presented the Quad 
with a concept paper on the security regime he wants included 
in the draft resolution. Georgian Permrep Lomaia told 
Ambassador DiCarlo on June 5 that Georgia is prepared to 
withhold consent to a UN mission if a SC resolution were to 
cross Georgian redlines.  USUN will continue to engage with 
Western allies to plot a way forward, with the goal of 
achieving a substantive mandate and security regime that does 
not cross our redlines.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
Political Framework 
------------------- 
 
2, (SBU) At a meeting of Permreps/Deputy Permreps from 
Croatia, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and United 
States on June 5, Russian Permrep Vitaly Churkin continued to 
resist negotiating the text of a German draft resolution 
extending the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), 
insisting instead that the current "political framework" for 
the resolution was unacceptable.  Churkin emphasized that, 
"Moscow wants agreement on the political framework first-- if 
there is not clarity on the political framework, the rest is 
meaningless."  During the meeting, Churkin resisted defining 
what he considers to be a reasonable political framework 
since, he said, he had already shared his views with 
Ambassdor Matussek.  This statement prompted Matussek to run 
down a list of Russian concerns that included references to 
territorial integrity of Georgia, reference to Georgia in the 
name of the UN mission, language in the resolution which 
considers the conflict to be unresolved, language which 
suggests that Russia is a party to the conflict, and 
reference to a future UN presence in South Ossetia, 
references to the ICJ case or to the OSCE, and references to 
interethnic policing.  Churkin agreed that those were some, 
but not all, of the Russian concerns.  Churkin pointed out 
some paragraphs in the draft resolution that contained 
language that was unacceptable to Russia, though he still 
maintained he would not engage in detailed negotiations 
unless presented with a new draft. 
 
--------------- 
Security Regime 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Also on June 5, Russia presented to the Quad a 
concept paper on the security regime currently laid out in 
OP3 of the German draft resolution.  (USUN has passed this 
paper via email to IO/UNP.)  The security regime proposed by 
Russia differs in several respects from the SYG's 
recommendations in paragraph 65 of his May 19 report.  UN 
observers would be specifically tasked with observing 
compliance with the "Sarkozy-Medvedev" agreements of August 
12 and September 8 under the security regime.  It is not 
clear whether the ceasefire line --the Russian paper refers 
to the ceasefire line as a "border"-- would extend all the 
way along the administrative boundary to Russia, or whether 
it would extend only along the 80km ceasefire line of the 
former Moscow agreement.  The security regime does not 
include extension of the restricted weapons zones or UN 
monitoring of the Upper Kodori Valley.  Several other aspects 
of the security regime differ from the SYG's proposals. 
 
-------------- 
Georgian Views 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Separately on June 5, Ambassador DiCarlo updated 
Georgian Permrep Lomaia and Deputy Permrep Chikovani on the 
state of the negotiations.  DiCarlo reinforced that the U.S. 
was being firm, despite Russia's intransigence.  DiCarlo said 
that since we had not yet received any written proposals from 
Russia, it would be premature to judge them.  However, she 
reinforced with Lomaia that it would be in Georgia's interest 
to have a security regime with international observers on the 
ground in order to monitor and report on Russian activities 
in the conflict zone.  A continued UN mission, she said, 
would also make clear that the international community does 
not view the conflict as resolved. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000570  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Lomaia said he thought Georgia was unlikely to gain 
anything "on the ground" by having a UN mission, but could 
likely "lose something on paper." He added, "One more 
resolution that doesn't mention Georgia-- I don't think this 
is something we could live with."  He emphasized that Georgia 
intended to stick to all of the redlines that had been 
outlined in a letter to Secretary Clinton, and that had been 
reinforced by Georgia in subsequent meetings in Tbilisi, 
Washington and New York. Georgia, he said, was prepared to 
withhold consent for the mission if Georgian redlines were 
not met.  Ambassador DiCarlo told Lomaia frankly that it 
would be very difficult to get a direct reference to 
Georgia's territorial integrity in the next resolution-- one 
of Georgia's redlines-- since the last two resolutions (1839, 
1866) had only referred to Georgia's territorial integrity 
indirectly, by reference to Resolution 1808. 
 
¶6. (C) Lomaia wondered aloud whether a 6-month technical 
rollover might be an alternative to "killing the mission," 
since he thought the dynamics on the ground could change as a 
result of the developing U.S.-Russia relationship. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Permreps/Deputy Permreps from France, the U.K. and the 
U.S. plan to meet on Monday June 8 to plot a way forward, 
given significant Russian intransigence.  We will also need 
to continue to engage closely with Georgia during the coming 
days.  If we do break through the logjam with Russia and come 
to an agreement on a security regime and a mandate that does 
not cross our redlines, Georgia will need to be prepared to 
accept such an agreement. 
RICE