Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09STATE64631, ALLIANCE AND USG COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09STATE64631.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09STATE64631 2009-06-22 23:18 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State
O 222318Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 
CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO IMMEDIATE
CDR USPACOM CC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR IMMEDIATE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
S E C R E T STATE 064631 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2034 
TAGS: MARR PREL PARM KPAO KN KS JN
SUBJECT: ALLIANCE AND USG COORDINATION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATION 
 
Classified By: EAP AA/S Scot Marciel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Our embassies and military commands in the Republic 
of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the region need to work closely 
with host governments and provide consistent public messaging 
in the event of any further North Korean provocations or 
threatening actions such as missile launches, nuclear tests, 
incursions into South Korean territorial waters, maritime or 
DMZ clashes, or other potentially destabilizing or escalatory 
actions, to include a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) 
event.   The following guidance should be implemented under 
the direction of the Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo, 
and in coordination with Commander USPACOM and Commanders at 
United States Forces Korea (USFK) and United States Forces 
Japan (USFJ). 
 
2. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a North Korean provocation, 
Chiefs of Mission in Seoul and Tokyo may, if 
requested/invited, call on the Blue House/Kantei or the 
foreign ministries for discussions and to publicly exhibit 
coordination.  In the event of any such North Korean action, 
Commanders at USFK and USFJ should provide to their ROK and 
Japanese military counterparts as much real time information 
as possible about actual physical events and the actual 
responses of U.S. forces (but NOT/NOT prospective or possible 
actions or reactions). 
 
3. (S/Rel JA, KS) Either the White House or the Department of 
State may issue a public statement following a North Korean 
provocation.  Embassies should not/not release press 
statements absent guidance to do so from the Department of 
State.  Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may respond to 
on-the-record press inquiries using the pre-cleared language 
contained in para 7 at any time.  Embassies Seoul and Tokyo 
may also share the points contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 
with the ROKG and GOJ in advance of a provocation and 
recommend that the ROKG/GOJ use the same points in order to 
ensure a consistent message.  Because most actions of this 
type by North Korea are likely to occur during the day in 
Seoul and Tokyo (overnight in Washington), to ensure roll out 
of a coordinated post-provocation message, Embassies Seoul 
and Tokyo should limit their on-the-record responses to press 
inquiries using the pre-cleared language contained in 
paragraphs 8 and 9. 
 
4. (S/Rel JA, KS) In the event of a missile launch, when 
directed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(OASD) Public Affairs, and in coordination with a post-launch 
White House or State Department public statement, NORTHCOM 
will be prepared to issue a press release confirming the 
launch, as NORTHCOM has the responsibility and capability 
within the Defense Department to provide launch 
characterization. 
 
5. (S/Rel JA, KS) Country teams, with the support of the 
military commands, should make the following general 
consultative points to counterparts in the ROKG and GOJ as 
context for coordinating public diplomacy related to a North 
Korean provocation. 
 
--It is important to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere that 
will reduce our governments' combined flexibility and give 
advantage to North Korea's escalatory intentions. 
 
--We understand that North Korea's actions create domestic 
pressure in your countries to appear responsive.  The demands 
of the news cycle only heighten the pressure.  However, we 
strongly urge you to use public statements as a means to 
reduce public anxiety and project our combined, bilateral 
preparedness and emphasize the in-depth cooperation that 
continues trilaterally with the ROK/Japan. 
 
--We expect that the international response to any North 
Korean provocation may be addressed, at least in part, in the 
UN Security Council, particularly to the extent such action 
constitutes a violation of existing UNSCRs.  It would be 
unwise and potentially counterproductive to speculate 
publicly on the outcome of our joint efforts there. 
 
--We are very concerned by continued intelligence leaks, 
which place sources and methods at risk and undermine the 
unified careful message we have developed together.  It is 
important that our governments not confirm leaked information 
that appears in the media. 
 
--Each government should refrain from commenting on the plans 
and activities or characterizing the positions of the other, 
apart from reinforcing agreed policies and principles. 
 
6. (S/Rel JA, KS) U.S. military commands (including PACOM, 
USFK, USFJ, the Missile Defense Agency, and STRATCOM) should 
not/not release press statements following any DPRK 
provocation.  As authorized by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and Commander PACOM, USFK and USFJ personnel may 
respond to media questions on background, to explain in 
general terms, using unclassified information, the extent of 
U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK information-sharing and 
military-to-military coordination in advance of and during 
the provocation. 
 
7. (SBU) Preceeding any specific provocative act, Embassies 
Seoul and Tokyo may use the following points to respond to 
press inquiries.  These points are similar to the standing 
guidance being used by the State Department spokesperson. 
 
--We are closely monitoring North Korea's activities and 
intentions. 
 
--Through close consultations, the governments of the United 
States, Republic of Korea, and Japan, in coordination with 
China and Russia, have attempted to discourage North Korea 
from taking further provocative actions which could diminish 
stability and impair relations in the region. 
 
--Any further provocation would only further isolate North 
Korea from the international community. 
 
--North Korea should focus instead on denuclearization, and 
on improving its relations with its neighbors. 
 
--Our governments will continue to be in close communication 
as this situation further develops. 
 
8. (S/Rel JA, KS; SBU after provocative action) After North 
Korea launches a missile, tests a nuclear device, or commits 
incursions upon South Korean territorial waters or land, 
Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following points 
in response to press inquiries.  All other questions should 
be referred to Washington. 
 
If asked about North Korea's motives: 
 
--We will not speculate about North Korea's motives. 
 
If asked about North Korean WMD or missile-related 
proliferation activities: 
 
--We are greatly concerned about North Korea's continued 
export of ballistic missiles and related equipment, 
materials, and technologies to countries of concern.  North 
Korean exports of such items violate UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 
1874. 
 
--UNSCR 1874 establishes new procedures, expectations and 
obligations to counter North Korea's proliferation 
activities.  The U.S. is committed to fully implementing all 
aspects of this resolution and will do so in close 
coordination with our international partners. 
 
--North Korea has marketed its missile technology and 
equipment worldwide. 
 
--The United States has imposed sanctions on North Korean 
entities multiple times for missile-related transfers, most 
recently in February 2009. 
 
If asked about the future of the Six-Party Talks: 
 
--The United States remains committed to the Six-Party Talks 
process, and calls on the DPRK to fulfill its commitments 
under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party 
Talks, to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. 
 
If asked about U.S.-ROK-Japan Missile Defense Cooperation or 
any other form of operational cooperation: 
 
--The United States, ROK, and Japan have worked closely as 
alliance partners to better monitor, understand, and respond 
appropriately to provocative North Korean actions. 
 
If asked about the U.S. commitment to defend (Japan) (the 
ROK): 
 
-- The United States is prepared to meet fully its 
obligations under the (U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security) (U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 
1954).  Our forces in Korea, Japan, and throughout the region 
train rigorously to ensure readiness for upholding our treaty 
obligations. 
 
If asked about the U.S. nuclear umbrella: 
 
--The U.S. maintains its firm commitment to the security of 
our treaty allies the ROK/Japan, including the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, an integral part of our extended deterrence. 
 
If asked about the Northern Limit Line: 
 
--The Northern Limit Line (NLL) is intended to prevent 
maritime incidents, and respecting it serves the best 
interests of North Korea, South Korea and the region.  We 
urge North Korea to avoid (further) provocative actions with 
respect to the NLL. 
 
9. (SBU) Regarding Maritime Interdiction Operations, 
Embassies Seoul and Tokyo may draw from the following 
standing press guidance in response to press inquiries.  All 
other questions should be referred to Washington. 
 
--The DMZ and the rules that govern it were agreed to by 
North Korea in the Armistice Agreement in 1953.  The DMZ has 
served North Korea, South Korea and the region well for 
almost 56 years.  North Korea should avoid any (further) 
provocative actions with respect to the DMZ. 
 
If asked about the Northwest Islands: 
 
--The Northwest Islands (NWI) and the rules that govern them 
were identified and agreed to by North Korea in the Armistice 
Agreement in 1953.  North Korea should avoid any (further) 
provocative actions with respect to the NWI. 
 
If asked regarding Maritime Interdiction Operations: 
 
--Exports and proliferation of ballistic missiles and related 
equipment, materials, and technologies to countries of 
concern violate UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1874. 
 
--As obligated by UNSCR 1874, the U.S. will remain vigilant 
of any North Korean activities that might contravene the 
resolution, and we will respond in line with the provisions 
of the resolution. 
 
--We intend to vigorously enforce these resolutions in all 
their aspects. 
 
--The military remains ready at all times to defend against 
threats in the region. 
 
--We cannot comment on any military planning or operations. 
 
End Text of Press Guidance. 
 
 
CLINTON