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S E C R E T STATE 060334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029 
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SYR TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA 
 
REF: MADRID 514 
 
Classified by: ISN - C. S. Eliot Kang, Reasons 
1.4(b),(d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  See paragraphs 6-10. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest 
reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into 
Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 5 June 2009.  Both 
reports conformed to expectations in describing the 
absence of any meaningful steps by either country to 
address the serious issues that exist with respect to 
their nuclear programs. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The activities described in the DG's latest 
Iran report underscore Iran's continued defiance of its 
international obligations and its progress toward a 
nuclear weapons capability.  DG ElBaradei notes that 
Iran is now enriching uranium using approximately 5,000 
centrifuges (up from nearly 4,000 centrifuges in March 
2009), testing an additional 2,000 centrifuges, 
continuing to install new centrifuge cascades, and 
proceeding with research and development work on 
advanced centrifuge designs.  Even more troubling, Iran 
has produced over 1,300 kilograms of low enriched 
uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6).  This is sufficient 
material for one nuclear weapon, were Iran to enrich it 
further to weapons-grade. 
 
¶4. (SBU) At the same time, the report notes, Iran has 
refused even to meet to discuss the IAEA's outstanding 
questions regarding its past efforts to develop a 
nuclear warhead.  Nor has Iran accepted the full 
implementation of safeguards, including access to the 
Arak reactor, which ElBaradei stresses "could adversely 
impact the Agency's ability to carry out effective 
safeguards at that facility."  ElBaradei concludes with 
a request to Iran to cooperate with the IAEA without 
further delay. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) DG ElBaradei's report on Syria reinforces our 
conclusion that Syria was engaged in a clandestine 
effort to construct and operate a nuclear reactor at Al 
Kibar.  It also highlights the litany of fruitless 
attempts by the IAEA to solicit additional information 
and clarifications from Syria.  The list of unanswered 
questions appears to be growing.  The IAEA notes in this 
report that it detected traces of chemically-processed 
uranium in the hot cells of Syria's declared Miniature 
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus.  Like the 
uranium found at Al Kibar, these traces do not match 
uranium in Syria's declared nuclear material inventory. 
According to the report, the Agency is conducting 
further analysis to determine a possible connection 
between the uranium detected at the MNSR and that 
detected at the Al Kibar site.  The presence of 
additional, unexplained particles of uranium in Syria is 
a potential source of concern and could indicate more 
widespread undeclared nuclear activities in the country. 
These particles also reinforce the IAEA's assessment 
that the particles at Al Kibar were not introduced by 
Israeli munitions, as Syria maintains, though the IAEA 
also notes that further Israeli cooperation in this 
regard would be helpful. 
 
--------------- 
Action Requests 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS:  Posts are 
requested to convey U.S. views regarding the IAEA 
reports to appropriate host government officials.  Posts 
should underscore that these reports demonstrate that 
neither Iran nor Syria has taken any meaningful step to 
cooperate with the IAEA since the last report was issued 
in February 2009.  Posts should stress that while Iran 
has stalled the IAEA's investigation and still refuses 
to provide the IAEA with requested transparency, its 
centrifuge program continues to make progress.  The net 
result is that for both cases the international 
community continues to lack confidence in the 
exclusively peaceful nature of these nuclear programs. 
For Iran, the UN Security Council has imposed a 
mandatory requirement that Iran suspend specified 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities [those are: 
(1) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, 
and (2) work on all heavy-water related projects.  See 
UNSCR 1737 OP 2.] and cooperate fully with the IAEA.  We 
believe that Iran's failure to do so yet again is 
another opportunity lost.  With respect to Syria, Posts 
should emphasize that that Syria's ongoing refusal to 
cooperate with the Agency deepens concerns regarding the 
nature and extent of its clandestine nuclear activities, 
particularly in light of new findings of chemically- 
processed uranium at a declared nuclear facility in 
Damascus. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR ALL POSTS EXCEPT LONDON, 
PARIS, BERLIN, MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT:  With respect to 
the upcoming 15-19 June IAEA Board of Governors meeting, 
Posts should stress the need for the following from host 
governments: 
 
-- Strong national statements on Iran and Syria to 
demonstrate unity in the Board in demanding Iran and 
Syria immediately comply with their international 
obligations.  Statements should underscore the need for 
full transparency with the IAEA (including Iran's 
implementation of the Additional Protocol) and 
cooperation with the IAEA's investigation, as well as 
suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities.  Statements should also highlight the degree 
to which both Iran and Syria have refused to cooperate 
with the IAEA by listing the unanswered questions noted 
in the Agency's reports; and, 
 
--      Strengthened statements on Iran and Syria from 
regional or other groups, e.g., European Union, the 
Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
Group of Latin America and the Caribbean; the Africa 
Group, etc.  To the extent possible, Posts should 
encourage host governments to instruct their delegations 
not to accept statements from any group to which they 
are a member that would downplay the factual reports of 
the IAEA, or undercut the Agency's ability to obtain the 
necessary information and access needed to resolve these 
serious issues. 
 
¶8. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST FOR LONDON, PARIS, BERLIN, 
MOSCOW, BEIJING CONT:  P5+1 posts should draw on 
paragraph 7 points to encourage host governments to 
deliver strong national statements on Syria.  Posts 
should also note that we are pursuing a joint P5+1 
statement on Iran.  Such a statement would be negotiated 
among capitals. 
 
¶9.  (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR MADRID:  In addition to the 
above guidance, Post is requested to follow-up with the 
MFA officials who were briefed on Syria's clandestine 
nuclear activities on May 18 (See Reftel).  Post should 
note that the discovery of additional traces of 
undeclared uranium at the MNSR in Damascus is yet 
another piece of evidence that Syria's clandestine 
nuclear activities went beyond the Al Kibar reactor. 
Post is also requested to strongly encourage Spain to 
give a strong national statement on Syria even if they 
are associated with an EU statement. 
 
¶10. (S) ACTION REQUEST FOR UNVIE:  In addition to 
conveying these messages to local IAEA Missions, UNVIE 
should continue promoting support within the IAEA 
Secretariat and among IAEA Board Members for continuing 
and expanding the investigation into both Iran and 
Syria's nuclear activities and pressuring both to 
cooperate with the respective investigations.  Mission 
is requested to place maximum effort into securing 
strong national statements demanding Iranian and Syrian 
cooperation with the IAEA by as many Board members as 
possible, particularly those in the EU.  Mission should 
bear in mind that we continue to explore the possibility 
of a P5+1 joint statement regarding Iran, but would 
negotiate any such statement directly among capitals. 
 
--------------------------- 
POCS AND REPORTING DEADLINE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Posts are requested to report any substantive 
reactions at the earliest possible date.  UNVIE is 
requested to report on the status of its efforts related 
to Iran and Syria in advance of the Board.  Richard 
Nephew (202-647-7680) and Jim DeTemple (202-736-7930) 
are the Department's POCs for this issue. 
CLINTON