Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BANGUI114, RECENT VIOLENCE AGGRAVATES SIMMERING TENSIONS IN NORTHERN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BANGUI114.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGUI114 2009-06-08 17:58 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangui
VZCZCXRO3415
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0114/01 1591758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 081758Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0914
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0165
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0268
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0278
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0179
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0123
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0457
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0442
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0437
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1148
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000114 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR KOCH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: RECENT VIOLENCE AGGRAVATES SIMMERING TENSIONS IN NORTHERN 
CAR 
 
REF: A. 07 BANGUI 61 
     B. 09 BANGUI 12, 21, 46, 47, 50 
     C. 09 NDJAMENA 173 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Increased instability and violence in the 
northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) is not waiting 
on the rains.  As the summer downpours will make the unpaved 
roads of the Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, and the Haute Kotto 
prefectures impassable between July and November, Post suspects 
that the Patriotic Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the 
Union of United of Democratic Forces (UFDR) and the region's 
various role players may feel pressured to consolidate their 
positions while they still can.  With the illness of UFDR chief 
Zakaria Damane, the CPJP may see an opportunity to retake the 
diamond fields between Ouanda Djalle, Ouadda, and Sam Ouandja or 
potentially even make a move for Ndele and towards Bangui. 
While this should not threaten the fundamental stability of the 
Central African Government (CARG), it is yet another example of 
the CARG's lack of control over the northeast and Post remains 
fearful that the ethnic overtones of this conflict could lead to 
heretofore unseen levels of violence.  The recent outbreak of 
fighting in Birao, however, may indicate however, that this has 
already begun.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (SBU) General Zakaria Damane, who led the UFDR to prominence 
in between 2006 and 2007, is reportedly suffering severe renal 
trouble, possibly as a result of kidney stones.  Despite 
reportedly going into a possible coma for three days, Damane is 
said to be cut off from medical care in both Bangui and Birao, 
the only two options available for grave health issues in the 
CAR.  Blocked from Bangui (a government plane reportedly landed 
in the village in which he is convalescing but did not pick him 
up), Damane also is unable to go to Birao as all roads to the 
town are purportedly blocked by Kara militia men.  The Kara are 
hostile to the UFDR after a long running dispute with the Goula 
whose most recent manifestation was an attack on Birao with some 
60 armed men aimed at the Central African military (FACA) and 
UFDR positions on June 6th, 2009. This follows the burning of 
thirty four homes in Kara dominated Delembe in response to the 
murder and crucifixion of a young Goula man by the Kara. 
Furthermore, Damane's brother was recently murdered by Kara, 
though it is not clear if he was targeted or killed at random as 
he was trying to go to Birao to get medicine for his sibling. 
Until now, the violence has been for economic reasons, with each 
side wanting control of the roads and trade, but Post fears that 
the acrimony is as such that the violence may escalate the 
stakes. 
 
3. (SBU)After Saturday's violence, Post received reports that 
the UFDR commanders were asking for Damane's permission to 
retaliate, and, even absent his permission, might do so anyway. 
This is sole source, but if true, would signify not only a 
dangerous shift into disorder by the UFDR, but would also open 
the door to overreaction by less disciplined subordinates. Also, 
one of the Kara columns that attacked Birao is thought to have 
come from the Nyala, Sudan area and, though historically 
intertwined, the internationalization of the conflict will do 
nothing to ease the situation. Overall, tensions are extremely 
high between the Kara and the Goula and there are signs that the 
Rounga and the Kara, former enemies, may be making common cause 
against the Goula in the name of retribution for the latter's 
greed post the UFDR/CARG peace agreement of April 2007 (07 
BANGUI 61) . 
 
4. (SBU) A reliable Embassy source said he recently saw what he 
believes to the ``missing'' male population of the Rounga tribe. 
 As previously reported, over 18,000 mostly Rounga have fled to 
Chad.  Strikingly, over 80 per cent of these refugees are women 
and children. (09 BANGUI 12, 21, 46, 47, 50; 09 NDJAMENA 173) 
This has led to speculation among AmEmbassy Bangui staff as to 
the location and intentions of the male Rounga.  It now appears 
the men, probably the core of the CPJP, have moved into the town 
of Sikikede.  Normally a collection of small villages, Post's 
source saw a marked increase in the town's population. Among the 
recent arrivals were men in uniform, sporting new camouflage, 
satellite phones, and weaponry (type unknown). Though they 
maintain a headquarters in a school building in Sokoumba (09 
BANGUI 46), and are openly present in Akoursoubak (both north of 
 
BANGUI 00000114  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ndele) such a large number of men concentrated in one location 
begs the question, why are they there?  It could be that the 
CPJP is gearing for an assault either towards the Vakaga or to 
Bamingui-Bangoran and further south. 
 
-- Sikikede is not far from the UFDR stronghold of Tirigulu 
(100km).  The origins of the CPJP lie in their opposition to the 
Goula led UFDR and their complaints that the Goula pushed them 
off their diamond fields; a problem yet to be resolved. 
 
-- More importantly, past Tirigulu are the diamond fields of the 
Vakaga, in the area of Ouanda Djalle and Sam Ouandja. A push 
before the rainy season would not only allow the Rounga to 
exploit the fields uninhibited for the coming few months, but it 
would also allow them to consolidate their defenses and/or 
negotiate with the Goula from a position of strength going 
forward.  CAR diamonds are all alluvial and it is said to be 
easier to dig/sluice the diamonds in the rainy season when water 
is abundant and rivers are flowing. There are been very few 
large scale fights of this kind in the CAR, so while this is not 
probable, it remains a possibility. 
 
-- Post received reports over the weekend that elements of the 
CPJP have deployed north of Ndele with motor vehicles and an 
unknown number of troops. While a FACA detachment has moved 
north, they halted thirty miles outside of the city and have not 
engaged the suspected CPJP column. Our well informed source 
speculated that the CPJP may make a move on Ndele and from there 
Kaga Bandero and perhaps even Bangui. It must be stressed that 
there has been no independent confirmation of this intention, 
though a source from the FACA said he thought it possible that 
the rebels will attempt to take Ndele. But with the government 
recently discussing the need to replace the highly influential 
mayor (and the Sultan) of Ndele (BANGUI 46), the potential 
exists that he may seek to strengthen his position by 
encouraging the rebels. 
 
5. (SBU) The most interesting bit of RUMINT to come out the area 
is a report of a motorized column of some sixty French ``special 
forces'' from Chad, not/not Birao.  The column was said to have 
been seen in February somewhere between Birao and the Chadian 
border.  The troops were not hostile, but refused to let their 
faces be photographed. (We have not determined if any photos do, 
in fact, exist.)  While our source on this has never been wrong, 
we have no confirmation and it is interesting that this 
information was not shared with the Ambassador and only 
developed later.  Post remains skeptical, but offers this up in 
the event that others may be able to confirm/deny the veracity 
and, perhaps more to the point, the purpose of such an 
incursion.  Rumors and conspiracy theories abound, of course, 
but we cannot see any reason for a French movement of this type. 
 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT: Tensions are extremely high in the Vakaga, 
Bamingui-Bangoran, and the Haute Kotto prefectures.  While Post 
has some solid sources on the happenings in the region, it is 
both physically and politically very far from Bangui and thus 
elements of the equation may well be missing. Despite this, 
there are some clear takeaways from rising tensions: 
 
-- The central government has neither the will nor the capacity 
to be anything more than meddlesome in these events. This 
ensures that otherwise minor players are able to have major 
effects on the politics of the area and threaten the stability 
of the southern parts of Chad and the west of Sudan, not to 
mention the CAR. 
 
-- Further violence would undoubtedly push more refugees into 
southern Chad, compounding the pressures upon an already 
overstretched UNHCR in Daha. 
 
-- Violence and insecurity has already caused the remaining NGOs 
in the region to shut down until at least October 2009, 
compounding the root causes of alienation and a lack of 
development that spurred the original creation of these groups. 
On Saturday 6th of June, international NGOs in Ndele closed and 
sent their workers south. Government functionaries in the town 
 
BANGUI 00000114  003 OF 003 
 
 
have apparently done the same thing with their families. 
 
-- The rupturing of the traditional coexistence between these 
groups risks creating ethnically motivated violence.  The CAR 
has thus far been blessed by the absence of purely ethnic 
violence and, up until now, the hostility in the northeast been 
ethnically flavored but driven by economics.  As the lines 
harden and more blood is split, Post worries that atrocities 
could follow. 
 
-- Damane has no obvious successor.  Should he die from his 
illness, his charisma and political acumen would be hard to 
replace and could lead to a further breakdown of an already 
tenuous order. 
 
There are at least two possible scenarios: the sides will make a 
rush before the rains come in mid July so that they can 
consolidate gains over the wet months and negotiate from a 
position of strength. Yet at the same time, food is always in 
chronic shortage and the groups may plant, harvest and store 
food in anticipation of a fight after the rains. Post leans 
towards the later hypothesis, but the violence of the weekend 
may push the sides to early action. Regardless of the short term 
potential for violence, the root cause will remain and none of 
the involved players appear willing or able to solve them, 
meaning the northeast will remain an area of great concern going 
into 2010. END COMMENT 
COOK