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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000439 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PTER IS IR AJ
SUBJECT: IRAN/AZERBAIJAN: GOAJ INCENSED BY IRANIAN PRESSURE 
OVER PLANNED VISIT OF ISRAELI PRESIDENT 
 
REF: A. A) BAKU 132 
     ¶B. B) BAKU 139 
     ¶C. C) BAKU 175 
     ¶D. D) BAKU 282 
 
Classified By: Robert Garverick, Polecon Chief, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
 Summary 
--------- 
 
¶1.  (S) The GOAJ, as well as a large number of political 
figures and organizations from across the political spectrum, 
has expressed deep resentment over recent heavy-handed 
Iranian government efforts to force the GOAJ to rescind its 
recently extended official invitation to Israeli President 
Peres to visit Baku.  While most anger is focused on a strong 
condemnatory statement by the Iranian Army Chief of Staff 
that was widely reported in the local press, the GOAJ has 
recently informed post that the General's remarks were 
followed by a furious series of demarches (not yet made 
public, during which the Iranian Ambassador reportedly 
threatened the GOAJ with "very, very grave consequences" if 
the invitation is not rescinded.  The GOAJ Foreign Minister 
and other senior officials have told us that they are 
incensed by the Iranian pressure, and have no intention of 
canceling the official visit - in fact, they say they now 
want it more than ever. This is the latest effort by a 
neighboring country to strong-arm Azerbaijan, which is 
fighting craftily to maintain its independence as a secular, 
modernizing state.  GOAJ officials look apprehensively toward 
an "inevitable"  future with a nuclearized Iran on their 
borders, which they predict will in the short term encourage 
greater Iranian regional ambitions and adventurism.  End 
Summary. 
 
GOAJ Invitation to Israeli President... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On May 6, during a meeting with Israeli Foreign 
Minister Avigdor Lieberman in Prague, Azerbaijan President 
Ilham Aliyev agreed to invite Israeli President Shimon Peres 
to make an official visit To Baku, in concert with the 
latter's planned visits to several Muslim-majority Central 
Asian republics, expected to occur some time in late June or 
early July.  The joint communique released after the Prague 
meeting added that President Peres will be received in Baku 
"at the highest level and with all honors."  This will be the 
first visit of an Israeli President to Azerbaijan, although 
current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited Baku during 
the mid-1990's, during his earlier term as Prime Minister. 
 
Sparks Anger, Condemnation in Tehran 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) On May 19, Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major 
General Hassan Firuzabadi strongly criticized Azerbaijan's 
invitation to Peres during an interview with Iran's ISNA news 
service.  ISNA quoted him as stating that "the Republic of 
Azerbaijan's invitation to the President of the Zionist 
regime is insulting to Muslims," and "in contradiction with 
Azerbaijan's (professed) friendship with Iran."  Other press 
reports claimed that Firuzabadi described the Peres 
invitation as a "provocation."  Firuzabadi's statements were 
widely reported in the Azerbaijani press, resulting in many 
angry retorts from Azerbaijani members of Parliament from all 
parties, as well as from several Azerbaijani NGOs, and local 
media. 
 
Azerbaijani MPs, Press Attack Iranian "Hypocrisy" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (C) For example, the Azerbaijani news agency Azadlig 
described Firuzabadi's statement as a "threat against 
Azerbaijan," while member of Parliament (and head of the 
Azerbaijani People's Front) Fuad Qahramanli cited 
Firuzabadi's statement as a reminder that Azerbaijan is 
threatened by Iranian "fanatics."  Another MP, Sabir 
Rustamanli, attacked Iran's "hypocrisy," noting that "this 
(Muslim country) embraces and supports (Christian Armenia) 
 
BAKU 00000439  002 OF 003 
 
 
against us."  Former Azerbaijani Ambassador to Iran Aliyar 
Safarli similarly wondered out loud if Iran was consulting 
Azerbaijan over its close relations with Armenia.  Another 
Azerbaijani MP, Arzu Samadbayli, called for the immediate 
opening of an Azerbaijani Embassy in Tel Aviv (Note: While 
Israel has maintained an Embassy in Baku since the early 
1990's, Azerbaijan has yet to open a counterpart Embassy in 
Israel, officially citing "budget limitations." 
Unofficially, the GOAJ has told us that Iranian sensitivity 
to such an Embassy opening has also slowed the process.  End 
Note). 
 
Iranian Demarche: "Very Grave Consequences" If Visit Occurs 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) On May 18, newly-arrived Iranian Ambassador to 
Azerbaijan Bakir Bahrami presented his credentials to 
President Aliyev.  During a meeting with Staffdel 
Makovsky-Katz on May 27th, Presidential Office Foreign 
Relations Division Chief Novruz Mammadov related that 
Ambassador Bahrami had called on him the previous day to 
furiously protest the invitation to President Peres. 
According to Mammadov, Bahrami told him there would "very, 
very grave consequences" if the GOAJ went forward with this 
visit.  Later the 27th Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar 
Mammadyarov confirmed the harsh Iranian demarche to 
Ambassador Derse.  He told Ambassador Derse that the GOAJ is 
now more committed than ever to going ahead with the Peres 
visit, if only to send a message to Iran that it "cannot push 
Azerbaijan around." 
 
¶6.  (S) Mammadyarov revealed that the GOAJ had actually 
extended the invitation to the Israeli President to visit 
months ago (well before Prague), but that Israel had 
refrained from making any announcement.  He added that he 
told Ambassador Bahrami in no uncertain terms that Azerbaijan 
did not need Tehran's permission before inviting official 
visitors.  Note: information about the above Iranian 
demarches to the GOAJ has not/not yet been released publicly 
by either government, and must be held close.  End Note. 
 
"Revolutionary Guard Flooding Azerbaijan with Narcotics" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7. (S) During a separate meeting with Staffdel Makovsky-Katz, 
Presidential apparat Chief-of-Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev railed at 
Iran's alleged multi-faceted efforts to destabilize 
Azerbaijan. Among other measures, Mehdiyev claimed to have 
evidence that Iranian security forces are collaborating with 
drug traffickers and flooding Azerbaijan with inexpensive 
narcotics, including heroin. (See reftels (a) (b) and (c) for 
detailed analysis of Iran's Hezbollah-like influence-building 
tactics in Azerbaijan; reftel (d) also relates GOAJ 
accusations concerning Iranian security authorities alleged 
collaboration in trans-Caucasus drug trafficking). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Azerbaijan in many ways can be seen as a brave little 
country stubbornly attempting to hold on to its independence 
and chart a secular path in a very tough neighborhood.  GOAJ 
officials are deeply aware of their limited menu of options 
in repelling perceived Iranian and Russian attempts to turn 
their country into a satellite state, or an object within a 
sphere of influence, but have managed to play their cards 
fairly well up to now.  In several recent conversations GOAJ 
officials have signaled to us that they are very concerned at 
what a notionally nuclear Iran will mean for this region and 
their country.  Though seemingly resigned to the eventual 
inevitability of a "nuclear Iran," they express little doubt 
that in the short term such capability will embolden Iranian 
adventurism. 
 
¶9.  (S) The implications of Ambassador Bahrami's threats and 
General Firuzabadi's public statement for the future 
Iran-Azerbaijan relationship remain to be seen.  Further 
public Iranian protests (not excluding organized 
"spontaneous" protest demonstrations in Tehran and elsewhere) 
are to be expected once the actual date of Peres visit is 
 
BAKU 00000439  003 OF 003 
 
 
announced, and during the visit itself.  What other concrete 
actions by Iran, if any, will be revealing.  How to handle 
this may be the first major foreign policy test of the 
incoming Iranian President, especially if Ahmedinanjad is not 
re-elected. 
DERSE