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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD1427, NINEWA OPERATIONS COMMAND: SOME DETAINEES FINALLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD1427 2009-06-01 06:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO7027
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1427/01 1520629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010629Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3276
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001427 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2019 
TAGS: PHUM PJUS PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA OPERATIONS COMMAND:  SOME DETAINEES FINALLY 
RELEASED BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 1117 
     B. BAGHDAD 884 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Ford for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  The Government of Iraq is trying to adequately 
address problems relating to its detainee population.  The 
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC) is a particularly egregious 
offender.  Although most of the approximately 1,000 people 
incarcerated at the NOC have had their cases reviewed by an 
investigative judge, the NOC Commander has refused to release 
hundreds of prisoners in possession of valid judicial release 
orders.  These detainees have languished behind bars for 
months and sometimes years.  In addition, conditions at the 
various NOC detention facilities fall well short of 
international, and even Iraqi humanitarian, standards for 
prisoners.  Despite efforts by the Minister of Defense, 
Minister of Human Rights and the Chairman of the Higher 
Judicial Council, the NOC Commander has disregarded due 
process (ref A).  However, on May 20, after repeated 
approaches by PRT-Ninewa, MOD officials and Emboffs, the NOC 
Commander finally released a group of 68 former Camp Bucca 
detainees held at the NOC and 59 additional individuals in 
possession of release orders.  End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
The Process is Broken 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  From May 9-12, Poloff accompanied the MOD's Director 
of Human Rights, Iman Naji, and a representative from 
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) on 
an unannounced inspection visit to the NOC, one of a number 
of operations commands under Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
authority.  In cooperation with Coalition Forces (CF) and 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the team inspected facilities at 
al-Kindi, Command Outpost (COP) Spear, and al-Kisik, all of 
which are under NOC control.  Nearly a thousand detainees are 
currently held at these locations.  While this number has 
been decreasing over recent months, new prisoners continue to 
arrive; during the visit to COP Spear, Poloff witnessed a 
busload of 21 prisoners entering the detention center. 
 
3.  (C)  Various ministries, including the MOD, Interior 
(MOI), Justice (MOJ) and Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) 
have responsibility for and are in control of detainees (ref 
B).  Under Iraqi law, the MOD has no authority to detain 
citizens for lengthy periods.  However, citing overcrowding 
in other facilities, and given a lack of communication among 
the various ministries, the MOD has independently established 
detention facilities under the auspices of various operations 
commands, including the NOC and the Baghdad Operations 
Command (BOC).  (Note:  During a May 18 meeting with Poloff, 
the MOI's Director of Human Rights disputed MOD's 
often-repeated charge that it continues to hold detainees to 
accommodate overcrowding at MOI facilities.  The MOI official 
claimed that the MOD prefers to hold prisoners in its own 
facilities, rather than send them to an MOI pre-trial 
detention center, to circumvent the judicial process.  End 
note.). 
 
4.  (C)  Within this overburdened, overcrowded and 
often-dysfunctional system, the NOC stands alone for its 
categorical disregard of judicial release orders.  In 
February, nearly 500 of the detainees in custody were in 
possession of such orders (ref B).  This number has since 
dropped to between 100-200.  Many of these detainees received 
their release orders over six months ago, yet continue to 
languish in the NOC's facilities.  When questioned about this 
disregard for the judicial process, ISF officers claimed that 
Qdisregard for the judicial process, ISF officers claimed that 
they are simply waiting for confirmation from other 
ministries that no outstanding warrants exist for the 
detainees.  (Comment:  As no centralized warrants database 
exists in Iraq, this can be a process without end.  End 
comment.).  Moreover, once a judge issues such a decree, the 
individual's case is essentially closed.  Although the 
judiciary has the authority to open a criminal investigation 
as to why a detainee remains incarcerated, neither the police 
nor the judiciary have the power to enforce release orders. 
Thus, if the order is not properly executed, the detainee as 
a practical matter has little legal recourse.  His freedom 
rests largely in the hands of the NOC Commander. 
 
5.  (C)  Many of the problems at the NOC are attributable to 
its commander, Staff Major General (SMG) Hassan Khodeer 
Abdul-Karim.  According to ISF officials responsible for the 
various detention centers, they may not release detainees 
without SMG Abdul-Karim's permission.  Release requests often 
 
BAGHDAD 00001427  002 OF 003 
 
 
sit on his desk for weeks or months before he provides a 
response, or he may ignore it entirely.  Despite attempts by 
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Human Rights, 
PRT-Ninewa and Emboffs, SMG Abdul-Karim has refused to comply 
with validly issued judicial release orders in accordance 
with Iraqi law if, in his opinion, the prisoner constitutes a 
security threat. 
 
----------------- 
Bucca Transferees 
----------------- 
 
6.  (C)  In late 2008 and early 2009, 73 prisoners were 
transferred from USG custody at Camp Bucca to NOC control. 
In November 2008, a group of 25 detainees was transferred to 
USG-controlled Camp Cropper and from there to local police 
forces in Ninewa, who handed them over to the NOC on January 
22.  An additional 48 former Bucca inmates were sent to COP 
Spear in February.  Since these transfers, MNF-I, in 
cooperation with the GOI, has instituted a formal structure 
for the review of all detainees held by CF (ref A).  (Note: 
Detainees are only transferred to the GOI if an arrest 
warrant or detention order is procured.  End note.).  Despite 
this close cooperation between the USG and GOI, and the lack 
of outstanding arrest warrants on these particular 
individuals, the "Bucca 73" remained incarcerated in Ninewa 
by order of the NOC Commander for months. 
 
----------------------- 
Some Detainees Released 
----------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  PRT-Ninewa, in cooperation with the local bar 
association, has engaged for months with NOC officials, local 
judges and Ninewa police in an attempt to secure the release 
of all detainees holding release orders, including the Bucca 
transfers.  In April, the Ministry of Human Rights sent an 
inspection team to the NOC whose findings were conveyed to 
Prime Minister Maliki.  The Embassy has raised the issue with 
GOI officials, including the Prime Minister and his staff. 
Poloff visited the NOC facilities between May 9-12 and met 
with numerous NOC officials during this trip.  Additionally, 
Naji met privately with the NOC Commander on May 12 to press 
for the release of all detainees holding release orders.  On 
May 20, PRT-Ninewa confirmed that 68 of the 73 Bucca 
transferees had been released.  Warrants or detention orders 
were procured for five individuals who will be transferred to 
appropriate pre-trial detention facilities.  On May 21, 
MNSTC-I confirmed that an additional 59 detainees were 
released. 
 
------------------------------ 
Inhumane Conditions at the NOC 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C)  Humanitarian conditions at the NOC are also of grave 
concern.  None of the facilities meets internationally 
recognized standards for detention centers.  Despite the fact 
that the NOC, which is under the MOD's authority, does not 
have a mandate to hold prisoners, some have been incarcerated 
in these facilities for upwards of a year and a half.  Many 
of the structures being used as detention facilities were 
clearly not built for such a purpose.  Some prisoners are 
being held in an old stadium.  Over 50 detainees are kept in 
a "holding cell," no more than 20 feet by 20 feet, which more 
closely resembles a broom closet than a detention facility. 
Prisoners are typically held in this room prior to being 
transferred to one of the larger facilities; while this 
usually takes place within 48 hours of arrest, some detainees 
claimed to have been there for over two weeks. 
 
9.  (C)  Detainees across the board complained of a lack of 
access to lawyers, infrequent contact with family members, 
and inadequate medical care.  In some of the facilities, 
Qand inadequate medical care.  In some of the facilities, 
prisoners lacked potable drinking water, sufficient bathroom 
facilities and little-to-no outdoor time.  Overcrowding was a 
problem throughout the NOC; at the primary detention center 
on FOB Shield, over 100 inmates were being held in each of 
five 500 square foot rooms, and had to share one toilet and 
one shower per room.  While none of the detainees complained 
of current abuse at the hands of their guards, many of them 
displayed scars from earlier beatings, which typically took 
place within 48 hours of arrest, during their 
"interrogation." 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
The Ministry of Human Rights Jumps Into the Fray 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10.  (C)  Poloff raised the inhumane conditions at the NOC 
with Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim, who confirmed 
that she is aware of the situation at the NOC.  An inspection 
 
BAGHDAD 00001427  003 OF 003 
 
 
team from the ministry visited the facilities in April, 
finding conditions very similar to those on evidence to 
Poloff last week.  Despite assurances from the NOC commander 
that detainees with release orders would be immediately set 
free, hundreds remain.  Salim said that SMG Abdul-Karim had 
assured the Ministry of Human Rights team that the 
approximately 50 people being held in the "holding cell" 
would be transferred to appropriate MOI pre-trial detention 
facilities.  One month later, they were still there. 
Minister Salim is drafting a second letter to Prime Minister 
Maliki on the subject and plans to raise the issue in her 
next meeting with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.  She also 
plans to discuss it with the Minister of Defense and Chief 
Justice Medhat.  If these "private" approaches do not 
succeed, she plans to "go public" with the NOC detainee 
situation, providing details and photographs to the local and 
international media. 
 
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Comment 
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11.  (C)  While the humanitarian situation at the NOC would 
be sufficient reason for immediate GOI intervention, the 
breakdown in the legal system is of even more concern.  Iraq 
has made important strides implementing the rule of law since 
2003.  The police force has grown exponentially.  Judges, for 
the most part, do not feel threatened or intimidated to rule 
in a particular manner, and their personal safety has 
improved.  Though often forced to wait several months, those 
who are arrested generally do get their day in court.  Yet 
the Ninewa Operations Command remains one of the system's 
"problem children." 
 
12.  (C)  The release and/or transfer of most of the Bucca 
detainees on May 20 is a step forward.  However, it remains 
to be seen whether this is truly a permanent change of 
direction or merely an attempt by the NOC Commander to 
assuage specific USG concerns.  Although security in Ninewa 
is perhaps the most tenuous of all Iraq's governorates, the 
province is not in a state of martial law; due process and 
judicial orders still apply to its citizens.  The Embassy and 
PRT-Ninewa will continue to monitor the situation and, as 
appropriate, remind the NOC Commander of his legal 
obligations and the need to adhere to the established rule of 
law. 
 
HILL