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Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI607, UPDATE ON UAE DETENTION OF MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ABUDHABI607 2009-06-15 14:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO8970
OO RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0607/01 1661427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151427Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2607
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0479
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0477
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0099
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000607 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, SCA, AND EEB/TRA/OTP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019 
TAGS: EAIR PTER PGOV PREL MOPS AF IZ KUAE
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON UAE DETENTION OF MILITARY CARGO, PERSONNEL ON 
RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT 
 
REF: ABU DHABI 00583 
 
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Following overnight indications that four U.S. 
military escorts (reftel) might be prosecuted along with the Russian 
crew and carrier, Ambassador met June 15 with UAE Armed Forces Chief 
of Staff General Rumaithi and Minister of Interior Saif to seek their 
intervention in the release the U.S. escorts and cargo.  Saif was 
direct in pointing to violations of the law by the Russian carrier, 
Volga-Dnepr Air, and the U.S. military personnel, but later June 15 
the U.S. legal team representing the Russian carrier informed us that 
the captain of one of the aircraft had been fined, and that this 
appeared to end the case.  Pending confirmation that there is no 
further legal action planned, and that the U.S. aircrew and cargo 
will be allowed to depart, we need to begin addressing how to design 
a better clearance request process in order to avoid similar 
incidents in the future.  See action request in para 14.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C)  On 15 June 2009, the senior of four U.S. soldiers 
accompanying the military cargo on the two IL-76 aircraft informed 
DATT that he was being questioned by the Ras al-Khaimah prosecutor 
and was now being considered a suspect in the commission of a crime. 
In response, Ambassador and DATT immediately met with UAE Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff (COS), Lt Gen Hamid Thani al Rumaithy.  The 
Ambassador laid out the background of the case, appealed for fair 
treatment of the four U.S. soldiers, and described the contractual 
relationship between Volga-Dnepr Air (VDA) and TRANSCOM.  The COS 
re-affirmed the unique and close relationship between the UAE and the 
US but stated the problem's resolution rested with the Minister of 
the Interior, Sheikh Saif bin Zayed al Nahyan.  He recommended the 
Ambassador meet with Sheikh Saif. 
 
3. (C)  The Ambassador met with Sheikh Saif in the early afternoon, 
and again reviewed the background, acknowledged that the cargo and 
passengers on the flight were not consistent with our diplomatic 
overflight clearance, but asked Sheikh Saif to release the couriers 
who had simply been performing their duties in good faith, and 
release the US cargo which was needed for the fight in Afghanistan. 
The meeting was cordial and Saif was conversant with the issue.  Saif 
indicated that the UAE is attempting to tighten its own internal 
controls to stop illicit cargo from entering the UAE, and was doing 
so after repeated requests from the USG (Note:  this is correct in 
that we have repeatedly attempted to shut down use of UAE based 
carriers carrying weapons in contravention of UNSCRS).  Saif 
emphasized the outstanding relations between the US and the UAE but 
noted that laws had been broken and local prosecutors needed to be 
allowed to do their duties.  Most troublingly, Saif observed that 
while the US personnel may not have been aware of what the overflight 
clearance said, they should have known that entering with a weapon 
was a "violation of international law."   He concluded his remarks by 
telling the Ambassador he would look into the matter but suggested 
both countries prevent further problems of this type in the future 
through enhanced cooperation.  Ambassador closed the meeting with a 
personal appeal to release the US Service personnel. 
 
4. (C)  Shortly after the Ambassador's meeting with Sheikh Saif, 
Volga-Dnepr legal rep Glen Wicks told the DCM and DATT that the VDA 
aircrew was called into the court in Fujairah.  The Judge told the 
crew he had made his decision and fined the Captain of the aircraft 
10,000 Dirhams (approximately 2740 USD).  The judge then closed the 
case and released the aircrew.  This is preliminary information; we 
do not know if there will be further steps from the courts.  We do 
not have final information on the status of the U.S. military 
personnel and cargo. 
 
5. (C)  Today's developments followed Mission discussions on June 14 
with the Wicks legal team.  Wicks told us that the main reason for 
the current problems was the inaccuracy of the diplomatic clearance 
obtained on VDA behalf by the Defense Attach Office (DAO).  VDA, 
through Mr. Wicks has secured local legal representation who agrees 
the problem is with the diplomatic clearance.  At the end of the day 
the bottom line is the UAE believes VDA was illegally carrying 
undeclared weapons into the UAE. 
 
6.  (C)  The process for obtaining a diplomatic clearance requires 
participants to pass and receive accurate information.  The shipper 
must provide the carrier an accurate list of the cargo, the carrier 
must provide the DAO an accurate list plus accurate details about the 
aircraft and crew as passengers.  The DAO in turn provides the 
 
ABU DHABI 00000607  002 OF 003 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs the complete information package.  MFA 
then provides a copy to General Headquarters who makes sure the 
aircraft is not intercepted and/or shot down.  MFA also provides a 
copy to the Ministry of the Interior, which in turn passes a copy to 
the local customs and immigration offices at the landing airfields. 
To complete the process MFA sends the clearance back to the DAO, 
which sends the clearance to the carrier. 
 
7.  (C) There are certain items that will always need to be 
highlighted in the clearance request process when carried on the 
aircraft: passengers, weapons, ammunition or reconnaissance 
equipment.  In this case the carrier, VDA, claims they did not get an 
accurate list of the cargo from the shipper (USG) and therefore 
forwarded a generic cargo description to meet the needs of the DAO, 
indicating they were carrying armored personnel carriers (APCs). 
(Note:  once the cargo was actually loaded on the VDA aircraft, VDA 
would have been well aware the cargo they were carrying -- sealed 
cargo containers and pallets -- was not the APCs they told the DAO 
they were carrying.)  The Wicks Group told us the aircrew and VDA had 
no idea what they were carrying, they were only completing their 
contractual obligations.  The containers did in fact hold a number of 
weapons of varying sizes and uses. 
 
8. (C)  VDA also failed to update the DAO with the number of crew and 
passengers actually on the aircraft.  In conveying the clearance 
request, VDA told the DAO there would be five crew members and no 
passengers on all of their aircraft.  The aircraft now stuck in 
Fujairah had five crew and two passengers (U.S. military personnel 
serving as cargo couriers).  The aircraft currently in Ras al Khaimah 
landed with thirteen crew and two passengers (U.S. military personnel 
serving as cargo carriers). 
 
9. (C)  Finally, the VDA crews did not follow their own company 
directives.  VDA requires the crew to confiscate and secure all 
personal weapons.  The crew completed their internal documents 
stating the personal weapons were confiscated and sealed in a locked 
container onboard the aircraft.  In reality, the U.S. military 
personnel serving as couriers were never approached by the aircrew in 
regards to their personal weapons.  In discussions between the VDA 
Executive President and the DATT the VDA executive admitted his crews 
rarely if ever follow this procedure because the US Army soldiers do 
not like the policy.  When the aircraft landed in Ras al Khaimah the 
two US Army couriers walked off the aircraft in possession of their 
personal weapons, which were in plain sight. 
 
10.  (C) The members of the Wicks Group asked the Mission today to 
deliver a letter stating the cargo and soldiers are USG and the 
aircraft was operating under a contract with the USG.  Mission 
informed the Wicks Group this letter and direction to deliver the 
letter must come from the Department and suggested the L in State and 
the Office of General Counsel in DOD as the best contacts. 
 
11.  (C)  The DAO is seeking guidance from the DOD executive agent 
for processing diplomatic clearances in the future.  The DAO will 
begin immediately to demand an accurate cargo, passenger and crew 
manifest from VDA and all other commercial carriers.  The DAO will 
require any changes to be provided immediately and the DAO will 
in-turn update the request.  All concerned should know the approval 
process for a diplomatic clearance is 3-5 business days after the 
request is made.  Any updates to a request re-start the 3-5 day 
clock.  All cargo, passenger and crew manifests must be accurate and 
static from request to execution or we risk further incidents and 
delays. 
 
12.  (C)  Comment:  There is an alternative solution, which VDA uses 
in the U.S.  VDA established and manned an office in the US to handle 
all clearances.  This office obtains clearances commercially rather 
than through diplomatic channels.  A similar arrangement could be 
established in the UAE to obtain clearances.  A commercial 
relationship will allow VDA greater latitude and flexibility in the 
cargo, passenger and crew areas of concern.  This commercial 
relationship would remove all USG official involvement in the 
clearance issues.  End Comment. 
 
13.  (C)  The Wicks Group makes the argument that since the USG 
secured the clearance for the aircraft the aircraft should be 
considered a "State Aircraft" under the Chicago Conventions of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization.  Wicks Group feels this 
status affords VDA the protection of diplomatic status.   In essence 
the VDA aircraft should be treated the same as a US Military 
aircraft, Wicks says. 
 
ABU DHABI 00000607  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
14.  (C)  Action requested:   Mission requests guidance on processing 
future clearance requests for commercial aircraft contracted to the 
USG.  Our preference is that such aircraft request clearances 
commercially.  However, if addressees prefer we continue to request 
through diplomatic channels, we need to be sure the process provides 
100% accurate information on cargo, crew, etc. in advance of our 
request for diplomatic clearances. 
 
OLSON