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Viewing cable 09ULAANBAATAR119, 2009 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ULAANBAATAR119 2009-05-01 04:58 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ulaanbaatar
VZCZCXRO4958
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHUM #0119/01 1210458
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010458Z MAY 09 ZDK CTG RUEHSD 0008 1221630
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2808
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCPCIM/CIMS NTDB WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 24 ULAANBAATAR 000119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/IFD/OIA 
STATE PASS USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINV ECON OPIC KTTB USTR MG
SUBJECT: 2009 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement 
 
REF: 08 STATE 123907 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  001.4 OF 024 
 
 
1. As requested ref, post provides the 2009 Mongolia Investment 
Climate Statement. 
 
A.1 OPENNESS OF GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
In its specific policies, laws, and general attitude, the Government 
of Mongolia (GOM), supports foreign direct investment (FDI) in all 
sectors and businesses.   Its industrial and economic strategies do 
not discriminate actively or passively for or against foreign 
investors.  Mongolia screens neither investments nor investors, 
except in terms of the legality of the proposed activity under 
Mongolian law. 
 
Mongolian law does not discriminate against foreign investors. 
Foreigners may invest with as little as US$100,000 cash or the 
equivalent value of capital material (office stock, structures, 
autos, etc.).   In both law and practice, foreigners may own 100% of 
any registered business with absolutely no legal, regulatory, or 
administrative requirement to take on any Mongolian entity as a 
joint venture partner, shareholder, or agent.  The only exceptions 
to this flexible investment regime are in land ownership, petroleum 
extraction, and strategic mineral deposits. 
 
Limitations on Participation in Real Estate, Petroleum Extraction, 
and Strategic Minerals Deposits 
 
Only individual Mongolian citizens can own real estate.  Ownership 
is currently limited to urban areas in the capital city of 
Ulaanbaatar, the provincial capitals, and the county seats, or 
soums.  No corporate entity of any type, foreign or domestic, may 
own real estate.   However, foreigners and Mongolian and foreign 
firms may own structures outright and can lease property for terms 
ranging from three (3) to ninety (90) years. 
 
Mongolian law also requires oil extraction firms to enter into 
production sharing contracts with the government as a precondition 
for both petroleum exploration and extraction. 
 
In 2006, the Mongolian Parliament (State Great Hural, or SGH) 
amended the 1997 Minerals Law of Mongolia.  In doing so, it enacted 
the concept of the strategically important deposit.  The amendments 
gave the Government of Mongolia (GOM) the right to obtain up to a 
50% share of any mine on such a deposit. The 1997 law had no concept 
of "strategic deposits" or state equity in mines. 
 
The 2006 amended law defines "mineral deposit of strategic 
importance" as "a mineral concentration where it is possible to 
maintain production that has a potential impact on national 
security, economic and social development of the country at national 
and regional levels or deposits which are producing or have 
potential of producing above 5% of total GDP per year."  Ultimately, 
the power to determine what is or is not a strategic deposit is 
vested in the State Great Hural (SGH).  For practical purposes, the 
GOM currently seems to define these deposits as world class copper 
and coal reserves and all deposits of rare earths and uranium. 
 
If a mineral deposit is determined to be strategic and if the state 
has contributed to the exploration of the deposit at some point, the 
GOM may claim up to 50%. This applies to all exploration conducted 
during the socialist era, primarily by Soviet geologists.  If the 
deposits were developed with private funds and the GOM has not 
contributed to the exploration of the deposit at any time, it may 
acquire up to 34% of the deposit. 
 
State participation (or share) is determined by an agreement on 
exploitation of the deposit considering the amount of investment 
made the state; or, in the case of a privately-explored strategic 
deposit, by agreement between the state and the firm on the amount 
invested by the state.   The SGH may determine the state share using 
a proposal made by the government or on its own initiative using 
official figures on minerals reserves in the integrated state 
registry. 
 
It is important to note that the state equity provision does not 
seem expropriatory on its face as the GOM has committed itself to 
compensating firms for the share it takes at fair market value. 
Although experience is limited with the new law, so far the GOM has 
honored this commitment. 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  002.2 OF 024 
 
 
 
Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold 
 
The Windfall Profits Tax Law of 2006 (WPT) has drawn criticism 
regarding the GOM's commitment to creating an open, predictable, and 
fair environment for foreign direct investment.  The speedy 
legislative process for passing the WPT was unprecedented.  This 
bill was passed in six days without any consultation with outside 
stakeholders on any its provisions.  The entire process has raised 
concerns among investors about the stability and transparency of 
Mongolia's legislative and regulatory environment. 
 
In May, 2006, the SGH the WPT in an effort to: 1) assuage 
wide-spread public fears that Mongolia was being stripped of its 
mineral assets and 2) to increase revenues for new social spending 
on pensions and children. 
 
The WPT imposes a 68% tax on the profits from gold and copper mining 
respectively.  The WPT for gold originally kicked in when gold the 
price for gold hit US$500 per ounce; however, in late 2008 
Parliament raised the threshold to US$850.   For copper, the 
threshold is US$2,600 per ton.  Mining industry sources claim that 
the 68% tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes, makes 
the effective tax 100% on all proceeds above the copper threshold 
price.  In theory, the WPT proceeds are set aside in a special fund 
for a combination of social welfare expenditures and a reserve fund. 
 
 
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code 
 
Problems with the WPT aside, major reforms to the Mongolian Tax code 
in 2006 were designed to improve the business environment in 
Mongolia for both foreign and domestic investors.  Before the 
reforms, a World Economic Forum survey of Mongolian business 
executives cited tax rates and the complexity of tax regulations as 
two of the top five problems for doing business in Mongolia.  The 
tax reforms benefited from two years of technical assistance from 
USAID's Economic Policy Reform and Competitiveness Project (EPRC). 
The reforms affected the Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate 
Income Tax (CIT) codes, as well as the VAT and excise tax codes. 
(EPRC has a number of useful and informative guides on their 
website:  http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz.) 
 
The old corporate income tax system's lack of a loss carry-forward 
provisions as well as arbitrary caps on deductions for business 
expenses discouraged investment; businesses could easily end up 
owing tax, even if they lost money.   The old law was so at variance 
with world norms that it was a prime reason why foreign investors 
sought tax holidays under stability agreements. 
 
The new laws became effective January 1, 2007.  In general, the new 
laws reduce tax rates, flatten the tax schedule, remove 
discriminatory loopholes and exemptions, and introduce appropriate 
deduction opportunities for corporate investment. 
 
The new corporate income tax law allows firms loss carry-forward for 
two years after incurring the loss, potentially encouraging 
investment and accommodating firms experiencing temporary negative 
shocks.  While most businesses approve of this provision, many note 
that the two year carry-forward limit is insufficient for projects 
with long development lead times, as is typical of most large-scale 
mining developments.  The new law allows firms to deduct more types 
of legitimate business expenditures: training, business travel, 
cafeteria expenses, etc.  The new law levels the playing field 
between foreign and domestic investors, eliminating the majority of 
discriminatory tax exemptions and holidays (most of which favored 
international investors). 
 
Unfinished Business (Including Customs Rates) 
 
There is unfinished business, however.  Parliament was scheduled to 
take up additional tax reform measures in 2007 but has not done so 
and has made no substantive progress since.  These measures include 
revisions to the law on customs and customs tariffs.  While the 
exact nature of the proposed changes in the customs law has been 
murky, the GOM states that changes will be consistent with 
Mongolia's WTO obligations and investment climate enhancement 
goals. 
 
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  003.2 OF 024 
 
 
institutions warn that last year's tax reforms by themselves are 
insufficient to improve Mongolia's business environment.  They 
report that reform efforts need to go beyond changes to the tax code 
to restructure the operations of the key agencies - the tax 
department, the customs administration and the inspections agency - 
that directly interact with private firms and individuals. 
 
2006 Amendments to the Law on State Procurements 
 
Amended in late 2006, the revised Law on State Procurement (LSP) has 
two provisions that raise investor concerns.    First, the new LSP 
bars international competitors from participating in government 
procurements under US$10 million, which covers 999 of the 1,000 
projects budgeted for fiscal year 2007.  The old law set a much 
lower bar for participating in state procurements of about US$1 
million.  In addition, the amended law specifically exempts power 
and transport projects from competitive procedures, as they were 
under the terms of the old law.  In these two sectors, ministries 
may procure the services for the GOM by direct contracting for 
projects under US$10 million and where local capacity is lacking. 
Issues in the Telecom and Aviation Sectors 
 
While the Mongolian government supports FDI and domestic investment, 
domestic and foreign investors report that individual agencies and 
elements of the judiciary often use their respective powers to 
hinder investments into such sectors as meat production, 
telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals.  Investors report 
similar abuses of inspections, permits, and licenses by Mongolian 
regulatory agencies. 
 
Abuses in Mongolia's telecom and information technology sector have 
raised public and business concerns. The state-owned telecom 
company, Mongol Telecom (MT) uses its regulatory and technical clout 
to forestall or attack competition.  As the monopoly supplier of 
land-based lines through which much internet traffic flows, MT 
charges predatory rates for access to all other Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) at a rate 10 times the charges assessed to the 
state-owned ISP.  These per-minute charges add up and are hard for 
competitor ISPs to absorb.  In addition, the GOM, in an effort to 
make Mongol Telecom more attractive for privatization, is inclined 
to make MT the sole portal for all telecommunication into Mongolia. 
The apparent intent here is to require licenses for both 
telecommunication services and technology, which only MT could 
satisfy.  There has been significant lobbying against this policy by 
ISPs, voice-over IP providers, cellular rights holders, 
multi-lateral organizations, and diplomatic missions as contrary to 
Mongolia's own competition law and long-term interests.  So far 
these efforts have delayed the passage of any damaging legislation. 
 
Compounding these problems are the non-transparent activities of the 
Mongolian Information and Communication Technology Agency (ICTA), 
which is charged with providing policy guidance to the Communication 
Regulatory Commission of Mongolia (CRC).  Companies report that this 
agency routinely embarks on maneuvers that seem to have no basis in 
law or regulation but that have hurt American interests, not to 
mention those of other investors.  For example, ICTA has attempted 
to order internet service providers to charge set access prices, 
without recourse to the market.  Most recently this government 
intervention has taken the form of setting floor prices for hook up 
charges on wireless, voice over IP, etc., but without setting 
ceiling prices for charges.  The four  big cellular providers 
dominating the market favor this approach because it protects their 
respective market shares.  However, competitors cannot offer similar 
services at a price that might undercut the market leaders, harming 
and limiting consumers' rights to low cost communication 
alternatives. 
 
ICTA has justified these acts by claiming that these low-cost 
providers would have offered services at such low prices that the 
dominant Mongolian cellular providers would have been driven out 
business, thus depriving the state of the benefits of cellular 
service. 
 
The state also involves itself in the domestic aviation sector. 
Mongolia has two domestic service providers, the privately owned 
Aero Mongolia and EZNIS.  Government regulation recommends maximum 
ticket prices that airlines may charge for all domestic routes, but 
the law does not strictly forbid airlines from charging fees higher 
than the state carrier.  However, the GOM frowns on domestic 
airlines that charge more for service.  These state prices are well 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  004.2 OF 024 
 
 
below operating costs and inhibit the private carriers from charging 
a break-even fee.  However, the private carriers seem to have 
decided to shake off GOM prohibitions and are charging rates that 
might yield profits and support safe and efficient flying 
arrangements. 
 
State-owned MIAT formerly ran domestic operations which were heavily 
subsidized, primarily through its foreign routes.  This 
state-subsidized competition with private carriers has inhibited 
investors from participating in the provision of private domestic 
service; and consequently limited the aviation products and services 
that U.S. firms might sell into the Mongolian market.  .  However, 
MIAT and the GOM have failed to upgrade the domestic air fleet, 
letting it slowly wither.  This tacit policy seems to have opened 
the field for private investment into the aviation sector. 
 
The Mongolian Judiciary and the Sanctity of Contracts 
 
We find no concerted, systematic, institutional abuse specifically 
targeted at foreign investment.  In the case of the 
judiciary-corruption aside (see A. 11 Corruption)-most problems 
arise from ignorance of commercial principles rather than antipathy 
to foreign investment.  In principle, both the law and the judiciary 
recognize the concept of sanctity of contracts.  However, the 
practical application of this concept lags, with both foreign and 
domestic investors reporting inconsistent enforcement of contracts 
by the judiciary.  This inconsistency comes from the slow transition 
from Marxist-based jurisprudence to more market oriented laws and 
judicial practices.  Recent decisions in banking and land use cases 
in which contract provisions were upheld reflect a growing 
commercial sophistication among Mongolia's judges.  As more judges 
receive commercial training and as Soviet era (1921-1990) jurists 
retire, we expect to see the gradual improvement of the entire 
judicial system. 
 
Privatization Policies and Resistance of Mongolian firms to Foreign 
Investment 
 
Privatization policies have actually favored foreign investment in 
some key industries, including banking and cashmere production.  The 
bidding processes for privatizations and other tenders have 
generally been transparent, and after some legal disputes among the 
winners and losers lasting from late 2006 through mid-2008, most 
participants have accepted the results. 
 
Foreign companies and investors are subject to the same legal regime 
imposed on Mongolian domestic firms regarding incorporation and 
corporate activities   For example, casinos are illegal under 
Mongolian law, and so, neither Mongolians nor foreigners may own or 
operate them (except in one specifically designated free trade 
zone). 
 
Generally, Mongolian private businesses want foreign participation 
in all sectors of the economy.  They seek foreign partners and 
equity.  That said, some Mongolian businesses use Mongolian 
institutions to stop competitors, if they can.  These activities 
represent no animus against foreign investment as such; rather, they 
reflect individual businesses desire to keep competitors, Mongolian 
or foreign, at bay. 
 
Key Investment Laws 
 
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM) transformed the 
anti-business environment of the Soviet era into today's 
investor-friendly regime.  Under the old system, everything not 
provided for in law was illegal.  Because such economic activities 
as franchising, leasing, joint venture companies were not 
specifically mentioned in earlier Mongolian statutes, they were 
technically illegal.  In 1993, the GOM enacted FILM to legalize all 
manner of foreign investment in Mongolia (amended in 2002 to allow 
for representative offices and franchises).  This law and subsequent 
amendments define broad ranges of activity that would otherwise have 
limited validity under Mongolian law.  It also defines the meaning 
of foreign investment under the civil code without limiting 
activities that foreign investors can conduct. FILM also establishes 
registration procedures for foreign companies. Specifically, the law 
requires that any investment with 25% or more of foreign content 
must register as a foreign-invested firm with the government. The 
law creates a supervisory agency, the Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Trade Agency (FIFTA), that runs the registration process, liaises 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  005.2 OF 024 
 
 
among businesses and the Mongolian government, and promotes in- and 
out-bound investments. 
 
In 2008, the Parliament of Mongolia amended the FILM.  The stated 
intent of the revision was to improve FIFTA's ability to track 
foreign investment and to enhance the services provided by FIFTA to 
foreign investors.  The amendments apply only to investments 
registered after the new law came into force in summer 2008.  The 
new law has raised the minimum level for new foreign investment from 
US$1,000 to US$100,000 and imposed a series of requirements on 
foreign investors seeking registration.  Registered foreign 
companies must now have FIFTA certify that their by-laws, 
environmental practices, their technologies, etc., comply with 
standards determined by FIFTA. 
 
FIFTA officials admit that procedures are still under development 
and that because they lack specific expertise in most of these 
areas,  they will have to consult with the relevant ministries and 
agencies as they assesses each firm's request for investment 
registration.  FIFTA has also not clearly defined what the precise 
processes it will use to evaluate investments, what the exact 
standards will be for any given investment, how it will determine 
those standards, and how an investor might seek redress if FIFTA 
denies a registration request. Foreign investors have expressed 
concern over what they perceive as FIFTA's broad and seemingly 
un-transparent regulatory authority; however, we have not received 
any complaint of abuse of these new powers to date. 
 
New Ministerial Structure Impacts Foreign Investment 
In early 2009, the Parliament re-organized the government structure 
by combining various ministries and agencies in an effort to 
streamline government functions.  Relevant to foreign investors, 
Parliament took trade policy and trade promotion functions that had 
been vested in the former Ministry of Industry and Trade and FIFTA 
respectively and merged them with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The new Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) has assumed 
direct control all formulation and execution of trade policies and 
promotion efforts, which includes export promotion and in-bound 
investment efforts.  FIFTA is now under MOFAT's direct supervision. 
 
Ministry officials have stated that the government will concentrate 
on promoting Mongolian exports and foreign investment into Mongolia. 
 They want FIFTA to resemble counterpart agencies in South Korea, 
Japan, or the U.S.; and have told both us and businesses that they 
plan to get FIFTA out of the regulatory business.  The intent is to 
limit FIFTA's activities to supporting business in their efforts to 
work in Mongolia and to registering in-bound investment for purposes 
of investment tracking only. 
A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES 
 
The Mongolian government employs a limited regulatory regime for 
controlling foreign exchange for investment remittances and 
maintains exceptionally liberal policies for these transactions. 
Foreign and domestic businesses report no problems converting or 
transferring investment funds, profits and revenues, loan 
repayments, lease payments into whatever currency they wish to 
wherever they wish.   There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign 
exchange, whether the investor wants Chinese Renminbi, Euros, 
English Pounds, Rubles, or U.S. Dollars.  The ongoing global 
financial crisis has made dollars scarcer, with banks and 
individuals reporting difficulties in exchanging into the currency. 
This currency shortfall, however, appears to have occurred because 
of challenging economic circumstances rather than policy changes. 
 
The Mongolian government wants funds to flow easily in and out of 
the nation, with one exception.  Foreign-held interest bearing 
dollar accounts remain subject to a 20% withholding tax.  The bank 
retains 20% of all such interest payments sent abroad, and remits 
this withholding to the Tax Authority of Mongolia.  Otherwise, 
businesses report no delays in remitting investment returns or 
receiving in-bound funds.  Most transfers occur within 1-2 business 
days or at most a single business week. 
 
Ease of transfer aside, foreign investors criticize Mongolia's lack 
of sophisticated mechanisms for converting currencies and parking 
money.  Letters of credit are difficult to obtain, and legal 
parallel markets do not exist in the form of government dollar 
denominated bonds or other instruments for parking funds in lieu of 
payment.  Many Mongolian financial institutions lack experience with 
these arrangements.  Moreover, Mongolian banking law currently 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  006.2 OF 024 
 
 
provides no secure statutory grounds for the activity to take place. 
 Banks may hesitate to use instruments that may be technically 
illegal under Mongolian law.  The immediate impact has been to limit 
access to certain types of foreign capital, as international 
companies resist parking cash in Mongolian banks or in local debt 
instruments. 
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION 
 
Mongolia respects property rights as they apply to most asset types. 
We detect no changes in policies, statutes, or regulations related 
to the use and ownership of private property.  Foreigners face no 
legal bias in asset ownership (except that only citizens of 
Mongolian may own land) or how they structure ownership.  Foreign 
investors need not seek local partners or share ownership of most 
assets or endeavor as a condition of doing business.   However, in 
the crucial mining sector, with extensive foreign participation, 
some note governmental actions that might represent "creeping 
expropriation" coupled more broadly with some renewed "statist 
tendencies," meaning gradual increases in government ownership of 
and participation in Mongolia's economy. 
 
Security of Ownership 
 
Mongolia and the United States signed and ratified a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) which entered in force in 1997, and which 
specifically enjoins both signatories from expropriatory acts 
against private property and investments.   In addition, both 
Mongolian law and the national constitution recognize private 
property and use rights and specifically bar the government from 
expropriation of such assets. To date, the government of Mongolia 
(GOM) has not expropriated any American property or assets.  Thus, 
we have no precedent from which to assess how the Mongolian system 
would respond to seizure and compensation. 
 
As can most governments, the Mongolian government can claim land or 
restrict use rights in the national interest.  Currently, this means 
little, as most land outside Mongolia's urban centers remains 
government property, as provided in Mongolia's constitution.  The 
government has no plans to privatize these vast countryside 
holdings, but it leases parcels for such economic activities as 
mining, pasturage, timbering, etc. This practice remains in flux 
because the government must still determine how to let these rights 
and what fees to charge.  Except for mining, most foreign firms 
remain inactive in these sectors. 
 
Since May 2003, land in the urban areas has been privatized to 
citizens of Mongolia or leased to both citizens and foreigners for 
periods ranging from 3-90 years.  The legislation and implementing 
regulations are evolving, but so far investors believe that the GOM 
generally respects recently enacted property rights and leases. 
 
I: Implications of the Current Minerals Law 
 
We closely watch the key mining sector, Mongolia's major foreign 
exchange earner.  The 2006 amendments to the Minerals Law have 
several provisions that raise red flags for investors and observers 
alike.  The law does not allow the GOM to usurp rights to explore 
and exploit natural mineral, metal, and hydrocarbons resources per 
se.  Instead, the amended law has imposed new procedural 
requirements and extends new powers to central, provincial, and 
local officials - new powers that, if abused, might prevent 
mineral's license holders from exercising their exploration or 
mining rights. The current law has the potential to deny the rights 
holder access to his rights without formally revoking use rights. . 
 
An example is the new tender process for apportioning some 
exploration rights.  The old law awarded exploration rights on a 
"first come, first served" basis, a process that gave little 
discretion to government officials to intervene.  The new law lays 
out a different procedure for obtaining exploration rights on land 
explored with state funds or lands where the current holder has 
forfeited exploration rights.  The Mineral Resources Authority of 
Mongolia (MRAM) will tender such exploration rights only to firms 
technically qualified to conduct minerals work. The new tender 
procedure neither requires nor allows for a cash-bid.  Only the 
technical merits of exploration proposals will determine who gains 
exploration rights. MRAM staff has the authority and responsibility 
to assess the merits of proposals to determine who wins the 
tenders. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  007.2 OF 024 
 
 
Both MRAM and its supervising authority, the Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Energy, now have broad discretionary authority to 
select who will get tenements.  This authority disturbs miners, who 
fear this power will be the source of corruption and arbitrary 
decisions by MRAM.  Evidence suggests that local mining guilds will 
define an expert in Mongolian mining as a person who received a 
degree from a Mongolian institution, such as the National 
University, rather than an internationally recognized institution. 
While this enforced employment program for Mongolian geologists 
would be an annoyance, the discretionary power MRAM now has 
generated the most concern.  If MRAM rejects a firm's experts and 
mining plan as unqualified, no recourse is spelled out under the new 
law, and the firm will in effect lose its rights. 
 
The concept of "expertise" allows another potential avenue for 
expropriation of rights by denying or preventing their use.  The law 
has the potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek 
financing, because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and 
exploration rights to non-qualified individuals.  Consequently, a 
miner will not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral 
to banks or to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to 
receive these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations. 
  A given bank is unlikely to set up a "qualified" mining firm just 
to receive a pledged license offered as collateral. Thus, the law 
limits the investment pool that a mining firm might tap to finance 
its mine, which might prevent bringing a property into production, 
again denying licensees access to their legal economic rights. 
 
The amended law removes the Mongol word for exclusive from the grant 
of exploration rights. The old article read, "To conduct exclusive 
exploration for minerals within the boundaries of an exploration 
area in accordance with this law." The new article reads, "To 
conduct exploration for minerals. . . ." It is unclear what, if 
anything, this deletion means. However, the deletion would seem to 
allow the government to apportion mineral rights per metal or 
mineral rather than as a whole, which has been the standard 
practice. The deletion was done intentionally, as the word appeared 
in earlier drafts, right up to the passage of the law. 
 
Investors and observers are also concerned about new authority 
granted to the MRAM Chairman to approve transfers of existing and 
new licenses.  The law grants final approval authority to the MRAM, 
without specifying any check or balance on this official's 
authority.   This power is not a revocation but if abused would 
certainly prevent exercise of economic rights. 
 
 Complicating matters is that in early 2009 MRAM had been moved 
under the direct authority of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and 
Energy in a sweeping re-organization of the government.  Prior to 
this restructuring, MRAM had been a quasi-independent agency, the 
acts of which did not require ministerial approval.  In the new 
structure, the ministry can intervene in the registration and 
transfer of exploration and mining licenses.  The ministry seems to 
have only intervened in cases where the license involves a 
"strategic" deposit. (See A.1 Openness to Foreign Investment for 
explanation of strategic deposits.)  In this specific category, 
ministerial officials have ordered MRAM to freeze all transfers and 
transactions involving properties near or in strategic deposits, 
which includes uranium deposits of any size and massive coal and 
copper deposits near the Chinese border.  Further, these same 
officials have indicated that the government may then revoke the 
rights of those holding exploration rights or mining licenses in or 
near strategic deposits.  Although the law seems to allow for 
compensation, the ministry has not presented formal compensation 
packages to those potentially affected by its actions. 
 
Acts of Provincial Administrations: 
 
With regard to the issuance of both exploration permits and mining 
licenses, provincial officials increasingly appear to use their 
authority to block arbitrarily access to mining rights legally 
granted under the current law.  For example, reports regularly 
circulate that some provincial government officials abuse their 
authority to designate land as "special use zones" to usurp mining 
exploration tenements.  In a common technique, provincial governors 
often reclassify property that has never felt the touch of the plow 
or felt the tread of a tourist for agricultural use or cultural 
tourism respectively, although the central government has legally 
granted exploration rights to miners.  In one case, a miner could 
not gain access to the subsurface resources because the provincial 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  008.2 OF 024 
 
 
government claimed that doing so would damage a potato farm that had 
suddenly appeared over the site. 
 
Other miners harshly criticize the misuse of the local officials' 
rights to comment on permits for water use and mining licenses. 
Comments are advisory, and have limited legal force regarding 
disallowing activity, but the central government routinely hesitates 
to reject a governor's negative comment no matter the motives behind 
it.  The effect has been to stop progress for months, limiting 
access to the resource and costing rights holders' time and money. 
 
Whatever the motives, these provincial actions are often seen as a 
creeping bureaucratic expropriation through denial of access and use 
rights.  The 2006 Minerals Law provides no clear limit on provincial 
control of permits and special use rights or guidance on how to 
apply these powers beyond codifying that the provincial and local 
authorities have some authority over activities occurring in their 
provinces and soums (counties).  Faced with these unclear boundaries 
of authority, the central government often interprets the rules and 
regulations differently from the provincial authorities, creating 
administrative conflicts among the various stakeholders.  The 
central government acknowledges the problematic ambiguity but has 
yet to definitively clarify the situation in law or practice, even 
though the situation threatens accessing one's rights. Mongolian and 
foreign permit holders have advised the government that letting this 
problem fester raises perceptions among investors that they may risk 
losing their economic rights, which can scare away inbound 
investors. 
A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
The GOM consistently supports transparent, equitable dispute 
settlements, but executing good intentions has proven problematic. 
These problems come from a lack of experience with standard 
commercial practices rather than from any systemic intent by public 
or private entities to target foreign investors.  The framework of 
laws and procedures is functional, but many judges who adjudicate 
disputes remain ignorant of commercial principles. 
 
Problems with Dispute Settlement in Mongolia's Courts 
 
The court structure is straightforward and supports dispute 
settlement.  Disputants know the procedures and the venues. 
Plaintiffs bring cases at the district court level before a single 
district judge or panel of judges, depending on the complexity and 
importance of the case.  The district court renders its verdict. 
Either party can appeal this decision to the Ulaanbaatar City Court, 
which rules on matters of fact as well as matters of law.  It may 
uphold the verdict, send it back for reconsideration or nullify the 
judgment.  Disputants may then take the case to the Mongolian 
Supreme Court for a final review. 
 
Problems arise for several reasons.  First, commercial law in 
Mongolia and understanding of it are in flux.  New laws on 
contracts, investment, corporate structures, leasing, etc. have been 
passed or are being considered at both the ministerial and 
parliamentary levels.  Mongolian civil law does not work on 
precedents but from application of the statute as written.  If a law 
is vague or does not cover a particular commercial activity, the 
judge's remit to adjudicate can be severely limited or non-existent. 
 For example, until recently leasing did not exist in the Mongolian 
civil law code as such, but seemed to be covered under various 
aspects of Mongolian civil law regarding contracts and other 
agreements.  But judgments on leasing made under these laws might 
not have applied to an arrangement not otherwise specifically 
recognized under its own exclusive law.  Further, because precedents 
are not legally relevant or binding on other judges and Mongolian 
courts, decisions reached in one case have no legal force in other 
suits, even when the circumstances are similar or even before the 
same court and judges. 
 
Trained in the former Soviet era, many judges lack training in or 
remain willfully ignorant of commercial principles. They dismiss 
such concepts as the sanctity of the contract.  This is not a 
problem of the law, which recognizes contracts, but of faulty 
interpretation.  In several cases courts have intentionally 
misinterpreted provisions regarding leases and loan contracts. 
Judges regularly ignore terms of a contract in their decisions.  If 
someone defaults on a loan, the courts often order assets returned 
without requiring the debtor to compensate the creditor for any loss 
of value.  Judges routinely assert that the creditor has recovered 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  009.2 OF 024 
 
 
the asset, such as it is, and that is enough.  Bad faith and loss of 
value simply do not enter into judicial calculations of equity. 
 
Replacing old-school judges is not an option.  It is politically 
impossible-if not functionally impractical-for the Mongolians to 
dismiss this cadre of Soviet-era judges.  There is a realistic hope 
that young justices, trained in modern commercial principles by 
American and European experts, will gradually improve judicial 
protections for commercial activities in Mongolia.  Lately, we have 
seen better decisions in several cases involving Americans seeking 
to recover on debts and contractual fees and to hold Mongolian 
government entities to the terms of their respective contracts and 
regulations, but these results tend to be limited to courts where 
modern-educated judges preside. 
 
Bankruptcy and Debt Collection 
 
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the 
rights of creditors need serious reform.  Mongolian law allows for 
mortgages and other loan instruments backed up with securitized 
collateral.  However, rudimentary systems for determining title and 
liens and for collecting on debts make lending on local security 
risky.  Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are 
barely workable and unfair to the creditor. 
 
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures 
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current 
system does not record Qting liens against immovable property 
has. In addition, no system exists to record ownership of, and liens 
on, movable property.  Consequently, Mongolian lenders face the 
added risk of lending on collateral that the debtor may not actually 
own or which may have already been offered as security for another 
debt. 
 
Overall, the legal system does recognize the concept of 
collateralized assets provided as security for a loan, investment 
capital, or other debt-based financial mechanism.  The legal system 
also provides for foreclosure, but this process has proved 
exceptionally onerous and time consuming.  A 2005 change to 
Mongolian law simplified the process by allowing creditors to 
foreclose without judicial review.  Prior to the new law, all 
creditors had to go to court to collect on securitized collateral, 
thus adding months to the entire collection process.  However, the 
Constitutional Court of Mongolia voided the law on constitutional 
grounds, slowing down debt collection to pre-2005 levels.  Waits of 
up to 24 months for final liquidations and settlement of security 
are not uncommon. 
 
Once a judgment is rendered, the disputant faces a relatively 
hostile environment to execute the court's decision.  For example, a 
bank collecting on a debt in Mongolia must allow debtors to put 
forward assets for auction and set the minimum bid price for those 
assets.  If assets do not sell, a second round of auctions occurs in 
which a reduced minimum bid is put forward. The State Collection 
Office (SCO) supervises this process but does not set the price. 
However, the SCO receives 10% of the sales price, or of the second 
auction minimum price even if there is no sale. 
 
The SCO does not allow collateralized assets to be valued by neutral 
3rd parties.  Because it derives income from the forced sale of 
assets, the SCO has a conflict of interest; and, anecdotally, seems 
to have failed as an impartial arbiter between debtors and 
creditors.  For banks, this has meant that forcing a company into 
bankruptcy may be the safest way to recover rather than forcing 
piecemeal sales of assets.  This approach automatically puts all 
assets into play rather than those selected by the debtor.  However, 
it is an onerous procedure without a clear process behind it. 
 
Purchase financing is also tricky.  For example, a local car dealer 
financed an auto for US$20,000 down and US$60,000 in credit, 
complete with a local bank guarantee. The buyer subsequently 
defaulted on the loan, the bank refused to honor its guarantee, and 
the dealer took the buyer to court.  Under current Mongolian law, 
interest payments are suspended for the duration of the case, from 
first filing to final appeal before the Supreme Court of Mongolia. 
Possibly months of interest-free time can pass while the asset rusts 
in an impound lot.  In this case, the dealer simply reclaimed the 
car and dropped the lawsuit, swallowing the lost interest payments 
and loss in value on the car.  Domestic and foreign businesses often 
respond by requiring customers to pay in cash, limiting sales and 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  010.2 OF 024 
 
 
the expansion of the economy. 
 
Binding Arbitration: International and Domestic 
 
The Mongolian government supports and will submit to both binding 
arbitration and international settlement procedures.   However, 
glitches remain in local execution.  Mongolia ratified the 
Washington Convention and joined the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1991.  It also signed and 
ratified the New York Convention in 1994. 
 
To our knowledge, the government of Mongolia has accepted 
international arbitration in four disputes where claimants have 
asserted the government reneged on a sovereign guarantee to 
indemnify them.  In all cases the government has consistently 
declared that it would honor the arbitrators' judgments.  However, 
this resolution has not been put to the test, as Mongolia has won 
each case. 
 
More widely, Mongolian businesses partnered with foreign investors 
accept international arbitration, as do government agencies that 
contract business with foreign investors, rather than avail 
themselves of the Arbitration Bureau operated by the Mongolian 
National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  They seek redress abroad 
because they perceive that domestic arbitrators are too politicized 
and self-interested to render a fair decision. 
 
Although arbitration is widely accepted among business people and 
elements of the government, support for binding international 
arbitration has not penetrated local Mongolian agencies responsible 
for executing judgments.  In two cases, the Mongolian-state-owned 
copper mine lost two international arbitral cases.  The awards were 
certified and recognized as valid and enforceable by Mongolian 
courts.  But the local bailiff's office has consistently failed to 
execute the collection orders.  Local business people routinely cite 
the failure of SCO and the bailiffs to enforce court-ordered 
foreclosures and judgments as the most common problem threatening 
resolution of debt-driven disputes. 
A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES 
 
Mongolia imposes few performance requirements on, and offers few 
incentives to, investors. The few requirements imposed are not 
onerous and do not limit foreign participation in any sector of the 
economy.  Performance requirements are applied somewhat differently 
to foreign investors in a limited number of sectors. 
 
2006 Amendments to the Tax Law of Mongolia did away with most tax 
incentives and exemptions. (Certain staples, such as flour, and 
sectors targeted for growth, most recently, the agriculture sector, 
have and continue to receive exemptions on import duties and on 
Mongolia's value-added tax.)  The GOM seems willing to let current 
agreements run their course. Foreign investors have accepted phasing 
out of tax incentive provisions since the amendments bring other 
world-standard practices to the tax code.  These include provision 
for loss-carry-forwards, five-year accelerated depreciation, and 
more deductions for legitimate business expenses including but not 
limited to marketing and training expenses. 
 
Few Restrictions on Foreign Investment 
 
The government applies the same geographical restrictions on both 
foreign and domestic investors. Existing restrictions involve border 
security, environmental concerns, or local use rights.  There are no 
onerous or discriminatory visas, residence, or work permits 
requirements imposed on American investors.   Generally, foreign 
investors need not use local goods and services, local equity, or 
engage in substitution of imports.  Neither foreign nor domestic 
businesses need purchase from local sources or export a certain 
percentage of output, or have access to foreign exchange in relation 
to their exports. 
 
Although there remains no formal law requiring the use of local 
goods and services, the GOM encourages firms to do value-added 
production in Mongolia, especially for firms engaged in natural 
resource extraction.  Certain senior officials and politicians have 
made in-country processing a consistent feature of their public and 
private policy statements regarding the development of mining. For 
example, the 2006 windfall profits tax on copper and gold applies 
the tax to copper concentrate, but exempts metallic copper produced 
in Mongolia.  Recent negotiations on strategic copper deposits in 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  011.2 OF 024 
 
 
the Gobi between the GOM and private Western firms ended with 
commitments by the companies to explore copper smelting in Mongolia. 
Government talks on coal production constantly feature discussions 
of power generation and coals-to- liquid processing in Mongolia. 
The recently-passed Government Action Plan also calls for increased 
investment in businesses and activities that keep the "value" of a 
resource in Mongolia.  As a result, firms should continue to expect 
the GOM to aggressively press them for value-added production in 
Mongolia. 
 
Generally, foreign investors set their own export and production 
targets without concern for government imposed targets or 
requirements.   There is no requirement to transfer technology.  As 
a matter of law, the government imposes no offset requirements for 
major procurements.  Certain tenders may require bidders to agree to 
levels of local employment or to fund certain facilities as a 
condition of the tender, but as matter of course such conditions are 
not the normal approach of the government in its tendering and 
procurement policies. 
 
Investors may finance as they see fit.  Foreign investors need sell 
no shares to Mongolian nationals.  Equity stakes are generally at 
the complete discretion of investors, Mongolian or foreign. 
Investors, not the Mongolian government, make arrangements regarding 
technology, intellectual property, etc. 
 
Regarding employment, investors can locate and hire workers without 
using hiring agencies-as long as hiring practices are consistent 
with Mongolian Labor Law.  However, Mongolian law requires companies 
to employ Mongolian workers in certain labor categories whenever a 
Mongolian can perform the task as well as a foreigner.  This law 
generally applies to unskilled labor categories and not areas where 
a high degree of technical expertise not existing in Mongolia is 
required.  The law does provide an escape hatch for all employers. 
Should an employer seek to hire a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot 
obtain a waiver from the Ministry of Labor for that employee, the 
employer can pay a fee of around US$140 per employee per month. 
Depending on the importance of a project, the Ministry of Labor may 
grant an employer a 50% exemption of the waiver fees as an 
incentive. 
 
Limited Performance Requirements 
 
Performance requirements are sparingly imposed on investors in 
Mongolia with the exception of petroleum and mining exploration 
firms.   The Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (PAM) issues petroleum 
exploration blocks to firms, which then agree to conduct exploration 
activities. The size and scope of these activities are agreed upon 
between PAM and the firm in writing and are binding. If the firm 
fails to fulfill exploration commitments, it must pay a penalty to 
PAM based on the amount of hectares in the exploration block, or 
return the block to MPPAM.  These procedures apply to all investors 
in the petroleum exploration sector. 
 
The 2006 amendments to the Minerals Law of Mongolia made receiving 
and keeping exploration licenses contingent on conducting actual 
exploration work.  Under the terms of the 1997 Minerals Law, mining 
companies holding exploration tenements or extraction licenses 
needed neither explore nor mine so long as they paid annual fees 
associated with their holdings and provided annual reports of their 
activities to the government of Mongolia. 
 
The amended law imposes more stringent work requirements.  Each year 
and subject to annual verification by the Minerals Authority of 
Mongolia (MRAM), exploration firms must submit a work plan and 
report on the execution of the previous year's performance 
commitments.  Commitments expressed in terms of US dollar expenses 
per hectare per year: 
 
--2nd and 3rd years miners must spend no less than US $.50 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
--4th to 6th years miners must spend no less than US $1.00 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
--7th to 9th years miners must spend no less than US $1.50 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
MRAM has the authority and right to inspect the exploration sites to 
verify that work is being done.  Failure to comply with work 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  012.2 OF 024 
 
 
requirements may result in fines, suspension, or even revocation of 
exploration rights. 
 
In addition to these performance requirements, the law also requires 
holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic importance to 
sell no less than 10% of company shares on the Mongolian Stock 
Exchange. Vaguely presented in the statute, there is still no formal 
clarification in law or regulation of what this provision means in 
practical terms or how it is to be implemented. 
 
All foreign investors must register with the Foreign Investment and 
Foreign trade Agency (FIFTA).   The Foreign Investment Law of 
Mongolia requires all foreign investors to show a minimum of 
US$100,000 in assets (cash, working stock, property, etc.) 
registered in Mongolia as a precondition for registration.  In 
addition to this particular requirement, all foreign investors must 
pay an initial processing fee of some 12, 000 Mongolian tugriks or 
about US$8.00.  Foreign Investors must then pay a yearly 
prolongation fee of 6,000 Mongolian tugrik or about US$4.00. 
 
In addition to these fees, foreign investors must annually report on 
their activities for the coming year to the government through 
FIFTA.  Businesses need not fulfill plans set out in this report, 
but failure to report may result in non-issuance of licenses and 
registrations and suspension of activities. This requirement differs 
from that imposed on domestic investors and businesses.  Local 
investors do not have a yearly reporting requirement.    Mongolians 
pay lower registration fees, which vary too much to say with any 
precision what the fees actually are. 
 
FIFTA explains that the higher registration costs for foreign 
investors arise from the need to compensate for the services it 
provides to foreign investors, including assistance with 
registrations, liaison services, trouble-shooting, etc.  The 
different reporting requirements provide the government with a 
clearer picture of foreign investment in Mongolia.  Foreign 
investors are generally aware of FIFTA's arguments and largely 
accept them, but they question the need for annual registrations. 
Investors recommend that FIFTA simply charge an annual fee rather 
than require businesses to submit a new application each year. 
 
Regarding reports, foreign businesses are concerned about the 
security of their proprietary information.  Several foreign 
investors have claimed that agents of FIFTA routinely use or sell 
information on business plans and financial data.  We have yet to 
verify these claims, but FIFTA acknowledges that data security 
largely depends on the honesty of its staff, as there are few 
internal controls over access to the annual reports. 
 
Tariffs 
 
Mongolia has one of Asia's least restrictive tariff regimes.  Its 
export and import policies do not harm or inhibit foreign 
investment.  Low by world standards, tariffs of 5% on most products 
are applied across the board to all firms, albeit with some concerns 
about consistency of application and valuation. However, some 
non-tariff barriers, such as phyto-sanitary regulations, exist that 
limit both foreign and domestic competition in the fields of 
pharmaceutical imports and food imports and exports.  The testing 
requirements for drugs are extremely unclear and onerous.  When 
companies attempt to clarify what the rules for importing food or 
drugs into the country are, they receive contradictory information 
from multiple agencies. 
 
WTO TRIMS Requirements 
 
Mongolia employs no measures inconsistent with WTO TRIMs 
requirements, nor has anyone alleged that any such violation has 
occurred. 
 
A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT 
 
Mongolia has one of Asia's most liberal ownership and establishment 
regimes.  Unless otherwise forbidden by law, foreign and domestic 
businesses may establish and engage in any form of remunerative 
activity.  All businesses can start up, buy, sell, merge; in short, 
do whatever they wish with their assets and firms. 
 
Diminishing Competition from the State-Owned Sector 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  013.2 OF 024 
 
 
Mongolia passed and implemented a competition law applying to 
foreign, domestic, and state-owned entities active in Mongolia.  As 
a practical matter, competition between state-owned and private 
businesses has been declining for the simple reason that most 
parastatals have been privatized.  The exceptions are the 
state-owned power and telecom industries, an airline, the national 
rail system, several coal mines and a large copper mining and 
concentration facility. 
 
Currently, three firms -- one a Mongolian company and the others 
Chinese state-owned entities -- are actively seeking opportunities 
for power generation.  Few want to enter the power generation field 
until the regulatory and statutory framework for private power 
generation firms up and tariffs are set at rates allowing profits. 
In the railway sector, a recent law allows private firms to build, 
operate, and transfer railroads to the state.  Under this new law 
several private mining companies have proposed rail links from their 
respective coal mines to the Chinese border or to the currently 
operating spur of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.  Mongolia has no 
plans to privatize railroads jointly held with the government of 
Russia. 
 
Although the trend has been for the GOM to extract itself from 
ownership of firms and other commercial assets, the current Minerals 
Law of Mongolia lets the state back into mining.  Under this law, 
the GOM gained the right to acquire equity stakes of up to 50% in 
certain deposits that it deems of strategic value for the nation. 
Once acquired, these assets are to be placed with a state-owned 
management company, Erdenes MGL, that will invest them for the 
benefit of the Mongolian people.  The role of state as an equity 
owner, in terms of management and operation of the mining asset, is 
unclear at this point.   There is some concern that the GOM will 
have to deal with conflicts of interest arising from its dual 
position as regulator and owner of these strategic assets. 
Specifically, firms are worried that the GOM's desire to maximize 
returns in order to provide a revenue stream to the Mongolian people 
may comprise the long term commercial viability of any mining 
project. 
 
A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The right to own private, movable and immovable property is 
recognized under Mongolian law. Regardless of citizenship (except 
for land which only citizens of Mongolia can own), owners can do as 
they wish with their property.  One can collateralize real and 
movable property.  Should a debtor default on such secured loans, 
the creditor does have recourse under Mongolian law to recover the 
debt by seizing and disposing of property offered as security.  The 
only exceptions to this liberal environment are recent changes to 
the mining law that prevent transfer of exploration and mining 
licenses to third parties lacking professional mining 
qualifications. 
 
Mongolia's Current Regime to Protect Creditors 
 
The current protection regime for creditors is functional but needs 
reform. The legal system presents the greatest pitfalls.  Although 
the courts recognize property rights in concept, they have a 
checkered record of protecting and facilitating acquisition and 
disposition of assets in practice.  Part of the problem is ignorance 
of, and inexperience with, standard practices regarding land, 
leases, buildings, and mortgages.  As noted in A.4 Dispute 
Settlement, some Soviet-trained judges, largely out of ignorance of 
the concepts, have failed to recognize these practices.  Newly 
trained judges are making a good faith effort to uphold property 
rights, and need time to learn how to adjudicate such cases. 
 
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the 
rights of creditors need serious reform.  Mongolian law allows for 
mortgages and other loan instruments backed up with securitized 
collateral.  However, rudimentary systems for determining title and 
liens and for collecting on debts make lending on local security 
risky.  Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are 
barely workable and unfair to the creditor. 
 
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures 
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current 
system does not record if immovable property has any liens against 
it. In addition, no system exists to record ownership and liens of 
movable property.  Consequently, Mongolian lenders face the added 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  014.2 OF 024 
 
 
risk of lending on collateral that the debtor may not actually own 
or which may have already been offered as security for another debt. 
 
 
Overall the legal system does recognize the concept of collaterized 
assets provided as security for a loan, investment capital, or other 
debt-based financial mechanisms.  The legal system also provides for 
foreclosure, but this process has proven exceptionally burdensome 
and time consuming.  A September 2005 change to Mongolian law 
simplified the process by allowing creditors to foreclose without 
judicial review.  Prior to the new law, all creditors had to go to 
court to collect on securitized collateral, thus adding months and 
expense to the entire collection process.  However, the 
Constitutional Court of Mongolia voided the law on constitutional 
grounds, slowing down debt collection to pre 2005 levels where waits 
of up to 24 months for final liquidations and settlement of security 
were not uncommon. 
 
Debt Collection Procedures 
 
However, even with the delays, getting a ruling is relatively easy 
compared to executing the court's decision.   The problem is not the 
law but the enforcement.  A judge orders the State Collection Office 
(SCO) to move on the assets of the debtor.  The SCO orders district 
bailiffs to seize and turn those assets over to the state, which 
then distributes them to creditors.  However, foreign and domestic 
investors claim that the state collection office and the district 
bailiffs frequently fail in their responsibilities to both the 
courts and the creditors. 
 
In some cases, bailiffs refuse to enforce the court orders (see the 
Erdenet case mentioned in A.4).  The perception is that they do so 
because they have been bribed or otherwise suborned.  Bailiffs are 
often local agents who fear local retribution against them and their 
interests if they collect in their localities.  In some cases, 
bailiffs will not collect unless the creditor provides bodyguards 
during seizure of assets.  Creditors also have reason to believe 
that the state collection office accepts payments from debtors to 
delay seizure of assets. 
 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Mongolia supports intellectual property rights in general and has 
protected American rights in particular.  It has joined the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signed and ratified 
most treaties and conventions, including the WTO TRIPS agreement. 
The WIPO Internet treaties have been signed but remained un-ratified 
by the State Great Hural, Mongolia's Parliament.  However, even if a 
convention is un-ratified, the Mongolian government and its 
intellectual property rights enforcer, the Intellectual Property 
Office of Mongolia (IPOM), make a good faith effort to honor these 
agreements. 
 
Under TRIPS and Mongolian law, the Mongolian Customs Authority (MCA) 
and the Economic Crimes Unit of the National Police (ECU) also have 
an obligation to protect IPR.  MCA can seize shipments at the 
border.  The ECU has the exclusive power to conduct criminal 
investigations and bring criminal charges against IPR pirates. The 
IPOM has the administrative authority to investigate and seize fakes 
without court order.  Of these three, only the IPOM makes a good 
faith effort to fulfill its mandates. 
 
Part of the problem is ignorance of the importance of intellectual 
property to Mongolia and of the obligations imposed by TRIPS on 
member states.  Customs has been particularly hesitant to seize 
shipments, saying that their statutory mandate does not allow 
seizure of such goods, but Mongolian statutory and constitutional 
law recognizes that international treaty obligations take precedence 
over local statutes and regulations.  A clear legal basis exists for 
Customs to act, which has been recognized by elements of the 
Mongolian Judiciary, the Parliament, and the IPOM. In any case, 
Customs officers do occasionally seize fake products, but it seems 
that Mongolian customs law will have to be brought into compliance 
with TRIPS before Customs will actively fulfill its obligations. 
The ECU has also been lax.  The ECU hesitates to investigate and 
prosecute IPR cases, deferring to the IPOM as the lead agency. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that ECU officials fear political 
repercussions from going after IPR pirates, many of whom wield 
political influence. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  015.2 OF 024 
 
 
The IPOM generally has an excellent record of protecting American 
trademarks, copyrights, and patents.  However, its small budget 
limits the scope of its actions.  In most cases, when the U.S. 
Embassy in Ulaanbaatar conveys a complaint from a rights holder to 
the IPOM, the IPOM quickly investigates the complaint.  If it judges 
that an abuse occurred, it will (and has in every case brought 
before it to date) seize the pirated products or remove faked 
trademarks, under administrative powers granted in Mongolian law. 
 
We note two areas where enforcement lags.  Legitimate software 
products are rare in Mongolia. Low per capita incomes have given 
rise to a thriving local market for cheap, pirated software.  The 
IPOM estimates pirated software constitutes at least 95% of the 
market.  The Office enforces the law where it can but the scale of 
the problem dwarfs its capacity to deal with it.  The IPOM will act 
if we bring cases to their attention. 
 
Pirated optical media are also readily available and subject to 
spotty enforcement.  Mongolians produce no fake CD's, videos, and 
DVD's, but import such products from China, Russia, and elsewhere. 
Products are sold through numerous local outlets and sometimes 
broadcast on private local TV stations.  The IPOM hesitates to move 
on TV stations, most of whom are connected to major government or 
political figures.  Nor does the IPOM raid local ("street") DVD and 
CD outlets run by poor urban youth; IPOM argues that such action 
would not halt sales and only alienate the public.  Again, when an 
American raises a specific complaint, the IPOM acts on the 
complaint, but IPOM rarely initiates action on its own. 
 
2006 Amended Mining Law Restricts Transfer of Licenses in Certain 
Cases 
 
The current Minerals law of Mongolia would seem on its face to 
prevent transfer of exploration or mining rights to any third party 
lacking professional mining qualifications as determined by the 
Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM). 
 
Under the Minerals Law, the concept of mining expertise can either 
qualify or disqualify any entity from acquiring, transferring, 
securitizing exploration and mining rights.  The law has the 
potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek financing, 
because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and exploration 
rights to non-qualified individuals.  Consequently, a miner might 
not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral to banks or 
to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to receive 
these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations. 
 
At a stroke the law seems to limit the investment pool that a mining 
firm might tap to finance its mine, which might prevent bringing a 
property into production, again denying licensees access to their 
legal economic rights. 
 
A.8 TRANSPARENCY OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
Generally, Mongolia's problem is not lack of laws and 
regulations-Mongolia has passed more than 1,600 laws since 
undertaking its transition to a market economy over 18 years ago-but 
a lack of knowledge on the part of the lawmakers on what is needed 
and a history of not consulting with affected and potentially 
affected communities. Corruption aside, the fact that laws and 
regulations change without much consultation creates a chaotic 
situation for all parties.  Many laws and regulations, as well as 
behavior, still require amendment and adjustment; but, overall, the 
trend is positive.  We have seen definite improvement in the mining 
sector and in the foreign investment statutes. 
 
Problems with the Drafting Process for Legislation and Regulations 
 
Normally, laws can be crafted in two ways.  Once rare but now more 
common, Members of Parliament and the President of Mongolia may 
draft their own proposals for direct submission to the Parliament. 
Such bills need not be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers but can 
be delivered directly to the Speaker of Parliament for consideration 
by the relevant Standing Committee.  The relevant Standing Committee 
may either reject the bill (in which case it dies in committee) or 
pass it on to the Parliament's plenary body, unaltered or revised 
for a general vote.  More common is when Parliament or the Cabinet 
of Ministers requests legislative action.  These institutions send 
such requests to the relevant ministry. The Minister relays the 
request to ministerial council, which in turn sends the request to 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  016.2 OF 024 
 
 
the proper internal division or agency within the respective 
ministry, which in turn forms a working group. The working group 
prepares the bill, submits it for ministerial review, makes any 
recommended changes, and then the bill is reviewed by the full 
Cabinet of Ministers.  Relevant ministries are asked to comment and 
recommend changes in the legislation. 
 
Prior to a final vote by the Cabinet of Ministers, the National 
Security Council of Mongolia (NSC)-consisting of the President of 
Mongolia, the Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament-can review 
each piece of legislation for issues related to national security. 
Although the legal and constitutional authority of the NSC to veto 
entirely, or to recommend changes to, draft legislation has not been 
clarified to outside observers, the Cabinet to our knowledge will 
not and has never overruled NSC recommendations. 
 
Once through NSC and Cabinet reviews, the bill goes to Parliament. 
In Parliament, the bill is vetted by the relevant Standing 
Committee, sent back for changes or sent on to the full Parliament 
for a vote.  The President can veto bills, but his veto can be 
overcome by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of Parliament. 
 
For regulations, the process is truncated.  The relevant minister 
assigns the task of writing the regulations to the working group 
that wrote the original law.  This group submits their work to the 
minister who approves or recommends changes. 
 
The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA) plays an important 
role in drafting both laws and regulations.  MOJHA vets all statutes 
and regulations before they are passed for final approval.  In the 
case of legislation, MOJHA is supposed to reconcile the language and 
provisions of the law with both existing legislation and the 
constitution of Mongolia, after which the law is supposed to pass to 
the Cabinet and then Parliament.  In the case of regulations, MOJHA 
vets the regulations to ensure consistency with current laws and 
provisions of the constitution.  In either case, MOJHA can, in 
effect, veto legal or regulatory provisions that it finds 
inconsistent with the statutes and constitution. 
 
Absent from these drafting processes is a statutory, systematic, 
transparent review of legislation or regulations by stakeholders and 
the public.  Ministerial initiatives are not publicized until the 
draft has passed out of a given ministry to the full Cabinet. 
Typically, the full Cabinet discusses and passes bills on to 
Parliament, without public input or consultations.  Parliament 
itself issues neither a formal calendar nor routinely announces or 
opens its standing committee or full chamber hearings to the public. 
  While Parliament at the beginning of each session announces a list 
of bills to be considered during the session, this is very general 
and often amended.  New legislation is commonly introduced, 
discussed and passed without public announcement or consideration. 
For example, in 2006, Parliament passed the Wind Fall Profits Tax 
Law bill in six days without consulting any business, NGO, or other 
entity about the impact and desirability of the bill.  In 2007, 
Parliament significantly amended the Law on State Procurement within 
thirty days without any public notification or comment regarding new 
limits competitive, transparent bidding practices and limits on 
access tender opportunities to foreign bidders.  In 2008 and 2009, 
key mining agreements were negotiated by the government and simply 
presented to Parliament for quick votes without formal public 
comment and review. 
 
The U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar and foreign and domestic investors 
have repeatedly urged the Mongolian government to utilize the 
government's Open Government web site to post draft and pending 
legislation for public consultation and review before it is 
finalized and sent to Parliament.  Over the past couple of years, we 
have noticed some improvement in the timeliness and completeness of 
the postings. 
 
To supplement this effort, the U.S. Embassy and local business 
organizations have jointly created an informal system to identify 
legislation and regulations under review.  Once identified, we meet 
with working groups, provide information on how other nations have 
handled such legislation, share stakeholders' points of view, and 
widely distribute publicly available draft bills, preferably before 
they reach a minister's desk.  Should a piece of vital legislation 
pass on to the Minister, Cabinet, or Parliament, these organizations 
are prepared to lobby at the appropriate level.  Over the last three 
years we have found that many agencies and Members of Parliament 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  017.2 OF 024 
 
 
welcome our advice and information, particularly if given in a 
non-confrontational way that respects Mongolia's political process 
and right to deliberate. 
 
Regulators also resist consultation when it comes to implementation. 
 Bureaucrats are only slowly becoming comfortable with the concepts 
and practices of broad, public consultation and information sharing 
with their own citizens, let alone foreigners.  Many times 
businesses ask for a clear copy of the current regulations, only to 
be met with blank stares or outright refusals. The government has 
acknowledged that the Soviet-era State Secrets Law requires 
substantial amendment.  Currently, most government 
documents-including administrative regulations affecting investments 
and business activities-are technically classified and cannot be 
released to the public.   This gives both bureaucrats and regulators 
a convenient excuse to deny requests for information or, more 
commonly, to demand extra-legal fees to provide documents.  The 
legacy of secrecy has also resulted in cases where government 
officials themselves cannot get up-to-date copies of the rules. 
Mongolia is considering a freedom of information law, but it is only 
in its formative stages. 
 
High officials acknowledge the value of and need for a more open, 
transparent system.  While laws are easy to fix, the behavior of 
individual bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, and the judiciary 
will only gradually change, with training and experience.  Already a 
younger generation of professionals, many trained abroad, is 
beginning to take hold and to move into senior positions of 
authority.  This bodes well for Mongolia's continuing transition to 
a private sector-led, open, market economy underpinned by good 
government and corporate governance. 
 
The Role of NGOS and Private Sector Associations in relation to FDI 
 
The Mongolian government actively protects its prerogatives to 
legislate, regulate, and administer economic activities in its 
domain.  While NGOs and private sector associations are given wide 
latitude to run their activities, the government of Mongolia has 
never allowed any non-governmental entity-be it business, civil 
society, trade union, etc.-to have anything more than an advisory 
role over the formulation and execution of the both laws and rules, 
which also applies to setting standards for various industries. 
Based on recent experience, the GOM routinely resists any expanded 
role for civil society and NGOs.  This tacit but unarticulated 
policy of the government of Mongolia applies to both domestic and 
foreign entities. 
 
Laws, Regulations, and Policies that Impede FDI 
 
While the GOM supports FDI and domestic investment, individual 
agencies and elements of the judiciary often reportedly use their 
respective powers to hinder investments into such sectors as meat 
production, telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals.  Both 
domestic and foreign investors report similar abuses of inspections, 
permits, and licenses by Mongolian regulatory agencies.    However, 
we have noted no consistent, systematic pattern of abuse 
consistently initiated by either government or private Mongolian 
entities aimed against foreign investors in general or against US 
investment in particular.  The impediments more often than not are 
opportunistic attempts by individuals to misuse contacts to harass 
U.S. and other foreign investors with whom the Mongolian entity is 
in dispute.  Alternatively, other reports suggest that they induce 
well-placed regulators at all levels to extract extra-legal payments 
from both foreign and domestic businesses or otherwise hinder their 
work.  In the latter case the general approach is to demand some 
sort of payment in lieu of not enforcing work, environmental, tax, 
health and safety rules, otherwise imposing the full weight of a 
contradictory mix of Soviet Era and the current reformed rules on 
the firm.  Most foreign businesses refuse to pay bribes, and in turn 
accept the punitive inspections, concede to some of the violations 
found, and contest the rest in the City Administrative Court.  In 
our experience companies that show resolve against such predatory 
abuse of statutory and regulatory power will face impediments at the 
start; but these usually ease over time as state agents look for 
easier targets. 
 
A.9 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 
 
Mongolia currently lacks experience and expertise to sustain 
portfolio investments.  It has no regulatory apparatus for these 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  018.2 OF 024 
 
 
activities, and both the state and private entities are just 
beginning to engage in them.  However, Mongolia has active capital 
markets.   The Mongolian government imposes few restraints on the 
flow of capital in any of its markets.  Multilateral institutions, 
particularly the IMF, find the regime too loose, especially in the 
crucial banking sector.  Although the government has clear rules 
about capital reserve requirements, the Mongol Bank, Mongolia's 
central bank has historically resisted restraining credit flows at 
commercial banks.  In response to the current global financial 
crisis, however, Mongol Bank has responded to the decreasing 
availability of capital and liquidity in Mongolia by tightening 
reserve requirements and the interest it charges to local banks for 
funds, and currency controls. That said, most foreign businesses 
have approved of the ease with which they can access financial 
resources. 
 
Capital and Currency Markets 
 
Although liquidity is quite high in Mongolia, affordable capital 
remains scarce.  Local credit interest rates for customers range 
from 12% for the most credit worthy to perhaps 90% per annum (or 
more) for the least, with inflation peaking at around 40% in 2008 
before settling at 24%.  Foreign investors can easily tap into 
domestic capital markets.  However, they seldom do, because they can 
do better abroad or better locally by simply taking on an equity 
investor, Mongolian or otherwise. 
 
Mongolia's currency, capital, and equity markets took major hits in 
2008.  Over the last three years the currency had proved resilient, 
holding its value against most international currencies.  This 
resiliency has largely been attributed to the commodities boom, 
which saw Mongolia selling such raw materials as copper, gold, and 
coal, primarily to China.  In mid 2008, the commodity markets began 
to cool and Mongolia's foreign trade began to fall, leading to 
growing trade deficit as imports no longer balanced or exceeded 
exports.  Subsequently, the once strong tugrik has begun to slide 
and by March 2009 had lost 40 % of its value relative to the U.S. 
dollar, affecting all import-related trade.  Complicating matters, 
major banks and other institutions that formally had access to 
international capital flows (in the form of dollars, yen, renmimbi, 
Euros, etc, which were parked in high-interest yielding tugrik 
accounts), found international in-flows reversing as foreign 
depositors repatriated their funds, either because these entities 
needed the money to weather their own financial crises or they fear 
that the tugrik's collapse would eat away the value of their 
deposits. Banks no longer had access to easy capital and liquidity, 
and began to restrict lending to almost all clients, who in turn 
found they lacked funds to finance construction projects, trade, and 
other activities. 
 
After several months of tapping reserves to slow the tugrik's 
decline, Mongol Bank has curtailed such infusions.  Instead, the 
Bank will sell dollars into the system via an auction to the local 
commercial banks and will let the market decide the value of the 
exchange rate rather than attempt to set the rate or artificially 
support it. 
 
Equity Markets 
 
Investors do not use stocks to raise equity for investment but to 
gain control of companies listed on the exchange.  As most of the 
firms have been bought up, the market sees little trading. 
 
Mongolian firms do not use shareholding relationships to restrict 
foreign investment at this point.  Part of this arises from lack of 
experience with such devices.  It also arises from the fact that 
Mongolians prefer to concentrate ownership in their own hands, 
rather than disperse it through complicated shareholding 
relationships.  They perceive such devices as weakening their 
ability to control the companies, which is more important than 
safeguarding the firm from foreign or domestic raiders.  If a 
foreign company wanted to purchase a Mongolian firm, the foreign 
entity would have to contact the shareholders and buy them out. 
These could not be hostile takeovers, because few outstanding shares 
remain on the market to buy.  Eager to take on equity partners or 
sell businesses entirely, the Mongolians would employ few defenses 
beyond sharp negotiating. 
 
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia recently imposed a provision 
that requires that holders of mining licenses for projects of 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  019.2 OF 024 
 
 
strategic importance must sell no less than 10% of the resulting 
entity's shares on the Mongolian Stock Exchange.  Vaguely presented 
in the statute, what this new provision means in practical terms and 
how it is to be implemented has yet to be spelled out in regulation. 
 
 
The Banking Sector 
 
Weakness in Mongolia's banking sector concerns all players, 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF: http://www.imf.org). 
 Small by American standards, the total assets of Mongolia's sixteen 
(16) banks adds up to just over US$2 billion. The system has been 
through massive changes since the Soviet era, during which the 
banking system was divided into several different units.  This early 
system failed through mismanagement and commercial naivety in the 
mid-90s, but over the last decade has become more sophisticated and 
better managed. 
 
Mongolia has three large, generally well-regarded banks owned 
primarily by Japanese and, Mongolian interests respectively.  They 
follow international standards for prudent capital reserve 
requirements, have conservative lending policies, up-to-date banking 
technology, and are generally well managed.  If a storm should 
descend on Mongolia's banking sector, these banks appear 
well-positioned to weather it. 
 
However, concerns remain among these bankers about the effectiveness 
of Mongolia's legal and regulatory environment.  As with many issues 
in Mongolia, the problem is not of lack of laws or procedures but 
the will and capacity of the regulator, Mongol Bank, to supervise 
and execute mandated functions, particularly in regard to capital 
reserve requirements and non-performing loans. 
 
From 1999 through late 2008, Mongol Bank had consistently refused to 
close any private Mongolian bank for insolvency or malpractice.   In 
late 2008, Mongol Bank took Mongolia's fourth largest bank into 
receivership.  Most deposits were guaranteed and their depositors 
paid out.  Mongol Bank survived the crisis, which cost it around 
US$150 million -- not an inconsequential sum in an economy with a 
US$5 billion per annum GDP.  However, most observers noted that the 
bank in question had shown signs of mismanagement, non-performing 
loans, and ill-liquidity several years before the central bank moved 
to safeguard depositors and the financial sector; and they argued 
that that Mongol Bank had not shut any bank, fearing that closure 
would signal weakness to the general public or because regulators 
within the Mongol Bank, as Mongolia's central bank, have financial 
interests in the troubled banks that would be threatened by 
regulatory action.  The latest crisis led to a new Mongol Bank 
governor, and the institution has tightened some but not all of the 
reserve requirements and formally indicated to banks that it will 
not indemnify them for deposits they park in any bank which 
subsequently goes bankrupt. 
 
No accurate figures exist on non-performing loan (NPL) rates. 
American and foreign bankers and the IMF believe that central bank's 
methods for tracking NPLs understate the rate, and as such are 
concerned that several banks may teeter near insolvency. 
 
A.10 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
Mongolia is peaceful and stable.  Political violence is rare. 
Mongolia has held eight peaceful presidential and parliamentary 
elections in the past 15 years.  However, a brief but violent 
outbreak of civil unrest followed disputed parliamentary elections 
on July 1, 2008.  Accompanied by some property destruction and 
bodily injury, the unrest was quickly contained and order restored. 
There has been no repeat of this civil unrest since July 1. 
 
Mongolia has an ethnically homogenous population: 97% of the 
population is Khalkh Mongol. The largest minority, numbering an 
estimated 90,000 people, is Kazakh (Muslim), concentrated in the far 
western part of the country. 
 
There have been no known incidents of anti-American sentiment or 
politically motivated damage to American projects or installations 
in at least the last decade.  However, there has been a gradual and 
perceptible level of rising hostility to Chinese and, to a lesser 
extent, Russian nationals in Mongolia.  This hostility has led to 
some instances of improper seizure of Chinese-invested property; and 
in more limited cases acts of physical violence against the persons 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  020.2 OF 024 
 
 
and property of Chinese nationals resident in Mongolia.  Other 
Asians living in Mongolia have expressed concern that they may 
inadvertently become victims of this hostility. 
 
A.11 CORRUPTION 
 
In mid 2005, the USAID Mission to Mongolia, in collaboration with 
USAID/Washington and The Asia Foundation (TAF), funded a corruption 
assessment conducted by Casals & Associates, Inc. (C&A).(the 
complete report is available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn). Follow up 
surveys of the problem show that the results of this assessment 
remain valid in 2009.  The study found that opportunities for 
corruption have and continue to increase in Mongolia at both the 
"petty" or administrative and "grand" or elite levels. Both types of 
corruption should be of concern to Mongolians, but grand corruption 
should be considered a more serious one because it solidifies 
linkages between economic and political power that could negatively 
impact or ultimately derail democracy and development, as it has in 
other post-Communist countries. Several inter-related factors 
contribute to Mongolia's corruption problem: 
 
--A profound blurring of the lines between the public and private 
sector brought about by endemic and systemic conflict of interest 
(COI) at nearly all levels; 
 
--A lack of transparency and access to information, stemming in part 
from a broad State Secrets Law that surrounds many government 
functions and undermines nearly all aspects of accountability by 
contributing to an ineffective media and hindering citizen 
participation in policy discussions and government oversight; 
 
--An inadequate civil service system that gives rise to a highly 
politicized public administration and the existence of a "spoils 
system;" 
 
--Limited political will and leadership to actually implement 
required reforms in accordance with the law, complicated by 
conflicting and overlapping laws that further inhibit effective 
policy implementation; 
 
--Weak government control institutions, including the Central Bank, 
National Audit Office, parliamentary standing committees, Prosecutor 
General, Generalized State Inspection Agency, State Property 
Committee, and departments within the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The aforementioned systemic shortcomings have allowed for an 
evolution of corruption in Mongolia that "follows the money," 
meaning that graft on the most significant scales generally occurs 
most often in the industries and sectors where there is the most 
potential for financial gain. During the early 1990s, opportunities 
for increased corruption emerged during the transition toward 
democracy and market economy and process of reconnecting to the 
international community. Two areas that offered particular 
opportunities for grand scale corruption at that time were foreign 
donor assistance and privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Later, as Mongolia embarked on further policy changes to install 
capitalistic practices, corruption reared its head in the process of 
privatizing public land. Now that most of the small amount of 
high-value land has been doled out and the overall economy continues 
expanding, based in part on extractive industries, emerging areas 
for corruption include the banking and mining sectors. As in many 
developing countries, there also are several areas that provide 
stable and consistent opportunities for corruption, both grand and 
administrative in nature, such as for procurement opportunities, 
issuance of permits and licenses, customs, inspections, the justice 
sector, among high-level elected and appointed officials, and in the 
conduct a variety of day-to-day citizen- and business-to-government 
transactions, notably in education, health care, and city services. 
 
Despite the fact that few of the conditions to prevent corruption 
from getting worse are in place, the situation has not reached the 
levels that are evident in many other countries with contexts and 
histories similar to that of Mongolia. Perhaps more importantly, 
there are a number of nascent and rudimentary efforts underway to 
actively combat corruption, including: 
 
--Government commitments to international anti-corruption regimes 
and protocols, such as the Anti-Corruption Plan of the Asian 
Development Bank/Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (ADB/OECD) and the United Nations Convention Against 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  021.2 OF 024 
 
 
Corruption (UNCAC); 
 
--Development of a National Program for Combating Corruption and 
formation of a National Council for coordinating the Program and a 
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Working Group; 
 
--Implementation of an anti-corruption law that has included the 
formation of an independent anti-corruption body; 
 
--Short- and medium-term anti-corruption advocacy and "watchdog" 
programs initiated by civil society organizations, often with 
international donor support. 
 
There is, in fact, time for Mongolians and the international 
community to nurture these efforts and take further action before 
the corruption problem gets out of hand. In general, the main need 
in Mongolia is for effective disincentives for corrupt behavior at 
both the administrative and political level. In its broadest 
configuration, this implies a strategy of increasing transparency 
and effective citizen oversight, as well as intra-governmental 
checks and balances. Without these major changes, administrative 
reforms may provide some small improvements, but they are unlikely 
to reverse current trends. Specifically, the report makes several 
strategic recommendations, including: 
 
--Diplomatic engagement focused on keeping anti-corruption issues on 
the policy agenda, promoting implementation of existing laws related 
to anti-corruption, and highlighting the need for further measures 
to promote transparency and improved donor coordination; 
 
--General programmatic recommendations to address conflict of 
interest, transparency/access to information, civil service reforms, 
and the independent anti-corruption body, with a definitive focus on 
engaging civil society and promoting public participation utilizing 
UNCAC as a framework; 
 
--Specific programmatic recommendations to address loci of 
corruption, such as citizen- and business-to-government 
transactions, procurement, privatization, customs, land use, mining, 
banking, the justice sector, and the political and economic elite 
 
In addition, the reputable international anti-corruption NGO 
Transparency International (TI) opened a national chapter in 
Mongolia in 2004.  (See: www.transparency.org)  U.S. technical 
advisors are working with TI to train Mongolian staff to monitor 
corruption and to advocate on behalf of anti-corruption legislation 
and, TI first included Mongolia in its annual "Perceptions of 
Corruption" survey in September 2004.  In that initial survey, 
Mongolia ranked 85 out of 145 countries and its score of 3 on the 
Corruption Perception Index was "poor." (TI's CPI Score relates to 
"perceptions" of the degree of corruption as seen by business people 
and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). TI's 2005 Survey ranked Mongolia 85 out 158; and 
again Mongolia earned a "poor" score of 3. In TI's 2006 survey, 
Mongolia had dropped to 99 out of 163 countries, being on par with 
Mali, Mozambique, and the Ukraine, receiving a score of 2.8-poor. 
In 2007, Mongolia was still 99 but out of 179 nations and had 
achieved a score of 3.0, slight uptick but still poor.  2008 saw 
Mongolia drop to 102 out 180 nations, maintaining its poor score of 
3.  In short, Mongolia has become neither more nor less noticeably 
corrupt. 
 
2006 Anti-Corruption Law 
 
In 2006, Parliament passed an Anti-Corruption Law (ACL), a 
significant milestone in Mongolia's efforts against corruption.  The 
legislation had been under consideration since 1999. 
 
The ACL created an independent investigative body, the Independent 
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC).  The IAAC has four sections. 
The Prevention and Education Section works to prevent corruption and 
educate the public on anti-corruption legal requirements. The 
Investigation Section receives corruption cases and executes 
investigations. The third section collects, checks, and analyzes the 
legally required property and income statements of government 
officials.   The fourth section, the IAAC's Secretariat, handle s 
administrative tasks.  The IAAC formally began operations in August 
2007.  (For a review of  the IAAC's activities from its inception 
through late 2008 and a general assessment of the public's current 
views of corruption in Mongolia see the series of Mongolia 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  022.2 OF 024 
 
 
Corruption Benchmarking Surveys prepared for USAID Mongolia: 
http://www.usaid.gov/mn;  and The Asia Foundation: 
http://asiafoundation.org/publications) 
 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
 
The U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar reminds U.S. entities and citizens 
active in Mongolia that both they and their agents are subject to 
the provisions of the FCPA.  For information about the FCPA visit 
the U.S. Department of Justice web site at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/. 
 
A.12 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
 
(For Agreement list see UNCTD: http://www.unctad.org) 
 
Taxation issues of Concern to American Investors 
 
Taxation remains an area of key concern for American, other foreign 
investors, and Mongolian domestic investors and businesses.  2006 
saw major reforms of the Mongolian tax system, most of which, with 
the exception of the windfall profits tax on gold and copper, were 
greeted positively by most foreign and domestic investor in 
Mongolia. 
 
Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold 
 
The Windfall Profits Tax Law of 2006 (WPT) drew sharp criticism of 
the GOM's commitment to creating an open, predictable, fair 
environment for foreign direct investment. (See Section A.1 for 
discussion of the WPT.) 
 
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code: 
 
Problems with the WPT aside, major reforms to the Mongolian Tax code 
in 2006 greatly improved the business environment in Mongolia for 
both foreign and domestic investors.  Before the reforms, a World 
Economic Forum survey of Mongolian business executives cited tax 
rates and the complexity of tax regulations as two of the top five 
problems for doing business in Mongolia.  The tax reforms benefited 
from two years of technical assistance from USAID's Economic Policy 
Reform and Competitiveness Project (EPRC).  The reforms affected the 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate Income Tax (CIT) codes as 
well as the VAT and excise tax codes. (EPRC has a number of useful 
and informative guides on their website: 
http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz. See Sections A.1 and A. 5 for 
description of these tax reforms.) 
 
Unfinished Business (Including Customs Rates) 
 
There is unfinished business, however, as Parliament continues to 
consider additional tax reform measures.  These include revisions to 
the law on customs and customs tariffs.  While the exact natures of 
the proposed changes in the customs law have been murky, the GOM 
states that changes will be consistent with Mongolia's WTO 
obligations and investment climate enhancement goals. 
 
Institutional Impediments Remain a Concern 
 
Despite these solid, positive changes, international financial 
institutions and other observers warn that these recent legislative 
changes by themselves are insufficient to improve Mongolia's 
business environment.  Reform efforts need to go beyond changes to 
the tax code, requiring fundamental reform in how such key agencies 
as the tax department, the customs administration and the 
inspections agency directly interact with private firms and 
individuals. 
 
Specifically, tax authorities charged with enforcing the tax codes 
require a more customer-based approach to dealing with their 
business clientele and a more detailed and rigorously enforced 
regulatory framework under which to audit company accounts.  Many 
foreign and domestic investors argue that the lack of such a clear, 
implementable code of ethics and enforceable set of guidelines leads 
to arbitrary, capricious, or predatory tax audits. 
 
A.13 OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
 
Recently OPIC (www.opic.gov) has become more active in Mongolia. 
OPIC has issued and plans to issue direct loans to American firms 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  023.2 OF 024 
 
 
providing a variety of services in Mongolia. Loans and political 
risk insurance to American investors involved the banking, tourism, 
mining, and equipment sectors are in process.  Because the amounts 
required are relatively small, OPIC seems willing to make direct 
loans rather than provide loan insurance to projects. 
 
In 2006, the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) opened in Mongolia for 
short-, medium-, and long-term transactions in the public sector and 
for short- and medium-term transactions in the private sector. 
(www.exim.gov). 
 
Mongolia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA: www.miga.org). 
 
A. 14 LABOR 
 
The Mongolian labor pool is generally well educated, relatively 
young, and adaptable, but shortages exist in most professional 
categories requiring advanced degrees or training. Only time and 
investment in education and training will remedy this deficit of 
trained skilled labor. Unskilled labor is sufficiently available. 
Shortages exist in both vocational and professional categories 
because Mongolians who obtain such skills frequently go abroad to 
find higher wages.  Why stay in Mongolia if one cannot recover the 
outlay on the training from a Mongolian-based job?  Foreign invested 
companies are dealing with this situation by providing in-country 
training to their staffs, raising salaries to retain employees, or 
hiring expatriate workers to perform functions not available 
locally.  In addition, the USG funded Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) is underwriting a five-year training and 
vocational education program (TVET) to develop sustainable programs 
to help Mongolia meet its needs for skilled blue- collar workers 
(http://www.mca.mn or http://www.mcc.gov). 
 
Mongolian labor law is not particularly restrictive.  Investors can 
locate and hire workers without using hiring agencies -- as long as 
hiring practices are consistent with Mongolian Labor Law.  However, 
Mongolian law requires companies to employ Mongolian workers in 
certain labor categories whenever a Mongolian can perform the task 
as well as a foreigner.  This law generally applies to unskilled 
labor categories and not areas where a high degree of technical 
expertise nonexistent in Mongolia is required.  The law does provide 
an escape hatch for all employers.  Should an employer seek to hire 
a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry 
of Labor for that employee, the employer can pay a fee of US$140.00 
per employee per month.  Depending on a project's importance, the 
Ministry of Labor can exempt employers from 50% of the waiver fees 
per worker. 
 
Foreign and domestic investors consistently argue that they bear too 
much of the social security costs for each domestic and foreign hire 
under the amended 2008 Social Insurance Law enacted in July 2008. 
Foreign employees became liable for social insurance taxes if they 
reside within Mongolia for 181 days within a 365 day period.  Under 
this law, foreign and domestic workers pay up to 108,000 tugrik (US$ 
67) for this tax, no matter their respective rates of pay. 
Employers must pay a tax equivalent to 13% of the annual wage on 
both domestic and foreign workers.  Given that state pensions have 
yet to broach even US $100, Employers argue that pensions are not 
commensurate with worker contributions, especially those of 
highly-paid ex-patriot employees.  In addition, workers must pay in 
for twenty years in order to be vested, highly unlikely for many 
ex-patriot employees, who reside in Mongolia for less than three 
years on average. Local and foreign business associations are 
working with both the government/Parliament to address perceived 
inequities. 
 
Regarding ILO conventions See ILO at http://www.ilo.org 
 
A. 15 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS 
 
The Mongolian government launched its free trade zone (FTZ) program 
in 2004. Currently there are two FTZs located along the Mongolia 
spur of the trans-Siberian highway: one in the north at the 
Russia-Mongolia border town of Altanbulag and the other in the south 
at the Chinese-Mongolia border at the town of Zamyn-Uud.  Both FTZs 
appear moribund, with no development at either site.  The port of 
entry of Tsagaan Nuur in Bayan-Olgii province is being considered as 
the site of third FTZ. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000119  024.2 OF 024 
 
 
Management for the Zamyn-Uud Free Trade Zone (ZUFTZ) was originally 
tendered to a Chinese firm.  In 2006, the GOM voided the agreement 
for non-compliance of the terms of the tender.  The GOM re-tendered 
the management contract in 2006, but later voided the contract, 
alleging that the current holder of the management rights in the 
ZUFTZ had failed to live up to the terms of the tender. 
 
So far, there are no indications that government will not keep 
promises to open the zone to any who satisfy the relevant legal 
requirements.  However, there are concerns about the Mongolian free 
trade zones in general and Zamyn-Uud in particular.  In April 2004, 
the USAID sponsored Economic Policy Reform and Competitiveness 
Project (EPRC: http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz/) made the following 
observations of Mongolia's FTZ Program.  In 2009, these issues 
remain concerns: 
 
--Benchmarking of Mongolia's FTZ Program against current successful 
international practices shows deficiencies in the legal and 
regulatory framework as well as in the process being followed to 
establish FTZs in the country. 
 
--Lack of implementing regulations and procedural definitions 
encapsulated in transparency and predictability quotient required to 
implement key international best practices. 
 
--A process of due diligence, including a cost-benefit analysis, has 
not been completed for the proposed Zamyn-Uud FTZ. 
 
--Identifiable funding is not in place to meet off-site 
infrastructure requirements for Zamyn-Uud and Altanbulag sites. 
 
--Deviations from international best practices in the process of 
launching FTZs risks repeating mistakes made in other countries and 
may lead to "hidden costs" or the provision of subsidies that the 
government of Mongolia did not foresee or which will have to granted 
at the expense of other high priority needs 
 
A. 16 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS: 
 
Comment on the data sources for foreign direct investment in 
Mongolia. The Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) 
provides most of the data for tracking FDI in Mongolia.  However, 
the data has limitations: 
 
A. Incomplete reporting and data collection: 
 
--Many foreign firms provide FIFTA with inaccurate or incomplete 
data on their annual investment amounts.  FIFTA's registration 
regime requires companies to document business plans and total FDI 
for the coming year.  FIFTA uses these amounts to determine FDI for 
the year.  However, firms reportedly believe FIFTA may not be able 
to guarantee the confidentiality of proprietary business 
information, and so they withhold complete data on their actual 
activities. 
 
--Mongolia also suffers from promised investment that does not 
materialize or which comes in at a lower level than originally 
stated.    FIFTA does not update reports to account for these or 
other changes to investments during the year. (See Chapter 6, 
Section A.5: Performance Requirements and Incentives). 
 
--In addition, many of Mongolia's largest foreign- owned or 
foreign-invested entities are in the mining sector, which because of 
a quirk of the current Minerals Law of Mongolia are not necessarily 
defined as foreign-invested firms.  The current minerals law 
specifies that only domestically registered mining firms can have 
mining licenses registered in their names, which means that foreign 
investments associated with mining may not be recorded by FIFTA, 
even though the investment is demonstrably foreign.  For example, 
the investment by Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia (a Canadian company) into 
Mongolia has reached at least US$ 800 million, yet this investment 
is not recorded among the data provided by FIFTA. 
 
B. Data not Available: Neither FIFTA nor any other Mongolian agency 
to our knowledge tracks Mongolia's direct investment abroad. 
 
MINTON